BISHOP GEORGE BULL’S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

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Doctor of Philosophy

by
William Douglas Bryant
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APPROVAL SHEET

BISHOP GEORGE BULL’S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

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To Stephanie,

who reminds me each day of God’s grace

by her faithful love, encouragement, and support.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographical Sketch</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of the Problem</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GEORGE BULL ON JUSTIFICATION</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bull’s Principal Works on Justification</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Justificatio Declarativa</em>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Legal Standing before God</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification as Adjudication</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputation: A Gift of Faith</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ordo Salutis</em>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounded in the Mercy and Grace of God</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ’s Satisfaction:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification’s Meritorious Cause</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Justificatio Constitutiva</em>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Covenantal Relationship</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God’s Initial Covenants with Humanity</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 3: Justification in England: The Sixteenth Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Gospel Covenant</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Meritorious Conditions of the Gospel</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rewards of the Gospel Covenant</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors Shaping Bull’s Thought</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formularies, Confessions, and Articles</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Tyndale</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Cranmer</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Barnes</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Latimer</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hooper</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Jewel</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bull and the Sixteenth-Century English Church</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 4: Justification in England: The Seventeenth Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Hooker</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Davenant</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Forbes</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hammond</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Taylor</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bull and the Seventeenth-Century English Church</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 5: George Bull: Restoring a Theological Tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Bull and the Seventeenth-Century English Church</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

v
Doctrinal Trajectories ........................................... 193

Justifying faith:
Justificatio sola Fide sine Operibus? .......................... 200

Remaining Questions .............................................. 209

Restoring a Theological Tradition ............................. 212

Appendix

1. BULL’S USE OF THE FATHERS ............................. 215

2. THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION
   AND THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN ........................... 220

3. JOHN OWEN AND RICHARD BAXTER ....................... 230

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 246
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APH</td>
<td>Apologia Pro Harmonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNB</td>
<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Examen Censurae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Harmonia Apostolica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LACT</td>
<td>Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Foundations for justification</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The means/conditions of justification</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The nature of justification</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

Some of my colleagues began their post-graduate studies with a very clear idea of their research topic in mind. I was not numbered among that fortunate group. My interest in Bishop Bull emerged at the very end of my coursework during my study of an eighteenth-century Anglican divine named Daniel Waterland. Waterland’s dependence upon the *Defensio Fidei Nicaenae* in his debates with Samuel Clarke on the doctrine of the Trinity introduced me to Bishop Bull and became the launching point for this project.

I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr. David Puckett, for his encouragement, critical commentary, and willingness to examine the works of a lesser known luminary of the English church. Dr. Puckett has been a great role model for me, and I count him as a friend.

My greatest appreciation, however, must be directed to my wife, Stephanie. Stephanie’s skill as a proofreader, her keen insights as a critic, her unwavering support, and her persistent encouragement inspired me to persevere when I found myself reaching the inevitable logjams that accompany a work of this nature. Stephanie never stopped believing that this project would be completed, and I can never thank her enough for her patience with me, particularly when work and family obligations precipitated protracted periods of inactivity.

I was warned by my colleagues that by the time I finished writing I would be so weary of the topic that I would never want to read another word related to justification. In one sense, I confess that this is the case for me. I realize, however, that I have merely
scratched the surface in my examination of this sublime truth. By God’s grace I find myself drawn to continue my study of humanity’s justification coram Deo. Contemporary debates on this question fuel my awareness that the church must constantly pursue additional clarity in the expressions of biblical doctrines in order more capably to offer a defense for the hope that is in us (1 Pet 3.15). Soli Deo Gloria!

William D. Bryant

Louisville, Kentucky

February 2011
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the Puritan revolution of the 1640s, parliament initiated a “systematic and ferocious attack” on the Church of England. Reformers sought to overhaul existing church structures in a comprehensive reversal of Laudian innovations to the doctrinal and worship life of the church. The exigencies of the civil war impeded these efforts for ecclesiastical reform, and in spite of legal barriers, episcopal ordinations continued. Men like John Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet, and George Bull were ordained and received livings during the Interregnum, even though their loyalties remained with the episcopacy and the prayer book. This project examines the thought of one of those divines, George Bull, whose elevation to the see at St David’s in 1705 capped a long and fruitful ministry within the established church.

Bishop Bull was a pastor and theologian whose ongoing influence led John Henry Newman to assert, “I have felt all along that Bp. Bull’s theology was the only theology on which the English church could stand.” Alister McGrath, in his seminal *Iustitia Dei*, argues that the “most significant expositions” of the Restoration Church’s

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2 Ibid., 9.

doctrinal emphasis “are Jeremy Taylor’s Dublin sermons of 1662 and George Bull’s *Harmonia Apostolica.*”⁴ Although McGrath rejects “Newman’s polemical attempt to construct a *via media* doctrine of justification on the basis of the teachings of the later Caroline Divines,”⁵ there is little debate that Bull exerted a lasting influence within the Church of England—for good or for ill.⁶

Two doctrinal emphases predominate in Bull’s scholarly works. Christology and justification. His later works reflect a singular passion to prevent the spread of continental antitrinitarianism by demonstrating that the ante-Nicene Fathers espoused a perspective on the nature of Christ that was consistent with that of the Nicene Council. Though it may be an overstatement to suggest that antitrinitarianism was “endemic in England” or that it “flourished during the Interregnum,”⁷ Arian and Socinian views definitely gained momentum in England during the latter half of the seventeenth century. Bull’s massive *Defensio*⁸ was the centerpiece of his effort to defend Nicene orthodoxy

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⁵ Ibid., 282-83.


and laid the foundations for Daniel Waterland’s later debate with Samuel Clarke.\footnote{Hunt notes that the “great Patristic scholars of the seventeenth century had almost unanimously declared that all antiquity before the Council of Nice was Arian. Bishop Bull was the first orthodox writer who earned a reputation by maintaining the contrary.” John Hunt, Religious Thought in England from the Reformation to the End of the Last Century (London: Strahan & Co., 1873; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1973), 3:260 (page references are to the reprint edition).}

The Defensio contributed to Bull’s reputation as one of the most learned Anglican divines of the period\footnote{Arnott includes George Bull among the three most learned bishops of the seventeenth century (with James Ussher and John Pearson). Felix R. Arnott, "Anglicanism in the Seventeenth Century," in Anglicanism: The Thought and Practice of the Church of England, Illustrated from the Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Paul Elmer More and Frank Leslie Cross (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), lvii. Bryan Spinks correctly notes that while “the term Anglicana ecclesia is found in the Magna Carta and the Act of Supremacy 1534, it does not seem to have been a common term for the English Church” until much later. Bryan D. Spinks, Two Faces of Elizabethan Anglican Theology: Sacraments and Salvation in the Thought of William Perkins and Richard Hooker (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1999), 3. This project follows Spurr, however, by unapologetically using Anglican to describe the Restoration Church of England. Spurr, Restoration Church, xiii.} and established him as a credible, orthodox churchman.

Three of Bull’s early works (\textit{Harmonia Apostolica}, \textit{Examen Censurae}, and \textit{Apologia Pro Harmonia}),\footnote{George Bull, \textit{Harmonia Apostolica, seu, Binae Dissertationes, Quorum in priore Doctrina D. Jacobi de Justificatione ex operibus Explanatur ac Defenditur: In posteriore, Consensus D. Pauli cum Jacobo Liquido Demonstratur} (London: Printed for William Wells and Robert Scott, 1670); and idem, \textit{Examen Censurae: Sive Responsio ad quasdam Animadversiones, Antehac ineditas, In Librum, cui Titulus, Harmonia Apostolica, &c. Accessit Apologia pro Harmonia, ejusque Authore, contra Declamationem Thomae Tului, S. T. P. in Libro nuper Typis evulgato, quem Justificatio Paulina, &c. inscrisit} (London: Richard Davis, 1676). (The \textit{Examen} and the \textit{Apologia} were published simultaneously.) For the versions in the consolidated \textit{Works}, see vols. 3 (for the \textit{Harmonia}) and 4 (for the \textit{Examen} and \textit{Apologia}) in \textit{The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s}, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846). All three of these works have been translated into English (see the bibliography), but all citations in this study refer only to the Latin text and will include major section, numbered paragraph, and page number (e.g., \textit{APH Sectio} I,9,15 refers to the \textit{Apologia}, sect. 1, para. 9, p. 15). Page numbers will follow the original publications. For additional assistance, I will also provide a reference for the consolidated \textit{Works} (e.g., \textit{Works} 3.16 is vol. 3, p. 16).} which emphasize the necessity of good works in humanity’s justification before God, have provoked persistent allegations that Bull rejected the Reformation’s \textit{articulus stantis et cadentis} justification by faith alone. Like other divines of the Restoration Church, Bull has been described as a moralist who compromised
theological foundations within the Church of England.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, his perceived contributions to this reductionist tendency prompted J. I. Packer to note with dismay the legacy of “the (unhappily) influential Bishop Bull.”\textsuperscript{13}

There is merit to the argument that Bull and his contemporaries represent a doctrinal shift from the first half of the seventeenth century. Although he shares common ground with divines like Hooker and Davenant, some facets of Bull’s doctrine of justification diverged from their thought. What is less certain is whether or not he inherited a tradition from the earlier years of the English Reformation. Therefore, the question driving this project is whether George Bull rejected Reformation tenets and an evangelical consensus on the doctrine of justification. Was he an innovator who contributed to theological ambiguity and even error within the Church of England by an uncritical embrace of “Romish” views on justification?

\textbf{Biographical Sketch}

The primary biographical work on Bishop Bull was written three years after his death by the Non-Juror, Robert Nelson, one of Bull’s former students.\textsuperscript{14} Nelson’s \textit{Life}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Robert Nelson, \textit{The Life of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, with the History of those Controversies in which he was Engaged and An Abstract of those Fundamental Doctrines which he Maintained and Defended in the Latin Tongue} (London: Printed for J. Parker; and Law, and Whitaker; and Ogles, Duncan, and Cochran, 1816). See also Thomas Rankin, \textit{The Opinion of the Catholic Church For the First Three Centuries, on the Necessity of Believing that our Lord Jesus Christ is Truly God. Translated from the Latin of Bishop Bull, to which is Prefixed a Memoir of his Life} (London: C & J Rivington, 1825), 5-53. The Non-Jurors were clergy who refused to affirm the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy to William and Mary.
\end{itemize}
is an encomium that reflects an intimate knowledge of the bishop and his household; nonetheless, personal detail often is found wanting due to the paucity of Bull’s personal correspondence, the lack of a journal or other personal reminiscences, and his failure to print the majority of his sermons. Most of Nelson’s attention is devoted to the controversies that surrounded Bull’s polemical works.

Bull was born in the county of Somerset in March 1634. His father died when he was only four years old but left him with a generous estate of £200 per annum for his care and tuition. He briefly attended the grammar school at Wells before moving “to the free-school of Tiverton in Devonshire.” He entered Exeter College at Oxford in the summer of 1648, but before the completion of his second year, he refused to take the required oath of allegiance to the commonwealth. He withdrew from the university with his tutor (Ackland) and other like-minded students who united to continue their studies.¹⁵

Several years later, primarily at the prompting of his family, Bull sought a clergyman to direct his theological studies. He boarded with Mr. William Thomas, a “puritan” who “closed with the presbyterian measures in 1642 and was appointed an assistant to the commissioners of Oliver Cromwell.” Though Bull did not believe that this time was well spent, his horizons were expanded as a result of his growing friendship with Mr. Samuel Thomas, his mentor’s son. Samuel embraced views that were opposed to those of his father, and he encouraged Bull to read a diverse array of divines (e.g., Hooker, Hammond, Taylor, Grotius, and Episcopius). Samuel’s father did not approve, believing that his son would “corrupt Mr. Bull.”¹⁶

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¹⁵ Nelson, Life, 5-14.

¹⁶ Ibid., 17-19. It is unclear exactly how long Bull studied with Ackland, but Nelson suggests
Though only twenty-one and too young to be ordained according to the English church’s canons, Bull determined that ordination was necessary if he hoped to minister in a manner consistent with the traditions of the church. He sought out Mr. Skinner, “the ejected bishop of Oxford, by whom he was ordained deacon and priest in one day.” The newly ordained pastor accepted a “small living near Bristol, called St George’s.” Nelson notes that Bull’s “sound doctrine and exemplary life,” including giving more to meet the needs of the poor than he earned in a year, enabled him to turn many who had joined the sects back to the church. In addition to the normal duties of preaching and visiting the sick, Bull committed himself to visit the homes of all of his parishioners in an effort to assess and meet their spiritual needs. He used this visitation as an opportunity to disciple those ignorant in the faith and confront theological error. In the process, he became convinced that antinomianism was the chief threat to orthodoxy in his parish, for virtually every home he entered was infested with antinomian literature.

From Bull’s perspective, the popularity of antinomian tenets undermined the moral fabric of society and had become one of the most significant threats facing the church. From the beginning of the English Reformation, the “accusation that evangelical doctrine fostered a lax attitude to sin” prompted virtually every discussion of justification to include “a denunciation of the ‘gross gospellers’ who abused evangelical liberty.”

that he remained until he was nineteen years old. One of his sisters and “his guardians” were particularly instrumental in prompting him to seek another tutor. See also the article in the DNB. McAdoo notes that Bull sought ordination “as a result of Herbert Thorndike’s writings showing the force of the criterion of early history and patristic works in the matter of Orders.” See McAdoo, Spirit of Anglicanism, 386.

17 Nelson, Life, 20-21. Skinner prudently refused to give Bull any written documentation of his ordination since it was illegal for him to confer holy orders under the commonwealth. Nelson notes, however, that this documentation was provided following the “happy restoration of Charles the Second.”

18 Alec Ryrie, "Counting Sheep, Counting Shepherds: The Problem of Allegiance in the
Nonetheless, in the early 1640s the incendiary writings of men like John Eaton, John Saltmarsh, and Tobias Crisp fueled the spread of antinomianism in the volatile climate of antipathy toward the authority of the Establishment fostered by the Civil War.¹⁹

George Bull has been accused of being overly “preoccupied with antinomian influences,” allowing those biases to shape his understanding of justification.²⁰ Indeed, he formulated his doctrine of justification when antinomian sentiments were prevalent and devoted the early years of his ministry to battling this error. Bull often challenged antinomians to public disputations, particularly if they had influenced one of his parishioners to neglect public worship. Because of his youth, many initially accepted the

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²⁰ Allison, *Moralism*, 190. While antinomianism was arguably in decline by the early 1650s, the movement “continued with repercussions until the end of the century and even beyond.” Dewey D. Wallace, Jr., *Puritans and Predestination: Grace in English Protestant Theology, 1525-1695* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 113, and Lettinga, "Covenant Theology," 133. It became increasingly common to attribute antinomian proclivities to those holding Reformed views. Spurr notes this dynamic when he insists that “by the Restoration, the fear of antinomianism had seriously distorted Anglican perceptions and representations of Calvinism.” Spurr, *Restoration Church*, 321.
challenge, but he proved himself to be a highly capable debater and polemicist.\textsuperscript{21}

Throughout his ministry at St George’s, Bull regularly travelled to Oxford, spending nearly two months each year conducting research in the library. In addition to obvious professional and educational advantages, this annual tradition also provided a very personal benefit. During his visits to Oxford he developed a close friendship with Mr. Alexander Gregory, and in 1658 Bull married Gregory’s daughter, Bridget. Nelson paints a winsome picture of Bull’s family life. George and Bridget raised a large family of five boys and six girls, and their home was a model of piety and Christian devotion. Shortly after his marriage, Bull received a more substantial living at St Mary’s in Gloucestershire, and in 1662 he received an additional living at Suddington. Though the parish at Suddington was small, it was contiguous with his living at St Mary’s, allowing him to retain both. During this time he became more open about his use of the prayer book, and he won the hearts of his people by his decorum, personal piety, and an effective reading style that helped his parishioners understand the words of the liturgy and the Scripture.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to Greek and Latin, Bull was competent in Hebrew, “but above all,” notes Nelson, “he was thoroughly acquainted with primitive antiquity, and had with great care and observation read the works of the fathers and ancient doctors, from whence


\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 33-44. Nelson states that during this period the English church was “laid in the dust; she was ruined under the pretence of being made more perfect.” Consequently, “our admirable liturgy was laid aside as defiled with the corruptions and innovations of popery.” Thus, because the “iniquity of the times would not bear the constant and regular use of the Liturgy,” Bull memorized large portions of the Book of Common Prayer and prayed the liturgy with such fervency and vitality that his parishioners thought he was praying extemporaneously. When he told them that he was actually praying the prescribed prayers of the church, they were stunned, and their opposition to the liturgy dissipated. Ibid., 24; 33-34.
he was best able to learn the sense of the catholic church upon all matters of consequence.” This familiarity with the Fathers informed Bull’s pastoral efforts and is evident throughout his published works. He placed a high priority on catechesis, and on one dramatic occasion he presented fifty persons to the bishop for confirmation—from a congregation of only thirty families.23

In 1704 Bull became aware that he was being considered for the see of St David’s, but he was not interested in light of his advanced age (seventy-one years) and ill health. He eventually accepted the preferment, but he did so because he assumed that his son, Mr. George Bull, a clergyman, would be able to assist him in his pastoral role. While this assistance was short-lived (his son contracted the smallpox and died in 1707), Bishop Bull’s ministry at St David’s was fruitful.24 When he assumed the bishopric, the office had been vacant for over five years, and the needs were great. During his tenure “he repaired the buildings of Christ College, encouraged the establishing of other schools and libraries, supported the S.P.C.K. in distributing religious literature in the Welsh language, revived the office of rural deacon, and endeavored to raise the educational and moral standards of the clergy.”25

Although he believed the Church of England was “founded upon the best and purest antiquity,” he “often lamented her distressed state, from the decay of ancient discipline, and from those divisions which prevailed in the kingdom; and more

23Nelson, Life, 47-49. In addition to the formularies of the Church of England, Bull instructed his parishoners in the teachings of the Fathers.

24Ibid., 328-32.

25J. Daryll Evans, Bishop Bull and His Memorial (Gwent, UK: Archangel Press, 1995), 8-9.
particularly from the great number of lay-impropriations.” The churches in Wales were in deplorable condition. John Davies notes that “in the southern dioceses, lay patronage was more common than in the sees of Bangor and St Asaph; in 1708, half the livings of St David’s were worth less than £30 a year and a quarter were worth less than £10.” Bishop Bull believed that the “slender salaries of these impropriations made it impossible to have those places served by able ministers,” so he sought to remedy the situation. In addition, Bull intentionally limited his residence to St David’s to prevent the problems associated with absenteeism.

Bull died 17 February 1709/10 and was buried at Brecknock. Prior to his death, his Latin works were collected in a single volume by Dr. John Ernest Grabe (1703). Nelson claims, however, that many of Bull’s unpublished works were lost due to negligence. He would lend them to others without ensuring their return, and he failed to make personal copies of his correspondence. Just before he died he gave his son, Robert, permission to publish his extant sermons. The most comprehensive collection of his works, however, was first published by Rev. Edward Burton in a seven-volume set in 1827.

26 Nelson, Life, 367.
27 John Davies, A History of Wales (London: The Penguin Press, 1990), 296. Davies states that a “high percentage of the livings of Wales—the majority, indeed, in the dioceses of Llandaf and St David’s—were owned by laymen from the dissolution until the disestablishment of the Welsh Church in 1920. In those appropriated parishes, the landowner received the greater part of the tithe, and it was he who appointed the incumbent” (229). See also Susan Doran and Christopher Durston, Princes, Pastors and People: The Church and Religion in England, 1500-1700, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 181.
29 Ibid., 383-86.
The Nature of the Problem

Bishop Bull is frequently mentioned in studies of the Restoration Church, but there are no extensive examinations of his life or thought after Nelson’s *magnum opus*. The most notable modern source is C. F. Allison, who devotes a chapter of *The Rise of Moralism* to Bull’s theology. He argues “that the later Carolines—with powerful assistance from certain non-Anglicans—radically abridged the Anglican synthesis and prepared the way for a moralism that has afflicted English theology ever since and still afflicts it today, a moralism which is less than the full gospel.”  

He further argues that “George Bull’s theology represented a more extravagant departure from classical Anglicanism than that of any other member of the ‘holy living’ school.”

*The Rise of Moralism* is frequently cited in subsequent works on the period. Though he questions Allison’s conclusion that “Anglican theologians generally accepted gratuitous justification until 1640,” Dewey Wallace suggests that Allison’s theological analysis of the period is particularly “acute.” J. I. Packer accepts Allison’s argument without qualification. John Spurr’s valuable work, *The Restoration Church of England*, also accepts the premise of Allison’s argument. He agrees that Bull’s theology was part of a new school of thought that deviated from established norms within the English church. He rejects attempts by Bull’s defenders to deflect such criticism, arguing that

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Bull obscured “the theological distinction between justification and sanctification.” Spurr insists that Bull laid the foundations for Latitudinarian moralists like Sherlock by his insistence that “repentance, love of God, and resolutions of amendment are antecedently necessary to our justification.”³⁴

In contradistinction to such claims, Alan Clifford suggests that Bull’s doctrine of justification has been misunderstood. Bull’s teaching, he argues, draws upon earlier foundations within the Church of England and is not a “betrayal of the Reformation.”³⁵ Though he does not develop this argument fully, at least in terms of Bishop Bull’s contributions, Clifford exposes a potential weakness in the received tradition. In addition, Ian Green also discredits assertions that “one of the hallmarks of later Stuart and early Hanoverian religion was the rise of ‘moralism’—a stress on ‘holy living’ which came dangerously close to undermining Christ’s role of justification by returning to a works-righteousness approach to salvation.” Green argues that any claim that there was a “major shift in official teaching is overdrawn and misleading.”³⁶

None of these modern studies provides a thorough examination of Bishop Bull’s view of justification. This project will facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of his thought by fully defining his doctrine of justification. In addition, this study will examine Bull’s thought in light of the writings of other Protestant divines within the Church of England in an effort to determine whether he abandoned a central

³⁴Spurr, Restoration Church, 158; 312-14.


teaching of the English Reformation.

**Methodology**

Any attempt to define continuity within a doctrinal position of the English church faces potential challenges for at least five reasons. First, though continental influence during the English Reformation is not disputed, the Reformation in England adopted a distinctive, yet somewhat amorphous form.  

Second, there is no single authoritative and highly influential person whose views are universally considered to reflect those of the English church. Third, there is no Anglican theological system that is normative for Anglicans, as Calvinism tends to be for some Protestants and Thomism used to be for Roman Catholics.  

Fourth, commitment to a shared theological method rather than a common systematic theology arguably united the Church of England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Fifth, the “strongly political cast of the English Reformation” prompted McGrath to suggest that theological matters within Anglicanism

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40 Green, “Anglicanism in Stuart and Hanoverian England,” 170. Green argues that this theological method included “the authority of Scripture, the use of reason, and the appeal to antiquity.”
are virtually indefinable due to their “secondary and derivative” nature.\(^{41}\)

Despite these challenges, a careful reading of the sources reveals the emergence of distinctive theological traditions related to the doctrine of justification during the formative years of the English Reformation.\(^ {42}\) Doctrine did, in fact, matter within the Church of England and must not be relegated to the dustbin of irrelevance.\(^ {43}\) In addition to the key formularies of the English church, there were a number of prominent leaders whose thought influenced future generations of Anglican thinkers. Therefore, this study will examine representative views by key leaders within the Church of England.

Among the first two generations of English reformers, six divines paved the way for later Anglican perspectives on justification. First, William Tyndale’s *Prologue to Romans* introduced English Protestants to Luther’s views on justification and paved the

\[^{41}\text{McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 258. H. R. McAdoo succinctly captures four of these concerns: “There is no specifically Anglican corpus of doctrine and no king-pin in Anglican theology such as Calvin, nor is there any tendency to stress specific doctrines such as predestination, or specific philosophies, such as Thomism or nominalism or any other one of the several medieval brands of philosophy. Richard Montague’s assertion that he was neither a Calvinist nor a Lutheran but a Christian, illustrates the point that Anglicanism is not committed to believing anything because it is Anglican but only because it is true.” McAdoo, *Spirit of Anglicanism*, 1.}\]


\[^{43}\text{Sykes summarizes this thought well: It is “certainly true that the Anglican reformation lacked the kind of doctrinal definiteness given, for example, to the Lutheran church by Luther and the Lutheran confessional documents; and an explicit part of the seventeenth-century apologia for the Anglican church was that it did not insist on the kind of formulated system of doctrine produced at the Council of Trent. But it would have astonished Cranmer or Hooker to be told that Anglicans had no doctrinal commitment, when the explicit claim which they were making was that the church professed the identical faith of the apostles and of the early church.” S. W. Sykes, *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London: Mowbrays, 1978), 42.}\]
way toward bolder expressions of solifidianism. Second, Thomas Cranmer’s contributions to the *Forty-Two Articles* and the accompanying *Homilies* laid essential foundations for the English church’s officially sanctioned teaching on the doctrine of justification. Third, Robert Barnes’s *Treatise on Justification* became “an important exposition of the Reformed doctrine of the manner of the sinner’s justification before God” within the Church of England. Fourth, Hugh Latimer’s highly popular *Sermon of the Plough* and many of his other occasional sermons revealed the doctrine of justification to a wider audience. Fifth, John Hooper’s *A Declaration of Christ and His Office* and *A Declaration of the Ten Holy Commandments* represented a more Reformed than Lutheran view of justification within the English church. Sixth, John Jewel’s *Apology* expressed a view of justification that “dominated the church” during the reign of Elizabeth, becoming increasingly influential after copies of the work were ordered to be placed in all of the English churches.

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44 A. G. Dickens, *The English Reformation*, 2nd ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 83-93. While Cranmer was the chief architect of ecclesiastical reforms under both Henry and Edward, Dickens suggests that Tyndale was perhaps “the most remarkable figure among the first generation of English Protestants.”


46 Latimer was remembered more as a preacher than a theologian, and his sermons captured the imaginations of the English people. See Loane, *Masters of the English Reformation*, 146.

47 Though criticized as “fanatical” because of his apparent inability to compromise, Hooper was a tireless and effective bishop within the Edwardian church who became particularly influential among the later Puritans. See Dickens, *The English Reformation*, 271-72.


In addition, although they drew very diverse conclusions, the influence of three later divines grew during the Restoration era. First, Richard Hooker’s *A Learned Discourse of Justification* embraced later Reformed teachings on the imputation of Christ’s righteousness as the formal cause of justification. Second, John Davenant’s *Treatise on Justification* may have been “the most impressive” and comprehensive exposition on justification “produced in the Caroline period.” Third, William Forbes’s *Considerationes* set the stage for Restoration divines by emphasizing the centrality of works in the process of man’s justification before God.

Following the restoration of the monarchy, two churchmen were particularly influential. Henry Hammond’s *Practical Catechism* was a work that became very popular during the latter half of the seventeenth century.


53 Spurr notes that it “fell to Henry Hammond . . . and a small group of divines of the pre-1640 generation . . . to take up the Anglican torch.” Spurr, *The Restoration Church*, 10. Lettinga argues that the “Practical Catechism” successfully forged a new Anglican consensus by re-defining what it meant for an Anglican to be a Christian.” Lettinga, “Covenant Theology,” 5. Although Hammond’s views represent a shift in focus from that of Hooker and Davenant, Rowan Greer notes that justification by faith remains a “central part” of Hammond’s argument in the *Catechism*. Rowan A. Greer, *Anglican Approaches to*
sermons on justification preached in Dublin in 1662, are frequently cited in scholarly literature as representative of the moralism seemingly regnant during this period. The emphasis on right living in the works of both Hammond and Taylor is a vital dimension of their doctrine of justification and, at least in part, reflects a response to the dramatic societal changes of the Interregnum rather than a retreat from doctrinal orthodoxy.

It must be acknowledged that this project will neglect other theologians, such as Independents like Richard Baxter and John Owen, whose extensive works on justification are of interest. Owen’s Justification by Faith codified Reformed views on justification, while critics of Baxter’s Aphorismes of Justification likened his doctrine of justification to that of Bishop Bull. The focus of this study, however, will be limited to persons who remained within the established church.

**Thesis**

George Bull was a key figure in the vanguard of the High Church party—a movement within Anglicanism that would become increasingly powerful in the late eighteenth century and beyond. Yet, in addition to the controversy that raged among his

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54 H. R. McAdoo, "Anglican Moral Theology in the Seventeenth Century: An Anticipation," in The Anglican Moral Choice, ed. Paul Elmen (Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow Co., 1983), 5. McAdoo asserts that Jeremy Taylor’s “writings on the spiritual life were so widely read that his approach to practical divinity was inevitably influential in the life of Anglicanism” (40). See also McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 281; Knox, "Bishops in the Pulpit," 108; and Allison, Rise of Moralism, 64-84.

55 In light of the importance of these divines, however, Appendix 3 includes a brief summary of their thought.

56 George Every identifies Bull as the “most distinguished High Church theologian.” George Every, The High Church Party, 1688-1718 (London: SPCK, 1956), 98.
contemporaries immediately following publication of the *Harmonia Apostolica* in 1670, scholars continue to question the orthodoxy of Bishop Bull’s views on justification and to condemn the ‘moralism’ that allegedly pervades his theology. Without question, his teachings differ in emphasis from the writings of earlier divines. If, however, it is possible to establish that Bull’s views fall within a trajectory of thought derived from the formularies of the Church of England and from representative leaders within the established church, then it may suggest that these questions about his orthodoxy and his commitment to Reformation ideals should be revisited.

Bull’s earliest works were crafted in the shadow of the Interregnum, and his doctrine of justification must be interpreted through the dual lenses of his historical context and his hermeneutical dependence upon antiquity. In effect, he adopted a modified form of *ad fontes*, relying upon the testimony of patristic authorities rather than the continental reformers—and even his predecessors in the Church of England—to serve as his exegetical guides. His description of the relationship between faith and works restored earlier Augustinian emphases within the Church of England. In the process, he sought to purge the church of error by rejecting excesses intrinsic to both the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions. Though he became a lightning rod for controversy

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57 Allison, *Moralism*, xii. Allison alleges that this "new moralism achieved virtual dominion over theology" within the Church of England "on account of its influence through the Latitudinarians, the Nonjurors, and, less directly, the Wesleyans and the Tractarians."

58 McAdoo is surely correct in his claim that in Bull’s “books the appeal to antiquity is the chief element.” McAdoo, *Spirit of Anglicanism*, 397.

59 This assertion builds upon Clifford’s definitions and will be discussed more thoroughly in chap. 5. See Clifford, *Atonement and Justification*, 226.
when the *Harmonia Apostolica* was published,\textsuperscript{60} his rejection of justification by faith is arguably one of nuance and emphasis.\textsuperscript{61}

This project accomplishes three objectives. First, it provides a thorough analysis of Bull’s earliest scholarly publications. Second, this project sheds additional light on the content and character of the theological debates that shaped Anglican views on justification during and antecedent to the Restoration era. Third, it evaluates the strength of allegations that Bull was a theological innovator whose doctrine of justification deviated from the teachings of earlier English Protestants.\textsuperscript{62}

In order to proceed with this investigation, a thorough analysis of Bishop Bull’s writings related to justification becomes necessary. In the process, the terms of the debate must be clearly defined from Bull’s perspective. What exactly does he teach about justification? The next chapter answers this question, beginning with an introduction to Bull’s key works on the doctrine of justification. The third chapter evaluates continuity or discontinuity between Bishop Bull’s thought and earlier teachings within the Church of England. The fourth chapter examines his thought in the context of the seventeenth century. Finally, the fifth chapter synthesizes the conclusions from earlier chapters in order to evaluate Bishop Bull’s thought in perspective to his theological tradition.

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\textsuperscript{61}This assertion does not, of course, suggest that there is no substance to the debate. Morgan insightfully notes that the “most hotly contested religious differences among Christians have often been differences of degree; the shift from orthodoxy to heresy may be no more than a shift of emphasis.” Edmund Morgan, *Roger Williams* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967), 11.

\textsuperscript{62}McGrath insists that there is and always has been a wide spectrum of beliefs on justification within Anglicanism. See McGrath, "The Emergence of the Anglican Tradition on Justification 1600-1700," 42-43. This project will not establish a universally-embraced doctrinal position characteristic of Anglicanism, but in subsequent chapters it will seek to establish a broad spectrum of thought that has roots in the early years of the English Reformation.
CHAPTER 2

GEORGE BULL ON JUSTIFICATION

In a classic study, Albrecht Ritschl concludes that the doctrine of justification includes the forgiveness of sins and “is the acceptance of sinners into that fellowship with God in which their salvation is to be realized and carried out into eternal life.”¹ Peter Toon describes the doctrine of justification as humanity’s “right standing before and relationship with God.”² John Spurr suggests that justification is “a doctrinal description of how God accepts sinful men as righteous, of how the atonement made by Christ is applied to sinners.”³

All of these descriptions may be found wanting, but they underscore the breadth and complexity of any discussion of justification. Though it is beyond the scope of this investigation to evaluate current debates on the character of this doctrine, justification arguably was a distinguishing theological issue of the Reformation.⁴ Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, debates over every facet of humanity’s justification before God were grounded by an unflinching commitment to

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evaluate this doctrine through the dual filters of biblical exegesis (particularly of Paul’s Epistles to the Romans and Galatians) and the teachings of the Fathers (particularly Augustine). Nonetheless, D. A. Carson correctly notes that any assertion of the centrality of this doctrine to Pauline theology is “slippery,” at best. Peter Toon agrees but suggests that, if not central, justification is at least a “dominant perspective in Paul’s theology.”

Consequently, once Luther started the ball rolling, polemicists expended prodigious quantities of ink in a quest to define the church’s teachings on justification.

**George Bull’s Principal Works on Justification**

George Bull was convinced that flawed interpretations of the doctrine of justification diminished the power of the Scriptures, undermined the authority of the church, and disabled the moral compass of the people. Therefore, during the early 1660s he penned the *Harmonia Apostolica* in an effort to refocus pastoral and scholarly attention on this matter. In the concluding chapter of that work, Bull warns his readers to avoid four errors associated with the controversies over justification.

First, he warns them to reject the “pernicious error of certain papists” that their good works merit “a heavenly reward” stemming from “their own intrinsic goodness and dignity.” Second, Bull warns his readers to avoid the opposite error of the “solifidians

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7George Bull, *Harmonia Apostolica, seu, Binae Dissertationes, Quarum in priore Doctrina D. Jacobi de Justificatione ex operibus Explanatur ac Defenditur: In posteriore, Consensus D. Pauli cum
and antinomians who entirely deny the necessity of good works to eternal justification and salvation." Third, he warns them to “avoid the Pelagian heresy” by acknowledging the necessity for the “assistance of an animating and very powerful grace” before any truly good works (i.e., works “acceptable unto salvation”) can be performed. Fourth, he warns them to avoid the trap of Manichaeism by placing a proper emphasis on the 

*liberum arbitrium* and the “cooperation of human industry” in the process of justification. Bull asserts that all four of these errors can be avoided if one embraces the doctrine of justification as it is taught in the Scriptures and affirmed by the Fathers.

The *Harmonia* includes two major divisions or “dissertations.” The first dissertation seeks to demonstrate the necessity of good works in the process of justification with a special focus on the Epistle of James. The second dissertation contrasts the teachings of Paul and James on justification, arguing for an essential harmony between the two views but insisting that Paul must be read through the lens of James in order to properly interpret the text. Bull rejects Reformed interpretations of the

_Jacobo Liquido Demonstratur* (London: Printed for William Wells and Robert Scott, 1670), *Diss. Post.* XVIII.4.325-26 (*Works* 3.280-81). Thoughout this study I seek to provide a fairly literal translation of the text, but punctuation and capitalization have been changed to make the text more readable for the English reader. The LACT versions informed any questions I may have had in translation, but I am responsible for any translation errors.


10Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.13.356 (*Works* 3.310). Citing Augustine and Bernard, Bull seeks to find a middle path between an over-emphasis on grace or on human volition. See also Bull, *APH Sectio IX.*21.155 (*Works* 4.522). Bull argues that “the will directs the powers of the whole man; so whatever we can do and wish to do with a perfect and consistent will, these things we necessarily do.”


12Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* 1.1.53-54 (*Works* 3.71). A secondary focus of the second dissertation is to reject errant attempts to reconcile apparent discrepancies between Paul and James.
imputation of Christ’s “alien” righteousness in a singular event of justification, arguing instead for a factitive view in which works of repentance are absolutely essential to the process of justification, a process that remains incomplete until the future judgment.

The Harmonia provoked opposition from divines who opined that Bull was rejecting a chief tenet of the Reformation. Consequently, he published two additional works in an attempt to clarify and defend his position. He wrote the first of these works, the Examen Censurae, primarily in response to criticism leveled by Charles Gataker, “the conformist son of a leading puritan divine.” Rather than publish a separate work articulating his criticisms, Gataker sent an annotated copy of the Harmonia to several bishops, including William Nicholson, the prelate who encouraged Bull to publish the Harmonia. Gataker rejected Bull’s definition of justification, criticized his exegesis, mocked his conclusions, and suggested that Bull’s teaching asserted “new and most pernicious doctrines, completely incompatible with the doctrines of the English and all the Reformed Churches.” Bull responded by addressing twenty-three aspersions raised by his critic, and he also included a response to questions raised by a dissenter named Joseph Truman. Truman affirmed Bull’s interpretation of James, but he disagreed with

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13 Robert Nelson, *The Life of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, with the History of those Controversies in which he was Engaged and An Abstract of those Fundamental Doctrines which he Maintained and Defended in the Latin Tongue* (London: Printed for J. Parker; and Law, and Whitaker; and Ogles, Duncan, and Cochran, 1816), 120-235.

14 Spurr, *Restoration Church*, 313. The Examen was not written solely in response to criticism. Bull also sought to bolster his argument from the Harmonia. See Nelson, *Life*, 197-98.


16 Joseph Truman, *An Endeavour to Rectifie some Prevailing Opinions, Contrary to the*
Bull’s interpretation of Paul’s use of the “works of the law,” believing that it would lead to further error. Bull drafted but never published a response to Truman; however, the Appendix ad Animadversion XVII in the Examen contains the substance of that paper.

Bishop Nicholson, Bull’s patron, died during the controversies with Gataker and Truman, and shortly thereafter Bull faced additional criticism from Dr. Thomas Barlow (the “Margaret Professor at Oxford and afterwards bishop of Lincoln”) and from Dr. Thomas Tully (“formerly fellow of Queen’s college and then principal at St. Edmund’s hall”). Following a censorious lecture by Barlow at Oxford, Bull confronted the professor, challenging him to a public disputation. Nelson alleges that Barlow refused because he knew that he could not produce the evidence needed to overthrow Bull in open debate. This challenge silenced Barlow, but Tully was not deterred. He published the Justificatio Paulina, forcefully attacking the Harmonia.

Bull penned the Apologia Pro Harmonia in response to this criticism by Tully. Tully’s complaints focused on virtually every dimension of Bull’s thought, from quibbles

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*Doctrine of The Church of England* (London: Printed by I. A. for Robert Clabel, 1671), n.p. (“To the Reader”). Truman was best known for two of his other works: *The Great Propitiation, or Christ’s Satisfaction and Man’s Justification by it, with a Discourse Concerning St. Paul’s Meaning of Justification by Faith; and A Discourse of Natural and Moral Impotency.*

17Truman, *Endeavour*, 2-4. Among other things, Truman expresses concern that Bull’s opinions imply that a person living a “truly Christian life” would no longer sin and that his opinions undermine efforts to challenge the Roman teaching on merit.

18Bull originally wrote his response in English but never published it because he feared that the subtleties of such candid discussions could become a stumbling block for the uneducated masses. See Bull, *EC, Ad Lectorem* (Works 4.viii); and idem, *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.6.155 (Works 4.212).


about his title to his view of good works, his understanding of imputation, and his description of the “nature of justifying faith.” In the Apologia Bull sought to distance himself from Tully’s allegations that he was a theological innovator and that he embraced Socinian views. Throughout the work there is a persistent undercurrent reflecting his antipathy toward antinomianism, implying that Bull believed Tully’s solifidianism would naturally lead to antinomian excesses. He conceded that much time had passed since “these dregs of men with their insane doctrines have been rejected from among us.” Nonetheless, he remained concerned that errant views on the doctrine of justification would continue to stoke the fires of antinomian elements in England.

Tully questioned the credibility of the Harmonia because it had been written in Bull’s youth, a criticism that would not be worth repeating if not for Bull’s response. Bull’s reply suggests that his theology did not experience significant development over time. Although he wrote the work when he was 27, he did not publish it until several years later. During the intervening years he frequently reviewed his manuscript and also carefully reexamined the work about fifteen years later. He admitted,

I see clearly that there are several [points] in it which could be explained more clearly and distinctly. . . . I see that my interpretation could call into doubt one or two of the more difficult passages in Paul’s [epistles], though a more sure explanation does not yet occur to me. But as far as the chief doctrine of the justification of man pertains, which I defend, and the scope of the apostle[s] Paul and James, whose union I have undertaken, I am most persuaded that I have never

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22George Bull, APH Sectio I.1.4 (Works 4.305). Idem, APH Sectio I.7.10-12 (Works 4.314-316). He was particularly incensed by Tully’s inference that he embraced Socinian and ‘Papist’ views. Nelson, Life, 134. Nelson notes that the foundation for claims that Bull embraced Socinianism was his teaching that there was no promise of eternal life in the Law of Moses.

strayed from the truth or from catholic opinion.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to these formidable opponents, Bull also faced criticism from the “Calvinist bishop of Winchester, George Morely, [who] issued a pastoral charge against Bull’s book” and from John Tombes, “Baptist and High Calvinist.”\textsuperscript{25} Bull believed, however, that he had adequately addressed any deficiencies in the \textit{Harmonia} with the publication of the \textit{Examen} and \textit{Apologia}, so he never wrote additional works on the doctrine of justification. Nonetheless, there are allusions to justification in several of his other works; therefore, the remainder of this chapter will fully explicate George Bull’s doctrine of justification from all of his published works.

\textit{Justificatio Declarativa. Our Legal Standing before God}

George Bull’s doctrine of justification is undergirded by two foundational pillars: a forensic understanding of the nature of justification and a covenantal framework for the process of justification. The first of these foundational elements, a judicial or forensic view of the nature of justification, reflects Reformation priorities.\textsuperscript{26} The medieval church inherited from Augustine a transformational understanding of justification that emphasized both forgiveness of sins and moral transformation; that is, the justified person was not only pardoned for his iniquities, but he actually was made

\begin{quote}
24 Bull, \textit{APH Sectio VIII.5.118-19 (Works 4.471)}.
\end{quote}
righteous. The reformers objected to this view, interpreting justification from within a judicial milieu: once the case was decided, the acquitted party acquired “the status of ‘righteous.’” This judicial ruling was not a “moral statement” but was instead an affirmation of one’s status “in terms of the now completed lawsuit.”

Bull’s view of justification was informed by Reformation debates, but he sought to find a via media between perceived deficiencies in both the Roman and Reformed formulations.

**Justification as Adjudication**

The first dissertation of the *Harmonia* argues that St James uses the term “justify” (δικαιοῖσθαι) in a *sensus forensis* to mean “to determine (censere) or pronounce just.”

Bull insists that this forensic interpretation of justification has been held by the most respected theologians, including divines as dissimilar as Hammond and Calvin. Even those like Grotius, who understand justification in a more transformational sense, agree that James consistently uses the term in a forensic manner.

James is not unique in this view of the nature of justification, however. To the
contrary, the “most obvious and familiar” New Testament usage of justification is this language of the courtroom. Perhaps the best general description of justification for Bull can be found in Acts 13:38-39, a passage he identifies as the *evangelii summum*. These verses portray an understanding of justification as a “gratuitous act of God, who for Christ’s sake, acquits true believers, that is, those endowed with a perfected faith (fides formata), and he frees them from the guilt and penalty of all (their) sins.”  

The justified person has been “acquitted from his sins before committed, treated by God as if righteous, and considered pleasing and acceptable unto salvation and eternal life.”

This forensic understanding is also revealed in Romans 8:33 where Paul contrasts accusation (τὸ ἐγκαλέων) with justification (τὸ δικαιοῦν) in such a way that he clearly means “to acquit an accused person and to pronounce or decree that he is free from accusation.” Similarly, 1 John 2:29 and 3:7 reflect the understanding that justification “signifies an act of God in the fashion of a judge acquitting the accused, pronouncing him righteous, and granting him the reward of eternal life.”

The inspired writers, Bull concludes, consistently use justificatio “in a forensic sense to signify the ‘acquittal from sins’ or the ‘remission of sins.’”

A judicial view of justification evokes the image of a legal process or trial (*jus processus*). Such a trial requires a judge to bring sentence, a defendant who stands

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32 Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* I.2.5-4.6-7 (*Works* 3.4-7).


accused before the court, and a law by which the defendant is tried. In the justification of humanity coram Deo, Bull maintains that it is readily apparent that God is the judge and man is the accused, but what is less certain is the “law” by which Christians will be judged. Bull affirms that “no one is justified or acquitted unless he has fulfilled the standard of the law by which he is judged,” and he concludes that James 2:12 defines this law as the lex libertatis, a law that he equates with the lex moralis taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Although that law liberates us from Mosaic ceremonial requirements, from the “guilt and punishment of sin,” and from “the dominating power and tyranny of sin,” Bull insists we will be judged by the standard of the lex libertatis. This language of the courtroom is necessary, argues Bull, because of the sinfulness of unregenerate humanity. It is undeniable, he insists, that “man has sinned and violated the conditions of a legal covenant (foederis legalis).” Immediately “after the fall of our first parents,” God pronounced a judicial sentence upon them as a direct result of their sin. All persons ultimately will find themselves before the judgment seat of God, so justification, first and foremost, is God’s pronouncement of acquittal: the remission of sins for those who have fulfilled the conditions of the gospel covenant. This

37 Bull, HA Diss. Prior III.1.22 (Works 3.38).

38 Bull, HA Diss. Prior III.2.23-24 (Works 3.39-40); idem, HA Diss. Post. XI.1.229 (Works 3.194). Bull never suggests that humans are capable of this obedience without the powerful intervention of the Holy Spirit. To the contrary, without the Spirit’s assistance, it is impossible for men to live righteous lives. See 2 Cor 3:6; Rom 7:14; Gal 3:14 and John 1:17.

39 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XV.3.130 (Works 4.180); idem, HA VIII.2.115-16 (Works 3.134).

40 George Bull, "Sermon XIV: That the Doctrine of the Recompense of Reward to be Bestowed on the Righteous After this Life, was Understood and Believed by the People of God Before the Law was Given; and that it is Lawful to Serve God with Respect to, or in Hope of, the Future Heavenly Recompense," in The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846), 1:354-55.
justificatio declarativa reflects a judicial declaration of guilt or innocence that will be revealed fully at the last judgment.\textsuperscript{41}

While some allege that Paul and James employ non-forensic descriptions of God’s justification of humanity, such a claim is untenable. Bull grants that Paul, on at least one occasion (1 Corinthians 6:11), seems to use “justify” in such a way that it means “purifying from vice,” but Bull argues that Paul uses “washed” (\(\dot{a}\pi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\sigma\theta\epsilon\)) rather than “justified” (\(\acute{e}\delta\upsilon\kappa\alpha\omega\theta\eta\tau\epsilon\)) to describe purification from sin. In this verse and elsewhere, Paul views justification as a judicial decision by God that reveals “the love of God, by which he embraces those already living a holy life and determines them to be worthy of the reward of eternal life through Christ.”\textsuperscript{42} Thus, one who is justified is “acceptable to God unto salvation.”\textsuperscript{43} There is no room for serious debate: there is uniformity in the biblical testimony about the forensic nature of justification.

Bull acknowledges an additional claim by some Reformed divines that Paul and James assume different definitions of the word ‘justification.’ These divines assert that Paul is concerned with humanity’s justification coram Deo which occurs sola fide; conversely, they argue that James speaks of justification coram hominibus which occurs ex operibus. Adherents of this view base their conclusions on a two-pronged argument. First, James admonishes his readers to “show me your faith by your works.” Second, while James suggests that Abraham was “justified by the sacrifice of his son Isaac,” Paul is clear that “before God he had been justified by faith much earlier.” Thus, they

\textsuperscript{41} Bull, HA Diss. Prior V.1.36 (Works 3.56).
\textsuperscript{42} Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.3.5-6 (Works 3.5-6).
\textsuperscript{43} Bull, HA Diss. Prior II.3.12 (Works 3.18).
conclude that justification in the Epistle of James “signifies being declared righteous before men and not before God.”

Bull rejects this argument, insisting that James always speaks of justification coram Deo rather than coram hominibus. He highlights five deductions drawn from the text. First, James makes it clear that we are justified “by works, not by faith alone” (ἐργον, οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον); that is, faith contributes (at least in part) to man’s justification. Second, if we grant that faith plays any part in justification coram Deo, James would be guilty of an absurd solecism if he spoke only of the justification coram hominibus since faith is invisible to other men. Third, James 2:14 makes it clear that “the apostle is speaking of the acceptance of man to salvation with God,” not merely demonstrating his faith before men. Fourth, in James 2:23 the apostle equates justification with “being called the friend of God” (φίλον Θεοῦ κληθήναι), a concept that is meaningless if one is concerned only with justifying faith before men. Fifth, James understands justificari to be synonymous with the expression, ‘to be reckoned as righteous’ (λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην) in James 2:23. Surely, Bull insists, it is absurd to suggest that this phrase relates only to justification coram hominibus.

In addition to this exegetical evidence, Bull rejects the argument that James thinks of justification coram hominibus because it erroneously presupposes that justification is an act “completed once, in a single moment.” This cannot be true, he insists. Instead, justification is both an event and a process, and that process remains incomplete until a person “has perfectly and continuously to the end fulfilled the

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44 Bull, HA Diss. Post. 1.5.54-55 (Works 3.72-73).
45 Bull, HA Diss. Post. 1.7.57-58 (Works 3.75-76).
condition of that covenant by which he is justified. Therefore, even if Abraham was justified earlier, he nevertheless could be said to be justified when he consecrated his only son, offering (him) in sacrifice to God.\textsuperscript{46} James and Paul, Bull concludes, hold to the same forensic understanding of man’s justification \textit{coram Deo}, and they both ground this life-long process in the remission of sins.

\textbf{Imputation: A Gift of Faith}

Like the continental reformers, English Protestants rejected the Roman Catholic assumption that the formal cause of justification was the infusion of an inherent righteousness into the individual; that is, they denied that God infuses a soul with his grace to such a degree that he actually makes a person righteous enough to merit his justification.\textsuperscript{47} Instead, many of the divines in the Church of England during the first half of the seventeenth century held that the formal cause of justification was the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to the accused.\textsuperscript{48} This view suggests that Christ’s “active as well as passive obedience are imputed to the penitent believer, who is, in consequence, judicially dealt with or treated as having satisfied in his own person all the demands of

\textsuperscript{46}Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post.} I.5.55 (\textit{Works} 3.73).

\textsuperscript{47}Toon, \textit{Evangelical Theology}, 145. Lane defines formal cause as a scholastic term that describes “that which makes something to be what it is.” Lane, \textit{Justification by Faith}, 69-70. See also Spurr, \textit{Restoration Church}, 299 and Allison, \textit{Moralism}, 3. Bull gives a similar definition: “\textit{causa vero formalis interna est, et essentiam effecti constituit}” in Bull, \textit{APH Sectio} V.11.60 (\textit{Works} 4.390). The Tridentine decree on justification includes the following statement: “the single formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just, that, namely, with which we being endowed by Him \textit{are renewed in the spirit of our mind}, and not only are we reputed but we are truly called and are just, receiving justice within us.” H. J. Schroeder, trans., \textit{The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent} (Rockford, IL: Tan Books and Publishers, 1978), Sixth Session, VII.33.

the law.” Bull rejects this interpretation: under no circumstances will he grant that Christ’s righteousness is somehow credited to humanity in such a way that we are no longer obligated to fulfill the conditiones foederis evangelici.

He bases this rejection of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness on three central claims. First, this phrase never occurs in the Scripture. Second, it is not mentioned in the “most famous confessions of the Reformed Churches,” including that of the Church of England. Third, this interpretation contradicts the clear teaching of the Scripture (e.g., Romans 4:3, 5, 9, 22-24), where it is not “the righteousness of Christ, but our faith that is imputed to us for righteousness.” This distinction is critical, argues Bull. By “the meritorious satisfaction of Jesus Christ alone” God makes us “partakers of righteousness and salvation. Therefore, according to the Scriptures, the righteousness of Christ is not properly that . . . which is imputed, but that on account of which (propter quod) our faith is imputed for righteousness.” If these claims are granted, Bull queries, how is it possible to affirm Reformed formulations on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness or even to hint that belief in such a view is necessary for salvation?

It is true that “God is willing to forgive (condonare) a repentant sinner, covering over his guilt and treating him as righteous” because of sola Christi justitia. Yet, 

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50 Bull, HA Diss. Post. XVIII.7.344-45 (Works 3.299); idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. VII.21.51 (Works 4.71). Bull briefly highlights these conditions of the gospel covenant as “a pure faith, repentance, and zeal for good works.” The conditionality of the covenant is amplified below.

51 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.2.68 (Works 4.94). He also includes the Augsburg, the Württemburg, the Bohemian, and the Belgic Confessions.

52 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.2.68 (Works 4.94-95).
Bull rejects as unreasonable the view that “Christ’s righteousness is so imputed to us sinners, that by it we are reckoned by God actually righteous ourselves, innocent—not only free from all punishment, but also from all guilt.”  He also rejects Gataker’s assertion that 2 Corinthians 5:21 eliminates any distinction between the justitia Dei and the justitia Christi. The justitia Dei, Bull argues, is the righteousness that is from God, not merely an attribute of God, that is, “that righteousness which God works in us by the faith of Christ” for our justification. In contrast, the justitia Christi is the righteousness intrinsic to Christ’s very nature but revealed most fully through his obedience on the cross. Paul’s intent here is to say that Christ’s satisfaction made it possible for us to be considered righteous coram Deo. That is, “because of our sins, Christ has been treated by God as a sinner” even though he never sinned; similarly, “on account of his righteousness and satisfaction, we are treated by God as righteous, although in reality we are not perfectly righteous.”

Bull acknowledges that many follow Erasmus’s view that λογίζεται in Romans 4:6 means to be considered “accepted” by God, and this acceptance implies that the recipient has been credited gratuitously with that “which he has not yet received.” Those embracing this premise conclude that Paul intends to demonstrate that Abraham received righteousness as a gift from God “since imputation denotes a free gift.” The flaw with this interpretation is exegetical: “imputation” is used elsewhere to signify crediting the

penalty for sin (e.g., 2 Sam 19:19), and it is absurd to suggest that the penalty for sin is granted gratuitously. In addition, the term may be used to “signify a true and just estimation or judgment” that is warranted, not merely one that is given as a free gift (e.g., Deut 2:11 and 20); even in Romans 4:4 Paul uses the term “as recompense for debt.” Surely, argues Bull, the nature of the word “imputation” cannot be limited to a gratuitous gift.  

Bull concludes that the causa justificationis formalis “is established in the remission of sins and acceptation to salvation . . . not in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.” The justitia Christi cannot be considered the formal cause of justification because it already is the meritorious cause, and it is absurd to suggest that the same thing can simultaneously be both the formal and the meritorious cause. God’s acceptatio is revealed in the imputation of faith that leads to righteousness, not the imputation of an alien righteousness; that is, “the thing said to be imputed to Abraham for righteousness was faith and, consequently, the obedience begotten from that faith.” Thus, faith (properly understood) is imputed or reckoned as righteousness for those who fulfill the non-meritorious conditions of the foedus evangelium. For Bull, therefore, the remission of sins and the imputation of faith is the causa justificationis formalis.

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57 Bull, *APH Sectio* V.11.60 (*Works* 4.389); idem, *APH Sectio* III.8.32 (*Works* 4.343-44) where he writes: “ratione ‘formali,’ quod nempe sita illa sit in remissione peccatorum et acceptatione hominis ad salutem aeternam.” He cites the Augsburg Confession and the *Homily on Salvation* in support of this view.

58 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XII.23.266 (*Works* 3.226). Bull is careful to reiterate, however, that “the very notion of the obedience of faith completely excludes all merit.”

59 Bull, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* II.4.18 (*Works* 4.25). “As form gives being in natural things, so charity gives faith being in the divine acceptation.” Thus, *fides sine charitate* will not result in justification.
Bull asserts that James and Paul agree that justification is a work of grace in which God “imputes a reward” to those who fulfill the requisite conditions of the gospel covenant. God credits the acquitted person with the “reward” of the remission of sins, but this reward is granted by an act of sheer grace. It is never merited or earned. Both apostles agree: through justification we are “admitted into the favor and friendship of God,” so God imputes to us not only the faith that leads to righteousness but the reward of eternal life. There is no secondary attribution of an alien righteousness.

Bull argues that nothing could be “more harmful or more dangerous” than erroneous Reformed interpretations of imputation because they provide “the very foundations (fundamenta) of the most pestilent heresy of Antinomianism.” He offers several reasons for his assessment. First, such a view makes any notion of repentance irrelevant. Second, this view effectively removes any necessary connection between faith and justification, making justificatio hominis antecedent to faith. Third, this understanding of imputation undermines the “catholic doctrine of universal propitiation resulting from Christ’s death for the sins of the whole world.” In short, Bull concludes that James uses justificari in the same sense that Paul uses “to be imputed for righteousness” (λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην); therefore, it is absurd to suggest that James ever anticipated that Christ’s righteousness would be credited to man.

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60 Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.5.7 (Works 3.7-8); idem, HA Diss. Post. XII.21.264 (Works 3.225). Bull uses the example of Abraham in Rom 4, arguing that Abraham’s “reward” was not granted as a result of any debt owed to him; rather, it was granted (imputatam) as a gift ex mera gratia.

61 Bull, HA Diss. Post. I.7.58 (Works 3.75). This distinction becomes particularly important for Bull as he compares Rom 4:2 with Rom 4:3-6, and Jas 2:21 with Jas 2:23.


63 Bull, HA Diss. Post. I.7.58 (Works 3.76).
**Ordo Salutis: Grounded in the Mercy and Grace of God**

Bull argues that “without divine grace” our righteousness cannot be said to contain any goodness; therefore, God is the “first, or more correctly, the only originator” of our salvation. Bull argues that “without divine grace” our righteousness cannot be said to contain any goodness; therefore, God is the “first, or more correctly, the only originator” of our salvation. It is by grace alone that God calls us to himself prior to any act of obedience on our parts: one simply cannot find the via salutis unless God shows him the way. Bull concludes from this that the “leading cause of our justification” is the misericordia Dei. After all, he writes, our promise of “heavenly life” is “a gift of God’s immense liberty” and could justly be denied even to a man “laboring most perfectly in a blameless state.”

Consequently, we must acknowledge the primacy of grace in the justification of humanity. Paul’s persistent emphasis on justification and salvation “by grace without works” is founded upon this very premise: any “good (boni) achieved by us toward fulfilling our justification and eternal salvation has been furnished completely by the grace of God.” Because all good things are “given to us freely by Christ” and have been

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66 Bull, *APH Sectio III*.8.32 (*Works* 4.343). In support of his argument he cites the Augsburg Confession and the English Church’s *Homily on Salvation*. For Bull, God’s mercy and his grace are inseparably linked. God’s mercy is a divine attribute or disposition, while God’s grace is the outward operation of that mercy within the created order, an operation particularly evident in God’s gift of the Holy Spirit to prepare the human heart for justification. See also Bull, *HA Diss. Post. XII*.7.252-8.254 (*Works* 3.214-16). Bull finds strong biblical support for this in Eph 1:8-10. In that passage the apostle suggests, “You are so far from being saved by your own works apart from the grace of God that, on the contrary, you are fashioned with the most wonderful effort and power of divine grace, as it were, a second time by God.”

received as gifts, they “should be credited to him.”

Further, this gift of grace was not an afterthought for God but was part of the Creator’s original intent in his relationship with humanity. Bull argues that, in addition to a human nature characterized by innocence and purity,

God gave the primus homo the gift of the Holy Spirit so that he could transcend his “natural faculties” and “obtain the happiness of heaven.”

That is, even before he lapsed into sin, Adam could not be saved without the prevenient, animating grace of the Holy Spirit in his life. From the beginning of creation, man has been fully dependent upon God’s mercy, and that mercy has been uniquely demonstrated through the sanctifying, life-giving work of God’s Spirit.

Although Bull is not consistent in his development of an ordo salutis, he condenses the more extensive proposals that emerged within the Reformed traditions into a simplified schema that can be summarized as follows:

68 Bull, HA Diss. Post. XII.11.256 (Works 3.217); idem, "Sermon I: The Necessity of Works of Righteousness in Order to Salvation; Though the Reward of Them is only to be Expected from the Free Grace and Merit of God: Asserted Against the Antinomians and Papists," in The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846), 1:18. Bull preached: “When we have sown in righteousness, that is, done righteous works, we must not plead any merit of our own in having so done; but we must look for the renewal of our righteousness only from the free grace and mercy of God.”

69 George Bull, "Discourse 5: “Concerning the First Covenant, and the State of Man Before the Fall, According to Scripture, and the Sense of the Primitive Doctors of the Catholic Church: Written at the request of a Friend,” in The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846), 2:68. Bull professed continuity with the Fathers in his view that “our first parents, besides the seeds of natural virtue and religion sown in their minds, in their very creation, and besides the natural innocence and rectitude, wherein also they were created, were endowed with certain gifts and powers supernatural, infused by the Spirit of God; and that in these gifts their perfection consisted.”

70 Bull, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.6.153 (Works 4.211-12).


72 Allison is particularly critical of Bull’s ordo salutis which he summarizes as follows: (1) prevenient grace; (2) first sanctification; (3) first justification; (4) second sanctification; and (5) second justification. Allison, Moralism, 125. However, Allison’s distinction is too specific. Prevenient grace and
prior to the adjudication of our case before the forum divinum, argues Bull, God’s Spirit begins a preparatory, sanctifying work that empowers each one of us to live a holy life. Ultimately, this prevenient, sanctifying grace makes it possible for us to become righteous coram Deo, but this is a grace of potentiality, not actuality. God removes the barriers precluding us from becoming righteous, but (contra Roman Catholic teaching) God does not infuse us with inherent righteousness. To be sure, there is a sense in which we possess justitia inhaerens. By his grace, God has determined “that our righteousness, although maimed and imperfect, should be received for our acquittal, as if it was actually complete and in all ways acceptable unto salvation.” Thus, it can be said that this “inherent righteousness can be called our righteousness for no other reason than that we are made righteous through it.”

Bull supports this claim by suggesting that Titus 3:4-7 demonstrates that Paul “does not reject all inherent righteousness from the business of salvation and justification (since he expressly establishes that we are saved through the righteousness which is in us by the renewal of Holy Spirit).” Paul does, however, reject any righteousness that “proceeds from our own powers.” In the fifth verse, Paul clearly affirms that the works excluded from justification are those that “we ourselves have done (ἐ̶ έ̶π̶ο̶ι̶ή̶σ̶ω̶μ̶ε̶ν̶ ή̶μ̶ε̶ῖ̶ς̶);”

“first sanctification” are inseparable concepts in Bull’s soteriology.

73 Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.3.6 (Works 3.6); idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. VI.1.34 (Works 4.46). Gataker challenges Bull’s interpretation of 1 Pet 1:2 that justification follows sanctification.


75 Bull EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.12.82-83 (Works 4.114-15).
the pronoun ‘we’ (ἡμεῖς) is emphatic and means ‘by our own powers.’” We can conclude, suggests Bull, that when “Paul says we are saved by the renewing of the Holy Spirit, he means all those virtues and good works which flow from a heart renewed by the Holy Spirit.” Thus, when the apostle (in v. 7) says that we are justified by the grace of God, he means that we are justified “only by the free grace (gratia gratis) of the Holy Spirit,” and it is by this grace that we are empowered to become righteous.76

Reformed churches affirm that fides justificans can never be “barren or unfruitful and stripped of good works,” concedes Bull, but solifidianism belies this claim. Fides justificans cannot occur “before all sanctification of the spirit, indeed before true contrition for sin, while man remains impious and destitute of every good quality.” Bull mocks the attempt to evade this dilemma by claiming that “faith, pregnant with good works, justifies before birth.” Such a view erroneously holds that all sanctification follows justification; hence, God is placed in the position of justifying persons who are “utterly impious.”77

To be sure, in Romans 4:5 Paul teaches that God “justifies the ungodly on account of Christ.” However, by impietas, insists Bull, Paul merely means those who once were ungodly but now “through faith and true repentance have ceased to be such.” Paul never implies that God will justify those who remain ungodly. We need not look far to be reminded that it “is repugnant to the righteousness and holiness of God . . . to forgive sins and grant a right to a heavenly life to one who is not cleansed from his

Bull rejects the criticism that he is conflating sanctification and justification in this teaching. He grants that the two are so enmeshed that they cannot be easily separated, but he insists that “justification by divine decree presupposes sanctification.” This thought permeates a sermon on Hosea 10:12 where Bull proclaims, “God indeed is infinitely good and merciful, and it is out of that infinite goodness and mercy that he bestows the gift of eternal life upon any man; but God is also infinitely wise, and righteous, and holy; and therefore he will not (I think I may say he cannot) confer the rich donative upon any unholy or unrighteous person.” That is, until God’s sanctifying grace has begun its work in the heart of a man, that man cannot be justified.

When Bull argues that sanctification must precede justification, he adds the caveat that he is referring to the sanctificatio prima et imperfecta. Clearly, he muddies the waters with his use of sanctificatio here: at best, one must acknowledge that he is inconsistent in his use of key soteriological terms, but rather than confounding sanctification with justification, he actually conflates sanctificatio prima with gratia


praevieniens. The Holy Spirit features prominently in Bull’s soteriology, so in order to grasp what he is teaching, these terms must be clearly understood.

The foundational premise undergirding Bull’s doctrine of salvation is that Christian virtues are not “acquired through any of our previous acts without the grace of God and without the preceding assistance of the Holy Spirit.”82 God’s Spirit empowers and inspires us to perform works of repentance by gratia praevieniens.83 Prevenient grace, therefore, precedes first justification and begins an initial, sanctifying work in the heart of the believer.

Our acquittal before the divine tribunal in ‘first’ justification follows this work of grace and includes the sacrament of baptism. The sacrament restores original innocence by cleansing us from “all of the sins committed before receiving the grace of the gospel (evangelii gratia).”84 In baptism “we are regenerated and renewed” (regeneramur ac renovamur); as a result of that grace, we are “rendered suitable of truly good” works.85 The one prepared by such grace (and in whom Christian virtues are born) receives “the greatest of blessings, justification.” His sins are forgiven and he receives the “right to eternal salvation.”86 Thus, once a person has been acquitted before the forum

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82 Bull APH Sectio III.4.26 (Works 4.335-36). He insists that Christian virtues are “actus excitatos et effectos a gratia.”


84 Bull, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.24.170 (Works 4.235).

85 Bull, HA Diss. Post. XII.7.252 (Works 3.214); idem, APH Sectio IV.9.43-44 (Works 4.358-61). Bull argues that, with virtually no other testimony, the witness of the English Church and Fathers such as Basil and Cyprian concerning the necessity of baptism to our salvation is adequate to overturn solifidianism. He also affirms baptismal regeneration in the Examen. Idem, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.24.170 (Works 4.235).

86 Bull, APH Sectio III.4.27 (Works 4.337). Bull notes, however, that this prevenient grace is not irresistible, so it does not necessarily result in justification and salvation.
divinum, he is granted a “right to the kingdom.” Yet, this “right” is, at best, “‘a right depending’ (jus pendens) on a future condition, to be performed if God will grant life: hence, this is a revocable right.” No person can expect to be granted the prima justificationis gratia unless he has surrendered in obedience to God secundum prae scriptum evangelii.\(^{87}\)

Bull concedes that one might legitimately be said to be justified per solam veram et vivam fidem, before revealing any evidence (fructus) of that justification, but this can only be affirmed if three conditions are met. First, this can only be true if one speaks of the justificatio prima. Second, it can only be true if we define viva fides as ‘faith perfected by love’ (πίστιν δι’ ἁγάπης ἐνεργομένη). Third, the evidence or fruits of this faith ultimately must include “a series and course (tractum) of visible works” which reveal “the internal virtues of repentance, love, etc.” Therefore, only one who “believes, repents of his sins, loves God, and on account of God [loves] his neighbor,” will be able to receive the prima justificationis gratia.\(^{88}\)

There is a gift of the Spirit that follows this first grace of justification and continues a lifelong process of sanctification. “This gift of the Spirit which follows justification differs in two ways from the grace of the same Spirit, which comes before and labors (praeveniens et operans) in the conversion of a man.” First, the sanctifying work of the Spirit following justification indwells every facet of a person’s life. Hence, not only does the Spirit “knock (pulsare) on the door of the heart; but, after conversion, it enters the interior of the house.” Only then does the Sanctissimus Spiritus fully indwell


the soul, a place he had previously “only visited (inviserat), and prepared by his prevenient grace (gratia praeveniente) into a habitation for himself.” Thus, this *donatio Spiritus Sancti*, “which is posterior to faith, repentance, and even justification, does not produce . . . new habits of virtue in a person.” Instead, it merely “confirms, strengthens, directs, increases,” and ultimately shapes “into solid habits, those more imperfect dispositions to virtue which had been before brought about by prevenient grace.”

Throughout the course of life, one can be said to be continually in a state of sanctification and justification. Bull confronts those who seek to evade the force of James’s argument for the necessity of works in justification by misinterpreting the distinction between first and second justification. For those divines, the *initium justificationis* is obtained *fide sola sine operibus*, but *justificatio secunda* (“the continuation, perfection, and completion of righteousness”) is accomplished *ex operibus*. They associate the former with Paul and the latter with James. The Roman Catholics use a similar argument, but Bull rejects them both. The Church of Rome, he suggests, understands first justification as the *primae gratiae infusion*, because they have confused final justification with the *habitualis gratiae infusion*. The reformers, on the other hand, err because they assume that justification can be received by faith alone; yet, no person can receive even the *prima justificationis gratia* if he has not fulfilled *poenitentiae opera*, works that must follow God’s gift of prevenient grace. To be sure, Bull concedes that fewer works will precede the first justification than will follow it, because after our initial

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90Bull *APH Sectio III.4.28 (Works 4.338).*
justification, “God, in proof of his passionate (flagrantissimi) love, pours upon us an abundant measure of his Spirit, by which we are enabled to produce exceptional and heroic works.”

Bull argues that there is a direct correlation between one’s present justification and the final judgment. Ultimately, Bull’s concept of “second justification” anticipates a time when those who “live under the gospel” will stand before God for a final adjudication of God’s case against them. The future judgment is best understood as the “public, open, and solemn” expression of the “declaration of the sentence by Christ, the judge,” a revelation of those who lived “according to the terms of the gospel covenant” (pacti evangelici) and those who did not. Bull posits a syllogism:

By whatever manner (modo) each person will be judged by God in the future age, by the same he surely will be justified by God in this life. But in the future age each one will be judged by God by works (not faith alone). Therefore, in this life each one is justified by God by works (not faith alone).

Bull concludes that “in the last judgment, the final acquittal and reward must be adjudicated (by the gracious law of Christ and on account of Christ) both for our faith and works,” that is, “for our faith which works (fidei nostrae operatrici).”

God’s Spirit empowers sinful humans to fulfill the conditions of the lex libertatis, thereby preparing the way for their final justification and salvation.

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91 Bull, HA Diss. Post. III.1.69-3.71 (Works 3.88-90). He argues that James makes it abundantly clear that faith considered apart from works is always dead, useless unto salvation. Paul rejects certain works, “not only from the first, but the second justification.”

92 Bull, HA Diss. Prior V.2.35-36 (Works 3.55).

93 Bull, HA V.1.35 (Works 3.55). Quomodo quisq(ue); in futuro saeculo a Deo judicabitur, eodem plane modo in hac vita a Deo justificatur. Atqui ex operibus (non fide sola) quisq(ue) in futuro saeculo a Deo judicabitur. Ergo ex operibus (non fide sola) quisq(ue) in hac vita a Deo justificatur.

94 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XIV.3.119 (Works 4.166). He amplifies that by this he means
Consequently, God’s judicial declaration in the *forum divinum* is on those already living a holy life, and he approves them as worthy of the reward of eternity through Christ.\(^95\)

Ultimately, however, this is all made possible because of Christ’s obedience: Christ’s expiation of sin on the cross made possible the sanctifying work of the Spirit, fulfilling the most fundamental condition necessary for God to fully demonstrate his mercy in justification.\(^96\)

**Christ’s Satisfaction:**

**Justification’s Meritorious Cause**

The question of merit is a key facet of Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification: justification is received solely by the merit of Jesus Christ.\(^97\) He insists that James never intended to suggest that works are the “principal or meritorious cause of our justification”; to the contrary, justification depends solely upon the “mere and gracious mercy of God the Father, which is established by the death and merit of Christ alone.”\(^98\) Thus, the atonement becomes the foundation for his personal profession of faith: “I openly declare to all men everywhere that I repudiate any merit for human righteousness, and I trust in the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, my dearest Savior, as the sole meritorious cause of my justification and salvation.”\(^99\)

\[^{95}\text{Bull, } HA \text{ Diss. Pror I.3.6 (Works 3.6).}\]

\[^{96}\text{Bull, } HA \text{ Diss. Prior II.5.14-15 (Works 3.20).}\]

\[^{97}\text{Bull, } HA \text{ Diss. Post. XII.7.252 (Works 3.214). See Titus 3:5-6.}\]

\[^{98}\text{Bull, } HA \text{ Diss. Prior I.8.10 (Works 3.10); idem, } EC \text{ Resp. ad Animad. XI.3.69 (Works 4.95); idem, } APH, \text{ Sectio III.9.33 (Works 4.344-45): Bull reaffirms that the “meritorious cause of our justification . . . must only be sought in the satisfaction of Christ our Lord.”}\]

\[^{99}\text{Bull, } EC \text{ Resp. ad Animad. V.4.32 (Works 4.44); idem, } EC \text{ Praefatio Censoris 2.2 (Works}\]
Bull unequivocally rejects works of condignity as a *perniciosissimus error*. In addition, he denies the possibility of works of supererogation, rejecting any notion of merit in respect to human actions, as if faith or works or any other thing causes us to be justified. He argues that “faith, repentance, hope, love, and the remaining virtues and our good works, by no means by themselves or their own merit avail to anyone being justified.” It can be said, he grants, “that a man is justified because of faith or because of works” only if this proposition is considered “in regard to the gracious gospel covenant, established by the blood of Christ, in which justification and salvation are freely promised either to faith or other works.”

Bull grants that there is a kind of worthiness required by God in all who hope to “be partakers of the future heavenly glory.” However, this worthiness “cannot be a worthiness of condignity or proper merit” as taught by Bellarmine and other divines of the Church of Rome. Rather, the “worthiness required in those that shall be partakers of

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4.2. Bishop Bull views the atonement in a manner that bears a striking resemblance to Anselm’s belief that Christ’s death satisfied God’s honor. Bull suggests that Christ’s death so satisfied God’s justice that our imperfect obedience becomes “acceptable” to God for our salvation. (Bull *HA Diss. Post.* V.5.92 (*Works* 3.111).) While on one occasion Bull affirms that Christ paid “the penalty for our sins (*poenas penderet pro peccatis nostris*),” suggesting a substitutionary view of the atonement, he is clear that the *satisfatio Christi* cannot be considered an “a payment of that very thing which was due.” Instead, as a result of Christ’s atoning work God’s justice is served and the penalty for sin is not executed. Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.7.343-44 (*Works* 3.298); and Bull, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XV.3.130 (*Works* 4.180-81).

100 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.4.325-26 (*Works* 3.280-81). This teaching would suggest that our good works merit heavenly reward “*propter intrinsecam eorum bonitatem ac dignitatem.*” Ultimately there is no legitimacy to such arguments because all works originate *ex gratia*. See also Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.6.328 (*Works* 3.283). He concludes, “*nulla prorsus sit contritionis seu poenitentiae nostrae condignitas.*”


102 Bull, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* IX.5.62 (*Works* 4.86); idem, “Sermon 1,” *Works* 1.20. Bull argues that there can be no “merit in our good works,” because “there is no just proportion between our works of righteousness” and the reward accompanying them. “Our good works are but a few seeds; but the reward is a harvest.”
the heavenly glory is only a worthiness of meetness, fitness, or due disposition to receive it: and this wrought in us by the grace, and accepted through the mercy of the gospel covenant, procured, ratified, and confirmed by the meritorious obedience and sufferings of the Son of God. Thus, in spite of our personal guilt before God, Christ is more than adequate to satisfy God’s justice on our behalf:

If one poses a question about the innocence of a person, whether he will be guilty or guiltless, we all must confess to this matter [i.e., to our guilt]. When accused as a sinner in the presence of God, no one can be freed from this accusation either by faith or works, or both at the same time, or by the strength of any other method, either in this life or in the age to come. But Christ has merited that no sinner, solely because he is a sinner and who also has not added to his other sins the crime of faithlessness or impenitence, should perish eternally: and this grace has been declared and sanctified in the gospel, which is called the new covenant. Therefore, no one can be freed from condemnation in any other way than through and on account of Christ and the gracious covenant established in Christ.

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103 George Bull, "Sermon IX: What that Worthiness is, and Wherein it Consists, which is Required of Those that shall be Partakers of the Future Heavenly Glory," in The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846), 1:219-23. The sermon text is Rev 3:4, and his primary focus is on the expression of worthiness (οὐκ ἄξιοι εἰσὶν”). He supports his argument with references to Luke 20:35; 21:36; 2 Thess 1:5; Col 1:12 and 2 Cor 3:6, arguing that this interpretation is the sense of the word “worthy” (ἄξιος) elsewhere in the Scripture (e.g., Matt 10:11-13). Bull’s understanding is quite similar to medieval views on meritum de congruo. (For a helpful discussion of the distinction between meritum de congruo and meritum de condigno, see McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 138-50.) Yet, Bull’s thought also bears striking resemblance to Davenant’s position. In his well-known images of a knight kneeling before his sovereign or a beggar reaching to accept a gift, Davenant notes that such actions might be considered a conditio sine qua non, a necessary condition, but they are not causes per se. Davenant and Bull would also agree that, while one who is justified might be called “worthy,” that worthiness neverpresumes any merit. Instead, that “worthiness” merely reflects a God-given “disposition or fitness” of those to whom the “kingdom of heaven has been given” (quibus regnum coeleste donatur). Davenant, Justification, 2.134. See Bull’s use of this in a footnote in his Apologia: Bull, APH Sectio VII.345 (Works 4.464). See also Bull, APH Sectio VIII.9.354 (Works 4.476).

104 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XIV.4.121 (Works 4.168-69); idem, HA Diss. Post. XVIII.7.344-45 (Works 3.298-99). Bull summarizes: God desired (because of his infinita bonitate) to bless us, but he was “hindered” (obstantibus) because of our sins. Therefore, he appointed Christ to die a horrific death so that he could “pay the punishment due to our sins,” provide visible evidence of his justice, and remove the barriers precluding the disbursement of his blessings. God then offered the remission of sins and the gift of eternal life by way of a covenant. Although the condition of this gospel covenant requires faith and works of repentance, no human action ultimately makes our salvation possible. God’s initiative to send his Son and his willingness to bless us (in spite of our unworthiness) is a part of God’s plan to provide satisfaction for our salvation but must be clearly distinguished from justification. That is, “obtaining salvation” must be clearly differentiated from its application through the gospel covenant.
While God’s decree necessitates condemnation for sin, Christ’s sacrifice removes the necessity of eternal death;\(^{105}\) that is, the “true promise of eternal life that occurs in the gospel has been established in the meritorious satisfaction of Jesus Christ” through his “consecrated and most precious blood.” Therefore, we must consider “Christ as the only propitiation” for sin and confess that “his most perfect obedience in life and in death is the only thing that makes our imperfect and spiritless obedience pleasing to God.”\(^{106}\)

**Justificatio Constitutiva: A Covenantal Relationship**

In conjunction with a forensic understanding of the nature of justification, George Bull develops his doctrine of justification within the context of God’s covenantal relationship with humanity. He assumes that a covenant necessarily implies an agreement between two or more parties in which there is a promise of a reward if all of the conditions of the agreement are fulfilled and the threat of a penalty if those conditions are not met.\(^{107}\) He argues that the “whole quarrel” in debates over justification “is about the indispensable cause (causa sine qua non) or condition on our part,” a condition which is “requisite for justification.”\(^{108}\) However, in reference to the justification of humanity, Bull is careful to differentiate between a “condition” and a causalitas efficax, and he insists that any conditions are inexplicable outside of the context of the covenant.\(^{109}\) He

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\(^{106}\) Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* V.5.92 (Works 3.111); idem, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* VII.24.53 (Works 4.74). Bull adds a citation from Clement of Rome in support of this view: “Sanguinem Christi intentis oculis intueamur, & quam pretiosus Deo sit ejus Sanguis consideremus, qui propter nostram salutem effusus toti mundo poenitentiae gratiam obtulit.”

\(^{107}\) Bull, “Discourse 5,” *Works* 2.52.


\(^{109}\) Bull, *EC Praefatio Censoris* 2.2 (Works 4.2).
alludes to four of these special agreements between God and humanity: the Adamic, the Abrahamic, the Mosaic, and the gospel covenants, but these four can ultimately be reduced to three: God’s initial covenant with Adam in his innocence, the Mosaic covenant, and the gospel covenant.

**God’s Initial Covenants with Humanity**

Bull argues that when God created our first parents, he initiated a covenant with them which offered the reward of eternal life upon the condition of faultless obedience (and a “real threat of everlasting death” for disobedience) to the commands of God. That is, within the context of his covenantal agreement with Adam, God implemented a *lex perfectae obedientiae*, “a law distinct from and prior to the gospel” that demanded absolute conformity to all of God’s requirements. Yet, this covenant was not limited to individual adherence to a rigid legal code; it also provided the “assistance of the Holy Spirit” so that humanity was given the hope of eternal life.  

Adam’s transgression voided this *foedus vitae*, and his descendants “were thereby wholly excluded from the promise of eternal life . . . and subjected to the necessity of death without hope of any resurrection.” Fallen humanity became subject to the “law of nature and the dictates of reason,” but this new “law” was no longer a law of perfect obedience, and it never afforded the opportunity of eternal life without the gratuitous intervention of God.

Our first parents alone (in a state of “innocence”) had the capacity for perfect

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110 Bull, *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.2.150 (*Works* 4.206-07); idem, "Discourse 5," *Works* 2.62. Without this promise of the Spirit, one would be forced to conclude that Adam could have merited eternal life “by his natural abilities.” Nothing, Bull insists, could be further from the truth.

obedience to the commands of God. Because Adam was our representative, humanity (through his agency) lost this capacity to meet all of God’s absolute requirements. Therefore, in light of this moral inability, Bull argues that it is absurd to conclude that God continues to expect perfect obedience from fallen humanity and that our failure to obey all of God’s commands condemns us to eternal death. This flawed deduction is analogous to a magistrate cutting off the feet of a criminal and then ordering him to walk away. His failure to obey an impossible command leads to condemnation. Nothing can be so far from our knowledge of God’s character.\(^\text{112}\)

Immediately after Adam’s transgression, God initiated a second covenant, a covenant of grace that was nothing less than the *ipsissimum evangelium*. Therefore, the first covenant God initiated after Adam’s willful disobedience was the gospel covenant (though only “obscurely revealed”). This was not a covenant governed by a *lex perfectae obedientiae*, but it did include the renewed promise that the Holy Spirit would enable Adam to fulfill the conditions required by the covenant.\(^\text{113}\)

Bull casts only a passing glance at God’s covenant with Abraham, but his conclusion is significant: God proffered a covenant of grace with the patriarch—a renewal of the covenant of grace made with Adam after the fall. Tragically, however, Abraham’s descendants (particularly during the time of their captivity) ignored this gracious pact and drifted into idolatry. At Sinai, therefore, God initiated another covenant that included “many ceremonies and rites” by which he intended to break the Israelites of


\(^{113}\) Bull, *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.7.156 (*Works* 4.214-15). Bull argues from Gal 3:8, 16-17, and he turns to Titus 1:1-2 to emphasize that this covenant of grace was revealed “ante Abrahamum, adeoque statim a lapsu primi hominis obtinuit.”
their “addiction to pagan rituals and superstitions, that is, that he might protect them from devotion to pagan idolatry.”114 Yet, like the provisions of the Abrahamic covenant, the foedus Mosaicum was not governed by a lex perfectae obedientiae: God’s previous covenants with Adam and Abraham prompted Bull to conclude that no law of perfect obedience existed post lapsum primi hominis. In addition, claiming Paul as his authority, Bull insisted that it was never possible to be justified per legem Mosaicam.115 Therefore, while this new covenant was necessary, Bull argues that the foedus Mosaicum was inherently limited. The limitations of that covenant fall under two heads: first, it lacked grace that actually pardons; and second, it lacked the grace which encourages and sustains believers.116

The lack of a pardoning grace in the Lex Mosaica can be seen in the fact that “sins which were committed through flagrant pride and rebellion could be expiated by no sacrifice, but were punished by death without mercy and pardon unless the special grace of God intervened.” Therefore, while the Law provided limited provisions for the remissio peccatorum, that forgiveness was “external, civil, temporal, and was seen only in this carnal life.”117 In addition, the lack of a sustaining grace is evident because the Lex


115Bull, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.2.150 (Works 4.207); idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. XIX.1.176-4.179 (Works 4.241-42). Bull bases his argument on his belief that this Law never offered the possibility of “true justification” or the “forgiveness of sins,” regardless of the fulfillment of any conditions. See also Bull, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.3.150 (Works 4.207) where he turns to Rom 4:13-16 and Gal 3:18-19 for biblical support. His critics claim that by this assertion “the very foundations (fundamenta) for the law and the Gospel are equally shattered”

116Bull, HA Diss. Post. VII.4-5.103 (Works 3.122). See Num 15:25-31. Bull argues that “just as the old law granted no full and perfect pardon for past sins, neither did it sufficiently help guard against future ones.” See also Bull, HA Diss. Post. IX.1.177 (Works 3.146). Bull notes that Rom 8:3 and Heb 7:18 and 8:7 echo this sentiment. (Note the change in pagination in the 1670 publication.)

117Bull, HA Diss. Post. VIII.10.121-22 (Works 3.141-42); idem, HA Diss. Post. X.3.208-09
Mosaica could not provide a lasting, positive influence to overcome the allure of lust. At best, “the corporeal religion prescribed in the law was a shadow (umbra) and type of that spiritual righteousness clearly revealed in the gospel.” Thus, God’s covenant with Moses at Sinai fell far short of the gracious promise of life given to Adam and renewed with Abraham. Galatians 3:13-14 contrasts the maledictio legis with the benedictio Abrahami, and Bull concludes that this blessing is nothing less than “the promise of the Holy Spirit.” This gift of the Spirit, he insists, was never a part of the Mosaic covenant.

Therefore, the Mosaic covenant was never a foedus aeternae vitae.

Bull hints that the covenant of Deuteronomy 29 and following “was part of the gospel covenant (Novum Testamentum) proclaimed by Moses himself,” and “was different from the covenant made on Mount Sinai.” Instead, this was “a renewal of God’s covenant with Abraham.” Bull states that this was the foedus evangelicum, but (as with God’s covenants with Adam and Abraham) the gospel was only “dimly revealed.” Bull asserts that God “instructed Moses to publish this new covenant (novum foedus) with the Israelites, or rather to renew” God’s earlier covenant with Abraham—a covenant that “especially demanded righteousness and was full of grace and mercy.” The intent of this process was to demonstrate that God’s earlier covenant with Abraham retained its validity and force, even after the institution of the ritual or ceremonial law. In fact, the

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(Works 3.175); idem, HA Diss. Post. VIII.7.119 (Works 3.139). Bull supports his argument by asserting that Paul assumes that “nothing in the Mosaic Law promises anything about the true and perfect remission of sins or liberation from divine wrath and the eternal death owed because of sin.”


120 Bull, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.7.155 (Works 4.214); idem, HA Diss. Post. 10.6.212 (Works 3.178). See Rom 8:3.
very salvation of the Jews depended solely upon that covenant of grace.\(^\text{121}\)

**The Gospel Covenant**

Bull affirms his confidence that “the genuine Son of God the Father” assumed the “emptiness” (\(\kappa\epsilon\nu\nu\delta\sigma\epsilon\lambda\)) of our human nature and willingly gave his life to make satisfaction for our sins. The “emptiness” (\(\textit{exinanitione}\)) he embraced by his sacrificial death on the cross “worthily merited (\(\textit{digne commeritum}\)) for us that God would grant to us those great gifts promised in the gospel covenant, namely, the remission of sins, eternal life, and that which is necessary to pursue both benefits, the gift of the Holy Spirit, under the conditions prescribed in that same covenant.”\(^\text{122}\)

This was the fulfillment of the \(\textit{foedus vitae}\) partially revealed to Adam, Abraham, and Moses, but for the first time unambiguously revealed in Jesus Christ.\(^\text{123}\) Because of his confidence that the \(\textit{foedus Mosaicum}\) was not a \(\textit{foedus vitae}\), Bull boldly insists that, since the time of the fall, there has been “no law or covenant other than the gospel” that threatens “eternal damnation” to those who disobey, and promises “eternal life” to those who fulfill the conditions of the covenant.\(^\text{124}\)

Christ said that he came “not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it,” but for Bull, this was no subtle revision of the Mosaic Law. Instead, the gospel covenant is governed


\(^{123}\)Bull, "Discourse 5," \textit{Works} 2.53. Bull believes that God has \textit{never} offered fallen humanity a “covenant of eternal life” other than this gospel covenant which was “confirmed and ratified in Christ, the second Adam.” See also Bull, \textit{EC Appendix ad Animad.} XVII.7.155 (\textit{Works} 4.214): \textquote[Nullum unquam aeternae vitae Foedus cum lapsi Adami posteris invitus Deus, quod non in Christo Servatore nostro, altero illo Adamo, confirmatum ac sancitum fuerit.]

by an entirely new law instituted by Christ himself, a law that emphasizes those
dimensions of the moral law which are “pious and just” (ἐὐσεβής καὶ δίκαιος), so that law
“had to be explained more clearly than ever before” and it “had to be fortified (muniendo)
with more demanding precepts.” The ceremonies of the Mosaic Law had been a “figure”
of the promise fulfilled in Christ; therefore, they were abolished. 125 By contrast, Christ
articulated his own law (e.g., the Sermon on the Mount) and required its “observance by
all Christians, tempered by the grace of the gospel, as an absolutely necessary (omnino
necessariam) condition of his covenant.” 126

Luther and other Reformed divines erred in their debates with the Church of Rome when they argued that Christ gave us no new law but merely reinterpreted the old
law without the accretions of the Scribes and Pharisees. Bull asserts that, for Luther and
his disciples, the purpose of the moral law is merely to persuade men to faith in Christ or
to provide basic moral standards that Christians must obey out of gratitude to Christ.
These standards, however, are not “inflicted upon us at the peril of our soul or as a
condition of the new covenant (novi foederis) that must necessarily be observed for
salvation.” It is from this error, he claims, that the “detestable teachings (execrabilia
dogmata) of the antinomians, libertines, and familists” emerged. 127

125 Bull, HA Diss. Post. VI.3.94-95 (Works 3.114). Bull cites Justin’s Dialogue as the source of
this comment.

126 Bull, HA Diss. Prior III.3.24-25 (Works 3.30-41). Bull concludes this argument with a
two-tiered syllogism: "Quisquis a Deo per Christum justificatur, per legem Christi absolvitur. At sola fide sine operibus nemo per legem Christi absolvitur. Ergo, &c." and "Quicunque per legem Christi absolvitur, eam legem impleat necesse est; At fide sola sine operibus nemo legem Christi implet: Ergo fide sola sine operibus nemo per legem Christi absolvitur."

127 Bull, HA Diss. Prior III.3.24-25 (Works 3.30-41). The “familists” were an Anabaptist
offshoot called the Family of Love. This group rejected any notion of original sin (and thus the need for
infant baptism), and they taught a form of sanctification that envisioned the possibility of sinless perfection.
They eventually merged with the Society of Friends. For a brief discussion of this movement, see Dickens,
Non-Meritorious Conditions of the Gospel

Bull assumes as a fundamental axiom that a person who dies at the moment of his justification will receive the reward of eternal life.\textsuperscript{128} Therefore, to be justified is to have received the gift of salvation, and any condition required for salvation (e.g., faith and repentance) within the gospel covenant must also be a requirement for justification. He clarifies, however, that his use of \textit{conditio} does not include everything “taught in the gospel, but only that which is required at the peril of the soul”; that is, he focuses only on those fundamental requirements vital to “eternal life and salvation.” Failure to perform these conditions makes justification impossible.

Bull differentiates between absolute and hypothetical conditions: the former include faith and repentance and anything necessarily associated with those graces. The latter include those “worthy fruits of true faith and repentance” customarily associated with a holy way of life, assuming God’s gift of “life and opportunity.”\textsuperscript{129} He ultimately draws two conclusions: first, “faith and works are jointly prescribed as the only condition of justification in the gospel covenant”;\textsuperscript{130} and second, anything required “at the peril of the soul” in the \textit{foedus evangelicum}, whether absolutely or hypothetically, is also necessarily required for justification.\textsuperscript{131}


\textsuperscript{128} Bull, \textit{EC Resp. ad Animad.} III.7.27 (\textit{Works} 4.38).

\textsuperscript{129} Bull, \textit{EC Resp. ad Animad.} VII.2.35-3.36 (\textit{Works} 4.50-52).

\textsuperscript{130} Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Prior} VI.3.43 (\textit{Works} 3.63).

\textsuperscript{131} Bull, \textit{EC Resp. ad Animad.} VII.4-5.37 (\textit{Works} 4.52); idem, \textit{APH Sectio} I.10.16 (\textit{Works} 4.322); idem, \textit{HA Diss. Prior} VI.11.48-12.50 (\textit{Works} 3.68-70). Bull argues that Reformed divines agree that “good works are entirely necessary to obtain salvation,” but many of them reject the necessity of good works in justification for two primary reasons. First, they believe that by this understanding “the merits of Christ are disparaged (\textit{detrahitur})”; second, they believe “that the words of St Paul are contradicted.”
The Fathers did not consider justifying faith to be a *simplex virtus*. Instead, they persistently spoke of faith in a more complex manner as *fides formata*, perfected faith, or faith that cannot be considered apart from love. *Charitas* (i.e., “the true love of God and neighbor”), he argues, is a “universal virtue that imbues, as it were, all the others with goodness and procures for them excellence and grace (*dignitam ac gratiam*).” He captures the essence of this thought with a quotation from Ignatius’s *Letter to the Ephesians*, which he summarizes as teaching that the “beginning (*initium*) of gospel righteousness is faith; however, its completion (*complementum*) is love (*charitas*). Moreover, these two joined together render a man in Jesus Christ, or according to the gospel covenant, τέλειον ‘perfect’, that is, accepted by God unto eternal salvation.” These words, he affirms, “succinctly and clearly portray (*exprimentium*) the substance (*summam*) of the doctrine that I defend.” Hence, for Bull, *fides justificans*, by necessity, must be understood in terms of *fides formata*.

Misperceptions that justifying faith can be narrowly limited to *notitia*, *assensus*, or *fiducia* contribute to errant understandings related to justification. For example, some assert that faith is limited to *cognitione quadam electis peculiari* that

Nonetheless, he responds, these arguments are counterproductive since they could be offered in equal force to deny the necessity of works in any part of salvation.

132Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* VI.8.46 (*Works* 3.66); *idem, HA Diss. Post. IV.5.75-76 (*Works* 3.94). Bull teaches that there is no doubt that “the faith which is attributed to justification” is limited to “that which is effective through love (*quae per charitatem sit efficax*)”.

always is “efficacious and saving” (efficax & salvifica); yet, our experience reveals that a similar knowledge “can be discovered in the worst people” (in pessimis reperiri posse), so this surely cannot be the full extent of justifying faith.134 Others consider faith as mere assent; yet, even the demons assent to the truth, so justifying faith can never be limited to assent. Perhaps the greatest error to emerge from misunderstandings about the nature of faith, however, relates to the solifidian understanding of faith as personal confidence in one’s state before God. Bull rejects as an abomination the teaching that faith is a form of "intellectual certainty (animi certitudo) with which a man believes that his sins are forgiven,” and (without any doubts) believes that “he has been accepted by God unto salvation.”135 To the contrary, argues Bull, fiducia, like notitia and assensus, “is common to the righteous and to the impious”; thus, if justifying faith can be limited to such a confidence, even a reprobate can make such a boast.136

Dr. Tully, claims Bull, falls prey to one of the worst consequences of this third error—belief that one can have absolute confidence in his state before God. According to Tully, since justification has already been obtained per solam fiden, ‘the continuation or preservation of our justification” is assured; that is, “once a man is imbued with justifying


135Bull, HA Diss. Prior IV.6.31 (Works 3.52); idem, EC Resp. Animad. XIII.5.99-7.102 (Works 4.138-43). Gataker holds that fiducia is the “primary act of justifying faith.” He claims that this trust can be clearly distinguished from “πληροφορία (i.e., full) conviction of God’s favor in the forgiveness of sins,” but Bull argues that Gataker’s true theology belies such a claim. Bull does not question the ability of a believer to have great confidence in his salvation. However, he rejects any idea that such a confidence can be based on a “special mercy” attributed to a person’s “particular and absolute election to salvation.” Instead, the only assurance Bull can affirm is that God offers a “general promise” that all who embrace the gospel will receive the rewards promised in the gospel covenant as long as they persevere in the faith.

faith, he cannot thoroughly fall away from it or perish eternally.”\(^{137}\) Adherents of such a view, argues Bull, “fall into the grossest absurdities,” reducing the faith to “mere enthusiasm.” Those who reduce faith to *fiducia* and “persuasion of our election” and believe such a confidence is the *primus gradus in scala salutis*, teach others to have confidence in their justification before their own obedience.\(^{138}\)

In opposition to these errors, Bull teaches that faith is “a work (*opus*) prescribed by God and made available to us through his grace”; therefore, it can be said that faith is “the root and foundation (*radix ac fundamentum*) of all other works and the mother (as it were) of the remaining virtues.”\(^{139}\) Ultimately, argues Bull, one cannot limit an understanding of justifying faith to a single dimension such as *notititia*, *assensus*, or *fiducia*. Rather, all three of these dimensions of faith are equally necessary. In addition, it is “nonsense” (*nihil valeant*) to presume that justifying faith can be reduced to “knowledge without practice, the assent of the mind without love of the heart, or trust in the promises of the gospel without a genuine effort to fulfill its conditions.” Thus, “absolutely no one is justified in the sight of God by faith alone without the other virtues.”\(^{140}\) Because of this truth, the “faith Paul attributes to justification must never be

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\(^{138}\) Bull *EC Resp. Animad.* XIII.7.102-03 (*Works* 4.143-44). Bull asserts that this “opinion is so foolish (*inepta*) and absurd that it is not worthy of refutation”; yet, at the same time, this teaching “is impious and dangerous, most worthy of all hatred and whatever anathema.”

\(^{139}\) Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* II.9.20-10.21 (*Works* 3.54-55). See idem, *HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.6.333 (*Works* 3.287-88) where Bull states: “granted that other virtues are no less necessary to the justification of man than faith itself, and faith properly does nothing more in this matter than another virtue, yet because from all the virtues faith is the one by which we embrace the gospel promise, by which we are justified; therefore, by a convenient expression, our justification can be attributed solely and habitually to that very virtue (e.g., faith), namely, by way of a metonymy.”

considered as a single and simple virtue.” Instead, *fides justificans* must be seen “to denote the whole condition of the gospel covenant; that is, in its fullest extent (*ambitu*) he (i.e., Paul) includes all the works of Christian piety.”

Tully rejects Bull’s assumptions and maintains that faith is a *simplex virtus* which is not “a condition prescribed in the gospel, but an instrument (*instrumentum*) apprehending and applying the righteousness of Christ alone.” Bull insists that this cannot be true, particularly if one accepts instrumentality “in its strict and proper sense” as the *causa efficiens minus principalis*. Faith can never be considered an instrument of justification in a causal sense because justification ultimately is an act of God’s grace alone “by which he pardons our sins and grants us salvation.” Therefore, it is absurd to suggest that faith or works or anything else ‘causes’ forgiveness or grants salvation.

Those (like Tully) who claim that faith is the *unicum instrumentum* of justification face an additional dilemma. How can they possibly affirm the necessity of repentance to one who has already been justified? They may concede that God indisputably requires *poenitentiae opera*, but they insist that there is no necessary

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141 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* IV.4.75 (*Works* 3.94); idem, *HA Diss. Post.* XII.8.253 (*Works* 3.215); idem, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XVI.1.136 and 4.139-40 (*Works* 4.189, 193). See Rom 3:24. Bull interprets Eph 2:8-9 to describe faith as “obedience to the gospel.” Bull notes that Gataker rejects his assertion that Paul defined faith as that which “denotes the whole condition of the gospel covenant” rather than as a single virtue. Bull responds by insisting that Paul “excludes all human works of every kind, and even faith itself” with regard to the *causam meritoriam* of justification. The *causalitatem in negotio Justificationis soli*, he argues, is the *Domini nostri Jesu Christi sacrificium propitiatorium*. This testimony alone, argues Bull, undercuts Gataker’s malicious allegations that Bull is aligned with Socinianism.


connection between those works and justification since “a man may obtain the righteousness of faith” even if death precludes the opportunity to produce poenitentiae fructus. Bull scoffs at such foolishness since poenitentiae opera are either absolute or hypothetical conditions: the former are “absolutely necessary to the attainment of the first justification” (justificationis primae), while the latter are necessary to continue the process of justification if God gives us “the opportunity to exercise them.”

While Reformed creeds affirm justification by faith alone, Bull insists that they define the term figuratively to represent grace. That is, “to be justified by faith alone (sola fide), is the same as to be justified by grace alone (sola gratia), and not to be justified by the merit of works (operum merito); and properly speaking, faith and the rest of the virtues, including good works, are equally important and necessary unto justification.” Subsequently, fides justificans is a fides viva non mortua that is so closely united with works that the two cannot be separated. Disputes over this distinction are little more than metaphysical subtlety and quibbling that inevitably lead the unwary astray.

Bull acknowledges that Paul occasionally separates faith from “charity and its works.” Yet, he insists that in all of the cases when Paul “attributes justification and

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145Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. VIII.55 (Works 4.76-77); idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. XIII.11.108 (Works 4.151). Bull favorably cites Davenant’s description of the thief on the cross, noting that as far as externa opera are concerned, the thief “humbly confesses his sin (and) challenges his companion to the fear of God and repentence.” The thief’s simple acknowledgement of and testimony for Christ are “external works, the best and most noble” possible under the circumstances. Once we move beyond these externa opera and consider the interna opera, we will surely find a heartfelt sorrow for his sins coupled with a true repentance. He loved his companion enough to long for his repentance and salvation. He “firmly believed in Christ the Redeemer,” and he testified about his “fear and love towards God.”

146Bull, HA Diss. Prior VI.2.41-42 (Works 3.61-62); idem, HA Diss. Prior VI.3.43 (Works 3.63). Bull emphasizes that justifying faith can be differentiated from “historic and temporary faith, and from the faith of miracles.” Once faith and works have been joined together, they unite “esse conditionem solummodo justificationis in foedere evangelico preaescriptam.”
salvation to faith alone, although he calls it ‘faith alone’ (\textit{fidem solam}), yet he understands it to include all of the other things which customarily follow faith.”\footnote{Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post. IV}.10.82 (\textit{Works} 3.101).}

When former Protestants taught that we are to be justified by faith alone, they did not understand this (justifying faith) in such a way that other virtues and other good works were excluded, as if by no means necessary to the justification about to be obtained, or that faith had in this matter of justification a greater effect than other virtues. But they wished this proposition received as true only to the extent that this expression of “faith (alone)” denotes such an obedience as has been united with confidence in the merits of Jesus Christ and a complete repudiation of our merits, and which therefore excludes all those works which are performed with any confidence in or (a favorable) opinion of our (own) merit.\footnote{Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post. XVIII}.6.341 (\textit{Works} 3.295).}

Bull rejects the opinion that Paul “speaks of a true and living faith which is efficacious by works,” while “James speaks of one that is false, deceiving, and in short, dead.” Bull agrees that a demonic faith is useless because “it does not produce charity,” but any attempt to suggest that James is speaking only of a false faith is repugnant since the text would then imply that by good works one displays a \textit{fides falsa ac mortua}. Bull will concede this thought only if one acknowledges “all faith by itself to be dead and to receive its life from works; that is, without works it holds no validity with God in reference to salvation.” Thus, just as true faith without works is useless to demons, so also true faith without works is of no advantage in our \textit{justificatio coram Deo}.\footnote{Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post. II}.1.59-6.64 (\textit{Works} 3.78-83). His opponents base their argument on Jas 2:17, 20, and 26, but Bull rejects their conclusion as absurd. For James, he argues, the word \textit{nekra} “does not relate (\textit{respicere}) so much the nature of faith, as to its effect; that is, he (i.e., James) does not mean that faith without works is not a true faith, but that such a faith is without effect, that is, it has no validity with God and is never advantageous for the justification or salvation of man.”}

Further, the context of the second chapter of James disproves the claim that
James speaks of a false or dead faith. Did Abraham have a false faith? Does false faith cooperate with good works to bring about justification? Bull responds negatively to both questions, insisting that James’s intent is to teach that there is a true faith that “lacks nothing except good works, and which, if good works are added to it, without a doubt will render a man pleasing to God and he will be saved. However a counterfeit (fucata) faith already is imperfect in general and cannot be joined with good works or if added cannot therefore become true.”¹⁵⁰

In opposition to solifidian attempts to argue that justification occurs sola fide sine operibus, the crux of the first dissertation of the Harmonia is that good works are necessary for justification. Bull argues that when James uses ἐξ ἐργῶν (in Jas 2:25), the particula ἐξ signifies a conditio praecedaneum. To suggest, therefore, that a person has been “justified by works (ἐξ ἐργῶν δικαιοθηθα)” is to say that “good works are a condition established in the gospel covenant (evangelico foedere) according to the divine decree,” a condition that must be performed in order for one to be justified.¹⁵¹

James’s defense of the necessity for bona opera in the justificatio hominis is neither novel nor unbiblical. To the contrary, this doctrine is evident on “almost every page of Holy Scripture.” The testimony of the prophets (e.g., Isa 1:16-18 and Ezek 33:14-16) demonstrates that such obedience is a conditio necessaria requisita for justification. Other passages in the New Testament (e.g., John 14:21, 23; Matt 11:28-29; 1 John 5:3; and John 15:14) also make it clear that no person can profess to be “a friend of Christ”

¹⁵⁰Bull, HA Diss. Post. II.4.61-62 (Works 3.80-81).
¹⁵¹Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.8.10 (Works 3.10-11). This use of conditio praecedaneum stands in contrast to his opponent’s use of dispositio praecedaneum.
unless he “observes all his commands (mandata).” Thus, the Scriptures indisputably teach that works of repentance are required for justification.  

Some suggest that Paul denies any necessary connection between works and justification, but Bull argues that this cannot be true. In Romans 2:13 Paul speaks of the law as “those precepts which are moral, that is, laws which are universal and perpetual”; Paul insists that obedience to this moral law is “absolutely necessary (omnino necessariam) to justification.” Calvin’s evasion that the apostle is speaking only in hypothetical terms is “clearly refuted by the sixteenth verse which all interpreters agree is joined with the thirteenth,” with the remaining verses comprising a parenthetical (παρενθετικόν) expression. Thus, Paul teaches that the “doers of the law (legis factorum) are going to be actually and truly justified on the judgment day.”

In another notable example, Bull asserts that Hosea 10:12 employs the “sowing of seed” as a metaphor to “signify the doing of those moral exercises and works” that enable men to “expect from God either reward or punishment. To sow in righteousness therefore is nothing else but to live righteously.” Therefore, the person who believes that he is exempt from Christ’s commands might as well “throw away his whole creed.” If it is unnecessary to obey “the precepts of Christ, it cannot be necessary to believe any

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153 Bull, HA Diss. Post. IV.8.78-80 (Works 3.97-99). Bull depreciates Calvin’s attempts to limit this discussion to the Jews. Instead, he affirms Bucer’s opinion that this verse teaches that “God rewards (reddit) each one according to his deeds (facta).”

154 Bull, HA Diss. Post. IV.8.80 (Works 3.99-100). Though some divines object that it is impossible to obey God, Bull avers to follow Bucer’s interpretation that a doer of the law is one who is “devoted to the law and meditates on it, so that all his life might be conformed to the law,” not necessarily someone who perfectly obeys that law. Hence, he concludes, “Paul’s opinion is favorably disposed to James’s opinion (in Jas 1:22).” See also Rom 13:10; Gal 5:14; and Jas 2:8.
proposition or doctrine in Christianity. If there be no danger in an ill life, there can be no danger in a wrong belief.”\(^\text{155}\) This admonition reflects Bull’s pastoral concern that solifidianism leads to moral depravity and theological bankruptcy, and it informs Bull’s understanding of the role of works of repentance in humanity’s justification coram Deo.

Some divines claim that repentance is limited to a dispositionem praecedaneam (rather than a conditionem praecedaneam) “by which a sinner is prepared for the remission of sins.”\(^\text{156}\) However, Bull insists that such a view is inadequate: without internal works of repentance, one can never be justified coram Deo.\(^\text{157}\) In Acts 2:38 and Acts 3:19 the Bible unmistakably teaches that faith, repentance, and moral transformation are “necessarily required for the remission of our sins.” Some divines agree that repentance and faith might be considered conditiones evangeli, but they reject any notion that “attributes justification to repentance.”\(^\text{158}\) Bull responds that the lex evangelica teaches that repentance is commanded promiscuously for all persons—even

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\(^{155}\) Bull, "Sermon I," Works 1:1-16. He equates this righteousness to that expressed in Psalm 11:7; Prov 11:5-6; Dan 12:3; and Matt 5:20. In this sermon, Bull is adamant that the Church of England teaches the “necessity of works truly good, of true contrition for their sins, of mortifying their sinful and carnal affections, of all the substantial works of piety, justice, and charity.” The church, he continues, teaches that without these virtues, no man should ever expect salvation; at the same time, no man should ever think that by these virtues he merits heaven. Merit is solely attributed to Christ.

\(^{156}\) Bull, HA Diss. Prior II.8.17-18 (Works 3.23-24). Those adhering to the view that repentance is limited to a “preceding disposition” assume that works of repentance actually precede faith. This is impossible, Bull claims, since one cannot possibly “grieve for sin, detest it, undertake the conduct of a new life, or perform the other works of repentance” without faith.

\(^{157}\) Bull, APH Sectio III.11.33-12.35 (Works 4.345-48). Bull supports his argument with texts such as Isa 1:16-18; Ezek 18:21-23, 20-31; Ezek 33:11-16; Mark 1:4; Luke 24:46-47; Acts 8:22; and 1 John 1:9. See idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. XIV.3.120 (Works 4.167) and idem, HA Diss. Prior V.5.38 (Works 3.58). Bull favorably cites Gerard Vossius as saying “opera nostra in salutis negotio spectari ut causam sine qua non, sive ut conditionem praecedaneam, quae promissum vitae aeternae individuo secum nexu trahat.” See also Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. IX.1.57 (Works 4.80). If anything, Bull argues, justification is attributed to other virtues more frequently than it is to faith.

\(^{158}\) Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. VII.34 (Works 4.49).
sinners who have never experienced God’s grace and salvation—in order that they might be reconciled with God. That which is required for reconciliation is necessarily required for justification. Thus, if repentance is not required for justification, it is not required at all.\textsuperscript{159}

This repentance, argues Bull, is not an \textit{opus unicum aut simplex}, but is instead “a combination (\textit{complexionem}) as it were of many works.” These works include,

1. Sadness or sorrow for sin (2 Cor 7:10)
2. Humiliation that enables one to acknowledge that he deserves God’s anger (Jas 4:10)
3. Hatred and detestation of sin (Ezek 6:9; 20:43; 36:31)
4. Confession of sin (1 John 1:9)
5. An ardent appeal for divine mercy (Acts 8:22)
7. Cessation from sin (Prov 28:14; Isa 1:16)
10. Forgiveness of those who sin against us (Matt 6:14-15)
11. Works of kindness or mercy (Dan 4:27).\textsuperscript{160}

In light of this unequivocal teaching that certain works are necessarily required

\textsuperscript{159}Bull, \textit{EC Resp. ad Animad.} VII.6.38 (Works 4.54). Bull argues that Article XX of the Thirty-Nine Articles supports his thesis. He summarizes that article to teach that “repentance (which includes all works preceding the justification of man) is entirely necessary unto justification.” He grants that Article XI (with its affirmation of justification by faith) appears to be contradictory. However, the emphasis on justification by faith is merely to insist that “in our contrition or repentance” there is nothing meritorious. See also Bull, \textit{HA XVIII.6.328} (Works 3.283). Bull concludes that it “should be carefully observed, the Augsburg theologians, when they so frequently urge faith . . . only wish to signify that whenever we are justified, remission happens freely, not from the merit of our works.”

\textsuperscript{160}Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Prior} II.7.15-16 (Works 3.21-22).
for justification, Bull concludes that it “is evident that the works which Paul excludes from justification” must be limited to those of a very specific nature.\(^{161}\) That is, it must never be said without qualification that Paul “excludes good works (\textit{bona opera}) from justification”; however, he does exclude those works which proceed “from human capacity and powers,” are “devoid of all supernatural goodness,” or can potentially allow persons to claim credit (\textit{hominibus gloriandi}) for their deeds.\(^{162}\) Ultimately, when the apostle condemns the “works of the law,” he excludes from justification all ceremonial works, those related to rabbinical traditions, moral works performed without God’s grace, and works performed so that one might merit his own salvation through their performance.\(^{163}\)

Although Paul’s assault on the Judaizers “affirms a person to be justified by faith without works of the law, it is most evident that faith is itself opposed by him not to the other virtues of the gospel, but to the Mosaic rites; hence, it [i.e., faith] is depicted by metonymy (\(\mu \varepsilon \tau \omega \nu \nu \mu \iota \kappa \omega \varsigma\)) or synecdoche (\(\sigma \nu \iota \nu \kappa \delta \alpha \chi \iota \kappa \omega \varsigma\)) for that universal spiritual righteousness prescribed in the gospel, and opposed to the carnal ceremonies of the old law.” The Judaizers, continues Bull, disrupted the church by suggesting that both Jews and Gentiles were required to obey Jewish ceremonial laws prior to becoming a

\(^{161}\)Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post.} VI.1.93-94 (Works 3.113); idem, \textit{HA Diss. Post.} XII.9-10.255 (Works 3.216). For example, Rom 9:11 “only rejects those works which any one might do by his own will (\textit{sponte}), before and without regard to the divine calling.” In addition, “when the apostle juxtaposes grace (\(\chi \acute {a} \rho \iota \nu \nu\)) with works (\(\epsilon \rho \gamma \alpha \varsigma\)) and asserts that the former destroys the latter (as in Rom 11:6), it is as clear as the noonday sun that the only works understood by him are those done without grace (\textit{absque gratia}); for surely the works of grace do not destroy grace.” See 2 Tim 1:9.


Christian. To overcome this threat, “the works Paul attacks must especially be understood as the works prescribed in the Mosaic Law.”

Gataker rejects this conclusion, arguing that the “law” in Romans 3:28 also includes the lex moralis, but Bull highlights two reasons to support his claim that Paul intends to denounce the lex ritualis, not the lex moralis. First, some Jews could legitimately claim “an exact observance” of both the ceremonial and the ritual obligations of this law. Paul, for example, spoke of himself as “blameless” under the law; and the rich young ruler claimed to have fulfilled the requirements of the commandments since infancy. The second reason is human sufficiency: Bull argues that human volition is adequate to meet the demands for externa justitia necessary to fulfill the requirements of the Mosaic covenant without any “special grace of the Holy Spirit.”

These two claims introduce a crucial facet of Bull’s argumentation: he denies that Paul viewed the Lex Mosaica as a demand for “perfect obedience” that was “impossible to be fulfilled.” Some turn to Galatians 3:10 to prove that justification is

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166 Bull EC Resp. Animad. XII.5.89-90 (Works 4.125-26). See Matt 19:20. Bull argues that, while Jews like Elizabeth and Zechariah and Simeon led righteous lives before the gospel, there were very few (“a drop in the ocean”), and St Paul was not concerned with them. Bull iterates an important caveat about these righteous men and women: their righteousness came, not from their obedience to the Law but from the gratiam evangelii. Idem, HA Diss. Post. VIII.4.116-17 (Works 3.136-37).

167 Bull, HA Diss. Post. VII.6.104-8.107 (Works 3.123-26). The nature of the sacrificial system itself is further evidence that the Lex Mosaica was never a lex perfectae obedientiae. If the Law demands faultless conformity to its precepts, the sacrificial system becomes meaningless, for any provision for the pardon of sins precludes the necessity for perfect obedience. Idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. XVII.1.146-47 (Works 4.202). In response to Gataker on this matter, Bull clarifies: “I deny that the Law of Moses was a law of most perfect obedience (perfectissimae obedientiae) in the same sense that I deny the gospel to be a law of most perfect obedience.”
impossible under the Law solely because of our inability to fulfill its requirements, but Bull concludes that we are capable of fulfilling all of the requirements of “external righteousness” without any special gift of grace. This must not, however, be confused with perfect obedience of the Law. Instead, he defines this compliance more liberally: a person is considered obedient if he is not “cognizant or aware” (sciens prudens) of anything in himself that is “contrary to the law of God, although perhaps in some things he may fall short through ignorance and inadvertence.” Bull maintains, therefore, that Galatians 3:10 must be viewed in the light of James 2:10, and he interprets the latter verse to imply that God does not consider all failures to be equally worthy of condemnation; God is not concerned with “every offense, even the slightest” (levissimam). Thus, “the context of the passage and reason itself make it clear that James is speaking of the sort of sins in which one is consciously aware that he is transgressing the law.”

Bull suggests that this view is not a dogma novitium but was “approved by all of the ancients who wrote before the Pelagian controversy had disturbed the streams of pure and primitive doctrine.”

In a striking contrast between the foedus Mosaicum and the foedus evangelium, Bull refers to the gospel as the lex Christi, arguing that, in spite of the radical, seemingly

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168 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* VII.10.108-11.109 (*Works* 3.128-29); idem, *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.17.164-18.165 (*Works* 4.226-27). Bull paints a picture of a person seeking to be obedient to Christ but who is condemned to the “dreadful suffering of hell” for “immoderate laughter, for a word mentioned rashly,” or for some other trifling error. Surely, he insists, such thinking is absurd and is inconsistent with our understanding of God. We must conclude, therefore, that verses such as Ps 5:5; Ezek 18:20; Rom 6:23; and 1 John 3:8 apply only to mortal sins.

169 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* VII.14.112-13 (*Works* 3.132-33). Justin wrote, for example, that no person will be justified by the opera legis, but this does not refer to “the impossibility of doing that which is impossible, but to our unwillingness to do that which is possible.” He also cites Basil, Chrysostom, and Augustine in support of this view.
impossible requirements of Christ’s commands, there is nothing within it that “cannot be fulfilled by the grace that it promises.” That is, while it was possible to fulfill the requirements of the Lex Mosaica without any special grace, the only way possible to fulfill the lex Christi is by grace. By that grace, however, perfect obedience becomes possible. He insists that the Fathers support this argument in their teaching that it is possible to achieve “perfect virtue,” that is, “to fulfill the law perfectly through the grace of God and to be without sin.”\footnote{Bull, \textit{EC Appendix ad Animad.} XVII.8.157-11.160 (\textit{Works} 4.216-20). He cites Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Augustine, and Jerome. Bull acknowledges an apparent contradiction within Jerome’s thought on this matter. Though Jerome agreed that God only commanded the possible, he errantly concluded that man “is unable to live without sin even by the grace of God.” Bull categorically rejects this view as an \textit{execranda blasphemia} that was condemned by Augustine.}

To his critics, such a view implies that Bull did not believe that he remained a sinner after he had been justified.\footnote{Truman, \textit{Prevailing Opinions}, 3-4. Although he acknowledges that Bull does not hold this flawed opinion, Truman fears that Bull’s interpretation might lead one to conclude “that no man sins while he lives a truly Christian life” and “so needeth no pardon, or Christ’s satisfaction for such failings.”} Tully responds, “Will he [Bull] deny that he himself is a sinner and wretched on this very account?” Will he deny that in his “current state of affairs, he daily, or more correctly hourly, deserves death?” Bull replies, I willingly confess before God and men that I formerly was a most grievous sinner, and on that account was wretched: indeed, I recognize that I still offend in many ways. But in modesty (confessing) that I am saved, I trust that by the grace of God I can deny that I am now a sinner in the sense that ‘sinner’ is used in Scripture, or that I am under the body of death, about which the apostle speaks, and on that account am wretched. . . . I altogether deny that a regenerate or truly pious person is called anywhere in Scripture \textit{τελειότωρος} ἄνθρωπον, ‘a wretched or miserable person,’ still less, wretched on this account, subjected to the body of death about which the apostle speaks.\footnote{Bull, \textit{APH Sectio IX}.26.164 (\textit{Works} 4.535).}

Bull acknowledges that even a regenerate person may lapse into mortal sin and
“fall away from grace” unless he repents. In addition, he points out that there are “daily sins which are common to all regenerate persons,” and while those sins do not cause us to “fall away from grace,” all of us are guilty of those offenses.  

This explains why we plead for daily forgiveness of our sins in the Lord’s Prayer. Further, no matter how pious our works, our sin totally eclipses that piety, and it is impossible for any person, no matter how ‘good,’ to “deserve the Creator and the everlasting possession and enjoyment of him.” In light of these claims and his belief that we are not equally culpable for each and every sin, it is difficult to sustain the allegation that Bull rejects the possibility of sin among the justified. He does, however, deny that a justified person will remain enslaved to sin. Nowhere is this more evident than in his interpretation of the seventh chapter of Romans where Bull specifically rejects the view that the second half of that chapter refers to a regenerate person. He argues that in Romans 7:7-14 the apostle is “speaking of the state of a man who is under the law,” and Bull concludes that it is unreasonable to assume that Paul begins to speak of a regenerate man in the following verses.


175 Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* IX.6.182-9.185 (*Works* 3.151-53). Bull argues that the claim that Rom 7 refers to the regenerate is “contrary to the understanding of almost all antiquity before Augustine, and was finally rejected by Augustine himself” because it is absurd. Some errantly claim that Paul’s shift from the past tense to the present tense suggests a total change of direction in the passage, but this, too, is absurd. See also Bull, *APH Sectio* IX.18.151 (*Works* 4.517). Bull insists that Calvin, Beza, and other Reformed divines are “compelled to confess that the apostle is not dealing with a regenerate person in verse fourteen” for at least two reasons. First, the fourteenth verse is dependent upon the preceding verses, and Paul surely does not refer to a regenerate person in those verses. Second, the apostle uses expressions like “to be carnal” and “sold under sin” in a manner that cannot reasonably be applied to a regenerate person when interpreted within their biblical context. How is it, then, that these divines are unable to see that the evidence that proves the first portion of the chapter cannot refer to a regenerate person also demonstrates that the following verses must not be related to a regenerate person? The Greek particula γιὰπ, he insists,
Bull also rejects the efforts of some divines to prove that “concupiscence remains even in the regenerate,” by claiming that Galatians 5:17 and Romans 7:19 refer to the same inner struggle within the regenerate.\(^{176}\) He grants that “some relics (reliquiae) of the old man remain even in the regenerate (renovatis),”\(^{177}\) but the purpose of the seventh chapter of Romans is to prove that the Mosaic Law, \(a\ gratia evangeli\(\textit{\textit{ii}}\) sejunctae,\) is ineffective and cannot “break the power of sin” or relieve “the wretched condition of a man.” For that reason, Paul envisions an internal conflict between “sensual appetites and reason” or those same sensual appetites and “an intellect imbued with the knowledge of the law.” By contrast, in the fifth chapter of Galatians he envisions an internal conflict between “the flesh and the Spirit.” Surely the former refers to the struggles of a carnal person while the latter refers to the struggles of a regenerate person. In addition, Paul suggests in Romans that the person is “unable to accomplish the good he prefers,” is “captive to the flesh,” and is “a slave of sin,” but in Galatians Paul implies that “the state of the regenerate is just the reverse” since the Spirit is opposed to the flesh. By the power of the Spirit within, a person “will not commit those sins” he might otherwise desire to do in the “flesh.”\(^{178}\) Thus, Galatians 5:17 and Romans 7:19 cannot refer to the same struggle within the regenerate.

makes it self-evident that the fifteenth verse is directly connected with the fourteenth. Finally, in an argument from silence he concludes that the Fathers of the English Church, if they had believed that the latter half of Rom 7 referred to a regenerate man, would surely have cited this passage in support of their confidence that concupiscence remains in the regenerate; however, they did not do so.

\(^{176}\) Bull, \(APH\ Sectio\ IX.10. (Works 4.498).\)

\(^{177}\) Bull, \(HA\ Diss. Post. IX.18.197 (Works 3.165; note that reliquiae is misspelled in the 1670 edition as “relliquiae”).\)

\(^{178}\) Bull, \(HA\ Diss. Post. IX.23.203-25.204 (Works 3.170-72).\)
Bull seeks to avoid two extremes in his evaluation of the place of works in the business of humanity’s justification coram Deo. The first position “makes works meritorious,” and Bull repeatedly emphasizes that all merit for our justification belongs to Christ alone. The second position insists that works are nothing more than “signs of that faith to which alone salvation is promised.” Yet, Bull argues that works of repentance are a conditio in foedere evangelico requistia, and God graciously promises heavenly rewards for the fulfillment of that condition.¹⁷⁹

The Rewards of the Gospel Covenant

A chief characteristic of a covenant is the promise of a reward, and Bull argues that this characteristic is revealed by the fact that the doctrine Paul calls justificatio generally is called remissio peccatorum by other biblical authors.¹⁸⁰ Yet, while the forgiveness of sins can be described as the praemii imputatio, Bull refuses to limit this reward to the forgiveness of sins alone. Instead, God promises an even greater reward to those who fulfill the conditions of the foedus evangelicum: the remissio peccatorum and vita aeterna.¹⁸¹ Bull summarizes this thought syllogistically:

He who is justified by the gospel covenant, by this has a right to all the benefits contained in that covenant; but among the benefits contained in the gospel covenant, the principal and that which completes all the rest is salvation and eternal life; therefore, he who is justified by the gospel covenant, has a right to salvation and


¹⁸⁰ Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. IX.2.58 (Works 4.80). Bull notes that there are some exceptions to this rule. Other New Testament writers use the word ‘justification’ in reference to the justificatio peccatoris in at least four instances (Matt 12:37; Luke 18:13-14; Acts 13:39; and Jas 2), but the last two of these references were written specifically to address misinterpretations of Paul’s teaching.

Bull attributes to his “Censurer” the criticism that this view blurs a necessary distinction between the granting of a reward and justification as a forensic declaration of innocence. Bull agrees that judicial acquittal in a forum humanum is not necessarily accompanied with a reward. He differentiates between a temporal ruling in a forum humanum and the biblical doctrine of justification, however, because the latter has been adjudicated in a forum divinum. When acquitted (or “justified”) by a judge in a forum humanum, the exonerated defendant receives no reward “because the law establishes no such reward for innocence.” By contrast, in the forum divinum, we all stand guilty before the judge. In spite of our guilt, however, if we possess “faith made effective by love” (δι’ ἐγκατατερισμον), we are “justified according to the gospel covenant,” and within that covenant God promises the remission of sins and a right (jus) to a heavenly reward (praemium coeleste). Bull takes great pains to reiterate, however, that there is no personal merit to be found in our works of repentance. God saves us by his grace. Similarly, reward comes only because of the free promises of God. By his grace, God has ordained that those who fulfill the conditiones evangeli will receive the promised reward.

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182 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad III.6.26 (Works 4.37): Qui ex foedere Evangelico justificatur, is hoc ipso jus habet ad beneficia omnia, quae in illo foedere continentur; Atqui inter beneficia in Evangelico foedere contenta primarium, & caeterorum omnium complementum est salus & vita aeterna; ergo qui ex foedere Evangelico justificatur, eo ipso jus habet ad salutem & vitam aeternum.

183 The “Censurer” is a moniker Bull uses for Charles Gataker, the critic who prompted his writing of the Examen. For this particular allegation, see Bull, EC, Resp. ad Animad. III.1.22 (Works 4.30).

184 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. III.2.23 (Works 4.32-33).


186 Bull, HA Diss. Post. V.5.92 (Works 3.111); idem, HA Diss. Post. XII.24.268 (Works 3.228).
This promise of a reward should bring great consolation to the Christian. Christian obedience can and should be motivated by this “hope of reward.” Some have perverted the gospel, suggesting that our obedience is nothing more than a “servile mercenary obedience”; that is, to obey with the hope of reward is to act with impure motives and is incompatible with the gospel. Bull admonishes,

This divinity may be read in every page of the writings of Crisp, Saltmarsh, Townsend, Eaton, and the author of the *Marrow of modern Divinity*, and many others of the same herd. Books they are, which though they highly deserve the flames, are notwithstanding still to be found in many families of schismatics, especially those of the independent and anabaptistical sect.\(^{187}\)

This error must be rejected, continues Bull, because it is “repugnant to the whole tenor of sacred Scripture.” The potential consequences are horrific: this “enthusiasm commonly leads the way to atheism or infidelity; and a fanatic religion at last ends in no religion. It is no wonder that a doctrine designed to banish the future reward out of men’s thoughts and consideration, should soon proceed so far as to discard it from their belief.”\(^{188}\)

Factors Shaping Bull’s Thought

In addition to his attempt to interpret faithfully biblical teachings on the doctrine of justification, Bull’s conclusions were shaped by a trinity of forces: a reaction against the moral decay promoted by antinomian sentiments within English society, a reaction against perceived excesses by Calvinist divines in the Church of England, and an unapologetic reliance upon antiquity as a reliable and authoritative voice within the

No matter how excellentissima one’s actions, there can never be any sense that those actions merit reward from God.


\(^{188}\) Ibid., 357-58.
church of his own day. Bull’s apparent preoccupation with antinomianism has already become evident.

Although he may not have actively promoted “Arminian divinity,” Bull is arguably aligned with anti-Calvinist views. He implies that his opponents have uncritically accepted a theological system that ignores the teachings of antiquity. For that reason, he notes that Reformed divines, because of their flawed interpretation of the “eleventh article” of the Church of England, hold him (and those sharing his views) to be “innovators” (novatores) for at least four reasons. First, “we prefer the consensus of all antiquity to the single verdict (judicio) of Calvin.” Second, we “do not hold the canons of the Synod of Dordt to be in the same place and to have equal honor with the decrees of the general councils” (decretis conciliorum universalium). Third, we “are unwilling that that system of theology . . . should any longer prevail in our schools and universities, such that one is not permitted even to open his mouth or mutter anything against its definitions, theories, or conclusions.” Fourth, “after the Sacred Scriptures,” we hold in highest esteem the teachings of antiquity and “carefully follow its unanimous judgment wherever it can be discovered . . . while at other points each man’s opinion must be left (relinquendam) free.”

Bishop Bull insists that even a rudimentary understanding of the English church acknowledges that “our Reformation was shaped by the pattern of the ancient catholic church in all things, insofar as it was possible (id potuit atque aetas pateretur)

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189 Every, High Church Party, 17. Every argues, for example, that in “Bull’s eyes Episcopius and Grotius are dangerous writers, who by their views on the primitive Fathers had opened the way to discredit the authority of the Nicene Creed.” Note, however, that Packer identifies Bull with “a strong anti-Calvinst polemic.” Packer, “Doctrine of Justification,” 25.
and the age permitted.”\(^{191}\) Thus, while distancing himself from the Church of Rome, he persistently affirms the catholicity of the English church. At the same time, he also is unwilling to accept Reformed views uncritically: if there is any disagreement, he is unlikely to reject the teachings of the Fathers in favor of the reformers unless the evidence is compelling. In light of this perspective, it is unsurprising that Bishop Bull frequently cites Augustine.\(^{192}\)

Alister McGrath argues that Augustine established the theological “framework” that would govern all future discussions of justification.\(^{193}\) George Bull’s doctrine of justification arguably owes a debt to Augustinian thought. At least five broad areas of convergence emerge when comparing Bull’s thinking with that of the Bishop of Hippo.\(^{194}\) First, Bull finds common ground with Augustine’s emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in both the event and the process of justification.\(^{195}\) Second, Bull’s teaching

\(^{190}\)Bull, *APH Sectio* I.3.5-6 (*Works* 4.307-08).


\(^{192}\)It is beyond the scope of this investigation to fully evaluate Bull’s use of the Fathers, but Appendix 1 below contains a general index of Bull’s cited sources.


\(^{194}\)Bull mentions Augustine frequently, and it is noteworthy that, in addition to the five areas of agreement noted above, Bull also cites Augustine in support of several other claims. For example: (1) justifying faith may be lost: *APH Sectio* VII.19.94 (*Works* 4.436); (2) the latter half of Rom 7 does not refer to a regenerate person: *APH Sectio* IX.6.133-34(*Works* 4.492); (3) the covenant at Sinai can be distinguished from the rest of the OT message, suggesting that God retained a covenant of grace even after the giving of the ritual law: *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XXI.2.195 (*Works* 4.268); (4) no salvation was to be found in the OT Law: *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XXII.2.201 (*Works* 4.277); and (5) we are able to perfectly fulfill the requirements of the law: *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.10.158 (*Works* 4.218); and *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.13.161 (*Works* 223).

\(^{195}\)For example, Augustine emphasizes the Spirit’s role of granting prevenient grace to prepare us for justification. Augustine, *The Spirit and the Letter*, in *Augustine: Later Works*, ed. John Burnaby
echoes Augustine’s emphasis on the primacy of grace in justification. Third, Bull, like Augustine, repeatedly rejects all human merit in the business of justification. Fourth, Bull shares common ground with Augustine’s teaching on the relationship between works and justification, and they both highlight the supremacy of charity in that process. Fifth, Bull, like Augustine, proffers an understanding of humanity’s justification that does not include the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness.

This apparent consistency in thought does not suggest that Bull’s doctrine of justification could be called Augustinian without qualification. In addition to his rejection

(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1960), 11.201; 31.218; 56.241. References include numbered paragraph and page numbers. See also McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 45; and Toon, Justification and Sanctification, 49. In addition, in light of his confidence that the process of justification is transformational in character, Augustine views justification and sanctification as virtually indistinguishable. Anthony N. S. Lane, Justification by Faith in Catholic Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment (London: T & T Clark, 2002), 136, 154. See also McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 49.

Augustine, Spirit and Letter, 4.197-6.198. Augustine acknowledges that some men may actually come to know about God through natural revelation; however, without his help, they cannot know him (ibid., 20.209). Augustine highlights our ability to obey the commands of God by the grace of God (ibid., 62.245-63.247). Elsewhere he writes that because “all things are possible with God,” he was unwilling to “deny the possibility of perfection in this life” (ibid., 7.199). Bull cites Augustine in favor of his arguments on the primacy of grace. Bull, HA Diss. Post. XVIII.5.327 (Works 3.28; and idem, HA Diss. Post. XVIII.13.356 (Works 3.310).


Ibid., 26.215. Bull cites Augustine’s view on the relationship of faith and works in support of his argument. Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. I.6.12 (Works 4.16); idem EC Resp. ad Animad. XIII.15.113 (Works 4.157); and idem, APH Secto IV.1.37 (Works 4.350). In addition, Bull cites Augustine in support of his claim that God never commands impossibilities. Idem, HA Diss Post. VII.14.113-14 (Works 3.133); and idem, EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.11.159-12.160 (Works 4.220-21). McGrath concludes, “It is for this reason that it is unacceptable to summarize Augustine’s doctrine of justification as sola fide iustificamur—if any such summary is acceptable, it is sola caritate iustificamur. For Augustine, it is love, rather than faith, which is the power which brings about the conversion of people” (McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 45-46). G. R. Evans observes that in De Fide et Operibus, “Augustine insists that faith and works must always go together, that there can be no real faith where there is not a striving for amendment of life.” G. R. Evans, Problems of Authority in the Reformation Debates (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 138.

McGrath, Iustitia, Dei, 47-48. Although this is an area of agreement, it must be noted that Augustine, unlike Bull, does not specifically reject alternative teachings on this matter. Instead, Augustine never really considers such a view in light of his conviction that justificatio means “to be made righteous.”
of Augustine’s view of infused righteousness, there are other areas of significant disagreement between Bull and Augustine. For example, unlike Bull, Augustine’s interpretation of the “works of the law” in Romans 3:28 includes not only the ritual or ceremonial law but also the moral law. Bull also is compelled to qualify Augustine’s oft-stated comment suggesting that good works cannot precede justification. In addition, although he briefly hints at the possibility of a forensic interpretation of justification, Augustine does not explicitly embrace this view which is so central to Bishop Bull’s thought. In spite of these (and other) areas of disagreement, it nonetheless is reasonable to argue that Bull’s view of justification can be considered “Augustinian.”

The Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arguably precipitated a revival of interest in Augustine, but McGrath is surely correct when he

200 Augustine, Spirit and Letter, 42.226. Augustine teaches that a person will “be made righteous” in the act of justification (ibid., 17.206). See also Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XL 9.77 (Works 4.107) for his rejection of this teaching.


202 Bull, HA Diss. Post. III 2.70-71 (Works 3.89). Augustine, he insists, cannot mean all works. Instead, he is affirming that one must never look for a “long and ever-flowing work” (longa ac jugi operatione). That is, there will be fewer good works preceding justification than following it (pauci or a ac minora esse opera, quae justificandum praecedunt, quam quae justificatum sequuntur).

203 Augustine, Spirit and Letter, 45.229.

204 Toon, Justification and Sanctification, 48; Geisler and MacKenzie, Roman Catholics and Evangelicals, 93.

205 Alan Clifford, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640-1790, An Evaluation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 226. Clifford identifies three distinct schools of thought in terms of the relationship between faith and works in the justification of humanity. He argues that the “Augustinians proper” teach a twofold justification (the first by an infusion of grace at baptism; the second by faith and works.) In contrast, the “semi-Augustinians teach that good works are necessary for justification in the sense of a concomitant or feature of justifying faith,” and the anti-Augustinians argue that good works are merely evidence of justification.
maintains that “all medieval theology is ‘Augustinian’ to a greater or lesser extent.”

Therefore, while one might describe Bull’s theology as ‘Augustinian,’” this does not necessarily suggest that Bull’s conclusions were consonant with those of the reformers. The question driving this project is whether George Bull rejected Reformation tenets and an evangelical consensus on the doctrine of justification. More specifically, I will determine whether Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification was consistent with the teachings of other Protestants within the Church of England.

In seeking to determine whether there is continuity or discontinuity between Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification and other views within the Church of England, one must first establish benchmarks which can be used to determine whether common doctrinal trajectories even exist within Anglicanism. One might grant, for example, that all of the English Protestants rejected the Tridentine doctrine of the infusion of inherent righteousness as the formal cause of justification, but is anti-Roman rhetoric the only common ground in their thought on justification? Is it possible to trace one or more theological traditions that traverse the period from the early Henrician Reformation to the later Caroline divines of the Restoration Church? This study is predicated upon the premise that there is no single, clearly defined, and universally accepted doctrine of justification within the Church of England, but there are common streams of thought that can be used to identify broad parameters of doctrine which can reasonably be considered both ‘orthodox’ and ‘Anglican.’

In light of this summary of Bishop Bull’s teachings, numerous questions emerge as areas of interest in the study of the doctrine of justification in the English

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206 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 38.
church. What is the formal cause of justification? Is the nature of justification defined forensically or in some other manner? Is justification defined as an event, a process, neither an event nor a process, or some combination of the two? Is the framework for justification defined in terms of God’s covenants with humanity? What is the character of justifying faith? What is the relationship of works to justification? What is the relationship between justification and sanctification? Responses to questions of this nature may be gleaned from the church’s formularies and from the teachings of her principal leaders, and these responses will provide the necessary structure for the remainder of this investigation.
Nearly twenty-five years after Bishop Bull’s death, one of his admirers published a discourse on the fundamentals of the faith. The fourth of seven articles that Daniel Waterland identifies as essential to the very character of Christianity is an affirmation that Jesus must be acknowledged as our “Messiah and Mediator.” Echoing Bull’s thoughts, Waterland affirms that Christ alone, by his satisfaction for our sins merits the justification of humanity coram Deo: “To advance one's own righteousness in opposition to justification by the meritorious sacrifice of Christ, or as sufficient without it, is plainly altering the terms of acceptance, and frustrating the covenant in Christ's blood, as it is making him to have ‘died in vain,’ which is subverting the whole Gospel.” Following hard upon the heels of this affirmation, the fifth article includes the biblical teaching of repentance and a “holy life” as fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith.¹

¹Daniel Waterland, "A Discourse of Fundamentals, Being the Substance of Two Charges Delivered to the Middlesex Clergy, at the Easter Visitations of 1734 and 1735," in The Works of Rev. Daniel Waterland, D.D., 3rd ed. (Oxford: Univeristy Press, 1856), 5:74-82. Emphasis is in the original. Waterland’s Summary View articulates his doctrine of justification. The emphasis on the forensic nature and the covenantal context of justification in that brief treatise bears a striking resemblance to and frequently cites the works of Bishop Bull. For example, Waterland writes: “It may be noted, that that faith which I here call a condition, is of much wider compass than that particular kind of faith which is precisely the instrument of justification. For faith, as a condition, means the whole complex of Christian belief as expressed in the creeds; while faith, as an instrument, means only the laying hold on grace, and resting in Christ's merits in opposition to our own deserving: though this also, if it is a vital and operative principle, (and if it is not, it is nothing worth,) must of course presuppose, carry with it, and draw after it, an hearty submission to, and observance of, all the necessary conditions of that covenant of grace, wherein we repose our whole trust and confidence.” Daniel Waterland, A Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification, in The Works of Rev. Daniel Waterland, D.D., 3rd ed. (Oxford: University Press, 1856), 6:29. Emphasis in original.
Stephen Sykes argues that “within Anglicanism there is a long tradition of this type of direct appeal to the ‘fundamentals of Christianity.’” While it is beyond the scope of this investigation to determine whether a narrowly defined doctrine of justification may be codified as ‘fundamental’ to Anglicanism, justification is one of the principal doctrines that distinguished the Church of England from the Church of Rome. Yet, there has always existed within Anglicanism a fluidity of thought in terms of doctrinal formulations. Ian Green notes that even the Thirty-Nine Articles (“the most explicit statement” of the church’s doctrine) framed the discussion of doctrinal fundamentals by warning “against what should not be believed rather than laying down what should be believed down to the last detail.” However, this apparent lack of specificity does not suggest that there are no “boundaries” beyond which one may no longer be considered an heir to the English Reformation. To the contrary, by examining the written works that helped shape the earliest foundations of Anglicanism one is able to ascertain common beliefs that coalesce to form a broad, yet definable theological tradition. In order to begin outlining that tradition, this chapter will survey the teachings on justification that emerge from the formularies and the writings of influential divines within the English church. In


4Ian Green, "Anglicanism in Stuart and Hanoverian England," in A History of Religion in Britain: Practice and Belief from Pre-Roman Times to the Present, ed. Sheriden Gilley and W. J. Shiels (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 170. Spurr compellingly argues that “doctrinal unanimity was not the point. The Church of England had never been united by a detailed and explicit confession of faith; her Articles were short, often vague, and designed to foster unity rather than enforce orthodoxy. The church derived unity from other sources, from her Prayer Book and from her bishops.” John Spurr, The Restoration
so doing, I will not articulate a consensus statement on the doctrine of justification. Instead, I will begin to identify doctrinal trajectories that preceded Bishop Bull’s entrance into this debate.

**Formularies, Confessions, and Articles**

The checkered history of the English Reformation was punctuated by legislative intervention and royal fiat. Perhaps because of this political dimension, England’s succession from Rome never ensured the ascendancy of Protestantism in the realm.\(^5\) Henry VIII retained conservative views, and the popular undercurrent for reform was not widespread, at least initially. Regardless, however, of whether one argues for a Reformation “from above” or “from below” or whether one insists that the Reformation was “short” or “long,”\(^6\) the clergy laid the intellectual foundations for doctrinal development within the Church of England. In addition to other written works, influential divines helped craft several important public documents which influenced the development of the doctrine of justification within the English church. Yet, these documents also fostered ambiguity in English debates on justification by proposing seemingly incompatible views on the nature of humanity’s justification *coram Deo*.

Following England’s break with Rome, Henry VIII sent a delegation to Germany to explore the possibility of an agreement with the Lutherans. Although he

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never officially adopted the ensuing Wittenberg Articles, Henry sought to capture his perception of the spirit of those negotiations when he authorized publication of the Ten Articles in 1536.\footnote{The Wittenberg “articles” proposed a confession of faith that reflected German Lutheran and English Protestant priorities. MacCulloch notes that the articles were never officially recognized in either Germany or England, but their influence on the Ten Articles is readily apparent. Diarmaid MacCulloch, \textit{Thomas Cranmer: A Life} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 161. Articles 4 and 5 posit a three-dimensional view of justification that includes contrition, faith, and moral transformation while rejecting any merit for good works. Gerald Bray, \textit{Documents of the English Reformation} (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 123-37.} That document defines justification as the “remission of our sins and our acceptation or reconciliation into the grace and favour of God, that is to say, our perfect renovation in Christ.” This justification is granted by God’s grace and mercy, merited solely by Christ’s sacrificial death, and attained “by contrition and faith joined with charity.” Thus, works of repentance are necessarily required for salvation.\footnote{Bray, \textit{Documents}, 162, 170. See Article 5. In the same year the king published the \textit{Articles Devised by the Kinges Highnes Majestie, to Stabylshe Christen Quieties and Unitie Amonge Us, and to Avoysde Contentious Opinions: which Articles be also Approved by the Consent and Determination of the Hole Clergie of this Realm}. That document employs the same definition of justification as that of the Ten Articles. Charles Lloyd, ed., \textit{Formularies of Faith Put Forward by Authority during the Reign of Henry VIII} (Oxford: University Press, 1856), xxvi-xxvii. \textit{The Institution of the Christian Man} was published in 1537 but did not alter the wording of this description of justification.}

In 1543 the ‘King’s Book’ (\textit{The Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man}) was published.\footnote{Henry VIII initiated this work in order to revise the so-called "Bishop's Book," the \textit{Institution of a Christian Man}. Dickens notes that Cranmer was instrumental in the crafting this document but concludes that it is a “monument of Henry’s experiment in Anglo-Catholicism. Dickens, \textit{English Reformation}, 208.} That work defines justification in Augustinian terms as “making of us righteous afore God, where before we were unrighteous.” Although “God is the principal cause and chief worker of this justification in us,” and it is by his grace that we are empowered to respond to this initiative, works are nonetheless required for our justification. This first justification (i.e., “our first coming into God’s house”) can be lost if one lapses into mortal sin and can only be reclaimed by a spirit of contrition and
acts of penance. Therefore, in order to avoid falling into error, we must acknowledge that justification does not occur *sola fide sine operibus*. To the contrary, “no faith is sufficient to justification or salvation, but such a faith as worketh by charity.” That is, “our good works which we do, being once justified, by faith and charity, avail both to the conservation and perfection of the said virtues in us, and also to the increase and end of our justification and everlasting salvation.” This is not to say, however, that we are actually justified by our works. We are justified by grace alone, so we can make no claim of merit in the process of our justification.\(^\text{10}\)

The most significant officially-sanctioned theological document to emerge during the early years of the English Reformation was the Forty-Two Articles. This work was initially published in 1553 just prior to Edward’s death and was later revised and republished as the Thirty-Nine Articles. Bray suggests that this “uncompromisingly Protestant” work was “the most advanced systematization of Protestant theology then in existence anywhere.”\(^\text{11}\)

In Article XI of the 1553 edition, Archbishop Cranmer describes justification with a severe economy of words: “Justification by only faith in Jesus Christ, in that sense as is declared in the Homily of Justification, is a most certain and wholesome doctrine for Christian men.” This article was completely revised in 1563 to state: “We are accounted righteous before God (*iusti coram Deo reputamur*) only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that

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\(^{10}\)Lloyd, *Formularies*, 364-69.

\(^{11}\)Bray, *Documents*, 284. The first major revision to The Forty-Two Articles was actually published as The Thirty-Eight Articles in 1563, but the 1571 revision quickly eclipsed the earlier version.
we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.” In the following three articles, justifying faith is described as “true and lively” (vera et viva), the source of all good works. The articles reject works of condignity and supererogation and insist that all works performed prior to justification are unpleasant to God (minime Deo grata sunt).12

While the 1563 revision adds greater precision to this affirmation of justification sola fide,13 the church’s official documents remain, at best, very general guides in the explication of this doctrine. It fell to the clergy to flesh out the full implications of this doctrine, so the remainder of this chapter will focus on the written works of six influential divines from the first two generations of English reformers. William Tyndale, Thomas Cranmer, Robert Barnes, Hugh Latimer, John Hooper, and John Jewel reveal both unity and diversity of thought, providing a representative glimpse of the development of the doctrine of justification in the Church of England.

William Tyndale

William Tyndale was one of the earliest advocates for reform within the English church. His greatest contribution to the English Reformation was his translation of the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures into English. Yet, he also is credited with introducing Luther’s doctrine of justification to a broader audience in England.14 While his undisguised dependence upon Luther has prompted the impression that he was a

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12 Bray, Documents, 291-92.

13 McGrath, Iustita Dei, 263. McGrath also notes that this statement reveals the influence of Melanchthon’s Apologia.

theological lightweight who added little to the debates on justification,15 Tyndale’s works provide a helpful glimpse into early Protestant thought during the nascent years of the Reformation in England.

Tyndale argues that humanity has become captive to Satan as a result of sin and can only be freed from that captivity by the grace of God through the blood of Christ. The “whole nature of man is so poisoned and so corrupt, yet, and so dead, concerning godly living or godly thinking, that it is impossible for him to keep the law in the sight of God.”16 This moral inability makes it necessary for us to turn to a mediator to merit our justification coram Deo. Just as Adam bequeathed to humanity the guilt of sin even though that sin was unmerited, so Christ, as the second Adam, bequeaths life to us, even though our “spiritual birth” is undeserved.17 Thus, in justification we are released from our bondage to Satan because of Christ’s satisfaction: to “justify from sin” is to “forgive and remit sin, and to heal the conscience, and certify a man, not only that he is delivered from eternal death, but also that he is made a son of God and heir of everlasting life.”18


17Tyndale, Romans, 132, 136, 144-45.

Tyndale understands justification in factitive rather than declarative terms. That is, to be justified is to be made righteous and thereby reconciled with God through the forgiveness of sins. Tyndale argues that this righteousness is a gift from God in which we are made “partly righteous in ourselves and unrighteous.” We are righteous to the degree that we love, and we are unrighteous to the degree that our love is imperfect. Our good works are “the effect of righteousness, and thereto an outward testimony and certifying of the inward righteousness as sourness is of leaven.” Consequently, Tyndale does not mention the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to humanity. Instead, he speaks of the imputation of faith as righteousness; that is, justifying faith, though imperfect, is reckoned by God as our righteousness. Justification, therefore, includes the forgiveness of sins and God’s accompanying gift of inherent righteousness, and this gift is received by faith alone.

Tyndale places great emphasis on justification by faith. He argues that the


20 Tyndale, *Exposition*, 267-268. He writes, “Abraham’s circumcision was an outward sign, whereby he declared his righteousness which he had by faith, and his obedience and readiness unto the will of God; even so are all other good works outward signs and outward fruits of faith and of the Spirit; which justify not a man, but shew that a man is justified already before God, inwardly in the heart, through faith, and through the Spirit purchased by Christ’s blood.” Tyndale, *Romans*, 133.


22 Tyndale, *Romans*, 133. See also Tyndale, *Exposition*, 267, where Tyndale argues, “And when I say faith justifieth, the understanding is, that faith receiveth the justifying. God promiseth to forgive us our sins, and to impute us for full righteous. And God justifieth us actively: that is to say, forgiveth us, and reckoneth us for full righteous.” See also Tyndale, *Pathway*, 15.


“sum and whole cause” of Paul’s epistle to the Romans is “to prove that a man is justified by faith only.” Therefore, anyone who denies this truth willfully cuts himself off from the gospel message.”

Because faith is an undeserved gift from God, to speak of being justified by faith is to affirm that we are justified only because of Christ’s merit, through no merit of our own.

Justifying faith is confident belief in God’s promises. This faith never stands alone, however. It is “lively” and can be considered the “mother of all goodness.” That is, “God’s mercy maketh my faith; and my faith, my love; and my love, my works.” This is a logical order, however, and does not imply that faith can exist at any time without works. Justifying faith can never be separated from charity and works of repentance, but those works will never justify us *coram Deo*.

Tyndale argues that Paul and James clarify the relationship between faith and works in humanity’s justification. Paul speaks of faith as the means by which we receive justification and are made righteous; James warns against a false, dead faith characterized

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25Tyndale, *Romans,* 144.


29Tyndale, *Romans,* 135. Good works, argues Tyndale, always “accompany faith, even as the brightness doth the sun.”

30Tyndale, *Justification,* 370. He does note, however, that while faith, hope, and charity are inseparable, they nonetheless have different offices. Idem, *Exposition,* 192.
by words rather than deeds, reminding us that works are an outward testimony of our inward faith.\footnote{Tyndale, \textit{Justification}, 375.} Tyndale concludes, therefore, that works must necessarily accompany faith or there is no justification. Consequently, faith can be said to justify humanity before God; while our good deeds can be said to justify us before men.\footnote{Tyndale, \textit{James}, 161-62. For Tyndale, this interpretation makes James’s message consistent with that of Paul.}

Tyndale concludes that justification is not merely a one-time event; it is a process that occurs within the context of a covenantal relationship with God. The covenant is not merely a legal contract. Instead, the covenant is the foundation for an “intimate and ultimate bond of union, linking God’s grace to man’s obligation in a bilateral commitment of compelling force,” and trust becomes the “dominant characteristic on man’s side.”\footnote{Michael McGiffert argues that the covenant became Tyndale’s “cardinal principle of exegesis and the ruling element in his project of religious revolution.” Michael McGiffert, "William Tyndale’s Conception of Covenant," \textit{Journal of Ecclesiastical History} 32, no. 2 (April 1981): 167, 170, 174. See also Donald Dean Smeeton, "The Wycliffite Choice: Man’s Law or God’s," in \textit{William Tyndale and the Law}, ed. Dick Richardson and Anne Richardson (Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), 32-33. Werrell errs in his assertion that the uniqueness of Tyndale’s covenant theology lies in its inter-trinitarian sense rather than in a conditional promise uniting God and humanity. Werell, \textit{Theology of William Tyndale}, 12.}

Tyndale consistently uses the word ‘covenant’ to refer to conditional promises offered by God to humanity. God graciously promises reward to those who fulfill the specific conditions of a covenant, and he threatens them with punishment if they fail to perform those conditions. In terms of humanity’s justification \textit{coram Deo}, Tyndale acknowledges that the fulfillment of the conditions of the gospel covenant never earns or merits righteousness; instead, our obedience, however perfect or imperfect, is possible only because of God’s grace.\footnote{Tyndale, \textit{Exposition}, 268. In an earlier work Tyndale suggested that a covenant or}
withdraw “his Spirit of mercy and grace” if a person fails to continue fulfilling the conditions of the covenant.35 Tyndale illustrates this truth with the example of a murderer who has been pardoned by the king. No king would ever consider pardoning a murderer who was unwilling to obey the law from that point forward. And if the pardoned criminal subsequently returns to a life of crime, surely the king’s pardon will be withdrawn. “Even so, none of us can be received to grace but upon a condition to keep the law, neither yet continue any longer in grace than that purpose lasteth.”36

Within this understanding of humanity’s relationship with God, Tyndale speaks of two covenants: the old and the new. The old covenant was temporal: the promised reward was limited to “temporal life and prosperity in the land of Canaan,” while the threatened consequence of failure to perform the required conditions was “temporal death and punishment.” By contrast, the new covenant promises eternal life “to all that believe” and threatens eternal death “to all that are unbelieving.”37 This “belief” of the new covenant transcends an intellectual affirmation and encompasses the moral transformation of the person. Thus, made possible by God’s grace, the merit of Christ’s obedience, and the work of the Holy Spirit, human righteousness flourishes or diminishes


36Tyndale, Exposition, 185.

37Tyndale, Matthew, 112.
to the extent that we fulfill the conditions of the new covenant.\textsuperscript{38}

There are two conditions of the gospel covenant: a steadfast faith and trust in almighty God”; and “that we forsake evil and turn to God, to keep his laws, and to fight against ourselves and our corrupt nature perpetually.”\textsuperscript{39} The good news of the gospel is that God, by his mercy and grace and because of Christ’s sacrificial death, will heal our “corrupt nature” if “we will turn to God, to learn to keep his laws spiritually, that is to say, of love for his sake, and will also suffer the curing of our infirmities.”\textsuperscript{40}

The Holy Spirit plays a pivotal role in Tyndale’s understanding of justification. It is only by the grace of God that we are justified, and this grace is revealed in the prevenient work of God’s Spirit in our hearts.\textsuperscript{41} Faith and repentance are both the fruit of the Spirit’s work.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, God (by his Spirit) begins an essential work within humanity, making faith and repentance possible, filling us with a desire and love for God’s will, and strengthening us to obey his commands. This grace comes by God’s initiative alone: we are totally passive (e.g., “even as water is poured into a vessel”) and God acts in this

\textsuperscript{38}Tyndale, \textit{Exposition}, 268. Elsewhere Tyndale writes, “In the Old Testament are many promises, which are nothing else but the Evangelion or gospel.” Idem, \textit{Pathway}, 11.

\textsuperscript{39}Tyndale, \textit{Matthew}, 107.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 112; idem, \textit{Exposition}, 184. McGiffert correctly argues that Tyndale’s emphasis on the conditionality of the covenant was a necessary response to the plague of antinomianism. Thus, while God offered the promise of the covenant as a means to draw men to himself, “he made the promise conditional in order to elicit their responsive faith and obedience.” Therefore, Tyndale believed that a conditional covenant is “crucial to the practice of piety.” It is only by the obedient fulfillment of these conditions that humanity is able to demonstrate trust in God. In addition, McGiffert notes that “by the conditions of the covenant God secured the tribute of trust from the elect. Consequently, the promissory if/then was, at the deepest level, spiritually affiliative. It represented not a contractual transaction, not a bargain over salvation, not a quid pro quo of any kind, but a way of articulating the mutuality of God and man in a communion of commitment. Piety, not legality, supplies the key.” McGiffert, "Tyndale’s Conception of Covenant," 174-75.

\textsuperscript{41}Tyndale, \textit{Romans}, 122-23.

\textsuperscript{42}Tyndale, \textit{Justification}, 369-70; idem, \textit{Romans}, 125.
manner so that we can assert no merit for our justification.\textsuperscript{43}

Though he acknowledges faith as a gift from God,\textsuperscript{44} Tyndale argues that the faith of any person who professes to know Christ but refuses to obey the commandments of God is “vain, worldly, damnable, devilish, and plain presumption.” By such a faith no person will ever be justified or “accepted by God.”\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, in spite of repeated affirmations that humanity is justified by faith alone, Tyndale unquestionably places great emphasis on the Law and works. He maintains that ‘good works’ performed without grace are sinful\textsuperscript{46} and that obedience to God’s law is mandatory but never meritorious.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, our works are a sign of our justification, never a cause of that justification.\textsuperscript{48}

**Thomas Cranmer**

Thomas Cranmer was the most influential theologian of the early English Reformation, and his written works placed an indelible stamp upon worship life and theological development within the Church of England. He wrote extensively on the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist, but he also addressed the issue of humanity’s

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\textsuperscript{43}Tyndale, *Romans*, 134.  
\textsuperscript{44}Tyndale, *Mammon*, 53.  
\textsuperscript{45}Tyndale, *Matthew*, 106.  
\textsuperscript{46}Tyndale, *Romans*, 123.  
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., 124, 129; and idem, *Justification*, 379.  
\textsuperscript{48}Tyndale. *Exposition*, 268. He writes, “Finally, our works which God commandeth, and unto which he annexed his promises that he will reward them, are as it were very sacraments, and visible and sensible signs, tokens, earnest obligations, witnesses, testimonies, and a sure certifying of our souls, that God hath and will do according to his promises, to strength our weak faith, and to keep the promise in mind. But they justify us not, no more than the visible works of the sacraments do.”
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justification *coram Deo.* In his *Annotations*, Cranmer endorses the teachings of the *Institution of a Christian Man* that justification “signifieth remission of our sins, and our acceptance or reconciliation into the grace and favour of God, that is to say, our perfect renovation in Christ.” For Cranmer, the ultimate ground for this justification is threefold: “God’s mercy and grace”; Christ’s sacrificial offering; and humanity’s “true and lively faith in the merits of Jesu Christ.” These three concepts provide the framework for Cranmer’s mature doctrine of justification.

First, God is the principal actor in this process. Humanity’s inherent sinfulness makes us incapable of initiating a relationship with God. Thus, unless God takes the first step to save us, we all will be condemned. Yet, God has already taken this initiative in his gracious willingness to forgive our sins. Because of this forgiveness, we are accepted by God and reconciled with him. The effect of this reconciliation is dramatic: our lives are transformed.

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49 Hughes asserts that Cranmer was one of the “outstanding architects” of the doctrine of justification within “classical Anglicanism.” Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, *Faith and Works: Cranmer and Hooker on Justification* (Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow Co., 1982), 9. Nonetheless, Cranmer’s theology developed slowly, and it was not until the reign of Edward the VI that his mature thought flowered with the publication of the Homilies. Ashley Null, *Thomas Cranmer’s Doctrine of Repentance: Renewing the Power to Love* (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 7-10. Henry VIII never wavered from a more conservative view, and Cranmer faced the potential for the King’s censure if he was impolitic in his views. MacCulloch argues that Cranmer held a “relaxed attitude to the question of justification” in the early years. MacCulloch, *Cranmer*, 30


52 Cranmer, *Annotations*, 112. He writes, “No man shall be damned for the offences of Adam, but for his own proper offences, either actual or original; which original sin every man hath of his own, and
Second, Christ’s satisfaction for our sins is the sole “meritorious cause” of justification. Cranmer insists that there is nothing we can do to deserve or merit our justification. To the contrary, Christ is the sole mediator between God and man, and by his obedience he paid the penalty incurred by our sin. Therefore, Christ’s meritorious obedience ultimately makes our justification possible.\textsuperscript{53}

Third, Cranmer insists that we are justified by faith alone. This faith involves more than simple belief. To be sure, Cranmer speaks of a “general faith” which includes the belief of fundamental doctrines.\textsuperscript{54} Yet, this cannot be the totality of justifying faith because even the demons believe such things. Instead, in addition to right belief, justifying faith involves “a sure trust and confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, and a steadfast hope of all good things to be received at God’s hand.”\textsuperscript{55} Hence, one can speak of a “false” or “dead” faith that stands opposed by a “true” faith. He writes that a “dead” faith is one “which bringeth forth no good works, but is idle, barren, and unfruitful.” By contrast, a “true” faith can be described as “quick or lively,” a

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 is born in it, although it come from Adam.”
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\textsuperscript{53}Cranmer, \textit{Of Salvation}, 132.

\textsuperscript{54}Cranmer, \textit{Annotations}, 85. This “general faith” includes the belief “that God is, that he is the Maker and Creator of all things, that Christ is the Saviour and Redeemer of the world, and for his sake all penitent sinners have remission of their sins; and that there shall be a general resurrection at the end of this mortal world, at the which Christ shall judge all the good to joy without end, and the evil to pain without end; with such other like things.”

\textsuperscript{55}Thomas Cranmer, \textit{A Short Declaration of the True, Lively, and Christian Faith}, in \textit{The Works of Thomas Cranmer}, ed. John Edmund Cox for the Parker Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1846), 2:135. Idem, \textit{Of Salvation}, 133. In his \textit{Annotations} he writes: “But, if the profession of our faith of the remission of our own sins enter within us into the deepness of our hearts, then it must needs kindle a warm fire of love in our hearts towards God, and towards all others for the love of God—a fervent mind to seek and procure God’s honour, will, and pleasure in all things—a good will and mind to help every man and to do good unto them . . . and, \textit{in summa}, a firm intent and purpose to do all that is good, and leave all that is evil. This is the very right, pure, perfect, lively, Christian, hearty, and justifying ‘faith which worketh by love.’” Idem, \textit{Annotations}, 86.
faith that “worketh by charity.” Without such a faith it is impossible to perform deeds that are “acceptable and pleasant to God,” including works of repentance. Thus, Cranmer repeatedly emphasizes justification by faith, but he does so within the context of God’s grace and mercy and an unrelenting emphasis on Christ’s meritorious sacrifice. He writes,

But this proposition that we be justified by faith only, freely, and without works, is spoken for to take away clearly all merit of our works, as being insufficient to deserve our justification at God’s hands, and great infirmity of ourselves, and the might and power of God; the imperfectness of our own works, and the most abundant grace of our Saviour Christ; and thereby wholly to ascribe the merit and deserving of our justification unto Christ only, and his most precious blood-shedding.

For Cranmer, this justification is a process that cannot be limited to a single declarative event: justification is both declarative and transformational. Alister McGrath argues that the Archbishop seems to follow Melanchthon’s lead, but that influence “does not appear to extend to Cranmer’s discussion of the nature of justification. Cranmer interprets justification to mean ‘making righteous,’ which clearly reflects the strongly

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56 Cranmer, Of Faith, 136. For this reason, Cranmer argues that works performed prior to justification are not pleasing to God since they do not “proceed from an heart endued with pure faith and love to God.” Cranmer, Annotations, 114. Elsewhere he writes, if “a heathen man clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do such other like works; yet because he doth them not in faith for the honour and love of God, they be but dead, vain, and fruitless works to him.” Thomas Cranmer, An Homily or Sermon of Good Works Annexed Unto Faith, in The Works of Thomas Cranmer, ed. John Edmund Cox for the Parker Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1846), 2:142.

57 Cranmer, Of Salvation, 131.

factitive Augustinian concept of justification.” Ashley Null rejects this interpretation, suggesting that McGrath has misunderstood Cranmer, perhaps because of the “ambiguity of Cranmer’s description of renovation.” In opposition to McGrath, Null argues that Cranmer rejects the medieval “factitive understanding of justification” and endorses “a forensic understanding in which God imputed Christ’s righteousness to the ungodly who turned to him in faith.” Null grants that Cranmer believes justification necessarily results in a transformed life, but this teaching must be viewed in the context of Cranmer’s affirmation that justification is “being made ‘right-willed’ by faith, not being made inherently righteous.” This reformation of human volition occurs by grace as God imparts faith and love in a person at the moment of his justification.

The penultimate sentence of Cranmer’s Annotations presents potential evidence in favor of Null’s argument. Cranmer writes that those who seek “to advance their own righteousness, shall never come to that righteousness which we have by God;
which is the righteousness of Christ: by whom only all the saints in heaven, and all other that have been saved, have been reputed righteous, and justified.” This reference to the “righteousness of Christ” and being “reputed righteous” concludes a discussion related to Cranmer’s argument that good works can never be considered meritorious since all good works find their origin in God’s grace. Cranmer affirms that “by the merit and benefit of Christ, we being sorry that we cannot do all things no more exquisitely and duly, all our works shall be accepted and taken of God, as most exquisite, pure, and perfect.”62 Despite his allusion to reputari, therefore, Cranmer does not appear to interpret being “reputed righteous” in a Melanchthonian sense as the imputation of Christ’s “alien” righteousness. Instead, he seems to argue that Christ’s meritorious sacrifice made it possible for our imperfect faith and works to be accepted or reckoned as righteous by God.63

In the Homily of Salvation Cranmer makes another claim that might be marshaled in support of Null’s argument. He writes, “Christ is now the righteousness of all them that truly do believe in him. He for them paid their ransom by his death: he for them may be called a fulfiller of the law.” Yet, once again, this statement emerges from within the context of Cranmer’s emphasis on the merit of Christ. In the paragraph containing these sentences, Cranmer affirms that our works (following justification) are

62Cranmer, Annotations, 114.
63The Homily of Salvation supports this interpretation: Cranmer writes, “Because all men be sinners and offenders against God, and breakers of his law and commandments, therefore can no man by his own acts, works, and deeds (seem they never so good) be justified and made righteous before God; but every man of necessity is constrained to seek for another righteousness, or justification, to be received at God’s own hands, that is to say, the remission, pardon, and forgiveness of his sins and trespasses in such things as he hath offended. And this justification or righteousness, which we so receive by God’s mercy and Christ’s merits, embraced by faith, is taken, accepted, and allowed of God for our perfect and full justification.” Cranmer, Of Salvation, 128. McGrath notes that Melanchthon’s discussion of the imputation of justitia aliena emerges from within the context of Roman law. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 238.
considered by God to be righteous, but those works can never make us just or “good.” Our deeds, no matter how good they appear, are always imperfect and cannot justify us; however, Christ’s active and passive obedience compensated for our lack and made us righteous before God.  

Thus, Null’s argument is difficult to sustain. The only unambiguous reference to imputation in the *Homily of Salvation* is found in the context of the non-imputation of sin; that is, in the remission of human sin, God chooses not to reckon our sins to our account. Further, when Cranmer describes justification as making “us, of unjust, just before God,” he unquestionably views the process of justification in a factitive sense. To speak of making one “just” does not necessarily exclude a declarative dimension to justification, but it surely implies a transformational element. Thus, Ian Green (echoing McGrath) best summarizes the intent of the *Homily* when he argues that Cranmer advocates a “simple” view of the nature of justification “that equated it with pardon or forgiveness of sins and so being accepted by God as righteous,” but this acceptance was not accompanied by the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness.

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64 Cranmer, *Of Salvation*, 129-30. He writes, “For all the good works that we can do be unperfect, and therefore not able to deserve our justification: but our justification doth come freely by the mere mercy of God, and of so great and free mercy, that whereas all the world was not able of theirselves to pay any part towards their ransom, it pleased our heavenly Father, of his infinite mercy, without any our desert or deserving, to prepare for us the most precious jewels of Christ’s body and blood, whereby our ransom might be fully paid, the law fulfilled, and his justice fully satisfied. So that Christ is now the righteousness of all them that truly do believe in him. He for them paid their ransom by his death: he for them may be called a fulfiller of the law; foresasmuch as that which their infirmity lacketh, Christ’s justice hath supplied.”


For Cranmer, the forgiveness of sins, the heart of justification, is contingent upon our repentance.\(^{67}\) This repentance is never a meritorious work that earns God’s favor but is a God-ordained requirement or condition that we are incapable of fulfilling without the mercy and grace of God. Some who endorse the biblical teaching of justification by faith, “phantasy that they be set at liberty from doing all good works.” Such foolishness causes them “to trifle with God and deceive themselves.”\(^{68}\) We must affirm, then, that “right faith requireth good living.” It remains true that “our triumph and victory over the devil, hell, and death, standeth not in our well living, but in Jesus Christ,”\(^{69}\) but this does not mean that an ungodly man will ever receive God’s gift of salvation.\(^{70}\) Faith that does not result in a godly life is “a feigned faith,”\(^{71}\) and our profession of justification *sola fide* never implies that “justifying faith is alone in man, without true repentance, hope, charity, dread, and the fear of God, at any time or season.” In addition, to affirm that we are “justified freely,” is not to suggest that good works are optional, but it is to insist that these works of repentance, though necessary to our salvation, are excluded “from the office of justifying.”\(^{72}\) Hence, while our justification is

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*Cranmer, Of Salvation*, 132.


*Cranmer, Of Salvation*, 133. Cranmer writes, “Surely no such ungodly man can have this faith and trust in God. For as they know Christ to be the only Saviour of the world, so they know also that wicked men shall not possess the kingdom of God.”

*Cranmer, Of Faith*, 137.

*Cranmer, Of Salvation*, 129, 131. See also the Thirteen Articles in Bray, *Documents*, 188.
initiated by God’s grace, merited by Christ’s obedience, and embraced by faith alone, that faith is inseparable from a changed life.

**Robert Barnes**

Robert Barnes was a humanist scholar who became one of the principal agitators for reform in England. He was a leader among the early reformers who gathered at the White Horse Inn; yet although he was highly critical of the Roman church, his Lutheran sympathies evolved slowly.73 Once convinced of the truth of Luther’s propositions, however, Barnes never looked back. His brief treatise on justification became “an important exposition” of a Reformed view of the justification of humanity *coram Deo.*74 That polemic argues without pause that “fayth in Jesus Christ onely justifieth afore God.”75 He builds his argument upon the twin foundations of Scripture

Cranmer does not limit excluded works to those of the ritual or ceremonial law. Although the Christian is obligated at the peril of his soul to obey God’s moral law, this obedience does not contribute to man’s justification. Idem, *Notes*, 207. Bishop Bull quotes the passage from the Homily, including this exclusion of the works of repentance and other virtues from the “office of justifying.” He argues that rather than undermining his argument, this passage supports his claims. Cranmer’s intent, after all, is to affirm that there is nothing we can do to merit our justification. Christ’s obedience (active and passive) is the sole meritorious cause of our justification. See George Bull, *Examen Censurae: Sive Responsio ad quasdam Animadversiones, Antehac ineditas, In Librum, cui Titulus, Harmonia Apostolica, &c. Accessit Apologia pro Harmonia, ejusque Authore, contra Declamationem Thomae Tullii, S. T. P. in Libro nuper Typis evulgato, quem Justificatio Paulina, &c. inscrisit* (London: Richard Davis, 1676), Sectio V.4.50-51 (Works 4.376-77).

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74 Hughes, *Faith and Works*, 18.

75 Robert Barnes, *Onely faith iustifieth before God*, in *The Whole Workes of W. Tyndall, John Frith, and Doct. Barnes*, three worthy Martyrs, and Principall teachers of this Church of England, collected and compiled in one Tome together, beyng before Scattered, & now in Print here exhibited to the Church* (London: Printed by John Daye, 1573), 226. Spelling and punctuation are retained from the original. Future references will be listed as Barnes, *Faith*, 226. For a more readable version, see Robert Barnes, *A Treatise on Justification*, in *Writings of Tindal, Frith, and Barnes* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publications, 1842), 100. Future references to this version will be listed as Barnes, *Justification*, 100.
and antiquity, frequently citing Fathers such as Athanasius and Augustine while showing a distinct bias toward the Apostle Paul in his biblical references.\textsuperscript{76}

Barnes develops his doctrine of justification with three principal areas of focus: the merit of Christ, our appropriation of that merit through faith, and God’s imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. First, he responds to the question of merit, arguing that Christ alone merits our justification. Because all persons have been totally “corrupted by sin,” we are incapable of responding to the call of God to salvation.\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, Christ became “a Saviour, a redeemer, a justifier, a perfect peace maker, betwene God, and man” whose sacrificial death made satisfaction for our sins and made possible humanity’s relationship with God. Upon this basis, Barnes insists that if we can lay claim to any “deserving,” then our justification cannot be said to have been given “freely.”\textsuperscript{78}

Second, Barnes teaches that we are justified \textit{sola fide}. He views this faith instrumentally, as the means by which we receive God’s gracious gift of justification. Thus, he affirms that “faith alone justifieth, because that it is that thing alone, whereby I doe hange of Christe. And by my faith alone, am I partaker of ye merites and

\textsuperscript{76}Barnes also includes his citations from the Fathers in the first section (entitled, “That faith onlie justifieth”) in Robert Barnes, \textit{A Generall collection out of Doctour Barnes Woorkes of all the testimonyes, auncient fathers, Counclers, and the Popes own laws, alleged by hym to prove these articles following, in the manner of a Table or rather an Epitome of all his woorkes that hee hath made, in The Whole Workes of W. Tyndall, John Frith, and Doct. Barnes, three worthy Martyrs, and Principall teachers of this Churche of England, collected and compiled in one Tome together, beyng before Scattered, & now in Print here exhibited to the Church} (London: Printed by John Daye, 1573), 359.


\textsuperscript{78}Barnes, \textit{Faith}, 226-28. (Idem, \textit{Justification}, 99-102.) Barnes insists that the “læbe hath alone dyed for us: the lambe hath aloneley shed his bloud for us: the lambe hath aloneley redeemed us: these things hath hee done alone; now, if these bee sufficient, then hath hee aloneley made satisfaction, and is aloneley worthy to be our redeemer and justifier.” To attribute merit to anything or anyone other than Christ “robbeth Christ of his honour, and denyeth Christ, and is very Antichrist.”
mercy purchased by Christes bloude, and faith it is alone, that receive the promyses made in Christ.”

Just as simple belief never justifies because even the demons possess such belief, good works performed without faith are “of no value, but damnable and very sinne.” Thus, one can affirm that only those who have been justified are capable of performing truly good works. Nonetheless, Barnes affirms the necessity of good works in our salvation for three primary reasons: God has commanded them; others benefit from them; and those who reject the grace of God might be won to faith. Therefore, while our works never justify us, we must perform good works, not for any benefit of our own, but in order to serve others. In this, we follow the example of Christ.

Barnes takes great pains to clarify this relationship of faith with works in the justification of humanity. Five key affirmations provide a summary sketch of his argumentation. First, he rejects any assertion that Paul condemned “the workes of the olde lawe but not the workes of the newe lawe.” If for no other reason, we can never make this distinction because God justified men before the establishment of any “newe lawe.” Therefore, just as obedience to the “olde lawe” could never justify, obedience to the “newe lawe” cannot be required for justification. Second, he rejects as equivocation the assumption that justification occurs by faith coupled with works. According to Paul’s clear teaching, our justification occurs by faith alone. Third, he rejects the argument that good works are made meritorious by the presence of faith. This cannot be true, he insists;
otherwise the Jews, whose works surely were united with faith, would have been justified. Thus, “S. Paule proveth cerely that good workes helpe nothyng to iustification, nor evell workes let not the iustification, ye commeth by fayth.” Fourth, he rejects any assertion that a person can be considered “righteous” before he has faith in Christ. Though some assert that Cornelius was justified prior to receiving faith, they err. The mere fact that he was “a devout man, and one that feared God,” by definition implies that he already had faith. Fifth, in opposition to those who claim that “fayth wythout charitie can not iustifie,” Barnes argues that support for such an assertion cannot be found in Paul. Paul’s sole intent is to show that justifying faith will result in works of charity, but one may be justified before performing those works because we are justified by faith alone.  

In response to criticism that St James supports his opponents’ claim to the efficacy of works in justification, Barnes affirms Augustine’s conclusion that “S. Paule speaketh of workes, that goe before fayth, and S. James speaketh of workes, that folow fayth.” Both Paul and James share a common objective: to demonstrate that no Christian has the option of remaining “idle”; that is, as “childrē of grace” we must live godly lives. James wrote against those claiming that no works were necessary. Such a faith, Barnes argues, “is a dead fayth, and of no value.” Our “workes shoulde declare and shew the outward fayth, & workes should bee an outward declaration, and a testimonie of ye inwarde iustification, received of fayth, not ye workes can or may take away our synne, 

“true frutes of iustificatiō.”  

82Barnes, *Faith*, 228-31; 240. (Idem, *Justification*, 103-07; 122.)
or els bee any satisfaction, for any part of synne, for that belongeth all onely to Christ.\textsuperscript{83}

Third, in addition to his focus on the merit of Christ and justification by faith alone, Barnes emphasizes God’s imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. Barnes argues that the one who has been justified has already received God’s free gift of salvation. At best, men remain “hearers onely of the lawe” until they receive “the fayth of Christ Jesus, which is imputed unto them for iustice.”\textsuperscript{84} Yet, he goes further than this affirmation that faith is imputed or reckoned by God to be righteousness. He avers that God declares the ungodly to be righteous by imputing or crediting Christ’s righteousness to the believer’s account.\textsuperscript{85} Thus, while defending justification by faith alone, he grants that he never meant to argue that “faith, for its own dignity, and for its own perfection, doth justify us.” Instead, the Scripture insists that

\textit{fayth onely iusitifeth [by] imputation: that is, all ye merites and goodnes, grace, and favour, and all that is in Christ, to our salvation, is imputed and reckoned unto us, because wee hange and beleve of hym, and hee can deceave no man that doth beleve in hym. And our iustice is not (as the schoole men teacheth) a formal iustice, which is by fulfilling of the lawe, deserved of us, for then our iustification were not of grace, and of mercy, but of deserving, and of duty. But it is a iustice that is reckoned & imputed unto us, for ye fayth in Christ Jesus, and it is not of our deserving, by clearely, and fully of mercy imputed unto us.}\textsuperscript{86}

There is no notion of inherent righteousness in Barnes’s thought. Instead, by God’s grace, through the instrumentality of our faith, God imputes Christ’s righteousness us,


\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Barnes, Faith}, 240. (Idem, Justification, 121.) It is important to note that this use of the word “justice” is synonymous with “righteousness.”

\textsuperscript{85}McGrath identifies Barnes as offering the “first clear and unambiguous statement of the concept of imputation of righteousness to be found in the writings of an English Reformer.” McGrath, \textit{Iustitia Dei}, 259. See also Clebsch, \textit{England’s Earliest Protestants}, 67-68.

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Barnes, Faith}, 242. (Idem, Justification, 124.) Once again, in this passage Barnes uses
thereby justifying us.

**Hugh Latimer**

Hugh Latimer is remembered less as a theologian than as a dynamic preacher whose occasional sermons afforded him an unparalleled opportunity to influence the people of England, particularly during the reign of King Edward VI.\(^\text{87}\) There is little doubt that he helped popularize reform by his engaging sermons, but he claimed to do so with the confidence that he taught only those opinions that would have been affirmed in antiquity.\(^\text{88}\) Though his sermons typically were not “doctrinal” in character, one exception to this general rule was his repeated references to the doctrine of justification.\(^\text{89}\)

Latimer describes sin as “all that is done against the laws of God, contrary to his will and pleasure.”\(^\text{90}\) He argues that we have been so corrupted by this sin that we are incapable of entering into a relationship with God unless God first takes the initiative to reconcile himself to us. By forgiving our offenses, God takes this initiative and ensures that we receive the full benefit of Christ’s active and passive obedience. That is, God justifies or transforms us by the remission of sins and by giving us the gift of his Spirit,

\[\text{“justice” in the sense of “righteousness.”}\]


thereby empowering us to “attain to everlasting life.”

Latimer argues that we are justified by God’s grace through faith alone. Affirming the *Homily of Salvation*, he speaks of a “lively faith” that effectively becomes an instrument for our justification. He makes it clear, however, that there are different types of faith. For example, he addresses the concerns raised by those who turn to Paul’s teaching in 1 Corinthians that charity is greater than faith. He insists:

> There have been some which thought that St Paul spake against the dignity of faith: but you must understand that St Paul speaketh here not of the justifying faith, wherewith we receive everlasting life; but he understandeth by this word faith the gift to do miracles, to remove hills: of such a faith he speaketh. This I say to the confirmation of the proposition, ‘Faith only justifieth’: this proposition is most true and certain. And St Paul speaketh not here of this lively justifying faith: for this right faith is not without love: for love cometh and floweth out of faith. Love is a child of faith.

He consistently juxtaposes faith and works, arguing that works are necessary but never salvific. Latimer grants that no sin will ever be forgiven unless the sinner is repentant. He amplifies this thought to argue that this repentance includes four

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components: contrition, faith (belief), the intention to forgo further sin, and restitution. Yet, at the same time, he insists that our works are not pleasing to God until after justification and even then can only be fulfilled because of the Spirit’s work within us. Therefore, we can never be justified by works. In a striking example, he argues that even the Virgin Mary was not justified simply because she bore the Son of God. Our works demonstrate our love (as James teaches), and are the foundation upon which our rewards in heaven will be based. Thus, for the justified, our works provide the means by which we express our gratitude to God for his indescribable gift.

Latimer appears to understand the nature of this justification in an Augustinian sense as being made righteous by God, but his lack of systematization creates some confusion on this matter. On the one hand, in his famous “Sermon of the Plough” he


identifies “justifying faith” as “faith that maketh a man righteous.” Though he acknowledges that one remains a sinner after his justification, he speaks about being “made just” by God.

On the other hand, in two enigmatic statements Latimer opens the door for confusion on this factitive view, implying instead a declarative perspective in which the justification of humanity is directly attributable to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. The first of these statements is found in a sermon preached at Grimsthorpe where he speaks unambiguously about being “made just” by God but also proclaims:

I told you before wherein standeth our righteousness; namely in this, that our unrighteousness is forgiven us: for we must needs confess, that the best works that we do have need of remission of sins, and so not meritorious; for they be not perfect as they ought to be; and therefore we live of borrowing. We have no proper righteousness of our own; but we borrow, that it so say, we take the righteousness of Christ, which he offered freely to as many as believe in him.

While this allusion to taking the righteousness of Christ seems to imply the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the sinner, Latimer’s primary intent is to demonstrate that, although our works are imperfect, God nonetheless receives these

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104 Latimer, “Thelfth Day,” 142.

105 Ibid., 140.
otherwise unworthy gifts and considers us to be just because of our faith in the merits of Christ’s righteousness. Thus, “for Christ’s sake we be taken for just, and our works are allowable before God: not that they be so indeed for themselves, but they be taken well for his sake.” Consequently, for Latimer, the key question here is one of merit: our works are not intrinsically meritorious, but because of the merit gained by Christ’s sacrificial obedience, God views us as righteous.

In the second statement one cannot evade the implications of this inference that the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness is the foundation for our justification. Latimer proclaims, “So it appeareth that we are justified by the free gift of God, and not of ourselves, nor by our merits: but the righteousness of Christ is accounted to be our righteousness, and through the same we obtain everlasting life, and not through our own doings.” It is true that the context of this reference is Latimer’s interpretation of Romans 8:32 and is framed in terms of the question of merit. He argues that it necessarily follows that when God “gave us his only Son, he gave us also his righteousness, and his fulfilling of the law.” For that reason, we must eschew all pride because we could never have merited our own salvation. Yet, the force of his argument in this one case stands in opposition to a factitive view of justification.

In terms of the nature of justification, therefore, Latimer’s language lacks clarity and appears contradictory. He maintains a persistent argument that Christ alone has merited our justification because we could never do so on our own. He persistently

106 Ibid.


108 Latimer specifically rejects Roman teachings on the merit of our works in the justification of
argues that we are justified by faith alone. Yet, he seems to equivocate in his description of the nature of that justification, arguing on the one hand that Christ’s righteousness makes it possible for us to become righteous. On the other hand, he also seems to articulate a view in which we are viewed as righteous before God solely by the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness.

John Hooper

John Hooper was a “forerunner” of Elizabethan Puritanism whose writings may include some of the “most significant extant works on soteriology” to emerge in England during the period following the reign of Mary.¹⁰⁹ For Hooper, justification is a necessary corollary to the biblical teaching of the atonement,¹¹⁰ and his conclusions about justification reflect the influence of continental reformers. In particular, Hooper praises the biblical integrity of Luther’s teaching on justification in spite of errors he perceives in Luther’s understanding of the Eucharist.¹¹¹

The foundation for Hooper’s soteriology begins with the sinner’s plight under “the right and claim of the devil.” As a result of Adam’s sin, we all fall under the “malediction, curse, and damnation of the law” and deserve nothing but eternal death. Yet, by the grace of God and through the merit of Christ’s active and passive obedience, humanity before God. Instead, all merit for our justification must be attributed to Christ alone. Latimer, “Twenty-third Sunday after Trinity,” 520-21; idem, “Saint John Evangelist’s Day, at Grimsthorpe, Anno 1552,” 125; idem, “Eleventh Day,” 137-39; idem, “First Sunday after the Epiphany,” 146-48; idem, “Sixth Sermon, Preached on the First Sunday in Advent,” 13; and idem, “Third Sunday in Advent, 1552,” 74.

¹⁰⁹ Dickens, English Reformation, 271-73; Trueman, Luther’s Legacy, 4.


¹¹¹ Ibid., 29.
we are able to be restored to Adam’s original righteousness and perfection so that we might gain eternal life. Hooper argues that we receive this gift of grace in our justification *coram Deo*, an event through which “we have remission of sin, reconciliation, and acceptation into the favour of God.” In justification, the effects of the curse are reversed, and our broken relationship with God is restored. This relationship between God and humanity can be described using covenental terms that evoke the image of a binding agreement between God and humanity, an agreement that offers a conditional promise of everlasting life.

God is the initiator of this covenant with humanity which includes both promises and conditions. The promises afforded by the covenant include the “remission of sin, the acceptation into his fatherly favour, grace to live well in this life, and, at the end, to be received into the everlasting life.” In addition, there are very clear conditions that must be met before these promises can be received. The conditions of this covenant include confession, contrition for sin, and a plea for God’s mercy, all


113 John Hooper, *An Answer to the Bishop of Winchester’s Book*, in *Early Writings of John Hooper, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Worchester*, ed. Samuel Carr for the Parker Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1843), 136. Hooper writes, “When the matter entreated between two parties is full concluded upon, it is confirmed with obligations sealed interchangeably, that for ever those seals may be a witness of such covenants as hath been agreed upon between the parties.”


115 Hooper, *Answer*, 136. Elsewhere Hooper teaches that the “promises of God” do not “pertain unto such as will not repent.” Therefore, each believer must look not only upon the promise of God, but also, what diligence and obedience he requireth of thee, lest thou exclude thyself from the promise.” Idem, *A Declaration of the Ten Holy Commandments of Almighty God*, in *Early Writings of John Hooper, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Worchester*, ed. Samuel Carr for the Parker Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1843), 266-67.
of which are derived from faith. Thus, although it is legitimate to speak of a covenant between God and man which requires specific conditions to be met, our fulfillment of those conditions is never meritorious.116

In addition to simple belief (i.e., “the knowledge of God”), Hooper understands this justifying faith to include “a persuasion and confidence that the promise of God appertaineth unto him for Christ’s sake.” Justifying faith can be understood instrumentally to be the means by which the remission of sin may be received. Thus, while it is true to say that many things must necessarily be present for the remission of sin (e.g., the preacher, the Word of God, the work of Christ, the movement of the Holy Spirit, the contrition of the sinner, and the will to consent to Christ), we must also acknowledge that we are “delivered from sin” solely by our faith “in the death of Christ.” If we seek to find justification in some way other than sola fide, we inevitably will be plagued by spiritual doubts and our prayers will be impaired.117

While Hooper is unyielding in this emphasis on sola fide, he rejects antinomian tendencies to dismiss a necessary relationship between faith and repentance. Those who misunderstand Paul’s teaching on justification in Romans, argues Hooper, need only to read 1 John to see that amendment of life is a necessary evidence of justification. He insists that preachers must proclaim the “whole gospel” so that their auditors will hear the same message of “penance and a virtuous life with faith, as God preached the gospel unto Adam in Paradise, Noe, Abraham, Moses, [and] Esay.” This same call to repentance is repeatedly echoed in the preaching of John the Baptist and our Lord. Hence, while many

116 Hooper, Commandments, 264.

117 Hooper, Christ and His Office, 51-56.
may joyfully accept the promise that the remission of our sins occurs *sola fide*, in part because they perceive a new liberty, we must preach the full gospel, including a non-negotiable call to repentance.¹¹⁸

Hooper understands the “office of a justified man” to include both negative and positive actions: he is to avoid impiety, dishonesty, concupiscence, and injustice while seeking “to profit and do well unto all men.” Hence, the love of one’s neighbor becomes a driving force behind Hooper’s thought.¹¹⁹ The relationship of justifying faith to our good works is one of order, not causality. Though they are never meritorious, “good works do necessarily follow justification,” and any works performed before justification are valueless.¹²⁰ Thus, argues Hooper, one must embrace a virtuous life following his justification or “he is not justified at all.”¹²¹

Therefore, in spite of the wonderful gift of God’s grace in salvation, Christians are not exempt from a requirement to obey the moral law of God. To the contrary, obedience to this “law is also necessary for the justified man, to teach him with what works he should exercise his faith withal and obedience unto God.” It is no accident,

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¹¹⁸ Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 58-59. Thus, justification “is a free remission of sin, and acceptation into the favour of God, for Christ’s merits: the which remission of sin must follow necessarily amendment of life, or else we receive the grace of God in vain.” Hooper reiterates this thought elsewhere: “Now we know that Paul himself, Saint John, and Christ, damneth the contemners of God, or such as willingly continue in sin, and will not repent.” He cites Matt 12; Mark 3; Luke 12; Rom 8; 1 Cor. 5; 2 Cor 6; and 2 Pet 1 in support. Idem, *Commandments*, 262-63.

¹¹⁹ Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 93-94.


¹²¹ Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 57. Once a man “is accepted into grace,” he “will follow the life of a justified man, as Paul commandeth (Rom. viii. Coloss. iii.), and as all the scripture giveth example. For it is no profit to say sole faith justifieth, except godliness of life follow.”
maintains Hooper, that the Bible dedicates more attention to the necessity of a Christian man to live an obedient and virtuous life than it does to the promise of our salvation. Otherwise, we might be tempted to succumb to “licentious liberty” and “receive the grace of God in vain.” In addition, “the more the justified man beholdeth the law, the more increaseth the knowledge of sin; the more he beholdeth the mercy of God in Christ, the more his faith increaseth.”

Nonetheless, Hooper argues that God justifies sinners, not the godly. Paul wrote to a “justified church of the Corinthians” and yet confronted them for condoning gross sin (e.g., 1 Corinthians 5), insisting that they should not even eat with these so-called brothers. From within this context, Hooper describes the nature of justification both negatively and positively as the non-imputation of sin and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. By the grace and mercy of God and the sacrifice of Christ on our behalf, God does not impute our sins to our account. Conversely, God imputes or credits the righteousness revealed in Christ’s obedience to believers through faith. By this righteousness “we are accounted as faithful,” and our sins are forgiven. This has been God’s plan since Adam’s lapse into sin. Hooper writes, “For although by imputation of Christ’s justice these men [e.g., Adam, Abel, Abraham, Moses, and Aaron] and all faithfults be delivered from the tyranny of the devil and condemnation of the

122 Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 94-95. See also Hooper, *Commandments*, 281-82, and idem, *Visitation*, 121.

123 Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 59.

124 Hooper, *Certeine comfortable Expositions*, 274.

125 Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 51.

126 Hooper, *Commandments*, 263.
The works of man are “so imperfect, that if it were not for the free, liberal, and merciful imputation of justice in Christ Jesu, man were damned.”

The concept of merit plays a central role in Hooper’s understanding of humanity’s justification. We can never merit our own justification by anything we do. Instead, our justification depends solely upon the merit of Christ’s active obedience to the law and his voluntary sacrifice on our behalf. To be sure, it is only by our faith in and our confident reliance upon the merits of Christ that we can receive the promised mercy of God. Contrition, charity, and a virtuous life must necessarily be evidenced in the life of one who is justified, but the forgiveness of sins “is given only for the merits of Christ, and received solely by faith.”

John Jewel

John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, “was a leading figure in the early Elizabethan Church.” His *Apologia* argued that the Church of England is a true church whose doctrines conform to the teachings of the Fathers. His influence was broadened because the *Apologia* and *Defence* effectively became “official documents of the English Church

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127 Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 21.

128 Hooper, *Commandments*, 411.

129 Trueman, *Luther’s Legacy*, 212.

130 Hooper avers that the “example of Nicodemus declareth, that neither the works that go before justification, neither those that follow justification, deserve remission of sin.” Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 56.

131 Hooper, *Christ and His Office*, 33, 50-51. He concludes that “Paul did not exclude these virtues to be present, but he excludeth the merits of those virtues and deriveth the cause of our acceptation into the grace of God only for Christ.”

and State” when they were placed in the churches by order of the Convocation. While the doctrine of justification is not a primary focus in his written works, Bishop Jewel provides additional insights into the development of this doctrine within the English church.

The human condition provides the necessary foundation for Jewel’s soteriology as he argues that the “weakness and sinful corruption of our nature” makes it impossible for us to enter into relationship with God unless God first offers us his “mercy and favour.” We are born in sin and spend our entire lives under the burden of that sin. Consequently, if we examine ourselves honestly, we must admit that “we are nothing else but children of wrath,” incapable of doing anything to merit our salvation.

Because of this pessimistic view of human nature, Bishop Jewel rejects claims by the schoolmen that “everlasting life is a reward due for our deserving.” Instead, God compensates for our want by allowing Christ to merit salvation for us. That is, God ordained that he would forgive our sins because of the satisfaction afforded by Christ’s

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133Booty, John Jewel, 6. Booty writes, “Bishop Burnet notes that in the Convocation of 1563 ‘it was designed to have Jewel’s Apology joined to the Articles which Archbishop Parker intended be in all cathedral and collegiate churches, and also in private houses.’” See also Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 1555-1626 (London: SPCK, 1958), 154. Lettinga argues that Jewel’s Apologia was one of the most influential books of the Elizabethan Church. Cornelius Lettinga, "Covenant Theology and the Transformation of Anglicanism" (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 42. Further, Stacey attributes “several” of the homilies in the second book of homilies to Jewel; however, that authorship cannot be proven. Stacey, “Justification by Faith,” 269.


135Ibid., 5:232; 7:467; 8:299.

136Ibid., 5:239. This errant view, he insists, undermines any claim that our salvation is due to the grace of God. In one of his sermons he elaborates, “Paul and the other apostles taught free remission of sins, without any goodness or desert on our parts, only of God’s mercy, and in the blood of Christ.” Ibid., 7:438.
crucifixion. Thus, Jewel concludes that we “have no meed [merit] at all by our own works and deeds, but appoint all the means of our salvation to be in Christ alone.”

Jewel believes that the essence of justification is the remission of sins. This justification occurs by faith alone and ultimately results in our salvation. Although his opponent, M. Harding, insists that Scripture itself (e.g., James 2:24 and Philippians 2:12) overthrows any teaching of \textit{sola fide}, Jewel responds that this is little more than pedantic quibbling: “when St Paul excludeth all manner of works besides only faith, what else then leaveth he but faith alone?”

Jewel argues that to profess this teaching that we are “justified before God by only faith” is to say that we are justified “only by the merits and cross of Christ.” Ultimately, then, Jewel believes the heart of a Reformed profession of \textit{sola fide} is a denial that we can merit our salvation by anything we do, even when our actions are performed by the grace of God.

For Jewel, justifying faith is a gift of God through which God applies “the death and cross of Christ to our benefit.” While this faith includes simple belief, it can never be limited to belief alone. True faith is “lively” and must always be accompanied by repentance: it cannot be “idle.”

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137 Jewel, \textit{Works} 3:394, 408; 8:300.

138 Ibid., 4:294, 297-98.

139 Ibid., 4:298. He cites a host of Fathers such as Ambrose, Nazianzen, Origen, and Chrysostom in support of his claim.

140 Ibid., 8:297; 5:193; 3:396.

141 Ibid., 8:300; 7:41. In a sermon he wrote, “Therefore, unless we repent, the kingdom of God shall be taken away from us.” Ibid., 7:418.
separated from repentance.

This repentance is a lifelong process of moral transformation, and James makes it clear that faith is dead if it is not evidenced by repentance. Jewel adamantly rejects any claim that the faith of demons or the faith of those who do not complete good works can be considered a true faith: a “dead faith is not more a true perfect faith, than a dead man is a true perfect man. As for the faith of devils, indeed and verily it is no faith.”

Therefore, it is “the duty of the preacher to preach unto the people: that so they may be saved; that they may know the ways of God; that they may repent them of their sins, and be renewed into godliness.”

Jewel acknowledges an apparent conflict between James and Paul, especially since both refer to Abraham in defense of their claims related to justification. Yet, he denies any contradiction, arguing instead that the two apostles embraced different definitions of justification. Paul, argues Jewel, views justification prospectively, as the way in which Abraham was “received into favour” with God. James views the patriarch retrospectively, acknowledging that his good works validate that justification had already occurred. Without the works, Abraham’s faith would “have been no faith.”

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142 Jewel, Works 1:188. Jewel argues that good works (such as fasting) have great value, but those deeds never make us holy. To the contrary, in light of the “weakness and sinful corruption of our nature, there can be no works in us so pure and perfect, that we may thereby of right, and of duty, deserve everlasting life.” Ibid., 4:173; 5:241, 245, 246, 371.


144 Jewel rejects any aspersions on the canonicity or authority of James. Ibid., 4:627.

145 Ibid., 5:545-46.

146 Ibid., 4:299-300.
McGrath argues that Jewel understood the nature of justification to include the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.\textsuperscript{147} There are some tantalizing references that appear to sustain such a view, but the evidence is far from conclusive. In his \textit{Treatise of the Sacraments}, Jewel affirms that the sacraments are “seals of God, heavenly tokens and signs of the grace and righteousness, and mercy given and imputed to us.” The context of this comment, however, is on the nature or character of the sacraments, not justification. Jewel’s point is that the external elements of the sacraments point to a deeper reality, to the “things signified.” Hence, we “are not washed from our sins by the water, we are not fed to eternal life by the bread and wine, but by the precious blood of our savior Christ, that lieth hid in these sacraments.”\textsuperscript{148} His use of “imputed” in this sentence refers only to the gifts given by God and bears no relation to a Melanchthonian view of the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness.

In this same work, Jewel refers to the thief on the cross, acknowledging that his only hope for salvation lay solely in the “righteousness of Christ.”\textsuperscript{149} Again, however, this assertion does not support an argument for imputation. Instead, this is an affirmation of the meritorious nature of Christ’s passive righteousness in his sacrificial death. Christ, by his innocent, substitutionary death, made satisfaction for our sins and merited salvation for us. Human righteousness is always imperfect, but that which we lack has

\textsuperscript{147}McGrath, \textit{Iustitia Dei}, 279-80. McGrath does not cite Jewel on this matter. Instead, he cites correspondence from Thomas Barlow, a seventeenth-century divine who includes Jewel among a list of other leading English theologians who affirmed the imputation of Christ’s righteousness in humanity’s justification \textit{coram Deo}. Peter Nockles endorses this view, citing McGrath but not Jewel. Peter Nockles, \textit{The Oxford Movement in Context: Anglican High Churchmanship, 1760-1857} (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 257.

\textsuperscript{148}Jewel, \textit{Works} 8:5-6; 8:292; 5:7.

\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., 8:63. This emphasis on the merit of Christ is echoed in \textit{Works} 5:249; 8:68.
been compensated for by the righteousness of Christ.\textsuperscript{150} That is, because of Christ’s satisfaction, God forgives our sins and considers our imperfect righteousness to be acceptable.\textsuperscript{151}

The evidence, therefore, does not appear to support an argument for an exclusively declarative understanding of justification in which the alien righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer. To the contrary, throughout his works Jewel presents a factitive view of God’s justifying work. He argues that God’s will is for us to “serve him in holiness and righteousness all the days of our life, that we increase in virtue, and grow from grace to grace.” This view can be seen in the second chapter of Romans where the Apostle Paul affirms that “before God they are not righteous which hear the law, but they that do the law shall be justified.” For this reason, “God reckoneth no man just for hearing of the law, he accounteth no man righteous for knowing of his gospel, but for the keeping of his law, for the observing of his gospel: though no man indeed be able thoroughly to fulfill and keep the same.” If we fail to obey God’s commands, Jewel insists, we blaspheme God and reject the gospel.\textsuperscript{152}


\textsuperscript{151} Jewel argues that “the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience,” but we are incapable of perfect obedience; consequently, “there is no one mortal creature, which can be justified by his own deserts in God’s sight: and therefore our only succor and refuge is to fly to the mercy of our Father by Jesu Christ.” Ibid., 8:299; 5:232.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 7:36, 493-94. Jewel concludes: “We also teach that the gospel is not a boasting or bragging of knowledge, but that it is the law of life, and that a Christian man, as Tertullian saith, ‘ought not \textit{to speak} honourably, but \textit{to live} honourably’: nor they that be the hearers of the law, but the doers of the law which are justified before God.” Ibid., 8:315
George Bull and the Sixteenth-Century English Church

While these English Reformers share much in common, the diversity of thought that emerges from this brief summary of the writings of these divines calls into question the legitimacy of any attempt to define a consistent interpretation of the doctrine of justification within the Church of England during the sixteenth century. Nonetheless, these divines do provide representative views characterizing the development of this doctrine in the English church, thereby providing a basis upon which one might reasonably begin to evaluate the continuity (or discontinuity) of Bishop Bull’s thought with that of early English reformers. Bishop Bull rarely quotes or even directly mentions any of these divines in the Harmonia, the Examen, or the Apologia, \(^{153}\) so it is difficult to defend a thesis that any of these early reformers (with the possible exception of Cranmer’s Homilies) directly influenced his doctrine of justification. Despite some significant differences, the evidence suggests that Bishop Bull’s thought shows more continuity than discontinuity with that of these early reformers. \(^{154}\)

Like all six of these sixteenth-century divines, the absolute sinfulness of humanity is the foundation of Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification. As a result of Adam’s sin, we are fatally flawed and incapable of entering a relationship with God

\(^{153}\) In the Apologia Pro Harmonia Bull cites Latimer six times (APH Sectio VII.3), he refers to Hooper approximately twelve times (APH Sectio VI.3 and APH Sectio VII.3-31), and he refers to Jewel once (APH Sectio I.5). Cranmer is perhaps the sole exception to this rule: in all of these scholarly works Bull frequently refers to Cranmer’s Homilia de Justificatione sive Salute. In the Harmonia, for example, see George Bull, Harmonia Apostolica, seu, Binae Dissertationes, Quarum in priore Doctrina D. Jacobi de Justificatione ex operibus Explanatur ac Defenditur: In posteriore, Consensus D. Pauli cum Jacobo Liquido Demonstratur (London: Printed for William Wells and Robert Scott, 1670), Diss. Post. XVIII.5, 6, and 8. In the Examen, see EC Resp. ad Animad. XXIII.4. In the Apologia, see APH Sectio V.2, 4, 6 and APH Sectio VII.9-11.

\(^{154}\) This continuity does not suggest that the differences that do exist are not meaningful. Issues of continuity and discontinuity will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5 below.
unless God initiates that relationship. Tyndale and Hooper are unique within this group in their emphasis on the captivity of humans to Satan as a result of sin, but Bishop Bull’s position is virtually indistinguishable from that of the other four divines. His argument that the ungodly will not be justified (i.e., while one can say that God justifies the ungodly, God will not justify any person who remains ungodly) is remarkably similar to Cranmer’s thought on this matter. Thus, there is nothing substantive in Bull’s thought on the sinfulness of humanity that is not shared with one or more of these divines.

Bishop Bull also portrays justification in a manner similar to the descriptions provided by these reformers. Barnes is content to speak solely of the salvation of humanity as the result of justification. Hooper argues that the effects of the curse are reversed in justification. We are restored to Adam’s original perfection and righteousness; consequently, we are capable of receiving eternal life, remission of sins, reconciliation with God, and God’s full acceptation. Bishop Bull speaks of the remission of sins and our acceptance before God, using terms virtually identical with those used by Tyndale, Cranmer, Latimer, and Jewel. Although Bull attributes the restoration of original innocence to the sacrament of baptism, he does so within the context of the first justification. Again, there is no substantial novelty in Bull’s fundamental view of the

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157 Bull, *APH Sectio* V.11.60 (*Works* 4.389); idem, *APH Sectio* III.8.32 (*Works* 4.343-44).

results of justification.

Unlike Bull, none of these early English reformers pointedly stresses the forensic nature of justification, even if they accept a declarative view. Bishop Bull places great emphasis on this matter, insisting that a pivotal dimension of justification is God’s pronouncement of a verdict of not guilty in the *forum divinum*.

However, while Bull develops this concept more thoroughly than these representative divines, he nonetheless shares common ground with their understanding of the nature of justification. In a view bearing striking parallels with facets of Cranmer’s teachings, Bull affirms both a declarative and a factitive view of the nature of justification: as a result of the prevenient sanctifying work of his Spirit, God transforms the believer, granting him the potential of growing in righteousness, and God, as judge, issues a declaration of innocence.

Bull specifically rejects any teaching of the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to the believer as a misinterpretation of Scripture. Instead, Bull (like Tyndale and possibly Cranmer) insists that Scripture supports the claim that faith (not Christ’s righteousness) is imputed to the believer.

There is no consensus on this matter among these reformers. Most of these divines held a Augustinian view of the nature of justification, implying that through God’s gracious intervention, we are made righteous before him. At one end of the spectrum, Tyndale, Cranmer, Jewel, and the church’s formularies make no reference

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159 Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* I.2.4 (*Works* 3.4); idem, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XII.1.85 (*Works* 4.120).


whatsoever to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer. Conversely, Barnes and Hooper both affirm the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness and reject any notion of inherent righteousness. Latimer’s lack of precision makes it possible to argue either way on this matter, but the evidence leans more toward a transformational than a declarative view. Hence, while Bull’s description of the nature of justification would surely clash with that of Barnes and Hooper, he finds himself in league with the other four divines.

A major theme characterizing Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification is his unrelenting emphasis on the question of merit. In direct opposition to the teaching of the Roman church, Bull insists that human actions can never be meritorious, with or without God’s grace. Christ alone, by his satisfaction for our sins, merits our justification *coram Deo*. Thus, while Bull speaks of the necessity of works of repentance to justification, he specifically repudiates any merit in those works.\(^{162}\) Bull shares good company in this emphasis: without exception, all six of these early reformers insist that any merit for our justification is attributable to Christ alone.

\(^{162}\) Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* VII.6.104 and XII.7.252 (*Works* 3.124 and 3.214). Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* I.8.10 (*Works* 3.10); idem, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XI.3.69 (*Works* 4.95); idem, *APH*, Sectio III.9.33 (*Works* 4.344-45). One might reasonably conclude that Bull misrepresents Roman Catholic teachings on merit in order to strengthen his argument. The Council of Trent, for example, argues that the “beginning” of justification is not based upon any personal merit. Indeed, the council defines the meritorious cause of justification as Christ’s obedience on the cross, and concludes that neither our faith nor our works “merit the grace of justification.” H. J. Schroeder, trans., *The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent* (Rockford, IL: Tan Books and Publishers, 1978), Sixth Session, V-VIII.31-5. Nonetheless, through sin, one might forfeit “the received grace of justification,” and restoration requires specific acts of obedience on the part of individual. While it is true that justification remains a gift of grace even for the one who has been restored in this manner, that gift of grace is considered “a reward promised by God himself, to be faithfully given to their good works and merits” (ibid., XIV, XVI. 39-41. Emphasis added.). This leads the council to conclude, “If anyone says that the good works of the one justified are in such a manner the gifts of God that they are not also the good merits of him justified; or that the one justified by the good works that he performs by the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ whose living member he is, does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and in case he dies in grace, the attainment of eternal life itself and also an increase of glory, let him be anathema” (ibid., Canon 32.46). Hence, Bull (like his predecessors) rightly
Like Tyndale, Cranmer, and Latimer, Bull describes justifying faith as “lively.” Bull echoes Cranmer when he elaborates that justifying faith is faith perfected by love (fides formata) which can never be separated from works.¹⁶³ For Bull, this faith is a non-meritorious condition of the gospel covenant that ultimately can be considered a work.¹⁶⁴ In fact, faith is the foundation for all other works of repentance and can never be viewed merely instrumentally (i.e., as the means by which one receives justification). In his complex understanding of justifying faith, Bull finds some common ground with the other divines, but he stands alone in his assertion that faith is a grace-empowered “work.”

Tyndale and Cranmer both insist that this faith must be accompanied by works and cannot exist without the works of charity and repentance. Thus, while works never justify and are never meritorious, works must accompany justification. Tyndale (using an argument specifically rejected by Bull)¹⁶⁵ argues that faith justifies us before God while our works justify us before men. Barnes holds an instrumental view of faith: though more than simple belief, faith is the means by which we might receive God’s gift of justification. Though we must perform works (the fruit of our faith), we do so in obedience to God’s commands. Latimer, Hooper, and Jewel share a similar instrumental view of faith with Barnes. Thus, while Bull’s view holds some continuity with that of Tyndale and Cranmer, he unquestionably differs from the other four reformers.

acknowledged that Rome taught that works were meritorious in the final justification.

¹⁶³ Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.2.5-4.6-7 (Works 3.4-7). See p. 28 above. See also Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. II.4.18 (Works 4.24-25).


¹⁶⁵ Bull, HA Diss. Post. 1.7.57-58 (Works 3.75-76).
In one specific area, Bull’s view differs significantly from the writings of these reformers. Although these divines all acknowledge the role of the Holy Spirit in humanity’s justification, Bull affirms that justifying faith cannot occur until after Spirit-empowered works of repentance are manifest.\footnote{Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Post}. III.1.69-3.71 (\textit{Works} 3.88-90).} Thus, no person who remains ungodly can ever be justified. Similiarly, Tyndale implies that faith and repentance are both the fruit of the Spirit’s work within us, so it can be said that no ungodly person can be justified. Yet, Bull’s emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in justification differs from these six reformers and finds greater affinity with the proclamations of the King’s Book than with the writings of the other reformers of that era.

Another area where Bull differs from these divines is in his insistence that no person can be justified \textit{sola fide sine operibus}.\footnote{Bull, \textit{HA Diss. Prior} I.8.10 (\textit{Works} 3.10-11).} All six of these reformers appeal to justification by faith alone, so in this central affirmation, Bull finds himself standing alone—a major difference to be sure, especially if one considers the affirmation of justification \textit{sola fide} to be the \textit{articulus stantis et cadentis} of the Reformation. Specifically rejecting perceived misconceptions of solifidianism, Bull affirms that justification occurs \textit{sola gratia}, and he argues that the the sixteenth century divines had this in mind when they argued for justification \textit{sola fide}.

There is warrant for his claim with the exception of Barnes and Hooper. Tyndale, Cranmer, and Jewel argue that the primary intent of an affirmation of \textit{justificatio sola fide} is to affirm the merit of Christ in humanity’s justification \textit{coram Deo}. Latimer affirms that we are justified by God’s grace through faith alone. In short,
because his rhetoric was driven by his unrelenting attack on antinomianism, Bull’s refusal to affirm *justificatio sola fide* indisputably differs from these reformers, but Bull agrees with all of these earlier divines that Christ alone has merited our justification.

Bishop Bull finds common ground with these reformers when he argues that God’s relationship with humanity cannot be understood outside of the context of the covenant. Bull argues, has temporal implications and never promised eternal life. Only the gospel covenant contains a promise of eternal life and the corresponding threat of eternal death for failure to fulfill the conditions of that covenant.

Tyndale and Hooper place a similar emphasis on the role of the covenant. Tyndale describes a covenant which forges an intimate relationship between God and humanity. That covenant includes a promise to be fulfilled (e.g., salvation) after the requisite conditions (e.g., faith and repentance) are met. In addition, in a view very similar to that of Bishop Bull, Tyndale affirms that the old covenant had only temporal implications while the new covenant has eternal implications. Similarly, Hooper envisions a covenant in which God offers a conditional promise of everlasting life (which presumes remission and acceptance). That covenant requires us to fulfill several conditions (e.g., confession, contrition, and a plea for God’s mercy) prior to the receipt of

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\[168\] Bull, *EC Praefatio Censoris* 2.2 (*Works* 4.2).

the promise. Thus, while Bull undoubtedly places greater emphasis on this facet of humanity’s justification, he shares common ground with at least two of these divines.

The English reformers have rarely been recognized for making major contributions to Reformation thought. Theological development within the formative years of the English Reformation was erratic at best. While the reformers in England built upon the foundation of Continental thought, they nonetheless forged a unique identity for the English church that retained a greater affinity with the Fathers than with the Continental reformers. Consequently, Cranmer and other early English reformers “never saw themselves as anything other than true Catholics who were simply returning to the authentic, original script for their centuries-old faith, the Bible.”

They coupled reliance upon Scripture with an appeal to the authority of the Fathers in an attempt to affirm catholicity and circumvent any criticism of novelty.

In keeping with this view of the English church as the true inheritor of the teachings of the Fathers, Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification calls upon the testimony of the Fathers rather than other English or Continental divines. Therefore, it is not surprising that he forges a doctrinal formulation that fails to acknowledge even those earlier English reformers who share many of his conclusions (e.g., Tyndale). Nonetheless, his theology was not developed in isolation, and this survey has

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171 For example, this use of antiquity is evident in Cranmer’s Notes and in the Homily of Salvation when he avers that the Fathers consistently support Paul’s view of justification sola fide. Cranmer, Notes, 207-08; and idem, Of Salvation, 130-33. Bozeman critiques as anachronistic Cranmer’s attempt to find a Pauline sense in the Fathers’ doctrine of justification. Theodore Dwight Bozeman, The Precisianist Strain: Disciplinary Religions & Antinomian Backlash in Puritanism to 1638 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 16.
demonstrated that there is both continuity and discontinuity between his views and those of this representative sample of sixteenth-century divines. The next chapter will examine his thought within the context of the seventeenth century.
CHAPTER 4
JUSTIFICATION IN ENGLAND:
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Antipathy toward Archbishop Laud’s reforms prompted parliament to initiate a frontal assault on the episcopacy of the Church of England in 1641.¹ This attack on the church’s hierarchy and a widespread rejection of the administration of Charles I coalesced the following year to spark a conflagration that ultimately resulted in regicide and the formation of the Commonwealth. John Saltmarsh, a fiery preacher who earned his M. A. from Magdalene College during this volatile period, became one of the more influential chaplains in Oliver Cromwell’s ‘New Model Army.’² In *Sparkles of Glory*, Saltmarsh wrote,

> But they [i.e., those “commonly called Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, &c.”] look not on *justification* as flowing from *Christ* acted upon by the *faith* of a believer first, and so a consequent of *believing* or of *faith*, but an *antecedent* or going before *faith*; they hold Jesus Christ to be *righteousness* and *justification* to a sinner, and that all are *justified* before they believe or *repent*; *faith* and repentance are fruits of *righteousness* or *justification*, *Christ* being given to open the *eyes of the blind*, and to *bring the prisoners out of prison*, &c. and that all such *righteousness* and *justification* clothes the sinner so completely through God’s *imputation*, that all *sin* is done away like a *thick cloud*, and none imputed to *believers.*³

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Saltmarsh’s interpretation of imputation ultimately removes any necessary connection between justification, faith, and repentance. Many holding these views came to the natural conclusion that justification “was settled from eternity”; therefore, one could not speak of a conditional covenant of salvation. These dissenters believed that nothing we do (or fail to do) will influence any aspect of our salvation; thus, the church’s call to morality, particularly the oft-stated expectation that a person must repent in order to be saved, is an affront to grace and must be rejected as a hindrance to the Gospel. This inclination toward antinomianism was not unique to this era, but George Bull and other “Caroline divines considered the antinomians to be a real and present danger to society and a threat to Christianity itself.”

The “moderate radicalism” of “semi-Separatist” divines like John Robinson and Henry Jacob during the early years of the seventeenth century laid the foundations array of different sects, he presents these opinions as his own, and he asserts that he and these dissenters teach only those doctrines that are consistent with the “Articles of the Church of England.” Ibid., 124. Emphasis in original. Bishop Bull condemns Saltmarsh’s works to be worthy only of destruction. George Bull, “Sermon XIV: That the Doctrine of the Recompense of Reward to be Bestowed on the Righteous After this Life, was Understood and Believed by the People of God Before the Law was Given; and that it is Lawful to Serve God with Respect to, or in Hope of, the Future Heavenly Recompense,” in The Works of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, ed. Edward Burton (Oxford: University Press, 1846), 1:357.


5Bromiley argues that even during the early years of the English Reformation “Cranmer seems to have been particularly sensitive to the possible charge or danger of antinomianism. The whole point of the second and third homilies is to meet this misunderstanding.” G. W. Bromiley, Thomas Cranmer, Theologian (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 34.

for Independency during the 1640s and beyond. These Separatists, not unlike the more radical dissenters, increasingly sought to distance the church from the state, but they never envisioned the Presbyterian hegemony promulgated by the Puritans following the Civil War. However, Archbishop Laud’s anti-Calvinist policies and his liturgical innovations so alienated those holding Puritan sympathies, that no compromise seemed possible. The church was irrevocably divided. Political expedience (e.g., parliament’s military alliance with Scotland) during the Troubles resulted in the ascendancy of a semi-Erastian Presbyterianism. In its wake, a proliferation of sectarian groups emerged, further diluting the potential for doctrinal unity envisioned by the Westminster Assembly of Divines.

The monarchy was restored in 1660, initiating a time of renewal and hope within the established church. However, the fragmentation experienced during the Civil War continued to produce a climate more conducive to party divisions and conflict than to unity. Although many believed that a “Munsterian anarchy” had been averted by the return of a lawful monarchy,” their confidence was shattered following the foiled

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9“Restoration Anglicanism was rooted in the mixed experience of the Puritan Revolution, an experience for Anglicans of dispossession and persecution, but also one of renewed piety and ecclesiological confidence. The Church of England emerged from the 1640s and 1650s with a distinct doctrinal, ecclesiological and spiritual identity.” John Spurr, *The Restoration Church of England, 1646-1689* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), xiv.

10Ibid., 29.
uprising of the Fifth Monarch men in 1661.\textsuperscript{11} That rebellion exposed the fragility of the settlement and fueled antipathy toward all Dissenters. Within the establishment, “religious dissent of any sort was invariably equated in the mind of the church with subversion,”\textsuperscript{12} and for George Bull, this dissent inevitably was tainted by antinomian proclivities.

Dewey Wallace argues that antinomianism was little more than a bugbear used by Restoration divines to expose the excesses which they believed necessarily emerged from a Calvinist soteriology.\textsuperscript{13} Michael Mullett agrees with this premise. He suggests that the absence of any effective censorship allowed antinomianism (and other diverse opinions) to gain a hearing during the Civil War, but he dismisses any necessary connection between dissent and the decline of public morality.\textsuperscript{14} It is undisputed, however, that perceptions of moral decline during the 1640s and beyond increasingly became a source of concern for all churchmen, both inside and outside of the established church. The popularity of antinomian literature further undermined the credibility of the church. Therefore, concerned churchmen targeted the emphasis on Christian liberty promoted by Saltmarsh and others as a blight that must be removed before public order could be restored. In the process, anti-Calvinism gained further impetus among those who

\textsuperscript{11}This radical millenarian group flourished during the Interregnum but was crushed following the 1661 revolt.

\textsuperscript{12}Spellman, \textit{Latitudinarians}, 35.

\textsuperscript{13}Wallace, \textit{Puritans and Predestination}, 114. Wallace concludes that “the Antinomian menace may have been blown up out of all proportion by its enemies; like Voltaire’s God, had there been no Antinomianism, it would have been necessary to invent it.”

\textsuperscript{14}Mullett insists that “doctrines such as ‘free grace’ . . . did not lead in any way to moral collapse.” The Dissenters, he argues, were by and large “dedicated disciplinarians.” Mullett, “Radical Sects,”194-98.
viewed the excesses of the period with alarm.\textsuperscript{15}

J. I. Packer highlights the significant impact of this anti-Calvinist sentiment on the doctrine of justification. He finds the seeds for this movement much earlier in the seventeenth century, but he points to Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification as a seismic shift away from a consensus view that “Christ’s righteousness imputed was the ‘formal cause’ of justification.” Bull, he insists, popularized views that were shared by earlier divines such as Hammond, Thorndike, and Taylor, and Bull so radically changed the landscape within the English church that by “Wesley’s day the true meaning of justification by faith had been forgotten almost universally in the Church of England.”\textsuperscript{16}

The previous chapter examined Bull’s thought within the context of a representative group of English divines from the early years of the English Reformation, and the diversity noted there raises questions of any longstanding consensus on the doctrine of justification. This chapter has a similar objective and will examine Bull’s thought within the context of a representative group of seventeenth-century English divines. The remarkable diversity that existed within this period, much like that of the sixteenth century, suggests that claims of a universally accepted doctrinal consensus on justification within the Church of England rest on tentative grounds.

\textsuperscript{15}Spurr argues that “there can be no doubt that, by the Restoration, the fear of antinomianism had seriously distorted Anglican perceptions and representations of Calvinism.” Spurr, \textit{Restoration Church}, 321. See also Susan Doran and Christopher Durston, \textit{Princes, Pastors and People: The Church and Religion in England, 1500-1700}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 33.

\textsuperscript{16}J. I. Packer, "Arminianisms," in \textit{The Manifold Grace of God: Papers Read at the Puritan and Reformed Studies Conference} (London: The Westminster Conference, 1968; reprint, Stoke-on-Trent, UK: Tentmaker Publications, 1998), 27 (page references are to the reprint edition). Packer traces the genesis of this view to a host of factors such as King James’s rejection of the Lambeth Articles, the popular appeal of Peter Baro, the “moralism” embraced by the Cambridge Platonists, and “to the Englishman’s congenital instinct towards Pelagianism.”
Richard Hooker

While his most-lasting influence might be traced to an emphasis on theological method, particularly a hermeneutical dependence upon Scripture, tradition, and reason, Richard Hooker has been described as the “father of Anglican theology,” and no doctrinal survey of this period would be complete without examining his works. He died at the turn of the seventeenth century, but his greatest influence was not felt until after the Restoration. Therefore, in spite of his reputation as a defender of the Elizabethan Settlement, it is more appropriate to consider his thought in the context of the seventeenth than the sixteenth century.

Hooker’s teaching on justification is difficult to categorize. Alan Clifford identifies Hooker’s stance on justification as “Augustinian,” encompassing a “twofold justification (the first by an infusion of grace at baptism, the second by faith and works).” Lee Gibbs asserts that, despite some ambiguity, Hooker’s position holds


18 Peter Toon, Justification and Sanctification (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1983), 94.


greater affinity with the magisterial reformers than it does with Rome. Alister McGrath argues that Hooker’s “understanding of the nature of justification is similar to that of Calvin.” Peter Lake views Hooker’s position as a *via media* between “a Pelagian commitment to human merit and a Calvinist or puritan quietism.” Despite the difficulty of categorizing his thought, Richard Hooker’s works provide an important expression of Anglican views on justification on the eve of the Puritan revolution. In particular, he carefully maintains tension between an unyielding emphasis on justification *sola fide* and a concomitant emphasis on the necessity of human works in salvation. In the process, he builds his entire doctrine of justification on the question of merit.

In keeping with an earlier consensus, Hooker argues that justification is necessary because of the intractable sinfulness of humanity. Through original sin, humanity was blinded to the knowledge and experience of the love of God. This plight resulted in a universal inability to respond to God outside of the gracious work of God. Yet, Hooker makes it clear that we are not condemned solely for the imputed sin of Adam. To the contrary, our guilt is based on both original sin and actual sin.

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Consequently, we can never become perfectly righteous: even our very best efforts fall short of God’s perfect standard because human volition is “corrupt and unsound.” Yet, God, by his grace, initiates a relationship with us, and through justification “washeth away sin.” Once that sin has been removed “we are cloathed with the righteousness which is of God: the righteousness of God maketh us most holy,” thereby restoring our broken relationship with God.

The grace of justification is granted solely because of the sacrifice of Christ. By his divinity Christ becomes the “efficient” cause of our justification, and by his humanity he becomes the “meritorious cause of our iustice.” This view, Hooker insists, is affirmed by both the Church of England and the Church of Rome. Both traditions agree that “unto iustice no man ever attained, but by the merits of Jesus Christ.” Both traditions also agree that the redemption wrought by Christ is sufficient “for the salvation of the whole world.” Our disagreement with Rome, he insists, is in the application of Christ’s merit. There is no room for negotiation here: if we agree that “our salvation is by Christ alone,” and we simultaneously seek to add to the work of Christ from our own inherent righteousness, then “we overthrow Christ.”

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25Hooker, Justification, 7:11; 8.12. He writes of God that “so wide are the bowels of his compassion inlarged, that hee denyeth us not, no not when we were laden with iniquity.”

26Richard Hooker, Two Sermons upon Part of S. Judes Epistle, in The Works of Richard Hooker, The Folger Library Edition, ed. Speed Hill (London: Belknap Press, 1990), 5:50-51. He argues further that if “Christ haue paide a ransome for all . . . it followeth that al with out exception were captiues. If one haue died for al, then all were dead in sinne: all sinfull th therefore: none absolutely righteous in themselves; but we are absolutly righteous in Christ.” Hooker, Justification.2.2.

27Hooker, Justification, 4.3-4; 17.20-21; 31.50. Elsewhere he affirms, “I did saie and do, they (i.e., Roman Catholics) teache as we doe; That althoughe Christ be the onelye meritorious cause of our Justice, yet as a medicyne whiche is made for helth doth not heale by beinge made but by beinge applied, so by the merits of Christ there canne be no life or Justification without the applicacio of his merits.” Richard Hooker, The Answer of Mr. Richard Hooker to a Supplication Preferred by Mr. Walter Travers to the HH. Lords of the Privie Counsell, in The Works of Richard Hooker, The Folger Library Edition, ed. W.
Hooker embraces a reformed *ordo salutis* that includes our election, effectual calling, justification, sanctification, and then our ultimate glorification.\(^{28}\) The progressive nature of this process can be described as a “chaine” or a “ladder of many staves” that must be ascended in order; thus, only the elect can hope for justification. Yet, justification hinges on the presence of faith, so the absence of faith is analogous to the removal of a stave from the ladder, making our ascent impossible.\(^{29}\)

Hooker persistently argues that we receive the gift of justification by faith alone. This justifying faith can never be limited to simple belief in propositional truths, however, for the Apostle James is correct: even the demons believe the truth.\(^{30}\) Instead, justifying faith is transformational in nature: it necessarily results in a changed life. For that reason, Hooker rejects the criticism of those who malign the English church by insisting that an emphasis on *sola fide* leads to antinomianism. To the contrary:

> [It] is a childish cavill wherewith in the matter of justification our adversaries do so greatly please themselves, exclaiming that we tread all Christian virtues under our feet, and require nothing in Christians but faith, because we teach that faith alone

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\(^{28}\)Hooker, *Justification*, 31:51. He wrote, “As we have received, so we teach, that besides the bare and naked worke, wherein Christ without anie other associate finished all the partes of our redemption, & purchased salvation himselfe alone, for conveiance of this eminent blessing unto us, manie things are of necessitie required: as to bee knowne and chosen of God before the foundation of the world; in the world to be called, iustified, sanctified; after we have left the world, to be received unto glorie.”

\(^{29}\)Hooker, *Jude*, 5:44. He writes, “The thing prescribed is Faith. For as in a chaine, which is made of many linkes, if you pull the first, you drawe the rest; and as in a ladder of many staves, if you take away the lowest, all hope of ascending to the highest will be removed, so because all the precepts and promises in the law and in the Gospell doe hang upon this, *Beleeve*; and because the last of the graces of God doth so follow the first, that he glorifieth none, but whom he hath justified, nor justifieth any, but whom he hath called to a true, effectual, and lively faith in Christ Jesus.”

\(^{30}\)Hooker, *Justification*, 26.34.
iustifieth: whereas by this speech we never meant to exclude either hope, or charitie frō being alwaies joyned as inseparable mates with faith in the man that is iustified; or workes from being added as necessarie duties required at the hands of every iustified man; but to shew that faith is the only hand, which putteth on Christ unto iustification.\textsuperscript{31}

This instrumental view of faith as the means by which one appropriates God’s justification excludes any notion of personal merit. Our belief, no matter how perfect, holds no intrinsic merit save the “worthiness of him which is believed.” Our works, no matter how pure, have no intrinsic value outside of the “meere mercy” of God.\textsuperscript{32}

Nonetheless, while we are not saved by works, we cannot be saved if there are no works. Hooker concludes that “\textit{corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore fit confessio ad salutem}, except infants, and men cut off upon the point of their conversion: of the rest none shall see God, but such as seeke peace and holines, though not a cause of their salvation, yet as a way which they must walke, which will be saved.” Thus, works of repentance are a \textit{conditio sine qua non} of our salvation.\textsuperscript{33}

To those who might quibble with this view by arguing that any requirement for works in the process of salvation is an addition to the good news that we are justified \textit{sola fide}, Hooker responds with his own question. So what? Even if I grant that works are an addition to faith, “the foundation is not subverted by everie kind of addition. Simplie to adde unto those fundamentall words is not to mingle wine with water, heaven with earth.” To be sure, we must clearly define the foundation of our faith. “Salvation onely by Christ

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 31.50. In his \textit{Lawes} Hooker writes that no one can claim that “God doth require nothing unto happines at the handes of man saving onely a naked beliefe (for hope and charitie we may not exclude) but that without beliefe all other things are as nothing.” Hooker, \textit{Lawes}, I.11.6 (1:118).

\textsuperscript{32}Hooker, \textit{Justification}, 33.59.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 20.25. Hooker alludes to Rom 10:10.
is the foundation whereupon indeed Christianitie standeth.”34 Yet, this does not negate biblical admonitions that works of repentance are necessary unto salvation.

In addition to works of repentance, Hooker teaches that the sacraments are as necessary as belief to the process of salvation. The gospel dispenses with the ceremonial law, particularly the requirement for circumcision, but that requirement was superseded by Christian baptism. Baptism, argues Hooker, “is necessarie to take awaie synne.” Based on Jesus’ lesson to Nicodemus, we must conclude that baptism is “a necessarie outward meane to our regeneration.” He concludes, therefore, that baptism becomes the means by which we are “incorporated into Christ.” As a result of our regeneration in baptism, by the merit of Christ alone, we receive the “savinge grace of imputation which taketh away all former guiltiness” and the “infused divine virtue of the holie Ghost which giveth to the powers of the soule their first disposition towards future newnes of life.” Thus, baptism is a vital component of Hooker’s soteriology in several dimensions: first, it results in regeneration; second, baptism is wed with faith in order for us to be justified; and third, the sacrament infuses the believer with the initial righteousness of sanctification.35

For Hooker, the key differentiating mark between Rome and the Church of England is related to the “formall cauise of justificacion.” The Church of Rome finds the formal cause of justification in our inherent righteousness. They hold to a progressive process by which one becomes increasingly more justified as a result of his own works.36

34 Hooker, Justification, 29.47-48.
35 Ibid., 30:49; and idem, Lawes, V.60.1-4 (2:254-57).
36 Hooker, Supplication, 5:242; and idem, Justification, 5.5-6.
The English church rejects this view, argues Hooker. Instead, he insists that the formal cause of justification is the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. As a result of our faith, God imputes the righteousness of Christ to us, resulting in the remission of sins and making it possible for God to view us in the light of Christ’s righteousness rather than in the light of our sins. He writes:

The righteousnesse wherein we must be found if we wilbe iustified, is not our owne: therefore we cannot be iustified by any inherent quality. Christ hath merited righteousnesse for as many as are found in him. In him God findeth us, if we be faithfull, for by faith we are incorporated into Christ. Then although in our selves we be altogether sinnefull, and unrighteous, yet even the man which is impios in him selfe, full of iniquitie, full of sin, him being found in Christ though faith, and having his sin remitted through repentance; him God upholdeth with a gracious eie; putteth away his sinne by not imputing; taketh quite away the punishment due thereunto, by pardoning it; and accepting him in Iesus Christ, as perfectly righteous, as if he had fulfilled all that was so commanded him in the lawe.

This forensic view of God’s declarative justice administered through the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness does not stand alone, however. Hooker articulates his own form of *duplex iustitia* when he affirms that there actually are two forms of justifying righteousness. The first, as has already been noted, is an extrinsic righteousness given by imputation. The second is a form of inner righteousness which is infused within us by God through baptism in our adoption as sons and “cōsisteth of faith, hope, and charitie, and other Christian virtues.” Both of these forms of justifying righteousness are received simultaneously by the work of the Spirit.

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37 Hooker, *Jude*, 5:50-51. He writes, “But imputation of righteousnesse hath covered the sinnes of every soule which beleeveth; God by pardoning our sinne hath taken it away; so that now although our transgressions be multiplied above the haires of our head, yet being justified wee are as free, and as cleere, as if there were no one spot, or staine of any uncleannesse in us.”


39 Ibid., 21.26. Hooker definitely would not accept the Tridentine view of *duplex iustitia* that refers to the formal cause of justification. Instead, he embraces a view that is closer to a Thomist.
Similarly, just as there are two different types of justifying righteousness, Hooker argues that there are two types of “sanctifying righteousness: Habituall, and Actuall.” Habitual righteousness is received contemporaneously with both types of justifying righteousness: as the Holy Spirit takes up residence within us, we receive this gift of holiness. Actual righteousness is the ongoing “holynesse which afterwards beautifieth all the parts and actions of our life” and is the righteousness for which so many saints are praised in the Scriptures. If pressed to determine a hierarchy among these forms of justifying and sanctifying righteousness, Hooker acknowledges the primacy of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer (i.e. “in dignitie being the chiefest”). Yet, in terms of order, he insists that this imputed righteousness of justification actually follows the justifying righteousness that accompanies the “infused virtues” such as faith and charity. In addition, imputed righteousness follows (in terms of order) “Habituall” sanctifying righteousness. Ultimately, justification cannot occur without all three of these forms of righteousness, and all are received simultaneously in our adoption as sons; however, our growth in sanctification or “actuall” righteousness (i.e., “the righteousness of good works”) follows these other forms of righteousness both logically and chronologically (i.e., “both in order and time”).

40 Hooker insists that while external works are necessary for our salvation, they must be viewed from within the context of sanctification, not justification. He writes, “Salvation therefore by Christ is the foundation of Christianitie: as for works, they are a thing subordinate, no otherwise then because our sanctification cannot be accomplished without them.” Hooker, Justification, 32.52. Therefore, Hooker differentiates between the righteousness which accompanies justification and that which accompanies sanctification. The former, he insists, is “perfect, but not inherent” while the latter is “inherent, but not perfect.” Ibid., 3.3.

41 Hooker, Justification, 21.26-27. This discussion is convoluted, but can be summarized visually in the following manner. Though the first three forms of righteousness occur simultaneously in the
Thus, it appears that Clifford’s claim that Hooker embraced a “twofold justification” best summarizes Hooker’s view, but it has become evident that the complexity of Hooker’s thought defies a reductionistic attempt to neatly categorize his thought. Though he stood opposed to Tridentine errors, he nonetheless found room to agree with Rome. While he embraced a Reformed insistence that the formal cause of justification is the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to the believer, he continued to emphasize the necessity of works and the sacraments in the process of salvation and even held that God-infused virtues such as faith and charity must precede the righteousness credited to us by imputation, at least in terms of order. He held these seemingly disparate emphases in tension, however, by an unyielding insistence that

life of the believer (and one cannot exist without the others), there is a logical order in which they must occur: imparted justifying righteousness → habitual sanctifying righteousness → imputed justifying righteousness → actual sanctifying righteousness. Hooker consistently protests that one must differentiate between justification and sanctification. He elaborates: “Now concerning the righteousness of sanctification, we deny it not to be inherent; we grant that unless we work, we have it not: only we distinguish it a thing different in nature from the righteousness of justification: we are righteous the one way by the faith of Abraham, the other way, except we do the works of Abraham, we are not righteous.” He concludes unequivocally that “S. Paul doth plainly sever these two parts of Christian righteousness one from the other” (Hooker, *Justification*, 6.8). However, Hooker’s understanding of Habitual righteousness lends credence to Clinton Walker’s claim that Hooker believes sanctification is “a part of the justifying event.” Walker, “John Wesley’s Doctrine of Justification,” 79. This discussion also caught George Bull’s attention. Bull cites *Theologii perillustri, Richardi Hookeri nostri* only once in his primary works on justification. In response to Tully’s criticism, Bull insists that his teaching in the *Harmonia* does not conflict with the twelfth article of the English church that *bona opera justificationem sequi* because he interprets the article to refer to the “actual righteousness of works.” He acknowledges that he does not fully concur with every aspect of Hooker’s position, but Bull argues that his opinion that certain works of repentance must precede justification finds support in Hooker’s statements on actual and habitual righteousness. George Bull, *Apolologia pro Harmonia, ejusque Authore, contra Declamationem Thomae Tuli, S. T. P. in Libro nuper Typis evulgato, quem Justificatio Paulina, &c. inscrisit* (London: Richard Davis, 1676), Sectio V.4-5.51-53 (Works 4.376-79). Bull elaborates, writing that, for Hooker, “although the actual righteousness of works is entirely posterior to justification, yet that righteousness consisting of the internal virtues of faith, hope, and love, and which he calls implanted, habitual, and sanctifying righteousness (*justitiam insitam, habitualem et sanctificantem appellat*), precedes in the order of nature the imputation of our righteousness, or justification.” Hooker also insists that there is no inherent contradiction between affirming *justificatio sola fide sine opera* and simultaneously affirming that works are necessary in order to be justified as long as we maintain the “distinction between habitual and actual righteousness.”

Christ alone merited our justification.

**John Davenant**

John Davenant was the most prominent of the English divines chosen to represent James I at the Synod of Dort. He was elevated to the bishopric at Salisbury as a result of his service at Dort and for his contributions as the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. The publication of his massive commentary on Colossians established his reputation as a theologian of note, and C. F. Allison argues that Davenant’s *Treatise on Justification* set the standard for all future discussions on “the relationship between works and salvation, the problem of sin in the regenerate, the gratuitous nature of justification, and, in general, the relationship between justification and sanctification.” Unquestionably, Davenant’s extensive treatment of justification sought to eliminate the ambiguity that had existed within teachings the English church by articulating an unabashedly Reformed position.

Like so many of the earlier divines, Davenant’s understanding of justification is grounded in his anthropology. Prior to the fall, Adam’s original righteousness enabled him not only to know but to obey the “Divine law or will”; that is, he was “meet to serve God with perfect obedience.” The catastrophic consequence of Adam’s sin was a loss of this original righteousness. Therefore, rather than seeking to obey God’s commands, we (as Adam’s posterity) now evidence “a positive proneness to unlawful appetites.” Ultimately, the image of God has been “defiled and lost,” and that image can only be

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43 Allison, Moralism, 186.

repaired by the “sanctifying grace” of God. Davenant is careful, however, to differentiate between this sanctifying work of the Spirit and humanity’s justification coram Deo. By the grace and mercy of God, based solely on Christ’s meritorious obedience, God removes our sins and grants us eternal life in the “gracious act we call justification.” Yet, God also “heals the weakness of our minds and restores and repairs his image in us; and this act we call sanctification or regeneration.”

Davenant argues that regeneration is both an event and a process. On the one hand, regeneration is “the very first act, whereby spiritual life (as though by a creative act) is infused into man, and so is effected in a moment.” On the other hand, regeneration is an ongoing process in which the Holy Spirit continues to equip, empower, and transform the believer. He concludes that humans possess no innate capacity for repentance, Christian charity, or faith without this sanctifying and animating work of God. Thus, while some preliminary acts of contrition may be possible prior to the quickening that accompanies regeneration, “the will is not elevated to produce an act truly spiritual until regeneration” occurs; consequently, justification is not possible without this preparatory sanctifying work of God’s Spirit.

Davenant shares Hooker’s conviction that the pivotal question driving any discussion of justification relates to the formal cause of justification. He grants that it is legitimate to speak of the inherent righteousness of justified persons as long as one does not confuse that righteousness with a “formal or meritorious cause” of justification. By

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“formal cause” Davenant means “that by which we stand, in the sight of God, freed from condemnation, innocent, and graciously accepted unto life eternal.” He rejects Rome’s claim that the formal cause of justification is inherent righteousness. He also rejects assertions that the formal cause of justification can be attributed to faith (which is an instrumental cause) or that the formal cause of justification can be limited solely to the remission of sins. To the contrary, the formal cause of justification must be perfect righteousness, but we ultimately will always fail and our righteousness will always be imperfect. We can only have confidence in our justification, therefore, if we know that it is based upon a perfect righteousness, not our own frail efforts. Thus, he concludes that the “perfect obedience of Christ the Mediator, who dwells in us and by his Spirit unites us to himself, is the formal cause of our justification; since it is made ours by the gift of God, and applied by faith.”

We must turn to the teaching of the Apostle Paul, argues Davenant, in order to apprehend the fullness of the doctrine of justification. In so doing we see that this doctrine has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, justification involves the remission of sin, the “non-imputation of sin for punishment.” Because our transgressions are not counted against us, in justification we are liberated from the “chains of our sins,”

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47 Davenant, Justification, 1:159-62, 211. When “we are seeking for the formal cause of our justification, we seek for that on account of which the sinner is received into the favour of God; through which he stands immediately well pleasing to God and accepted to eternal life; by the benefit of which he escapes the condemning sentence of the law, and, in fine, on which he may and ought to depend, for obtaining the favour and approbation of his heavenly Judge.”


49 Davenant dismisses perceived discrepancies between James and Paul. He primarily cites James in support of his argument that no person is without sin, and he summarizes James’s teaching as an argument that “faith is dead, hypocritical, and by no means saving, which does not bring forth good works.” Ibid., 1:313.
set free to obey God’s commands. Positively, Paul teaches a forensic understanding of justification, suggesting that justification is “the act of God, absolving, like a judge, an accused person, pronouncing him just, and accepting him to the reward of righteousness, that is life eternal.” Thus, justification is “an act of jurisdiction, not of infusion.” He insists, however, that this judicial declaration can never be reduced to a “legal fiction” because God issues this declaration of righteousness and accepts the sinner on the basis of a “true and perfect righteousness, which also becomes truly the righteousness of the justified person himself.” This process is accomplished through the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer.50

By imputation Davenant means “to reckon and account it in the number of those things which are his own and belong to him.” He insists that when God imputes righteousness to us, we are not declared righteous because of anything inherent to us. Rather, we are declared righteous because of an external righteousness that has become our own, the very righteousness of Christ. Consequently, he rejects Bellarmine’s claim that moral transformation is required before one can be justified. To be sure, he grants that “regeneration requires the true death of sin” and this regeneration must occur before one can be justified, but he insists this can only happen by a gift of God’s Spirit. Hence, we can assert that we “are not only truly but perfectly righteous, if we regard the righteousness of Christ bestowed upon us; for it is not imaginary although it be imputed; because this imputation of God renders it no less rightfully ours, than if it were inherent in us.” By this gift of imputation, he maintains, the righteousness of our Lord serves to

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50Davenant, Justification, 1:27, 42; 1: 158-65. He argues that “no one is justified, but he upon whom God has bestowed a righteousness so complete and perfect, that God in beholding him cannot but regard as righteous the person upon whom the same is bestowed.”
“fill up what is yet wanting” on our parts.  

In spite of this affirmation of God’s imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the regenerate in justification, there is a true sense, suggests Davenant, in which “inherent righteousness is infused into the justified person by Christ.” God is the initiator of this process, and by it we are “perfected.” Yet, this must never, he insists, be confused with justification. To the contrary, this inherent righteousness will always be “inchoate and imperfect,” and it is ultimately the first fruits of our justification.  

This acknowledgement of inherent righteousness raises a key distinction for Davenant between “habitual” and “actual” righteousness similar to the position held by Hooker. Habitual righteousness is the inherent righteousness given to us as a gift of God’s Spirit that ultimately reverses the effect of the fall antecedent to our justification. This habitual righteousness is “infused into all the justified.” Hence, one can rightly affirm that true believers are “from this infused or inherent righteousness, called and esteemed righteous.” The law of cause and effect proves this to be the case. “A bad tree, whilst it remains bad, cannot bear good fruit.” In contrast, we acquire actual righteousness, the “righteousness of good works,” posterior to justification.

51 Davenant, Justification, 1:27, 174-78, 188, 231. Davenant dismisses Bellarmine’s argument that imputation must be rejected since it is not explicitly taught in Scripture. He insists that it can clearly be inferred.

52 Ibid., 1:165.

53 Ibid., 1:1-11. In support, he cites 2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; John 1:13; Eph 5:8; Col 3:10; Ezek 34:21; Rom 6:6. See also Ibid., 1.299-302. Davenant’s fifth conclusion states, “Some good works are necessary to justification, as concurrent or preliminary conditions; although they are not necessary as efficient or meritorious causes.” He includes “internal” works in this category (i.e., “to mourn over and to detest sin, to submit humbly to God, to flee to the mercy of God, to place hope in Christ the Mediator, (and) to resolve on a new life.” In addition, his sixth conclusion states, “Good works are necessary for retaining and preserving a state of justification, not as causes, which by themselves, effect or merit this preservation, but as means or conditions, without which God will not preserve in men the grace of justification.” Davenant clarifies that, in making these assertions, we must acknowledge that we are not speaking of the
Ironically, this understanding of inherent righteousness introduces some unintended ambiguity in Davenant’s thought. He argues, for example, that we might possess an “imperfect and incipient righteousness” that “renders a man just, but imperfectly and inchoately.” Yet, only a “perfect and absolute” righteousness can render us “perfectly and absolutely” just. Hence, he concludes that this imperfect righteousness is “the formal cause of this inchoate justification,” but only the perfect righteousness that accompanies imputation can be seen as “the formal cause of this absolute and judiciary justification.”\(^{54}\)

Davenant views the adjudication offered in justification from within the context of God’s covenantal relationship with humanity. He affirms that a covenant implies both conditions and rewards. As a result of Christ’s active and passive obedience, the Gospel or evangelical covenant has eclipsed the former Mosaic or legal covenant. The “legal contract” required the “condition of exact obedience,” but the Gospel covenant offers the promise of God’s gracious reward without this requirement of “exact obedience.” Thus, the promised “reward” of eternal life proffered in the evangelical covenant is a gift of grace rather than the administration of justice.\(^{55}\)

In spite of our proven moral inability, the legal covenant implies the possibility that one can perfectly fulfill the law. That humanity once possessed that capability, Davenant does not deny. Yet, he maintains that this capacity to obey was lost when “necessity of causality, but of order.” That is, good works are necessary “as the way appointed to eternal life, not as the meritorious cause of eternal life.”\(^{54}\)

\(^{54}\)Davenant, *Justification*, 1:160. In this affirmation, Davenant comes close to distinguishing between “first” and “second” justification.

\(^{55}\)Ibid., 1:144; 287.
Adam sinned. In response to complaints that God must be considered unimaginably cruel if he requires perfect obedience from persons who are unable to comply, Davenant rejoins that we must differentiate between laws impossible to fulfill by their very nature (e.g., if a “tyrant should command his citizens to fly in the air”) and laws impossible to fulfill through the “fault of the individual” (e.g., a drunkard’s inability to obey laws requiring a sober and modest life). Further, he argues that “it is not cruel to exact from his friends a tribute, though no one of them can pay it when it is justly due, when, too, he himself provides a proxy, and security for discharging the debt in their name; and when from that very exaction, no inconvenience, but the greatest advantage possible, redounds to his friends.”

Thus, he concludes:

[A]lthough we do not fulfill the law, yet the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us who are planted into Christ. First, because Christ satisfied the law for all his members by enduring the death of the cross. Secondly, because he has exactly fulfilled the whole law on their account, even to the least tittle of it. Thirdly, because he qualifies them by the Spirit of grace to render a true and sincere obedience to the law, although it be only inchoate and imperfect. Yet this inchoate obedience, when forgiveness of sins is added also, avails just as much as an absolute fulfillment of the law.

Davenant can argue, therefore, that good works are required for “those living under the Gospel covenant,” but this requirement can only be fulfilled subsequent to justification and is not a covenantal condition. The only condition required within the evangelical covenant is “a true and living faith.” Davenant concedes that this justifying faith can never be limited to “mere assent” of evangelical doctrine. Instead, justifying faith engenders a radical change of life that is revealed in repentance for sins and

56 Davenant, Justification, 2:54-57.
57 Ibid., 2:58.
surrender to the lordship of Christ. That is, this “special confidence” is a work of the Spirit in the life of the believer that always results in a changed life. This is why he denies that justifying faith can be “disunited from charity.” Our obedience to God’s commands does not bring about our justification; instead, that obedience reveals, confirms, or demonstrates our justification. Thus, while one must acknowledge the necessity of a condition of obedience (i.e., good works) in salvation, that “condition” is not formally a part of the evangelical covenant. We are justified sola fide.  

Davenant insists that this teaching must not be misinterpreted to artificially separate justifying faith from other evangelical graces. He notes that our good works include both “internal” and “external” works. The “internal” works (e.g., charity, repentance, mourning for sin, etc.) are necessary for our justification. This is not, however, an attribution of any merit for those actions. Instead, he affirms that repentance and other internal virtues are “previous or concurrent conditions” of the evangelical covenant; hence, there is “no possibility of justification, no hope of salvation” without them. Other “external” works necessarily follow our justification and must be evidenced “throughout the whole course of life.”

58 Davenant, Determinationes, 227; 408; 415.
59 Davenant, Justification, 1:288-90. He makes a key distinction here, arguing that those who have been regenerated are not “freed from the obligation of fulfilling the law,” but they are “freed from the Curse which, according to the legal contract, hangs over those who have not fulfilled the law.” See also Ibid., 1:305.
60 Ibid., 1:273-75. If anyone would have been exempt from this requirement, he muses, it would be the thief on the cross. Yet, Luke makes it clear that the thief was “distinguished by many and great good works.” His external works are evidenced by his open confession of sin, his admonitions to his companion, and his unqualified acknowledgement of Christ. His internal works can be seen in the way he anguished over his sin, the love that prompted him to care about his companion, and his faith “in Christ as the Redeemer.” Ibid., 1:279. Elsewhere he writes, “I answer that, life eternal is properly enough called a recompense for good works, in consequence of the form and order which God observes in apportioning this reward. For he does not offer it except to those who are diligent, and after their toil is finished, and in
Davenant grants Bellarmine’s claim that these interior works can be considered “causes of salvation,” only if it is clear that these works are not “meritorious causes, or properly efficient.” Thus, one may grant that interior works are causal only if he means causes “sine quibus non, that is, which produce something that ordinarily precedes the effect of salvation.” From this perspective, one can legitimately aver that repentance “is a condition, without which going before, salvation does not follow; but it is not a cause through the merit and virtue of which salvation itself if obtained.”

Davenant’s discussion of justification is incomprehensible outside of his response to the question of merit. He rejects any notion of works of condignity or supererogation, arguing that the Fathers used the word *meritum* with the understanding that “a good work is simply ordained to receive a reward.” Consequently, good works never possess an “intrinsic worthiness of reward” and are never the meritorious cause of our justification. Instead, these works are the natural result of the Spirit’s work within us subsequent to our justification. This does not imply that there is no reward associated with these works, but it does suggest that our works are never meritorious. While it can be said, therefore, that the promise of eternal life is a reward that is intimately intertwined with our works, this never implies that those works are “adequate to this infinite reward.”

.accordance with the form of the agreement or promise which he made with them." Ibid., 2:137. Yet, he qualifies his thought, saying, “We grant that no one is saved, who does not apply himself to the practice of good works; but we affirm that many, nay that all true believers are saved, although they do not fulfil the law of God, nor run with an undeviating foot the way of God’s commandments.” Ibid., 1:284.

61Davenant, *Justification*, 1:306-08. Even with a conditional promise, God does not incur debt. Hence, “God promises forgiveness and justification to the repentant sinner; yet, on this required condition being fulfilled, the individual will not be considered as having merited justification, but to have obtained it freely.” Ibid., 2:144.

Ultimately, the reward associated with our works is due not to any sense of obligation those works place on God but on the reality of his promised gift of grace. Consequently Davenant can affirm that it “is not any worthiness, then, which attaches to the work itself, but the love of God toward his child; that is the reason why, to a work by no means worthy in itself, an infinite reward is apportioned.” Even the Roman church, he maintains, acknowledges that God’s mercy, not any intrinsic merit of our works, makes our justification possible.63 Davenant avers,

The word worthy, then, does not prove that there is any merit in the strict sense of the word, in him who is pronounced worthy of the kingdom of heaven; it proves merely, that he has the disposition of fitness, which God requires to be previously existent in those upon whom he bestows the heavenly kingdom. For as the truly penitent is said to be worthy of pardon, not because the penitence itself has merited pardon as a payment, but because it contains that disposition which God has resolved to grant pardon: so the believer, cultivating holiness, is said to be worthy of the kingdom of heaven, not because our faith or holiness merits heaven deservedly, but because it contains in it that becoming disposition to which the kingdom of heaven is promised by God the Father of mercies.64

Davenant’s extensive treatment of justification is multifaceted, but he remains unyielding in his emphasis on the three core issues driving the debate. First, the formal cause of justification is limited solely to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the life of the believer. Second, works of righteousness can legitimately be considered as necessary to our justification and our salvation. Yet, this second affirmation is always qualified by a third affirmation that nothing we do will ever be meritorious outside of the gracious provision of God.


64Ibid., 2:134.
Following his graduation from Marischal College, William Forbes (1585-1634) served the same institution as a professor of logic for five years. After his ordination he served several different parishes before his elevation by Charles I as the first Bishop of Edinburgh for a very brief time prior to his death. He is best remembered for the Considerationes, an unfinished work that was published posthumously in 1658. In that work he sought to find common ground between Rome and “more rigid Protestants” on five divisive matters: the Eucharist, the invocation of the saints, Christ’s role as our mediator, and the doctrines of purgatory and justification. His high view of the episcopacy and his conviction that Reformation views could be reconciled with the teachings of the Roman church set him apart as a controversialist in his native Scotland.

Forbes describes justification as the “forgiveness of sins, and the acceptation of the man into God’s grace on account of Christ.” He argues that this justification has a forensic character which includes God’s judicial declaration of forgiveness. Yet, justification is no mere declarative event. To the contrary, it is also an ongoing process, a “continuous act” that involves moral transformation. Thus, justificare necessarily signifies not only to pronounce just, after the forensic manner, but also truly and

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66 This was his preferred moniker for divines holding Calvinist leanings. Forbes placed even more “moderate” Calvinists like Davenant in this group. William Forbes, Considerationes Modestae et Pacificae Controversiarum de Justificatione, Purgaturio, Invocatione Sanctorum, Christo Mediatore, et Eucharista., 4th ed., Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology Version (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1850), vol. 1, 3.3.5.343. The LACT version has alternating pages with the Latin and English text. References list the book, chapter, paragraph, and page numbers.

67 Forbes, Considerationes, 4.6.3.409.
inherently to make just.” For this reason, we must reject claims by the “more rigid Protestants” that God “first justifies the sinner, or forgives his sins, and afterwards makes him just, or sanctifies him.” Instead, the testimony of the Fathers and of the Scriptures is that in justification our sins are forgiven (i.e., “pardoned, covered, not imputed”) and we are made righteous (i.e., “no stain whatever of mortal or heinous sin remains in the soul of the sinner.”)\(^68\)

In contradistinction to the claims of the “more rigid” Protestants, therefore, justification must be understood in a twofold sense. The first justification includes the prevenient gift of God’s “sanctifying grace” and the remission of sins. The second justification “consists in the progress, increase, and completion . . . of the justice given at the first.” For that reason, attempts to stringently differentiate between justification and sanctification are “verbal and notional rather than real.”\(^69\) Forbes argues that he has the support of antiquity in this claim: confidence that sanctification is inseparable from justification “was the universal opinion of all the Fathers, both in Greek and Latin.”\(^70\)

Forbes opens the Considerationes by acknowledging that the word “faith” has many different meanings. He concludes that justifying faith “is nothing else than a firm and sure assent of the mind, produced by the Holy Ghost from the Word, by which we acknowledge all things revealed by God in the Scriptures, and especially those concerning the mystery of our redemption and salvation, wrought by Christ, to be most

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\(^68\) Forbes, Considerationes, 2.4.5.151; 2.4.8-10.165-171; 4.6.5.409.

\(^69\) Ibid., 2.4.4.149; 4.6.1.407. Bull insists that the “most rigid Protestants” err in their refusal to distinguish between the first and second justification.

\(^70\) Ibid., 2.5.1.175.
true.” He makes it clear that this justifying faith is a work, not a gift passively received, but he insists that we receive the *capacity* for this faith by “the preventing grace of Christ.” Once this is understood, he further asserts that this justifying faith “is an instrument or organ receiving justification.”

Although Forbes insists that justifying faith is related to the intellect rather than the will, this faith must never be reduced to mere knowledge. In addition, justifying faith may never be limited to the assurance of salvation. Forbes concedes the hypothetical possibility that we can have assurance that our sins have been forgiven, but he rejects the idea that we can have absolute assurance. This is true, he insists, because “justifying faith and regenerating grace are not peculiar to the elect, but can be attributed also to all baptized infants.” Because this is the case, it is indisputable that some who are truly justified “afterwards altogether and forever fall away from their faith.”

Forbes argues that the heart of the relationship of faith (and other virtues) to justification is the question of merit: if we are capable of meriting our justification as a result of our actions—even our faith—then Christ died in vain. Hence, he insists that Christ alone has merited our justification. Neither our faith nor our works are ever meritorious even though these acts are possible only as a result of God’s grace.

Forbes insists that Reformation debates concerning justification have led many astray. He grants that any affirmation of *justificatio sola fide* necessarily implies “a living
faith, and one which works by love, with at least the intention of doing good works.” Yet, since the Scriptures never state that we are “justified by faith alone,” and the Fathers did not use the expression in the sense taken by most Protestants, and since this addition of ‘only’ is not necessary, then Forbes argues it need not be defended. Indeed, Forbes insists that, in contrast with flawed interpretations of justification by faith, our obedience to the Gospel covenant requires both faith and works.

In addition, the “more rigid Protestants” err when they suggest that our works, no matter how excellent, are “worthy of eternal death, although done by the grace of Christ.” Those who seek support for such claims in antiquity do violence to the Fathers. For example, Forbes rejects the appeal to Augustine’s statement that good works follow and never precede justification. Though this claim has been repeated ad nauseam, it was never Augustine’s intent to categorically deny that works occur during the process of our justification. Forbes argues that Augustine always “makes the grace of justification consist not in forgiveness of sins solely, but also in sanctification,” and this sanctifying work is accomplished by the agency of the Holy Spirit who makes our works possible. Thus, Augustine’s admonition is nothing more than an attempt to reject any claim that works can precede justification if they are not accompanied by the assisting and preparatory grace of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, other “Protestants who are more sound and moderate,” argues Forbes, acknowledge that the Holy Spirit empowers “various disposing and preparing

75Forbes, Considerationes, 1.3.2.23; 1.5.14.88-89. Earlier he had maintained that Scripture never defines faith as the sole instrument for justification; therefore, we ought to avoid the use of sola fide “for the sake of peace.” Ibid., 1.3.16.39; 1.5.1.63.

76Ibid., 1.3.3.25
acts” that are antecedent to justification. These “disposing acts” are never meritorious, but by the grace of God they are “efficient causes” of our justification coram Deo. For example, repentance is a “condition under which God (ultimately of his own gratuitous promises) forgives sins.” In addition, the Scriptures repeatedly attribute the remission of sins to other good works. Thus, while one must conclude that faith is worthless without works, we must simultaneously acknowledge that works without faith are equally worthless.

Debates over the “formal cause” of justification, argues Forbes, should be discarded as “subtle and scholastic disputes” that are “verbal and notional rather than real.” Even if this question has merit, Forbes argues, “Christ’s justice or obedience imputed or applied to us is not the formal cause, but only the meritorious and impulsive cause” of our justification. Forbes acknowledges that imputation, “rightly understood,” is taught promiscuously in the Scriptures. He insists that a biblical view of imputation suggests that Christ’s righteousness (as manifest in his active and passive obedience) merits the “remission of our sins, our inherent justice, and our acceptation to eternal life.” That is, by his perfect righteousness, Christ has merited our justification for us.

In this discussion of imputation, however, Forbes believes that “the opinion of the more rigid Protestants seems to be not altogether agreeable either to Scripture or to

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77 Forbes, Considerationes, 1.3.4.27; 1.3.8.29; 4.5.4.381.
80 Ibid., 2.1.1.97; 2.2.15.115-117; 2.3.5.127; 2.4.4.149.
81 Ibid., 2.1.1.93; 2.2.5-6.103; 2.2.14.113.
the Fathers or even to right reason.” He rejects any teaching that “Christ was accounted by imputation really and truly a sinner before God.” In addition, he rejects any presumption that our sins are “entirely remitted gratis on account of the merit of Christ’s justice which is imputed to us.” This is true for three principal reasons. First, if Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us in the sense held by these divines, this necessarily means that we are “to be accounted before God no less just than Christ Himself.” Second, if this were true, then there would be no distinction between persons in justification: all justified persons are equally justified before God. Third, if this position were true, we must conclude that we are more righteous in this life than in the next, since we will stand before God in our own righteousness, not the righteousness of Christ.\(^{82}\)

This debate is further exacerbated by perceptions that the Apostles Paul and James contradict one another in their teachings on justification. Some seek to explain the apparent conflict between James and Paul by suggesting that James refers to our righteousness before men while Paul speaks of our true righteousness before God. This view must be rejected, argues Forbes. Without question, James 2:14 speaks of salvation before God (e.g., “that faith can save him”). In addition, James 2:23 makes it clear that Abraham’s “justification by works” is not merely declarative.\(^{83}\)

Forbes also rejects any notion that Paul and James “speak of different kinds of faith.” Consequently, one must presume that the apostles differed in their understanding of works. “S. Paul excludes from the work of justification those good works merely which precede the faith of Christ, and flow solely from the knowledge of the law.” In

\(^{82}\)Forbes, *Considerationes*, 2.3.6.131; 2.3.8.133-36; 2.4.4.149.

\(^{83}\)Ibid., 4.6.6.413.
contrast, “S. James speaks of the works which follow forth, and spring from it, and are governed by it.” Hence, there is no disagreement between the apostles.

Peter Nockles suggests that later Caroline divines were reacting against excesses that characterized the social and theological chaos of the Troubles when they rejected an earlier Anglican consensus on justification. There is no question that antipathy toward antinomianism fueled this debate in the second half of the seventeenth century. Yet, the Considerationes, though not published until 1658, was penned prior to that chaotic period, suggesting that the alleged consensus was being challenged even before the Civil War. Thus, while Forbes may not have exerted substantive influence over later divines, he reflects a conscious attempt to revert to a position on justification that was closer to that of the early English reformers.

\[84\] Forbes, Considerationes, 4.6.10.419; 4.6.13.425-27. Forbes concedes that the apostle Paul identifies works that are “excluded from the business of justification and salvation.” Yet, he argues, these works are not all-encompassing. Rather, these excluded works include the works of the Law of Nature and of the Mosaic Law, not merely the ceremonial law, but also the moral law done by Gentiles or Jews, and before and without faith and the grace of God.” Ibid., 1.4.1.47.


\[86\] The Considerationes was published posthumously. Forbes died in 1634, so at the latest the work was penned about three years after Davenant published his massive work on justification.

\[87\] Clifford concludes that the continuity between Forbes’s thought and that of Bishop Bull suggests that Bull was influenced by the Considerationes. Clifford, Atonement and Justification, 224. To be sure, the connection between the Harmonia and Forbes’s Considerationes was recognized early. Grabe (the compiler and editor of Bull’s works) made three references to the Considerationes in his supplemental notes in support of Bull’s interpretations. See Grabe’s comments in George Bull, Harmonia Apostolica, seu, Binae Dissertationes, Quarum in priore Doctrina D. Jacobi de Justificatione ex operibus Explanatur ac Defenditur: In posteriore, Consensus D. Pauli cum Jacobo Liquido Demonstratur (London: Printed for William Wells and Robert Scott, 1670), Annotata ad cap. III., ad sect. 3., Works 3.42-4 (Grabe cites Forbes in support of Bull’s sacramental theology); Annotata ad cap. III., ad sect. 2, Works 3.91-92 (Grabe cites Forbes in relation to Bull’s comments that we must qualify Augustine’s claim that good works follow rather than precede justification); and Annotata ad Animad. XI, sect. 9, Works 4.117 (Grabe quotes Forbes in support of Bull’s rejection of Reformed views on the imputatio Christi aliena). However, Bull never cites Forbes, and while they may share much in common, there is inadequate evidence to assert influence. At best one might argue that they share a common trajectory of thought on humanity’s justification coram Deo.
Henry Hammond

In the aftermath of the civil war, Henry Hammond (1605-1660) became one of the chief architects of renewal in the Restoration church. His *Practical Catechism* and other key written works fueled a resurgence of popular devotion and theological stability within the established church.  

Although he published his major works after losing his living during the civil war, Hammond forged those works from within the context of his pastoral experience. He sought to bring the church’s teachings to life for the common man by giving practical guidance for the application of key biblical principles. Consequently, his doctrine of justification was prescriptive, emphasizing practical morality because of his conviction that Reformed soteriological emphases create “a most visible hindrance to the building of good life.”

Hammond builds his doctrine of justification upon the dual foundations of his anthropological convictions and his covenantal understanding of God’s relationship with humanity. He teaches that, upon his fall into sin, Adam was “condemned to death, and so deprived both of Eternity and felicity.” Since that time, all men other than Christ have suffered the same penalty. They have “forfeited that perfect light and perfect strength” offered to Adam “and became very defective and weak both in knowledge and ability.”

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90 Henry Hammond, *Of Fundamentals. In a Notion Referring to Practice* (London: Printed for J. Flesher for Richard Royston, 1654), 14.1.145. Citations include chapter, paragraph, and page numbers. In particular, Hammond was convinced that Reformed views on unconditional election were mistaken and removed any motivation for sinners to repent. Further, he insists that limited atonement is taught without any biblical support and in direct contradiction to the “Article in the Creed.” Ibid., 13.10.127; 14.1.130.
That is, they became morally incapable of obedience to the Lord.\textsuperscript{91}

Moral inability would leave humanity without hope, but by God’s free grace and mercy he offers us the possibility of deliverance. For Hammond, this deliverance is found in humanity’s justification before God. Justification is God’s “accepting our persons, and not imputing our sins, his covering or pardon of our iniquities, his being so reconciled unto us sinners that he determines not to punish eternally.”\textsuperscript{92} This justification is accomplished completely “without” (i.e., outside) us by God. Hence, nothing we do or say or believe has any causal bearing on our justification. Nonetheless, God has determined that we must fulfill certain conditions before he will grant this justification to us. Those conditions or “qualifications” include “Faith, Repentance, firm purpose of a new life, and the rest of those graces upon which in the Gospel pardon is promised the Christian.” In response to a query about how one can simultaneously affirm this conditional view of justification alongside an affirmation that we are justified by God’s grace alone, Hammond responds that there is no conflict. Our faith, repentance, and other good works can never be adequate to merit our justification. Yet, God, in his great mercy, has determined that he is willing to accept those very imperfect gifts because of Christ’s sacrificial offering.\textsuperscript{93} Hammond fleshes out this concept by his understanding of God’s covenants with humanity.

There have been two key covenants initiated by God. The first of these covenants was made between God and Adam prior to the fall. That covenant was


\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., 84.
predicated upon a God-given awareness and understanding of God’s expectations and a “perfect strength” to fulfill those requirements. Consequently, that covenant required absolute obedience to the commands of God. Had Adam never sinned, that covenant offered the promise of “Eternal felicity” to the one who fulfilled the requirements of the covenant. The Mosaic Law represents an attempt to codify this law of perfect obedience from God’s first covenant with Adam, but the Mosaic Law differed from the original because it never made salvation possible. To the contrary, the Law (with its sacrifices) pointed to Christ, the only hope of salvation for sinful humanity, and the Law made it readily apparent that there was no hope for salvation outside of the grace of God.

After the fall, humanity was no longer capable of perfect obedience. Therefore, God initiated with Adam (in Genesis 3:15) a second covenant, a covenant of grace that was later renewed in his covenant with Abraham and ultimately was completed in Christ. This second covenant promised the gift of Jesus, whose death would make satisfaction not only for Adam’s sin but “for all the sins of all mankind.” After Christ’s earthly ministry, the promises of the second covenant were again renewed with all humanity. Thus, in contrast with the mechanical obedience and “carnal” nature characteristic of the Mosaic Law, Christ provides us with precepts that enable us to live a spiritual life through the “Law of faith.” This covenant is offered to us on the basis of God’s “free grace and mercy in Christ” without the “abstinences, sacrifices, uncleannesses, purgations, &c. as among the Jews.” This covenant promises forgiveness of sins and the

93 Hammond, Practical Catechism, 85.

94 Ibid., 3-4. Hammond describes a covenant as “a mutual compact...betwixt God and man, consisting of the mercies on God’s part made over to man, and of the conditions on man’s part required by God.”
gift of “grace or strength” to enable obedience.⁹⁵

Therefore, the Gospel covenant, in contrast with the legal covenant, is not a covenant of perfect obedience. Instead, the conditions required by God in this covenant are revealed as “a constellation or conjunction of all those Gospel-graces, Faith, Hope, Charity, Self-denial, Repentance, and the rest.” Although our fulfillment of these conditions will always be imperfect, these virtues must nonetheless be “sincerely rooted in the Christian heart.” Otherwise, “nothing but perdition is to be expected.” Ultimately, the reward of the covenant is the forgiveness of sins and the gift of salvation.⁹⁶

Though acknowledging the centrality of faith as a principal condition of our justification in this covenant of grace, Hammond unabashedly confronts the errors he believes accompany solifidianism. He decries perceptions that a person’s faith can be limited to an affirmation of the “Articles of his belief.”⁹⁷ He further rejects any affirmation that faith might be considered “the only instrument of this justification,” particularly when this “faith” is nothing more than “a full perswasion that the promises of Christ belong to him, or an assurance of his particular election.”⁹⁸ In contrast with these

⁹⁵Hammond, Practical Catechism, 4-8.

⁹⁶Ibid., 8-11. This Gospel covenant is mediated by the sacraments. From God’s perspective, baptism “secures to the infant a non-imputation of Adam’s transgression, seals unto him an assurance of God’s not proceeding with him according to the strict Covenant first made with man, of a perfect unsinning obedience, by which we could have no hope to be justified, and on the contrary receives him into a Covenant of Grace, where there is pardon reached out to all (truly penitent) sinners, and assistance promised and engaged.” Hammond, Of Fundamentals, 19.8.214-15.

⁹⁷Hammond insists that even those who are theologically orthodox frequently succumb to the allure of sin and chose a life of sin over the future joy of heaven. For this reason, it is impossible to suggest that orthodox belief “allwaies either necessarily or infallibly produces good works.” Because of the promiscuous character of sin, right belief can never guarantee right practice. Henry Hammond, An Accordance of St. Paul with St. James, in the Great Point of Faith and Works (Oxford: Printed by H. Hall for Royston and Davis, 1665), 154-55.

⁹⁸Hammond, Of Fundamentals, 12.9.117-18; 13.1.120-21. See also Accordance, 144.
views, Hammond teaches that justifying faith is “not only a working faith, an obeying faith, but even a work, even obedience itself.” Consequently, justifying faith can be described as receiving Christ, a life-transforming process.99

While Hebrews 11:6 emphasizes that we cannot please God without such faith, this statement never grants faith any “necessary precedence” over the “other graces.” This is true because faith “cannot please God” if it is separated from charity and repentance. Thus, one can never truly claim that we are justified by “faith alone.” Ultimately, faith is not even the source of the other graces since our “spiritual life” begins “in repentance and contrition.” Faith then follows “like Jacob at the heels, smooth and soft, applying all the cordial promises to our penitent souls.” Ultimately, faith must always coexist simultaneously with the self-denial of repentance. Neither of these graces can be independent of the other.100

This teaching, argues Hammond, is not novel. He concludes that the heart of the preaching of Jesus and the Apostles was to call men to repentance, suggesting that

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99 Henry Hammond, Thirty-One Sermons Preached on Several Occasions, in The Miscellaneous Theological Works of Henry Hammond, 3rd ed. (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1850), 3:20:413; 3:23:490-91. He writes, “Now this receiving of Christ is the taking or accepting of the righteousness of Christ, and so making it our own, as Rom. i.17, being rightly weighed, will enforce.”

100 Hammond, Sermons, 27:590-92. Scripture supports this affirmation that good works are not derived from faith, argues Hammond. Though the foolish virgins had the same opportunity as the wise, they failed to fulfill the “act of obedience requir’d of them; and the want of it forfeited their hopes.” Similarly, although the “unprofitable servant” was given a talent, he failed to invest it appropriately and therefore received no reward. Hammond argues that there are more “exhortations” in the New Testament calling us to good works than to faith; hence, there is no warrant to conclude that faith necessarily produces good works. For example, in 2 Pet 1:5 those who supposedly already have faith “are exhorted to adde to their faith virtue.” This admonition would be unnecessary if faith is the “necessary cause of Works.” Similarly, in Jas 2:22 “faith is said to be made perfect by works,” a clear sign that faith is not the cause of works since “the producing of what effect soever adds no perfection to the cause.” Hammond, Accordance, 150-152. Hammond also criticizes those who seek to evade James by insisting that true faith necessary produces good works: there are no good works; therefore, the faith is not true faith. This line of argumentation, Hammond insists, is a “sophism” that emerges from circular thinking and begging the question. Ibid., 141-43.
repentance (like faith) must be seen as a necessary condition for justification. For Hammond, this repentance signifies “a sincere change, and renovation of minde, a conversion of the sinner to God in a new life.” To those who claim that repentance does not precede justification, Hammond rejoins that if a person is “justified before he repents and amends his life, then nothing can hinder the continuance of his justified estate, in case he doe not repent at present, nor intercept his salvation, in case he doe never repent.”

Hammond bemoans the lack of faithfulness evidenced in every strata of society, dismayed by the tragedy that Protestants are content to boast that their piety may be imperfect, but it is at least superior to that of “heathens and Turks.” He counters that on the day of judgment the Romanist will triumph, quoting from James, “‘Thou hast faith and I have works,’ and all that we can fetch out of St. Paul [is] not able to stop his mouth from going on, ‘shew me thy faith without thy works . . . and I will shew thee my faith by my works.’” At best, we are guilty of metaphysical subtleties if we seek to divorce any necessary connection between works and justification. In the process, we will find that our presuppositions have separated us from God.

Hammond rejects the claims of those who claim that the formal cause of justification is the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to the believer. He grants that sin is not imputed to those who have been justified. In addition, he speaks of the

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101 Hammond, Of Fundamentals, 18.2.202. Intriguingly, he considers repentance and regeneration to “signifie one and the same thing in Scripture” (18.3.203).

102 Ibid., 13.2.121.

103 Hammond, Sermons, 20:441. Hammond notes that we will never be delivered “from the jawes or Gates of Hell” unless our faith is evidenced by “good workes, in the plural . . . and those manifest or discernable.” Hammond, Paraenesis, 3.1.211-12.
imputation of Christ’s passive righteousness. By this he means that Christ’s sacrificial death not only provides satisfaction for our sins, but Christ’s death merits for us our justification and salvation. He rejects, however, any notion that Christ’s active obedience is imputed to us in such a way that we are viewed by God as perfectly righteous. This cannot be the case since this would mean that we were viewed by God as if we had never sinned. If this were true, argues Hammond, then there would have been no need for Christ’s ultimate sacrifice.  

Hammond asserts that sanctification, at least to some degree, is antecedent to justification because God will not justify the ungodly. Thus, one must receive the sanctifying grace of God to prepare his heart for Christian obedience. Then, following his justification the believer receives even more grace to enable him to continue to receive the fruits of his justification. If he fails to do so (slipping into gross disobedience) then he will forfeit all of the benefits of justification and will die in his sins.

Employing colorful metaphors, Hammond insists that we must never embrace a total assurance of our justification. He writes, “Only let your lives witness a sincerity of your professions; let not a dead carcass walk under a living head, and a nimble active

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104 Hammond, Practical Catechism, 27-29. He also notes the interconnectedness of our faith and repentance with the sacrament of baptism, arguing that it represents our “death unto sin and new birth unto righteousness.” The latter refers to our receipt of “God’s favour” and the gift of a dual righteousness of sanctification (equipping us to “walk righteously”) and justification (which sets us “right in the favour of God”). Ibid., 367-68.

105 Categorically rejecting Reformed affirmations that Rom 7 describes a justified Christian, Hammond argues that this passage “is really a representation of one, which hath only the knowledge, not practice of his duty, and consequently, to the sinnes, which he commits, hath the aggravation superadded of committing them against knowledge, against conscience, against sight of the contrary law.” Hammond, Of Fundamentals, 18.4.204.

106 Hammond, Practical Catechism, 86. He further affirms that in “Jeremy 31.33 the tenure of the covenant sets Sanctification before Justification.” Ibid., 88.
Christian brain be supported with bed-rid, motionless heathen limbs.” To indulge in sin while claiming to have professed the faith is to make a false confession. From Hammond’s perspective, there is no “greater hindrance of Christian obedience and godly practice” than a false assurance.107

Allison insists that Hammond’s preoccupation with antinomianism prompted him to advocate a “new moralism” that undermined longstanding teachings on justification within the English church.108 It is undisputed that Hammond places great emphasis on a practical faith that is borne out in the way Christians live their lives. His anti-Calvinist emphases reflect (in part) the realities of the period. Yet, Hammond’s doctrine of justification reveals far more than a mere reaction against antinomian influences or Presbyterian excesses, and his influence on George Bull and other Restoration divines is readily apparent.109

Jeremy Taylor

Jeremy Taylor (1613-67) was a chaplain to Charles I before accepting a living at Uppingham. He served briefly as a chaplain for the Royalist forces, and after the

107 Hammond, Sermons, 19:410; 20:413. Elsewhere he likens attempts to minimize or ignore the message of St. James to the idolatrous attachment of the Jews to the temple, leading them to a false sense of security. Hammond, Paraenesis, 2.20.27.

108 Allison, Moralism, xi, 190.

109 While Bull shows a predilection for the writings of antiquity rather than drawing upon contemporary sources, he favorably cites doctissimum Hammondum on at least seven occasions in his principal works on justification. Bull, HA Diss. Prior I.4.6 (Works 3.6-7). See also Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. III.3.25 (Works 4.35), EC Resp. ad Animad. VII.10.41-42 (Works 4.58-59), and EC Resp. ad Animad. XIX.177 (Works 4.244). In addition, see Bull, APH, Sectio I.5.9 (Works 4.312), APH Sectio IX.8.135-36(Works 4.495-96), and APH Sectio IX.28.166 (Works 4.538). Those references are related to Hammond’s interpretation of Scripture, his forensic understanding of justification, and his covenantal framework for the question of justification. There are obvious parallels between Bull and Hammond, and it is reasonable to conclude that Bull owes a debt to Hammond for laying the foundation for some facets of his thought. See also Teale’s comments on Hammond’s influence over Bull. William Henry Teale, Lives of
Restoration he was elevated to the see at Down and Connor and made vice-chancellor at Dublin University. Like Hammond, Taylor expressed dismay that so many Christians regularly attend church on Sunday but live like pagans throughout the week. In response to this moral decay, he repeatedly emphasized the obligation for Christians to live holy lives. While others shared his concerns about the erosion of public morality, some divines viewed Taylor with deep mistrust, believing that his views on repentance were Pelagian in character. Nonetheless, Taylor’s popularity as a casuist ultimately made him one of the more influential divines of the Restoration Church of England.

The foundation of Taylor’s doctrine of justification is his understanding of the nature of sin, and while Lettinga overstates his case when he argues that Taylor “denied Original Sin,” Taylor’s view differs so radically from Reformed positions on the consequences of the fall that he redefines the entire doctrine of original sin. Taylor is unapologetic for this difference, making it clear that he rejects the “heap of errors” that accompanied statements on original sin issued by the Westminster Assembly.

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110 Jeremy Taylor, *The Righteousness Evangelicall Describ’d. The Christians Conquest over the body of Sin. Fides Formata, or Faith Working By Love. In Three Sermons Preach’d at Christ Church Dublin* (Dublin: Printed by John Crook for Samuel Dancer, 1663), 1.21. Citations include the number of the sermon and the page number.


114 Jeremy Taylor, *Deus Justificatus. Or, a Vindication of the Glory of the Divine Attributes in*
rejects claims that the fall resulted in the loss of “original righteousness,” the corruption of human nature, the inevitability of sin, and (most significantly) caused us to be “born enemies of God, sons of wrath, and heirs of eternal damnation.” Taylor notes that many believe that Adam was created with a unique capacity to resist sin, but as a result of sin he lost that capacity for himself and for all of his progeny. Those holding such views believe that even though we are no longer capable of resisting sin, we nonetheless have no one to blame but ourselves for our moral failures. Thus, God is righteous when he condemns us. This argument is flawed at the outset, argues Taylor, because there is no biblical evidence to support the premise that Adam (even in his innocence) ever possessed a moral capacity greater than our own.\(^1\)

Taylor argues instead that, in response to Adam’s sin, God “withdrew his grace,” and humanity “returned to the state of mere nature.” This does not mean, however, that Adam was no longer morally capable of pleasing God. To the contrary, in spite of the evil that plagues us as a result of the fall, humanity did not lose the “powers and capacities to serve and glorify God.”\(^2\) Thus, while the effects of Adam’s sin were significant, those consequences were limited to that which “God threatened, but no

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\(^2\) Taylor, *Deus Justificatus*, 498. Taylor argues that humanity retains the “liberty of the will” after the Fall. Ibid., 506.
more.” That is, the fall resulted in the “certainty of dying, together with the proper effects and affections of mortality.” These so-called “effects” include the fact that Adam “was reduced to the condition of his own nature,” and his offspring received that same nature. Taylor qualifies this statement, however, insisting that death did not enter the world as a direct result of sin since “man was created mortal.” However, had Adam not sinned, he could “have been immortal by grace, that is, by the use of the tree of life” since he would never have been expelled from the garden. Once he was expelled from the garden, this option was no longer available so all of Adam’s posterity was now condemned to death “without that remedy.”

Therefore, the apostle Paul’s admonition that “all men sinned” means “that in Adam we really sinned, and God does truly and justly impute his sin to us, to make us as guilty as he that did it, and as much punished, and liable to eternal damnation.” That we are “liable to eternal damnation,” however, does not mean that we are condemned solely as a consequence of original sin. Adam’s sin did not make us “heirs of damnation,” and it did not make us “naturally and necessarily vicious.” To the contrary, Taylor insists that if God has damned the entire world “to the eternal pains of hell for Adam’s

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117Taylor, *Unum Necessarium*, 7:6.1.243; 6.1.19.250. It is important to note that Taylor is inconsistent on this matter. In an earlier chapter of *Unum Necessarium* he insists that the consequence of sin is “temporal death.” Ibid., 7:1.1.9.23.

118Elsewhere Taylor clarifies that the word “damnation” may be interpreted to mean “that sentence which was inflicted upon Adam, and descended on his posterity, that is, for condemnation to death, and the evils of mortality.” Thus, while Taylor does not deny the possibility of eternal punishment in hell, he seems to assume that the focus of this word is “temporal death.” Jeremy Taylor, *An Answer to the Bishop of Rochester’s First Letter Written Concerning the Sixth Chapter, of Original Sin, in the Discourse on Repentance*, in *The Whole Works of the Right Rev Jeremy Taylor, D.D.*, ed. Charles Page Eden (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1850), 7:546.

sin, committed before they had a being, or could consent to it,” then “any thing in the world can be just.” Therefore, our condemnation or separation from God is a result of intentional sin; that is, we are condemned, not for the sins of our fathers, but for “a deliberate act, a willful, observed, known act.” This willfull disobedience “puts a man out of the state of grace; that is, the act of sin is still upon his account, he is not actually pardoned . . . and if he dies without a moral retraction of it, he is in a sad condition.”

Since the potential to die without pardon is an ever-present reality, God provided a remedy for our sin. Taylor argues that Romans 5:8-10 demonstrates that justification is a gift of God’s mercy to us. God determines to grant us his favor if we are willing to fulfill the obligations of the Gospel covenant (i.e., the “Oeconomy of Salvation”). By faith we are able to receive this grace, but our justification is not complete unless we “make it actual” through our works of righteousness. Thus, Taylor frames his understanding of justification on the basis of God’s covenantal relationship with humanity.

God has initiated only two covenants with humanity: the covenant of works and the covenant of repentance. The first covenant, the covenant of works, was initiated by God with Adam and was based on the condition of perfect obedience. That is, unless Adam perfectly fulfilled all of the covenantal conditions, there was no hope of

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122 Taylor, *Fides Formata*, 3.183. Taylor affirms that any covenant implies that a promised reward will be granted upon the fulfillment of any conditions. God’s covenants with humanity are no exception to this rule.

123 While Taylor favors the expression “covenant of repentance” for the second covenant, he does not do so consistently. He also refers to this agreement as a “covenant of faith and mercy” or a “covenant of holiness.” Taylor, *Fides Formata*, 3.189.
deliverance. Consequently, Adam’s lapse into sin resulted in his condemnation with no hope of salvation. Although God later renewed this covenant of works with Moses, the purpose of this renewed agreement was pedagogical: the only effective way to restrain immorality was “by threatening and severities.” Thus, the promises of the Mosaic covenant always were temporal, never eternal. These promises were more concerned with social and personal stability and order than with our relationship with God. The Law was not even able to fully restrain us from sin and certainly did not offer the promise of eternal life. Ultimately, the fear and overwhelming sense of helplessness prompted by the covenant of works prepares our hearts for the “‘hidden mystery’ of justification by faith and repentance.”

Immediately after Adam’s fall, in his infinite mercy and grace God initiated a second covenant, the covenant of repentance. This covenant (i.e., the Gospel) was not fully ratified until after Christ’s satisfaction for our sins, but it became effective immediately, offering fallen humanity the hope of life eternal. This second covenant never required “exact obedience” and was based solely upon God’s bountiful grace and mercy. In contrast with the covenant of works, the covenant of repentance made it possible for humanity to experience the fullness of God’s gift of salvation because our “infirmities are pitied, our ignorance excused, our unavoidable errors not imputed.” This does not, however, suggest that all humanity will be saved. Like any other covenant, “there are conditions required on our part, and no man can be saved but by Christ.” This

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124Taylor, *Unum Necessarium*, 7:1.1.2-6.21-23. In Rom 8:3, Paul taught that the law “could not bring us justification.” Ibid., 1.2.15.26. In addition, Taylor notes that the “law of Moses whose endearment was nothing but temporal goods and transient evils could never make comers thereunto perfect.” Taylor, *Fides Formata*, 1.2-3.
emphasis is vital, argues Taylor, because many exaggerate the grace of God and “exclude the conditions which this free grace hath set upon us.” Taylor insists that these conditions include both “faith and the works of faith.”

Taylor argues that justifying faith can never be reduced to mere belief. To the contrary, in a reference to John 6:28-29, Taylor insists that faith is a work. For that reason, in the justification of humanity coram Deo, it is impossible to distinguish between works of repentance and faith: one cannot exist without the other. Elsewhere Taylor argues, “Faith and repentance are only distinguished by relations and respects, not by substance and reality.” This makes it possible to dismiss as irrelevant the question of whether we are justified sola fide, because faith (if artificially considered alone) cannot justify.

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125 Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 7:1.1.7-8.23; 7:1.2.34.34. Taylor, Deus Justificatus, 512. Taylor, Fides Formata, 3.184-85. Let “no man . . . call for God’s fidelity without his own faithfulness; nor snatch a promise without performing the condition.” Ibid., 3.188.

126 Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 7:1.1.11.24. It is important to note, however, that the expression “works of faith” does not imply that Taylor viewed any causal relationship between faith and works. This will become evident below.

127 Taylor, Fides Formata, 3.186-87; 3.206. His critics, suggests Taylor, reject any notion that faith is a work, thereby reducing faith to belief or confidence that always results in good works. In response, Taylor posits two reasons that we cannot say that we are “justified by faith alone,” but “good works must follow.” First, once a person is justified, “the whole work is done,” and no lack of charity will hurt us. For Taylor, therefore, it is absurd to suggest that faith necessarily must be antecedent to good works. The second reason stems directly from the first: charity and obedience cannot be necessary at any time if “the whole work can be done without it.” Thus, to affirm that we are justified by “faith only” is to affirm that we are justified by “faith without obedience.” Yet, the overwhelming testimony of the Scripture is that “without obedience no man can go to Heaven.” To deny this truth is a demonstration that one does not even possess faith (ibid., 3. 3.156-57; 167-68).

128 Ibid., 3.162, 191. For Taylor, this acknowledgement removes any need to reconcile the apparent differences between Paul and James since “justifying faith contains in it obedience.” James does not suggest that we are justified by works without faith. Instead, we “are so justified by works, that it is not by faith alone; it is faith and works together: that is, it is by the ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, ‘by the obedience of faith,’ by the works of faith, by the conditions of the Gospel, and the measures of Christ.” Ibid., 3.190-91.

129 Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 7:2.2.2.67; and Taylor, Fides Formata, 3.194.
Under the new covenant, therefore, Christ requires both faith and active obedience, but he accommodates our imperfections. That is, God empowers us to “keep the commandments acceptably through Jesus Christ” in spite of our inability to keep them perfectly. Taylor envisions a paradox in which this new covenant simultaneously is one of “more mercy, but also of more holiness.” Thus, we should never think that we are not obliged to perform good works. To the contrary, “faith and works are not opposed.” Under the first covenant, there was no hope for one who sinned; under the new covenant, we have the promise of grace; yet, if we believe that this grace exempts us from any expectation of obedience, we are sadly mistaken. The one who is disobedient “loses the mercy and mistakes the whole design and economy of God’s loving kindness.” The one who “sins and repents not, is under the gospel in a far worse condition than under the law; for under the gospel he shall have a far sorer punishment than under the law was threatened. Therefore, let no man mistake the mercies of the new covenant, or

\[130\] Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 7:1.2.32.33; 7:1.3.50.42. The Gospel is the good news “that the covenant of works or exact measures should not be exacted, but men should be saved by second thoughts, that is, by repentance and amendment of life, through faith in the Lord Jesus. That is, if we become His disciples (for that is the condition of the covenant) we shall find mercy, ‘our sins shall be blotted out,’ and we shall be saved if we obey heartily and diligently, though not exactly.” Ibid., 7:2.2.1.66.

\[131\] Taylor suggests that post-baptismal sins are more egregious than sins committed antecedent to baptism, but all sins ultimately may be forgiven in God’s economy upon the conditions of faith and repentance. Thus, though the church has often spoken of “unpardonable” sins, those sins are not pardonable only in the sense that the church itself has not been given the authority to pronounce forgiveness for them. God alone retains that prerogative. Ibid., 7:9.3.22.400; 7:9.6.61.416. Elsewhere Taylor argues that “baptismal regeneration puts a man into a state of grace and favour” so that his sins committed antecedent to baptism are not imputed to him, but it does not preclude a baptized person from being "damned for his own concupiscence." Taylor, "An Answer to the Bishop," Works 7.546-47. Consequently, Taylor decries the dangers of false assurance of salvation, insisting that one “cannot ordinarily know that he is in a saveable condition but by the Testimony which a Divine Phylanthropy and a good mind always give.” Taylor, Fides Formata, 1.63). Indeed, our lapse into sin is often so gradual that we cannot trust our own intuition to know whether or not we have been forgiven. Nonetheless, we must find a balance between presumptive assurance and a total lack of certainty. The former can “destroy charity or good life by looseness and indulgence.” Yet, the latter could “destroy hope, and discountenance the endeavours of pious people: for if the smallest sins be so highly punishable, who can hope ever to escape the intolerable state of damnation?” Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 3.4.40.107; 9.3.30.403.
turn the grace of God into wantonness.”

Taylor is quick to make one important distinction, however. We are not justified “by the works of the law.” Instead,

[W]e are justified by the works of the gospel, that is, faith and obedience. For these are the righteousness of God, they are His works, revealed by His spirit, effected by His grace, promoted by His gifts, encouraged by special promises, sanctified by the HolyGhost, accepted through Jesus Christ to all the great purposes of glory and immortality.

In order to prevent any misunderstanding, however, Taylor makes it clear that while the key first step in our obedience is repentance, the “works of the gospel” are certainly not limited to repentance. Those “works” include also the “fruits of repentance.” Thus, to fulfill Christ’s command in Matthew 5:20, “we must keep the Letter of the whole Moral Law.” It is “not enough to say, My heart is right: but my hand went aside.” To be sure, one’s heart must be changed: this is no mere legalism. Yet, that change must be accompanied by action. In God’s wise and perfect “Oeconomy,” he has determined that “we must serve him by the measures of a new Love” and all the implications of that love. Therefore, Christian obedience includes abstinence from evil and obedience to the

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132Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 1.4.6-7.47. Taylor elaborates, “He that leaves any thing undone which he is commanded to do, or does what he is commanded to forbear, and considers or chooses so to do, does not do his best, cannot plead his privilege in the gospel, but is fallen under the portion of sinners, and will die, if he does not repent and make it up some way or other by sorrow, and a future diligence.” Ibid., 1.4.11.48.

133Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 5.4.49.188.

134Repentance always implies a “change of mind” or conversion; it is initiated by contrition or sorrow for sins, and it is motivated by our love for God. As a result of this contrition, we are compelled to reject all “sinful habits.” Thus, repentance involves a “turning from sin” which results in reconciliation and renewal. Ibid., 2.1.3-4.61-2; 2.2.11-12.71; 4.1.1.124; 5.5.62.196. “All of the whole duty of repentance, and every of its parts, is sometimes called ‘conversion.’ Thus godly sorrow is a conversion or change.” Ibid., 2.1.10.65.

135Taylor, Fides Formata, 1.23-24. He elaborates, “I know that without a good life, and the fruits of repentance a sinner cannot be justified.” Ibid., 3.186.
“affirmative commandments of Christ.”

Taylor denies that works that appear to be in excess of the commandment are works of supererogation. Conversely, there is no limit to our obedience. We must never suggest that we will obey only so far and no further. Yet, in a statement echoing the medieval emphasis on facere quod in se est, Taylor insists that to be faithful and obedient means that we constantly strive to do our very best. Doing our best does not suggest that we must always pray or serve God with equal fervency (since this is impossible), but we are called to make every attempt to fulfill our duty to the best of our ability. Therefore, while we (at best) are capable of imperfect obedience, we must never overestimate the eternal value of our obedience. Only God can determine whether or not our obedience truly comes from the heart, and it is only by his grace that this obedience is even possible.

Taylor notes that words like ‘faith’ and ‘works’ are used ambiguously in the Scriptures, and the same is true of justification. Nonetheless, Taylor is less concerned with developing an unambiguous definition of justification than he is with carefully describing the conditions or expectations placed upon the justified person. He does not examine justification as a judicial decision by God, implying instead that any discussion

136Taylor, Fides Formata, 1.4; and Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 1.2..33.33.

137Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 1.4.17.51-52; 1.4.19.53.

138Ibid., 1.4.9.47. “A man cannot pray always with equal intention, not give the same alms, not equally mourn with sharpness for his sins. But God having appointed for every duty proper seasons and solemnities, hath declared that he does his best who heartily endeavours to do the duty in its proper season.” See also Taylor, Fides Formata, 1.56; and Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 6.7.88.290.

139Taylor, Fides Formata, 3.150-54; 3.178-79.
of grace excludes a “legal” sense. Instead, he describes justification primarily as the non-imputation of sin: by the grace of God our sins are forgiven and are not charged to our account. He concludes that the justified person will not retain any “habit of sin whatsoever,” and anyone who willingly sins “is an enemy to God.” The implications of this transformation are dramatic: once “a sinner is justified, he is treated like a righteous person as if he had never sinned, though he really did sin oftentimes,” and this acceptance by God occurs solely because of the mercy of God, not as a result of any personal merit on our parts.

This question of merit is significant for Taylor. He argues that even if Adam had never sinned, he would not have spent eternity with God in heaven without a supernatural gift of God’s grace. The same is true for us. There is nothing intrinsically meritorious in our obedience. “Neither Adam nor any of his posterity could by any actions or holiness obtain heaven by desert, or by any natural efficiency; for it is a gift.” Instead, our justification is merited solely by the free gift of Jesus Christ whose death made possible the pardon of our sins, the removal of all enmity with God, and our ability to obey him.

Taylor insists, therefore, that the covenant of repentance, the gospel covenant, is characterized by the conjunction of God’s grace with human obedience. In this covenant justification and sanctification are inseparable. Instead, they signify “various steps of progression in the same course,” because “no man is justified but he that is also

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140 Taylor, "An Answer to the Bishop," Works 7.554. See also Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 1.4.19.53.

141 Taylor, Fides Formata, 2.114-15; 3.174; and Taylor, Unum Necessarium, 6.1.10.245-46.
sanctified.” Thus, in his ordo salutis, sanctification (i.e., the transforming grace of God) not only follows or accompanies our repentance, but it also precedes that repentance, making it possible.\textsuperscript{143} This prevenient grace is necessary because God will not justify one who habitually sins.\textsuperscript{144}

Though he does not present a developed attack on the Reformed understanding of the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness, Taylor seeks to find a via media between those who affirm that “Christ’s righteousness” must be “imputed to us or we perish” and those who affirm that we are justified by “inherent righteousness.” He concludes:

Christ’s righteousness is not imputed to us for justification directly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness; but our faith and sincere endeavours are, through Christ, accepted instead of legal righteousness: that is, we are justified through Christ, by imputation not of Christ’s nor our own righteousness, but of our faith and endeavours of righteousness, as if they were perfect; and we are justified by a non-imputation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfections; that is, we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners.\textsuperscript{145}

Jeremy Taylor’s doctrine of justification is not cogently argued, his inadequate emphasis on grace lends credence to claims of Pelagianism, and one can detect

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{142}Taylor, \textit{Fides Formata}, 3.185; 6.1.3.243; 6.1.25.253.
  \item \textsuperscript{143}Ibid., 3.182-83. He references Rom 8:29. Also ibid., 3.176.
  \item \textsuperscript{144}Taylor, \textit{Unum Necessarium}, 7:5.4.39.181. Even “constant innocence” cannot “justify us unless we have the righteousness of God, that is, unless we super-add holiness and purity in the faith of Jesus Christ.” Ibid., 5.4.50.188. Taylor acknowledges the response of his critics that Rom 7 demonstrates the possibility that God justifies the unrighteous, but he rejects this argument as flawed. He insists that Rom 7 cannot be autobiographical for the Apostle Paul because “he that is Christ’s freed man is not a slave to sin, nor captive to the Devil at his will.” Instead, this passage speaks of a “carnal, unredeemed, unregenerate person.” Taylor, \textit{Fides Formata}, 2.82-83.
  \item \textsuperscript{145}Taylor, "An Answer to the Bishop,” \textit{Works} 7.551-52.
\end{itemize}
inconsistencies on numerous levels. Without question, his opinions deviate not only from Reformed views but from the opinions of virtually all of his predecessors within the English church. Nonetheless, Taylor’s piety gained him a hearing among other divines of the period.

George Bull and the Seventeenth-Century English Church

These seventeenth-century divines, much like the sixteenth-century reformers examined in the previous chapter, reflect great diversity of thought and make it difficult to assert that there was a consensus on the doctrine of justification within the Church of England. Among the latter divines, however, one can begin to see greater emphasis on the need to make unequivocal statements concerning the necessity of works in the process of justification. Since this was the heart of Bishop Bull’s teaching, it is necessary to see how Bull’s doctrine of justification fits into the context of this thought.

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146 Allison particularly highlights inconsistencies between Taylor’s pastoral prayers and his more formal written documents. Allison, Moralism, 82. Lettinga argues that Taylor’s “views represented a synthesis between the rationalism of Hooker, the sacramentalism of Andrews and Laud, and the practice of Hammond.” Lettinga, “Covenant Theology,” 249.

147 Bishop Bull’s biographer, Robert Nelson, notes that Bull read Taylor when he was young, and later in life he frequently read from Bishop Taylor’s prayers when he led his family devotions. Robert Nelson, The Life of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, with the History of those Controversies in which he was Engaged and An Abstract of those Fundamental Doctrines which he Maintained and Defended in the Latin Tongue (London: Printed for J. Parker; and Law, and Whitaker; and Ogles, Duncan, and Cochran, 1816), 20; 56. Nelson also published a separate work that drew upon his more extensive Life to focus on Bull’s doctrine of justification. In the same volume he included Jeremy Taylor’s Dublin sermons, because of the common commitment of these works to oppose antinomianism at all costs. See Robert Nelson, Review and Analysis of Bishop Bull’s Exposition of the Doctrine of Justification; Extracted from His Life of Bishop Bull. To Which is Added Bishop Bull’s Letter to Mr. Nelson, on the Corruptions of the Church of Rome. Together with Bishop Jeremy Taylor’s Sermon, Entitled Fides Formata; or Faith Working by Love (Bath: Printed by Richard Cruttwell, 1827). Bishop Bull does not appear to rely upon Taylor’s thought for his doctrine of justification, but he includes him in a list divines who support his position that the seventh chapter of Romans does not refer to a person who is justified coram Deo, and in the process he describes Taylor as a maximi ingenii, eruditionis, et pietatis praesul. Bull, APH Sectio IX.8.136 (Works 4.368).
All five of these divines ground the need for justification in the absolute sinfulness of humanity. In this regard, they all share common ground with George Bull. With the exception of Taylor, they all affirm or imply that one of the chief consequences of Adam’s sin was the loss of our capacity to obey God’s commands; yet, at the same time, they suggest that condemnation is not solely based on original sin. Instead, condemnation is a direct result of both original and actual sin, and our only hope of salvation lies in the grace and mercy of God.

Taylor is the sole exception in this rule. He rejects any claim that Adam’s sin resulted in the corruption of human nature, the inevitability of sin, or makes any person subject to eternal punishment. He grants only that the sin of our first parents resulted in the inevitability of our mortality. We will all die, but Taylor argues that we all have the same capacity to resist sin and obey God as Adam did in his innocence. Our condemnation is just, therefore, because we are guilty, not of the sin of our fathers, but of our own sin.

There is greater diversity among the divines on their understanding of the nature of justification. Bishop Bull is content to restate the affirmations of the earlier English reformers that justification includes the remission of sins and our acceptance before God. Once again, with the exception of Taylor, who speaks primarily of the non-imputation of sin, all of these divines would agree (at least in part) with this understanding of justification. However, Bull concludes that the remission of sins and the imputation of faith is the causa justificationis formalis.148 Hooker and Davenant specifically repudiate this position. They insist that our acceptance by God is based solely

148 Bull, APH Sectio V.11.60 (Works 4.389); idem, APH Sectio III.8.32 (Works 4.343-44).
on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness to the believer; hence, the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is the formal cause for justification. For Hooker and Davenant, this difference represents the heart of this doctrine. If this view of imputation is denied, they argue that one must affirm a view of inherent righteousness such as that embraced by the Roman church. Forbes rejects this view and argues that the entire question over the “formal cause” of justification is frivolous, reminiscent of scholastic dialectical debates.

Even if there is any merit to a discussion of the “formal cause” of justification, Forbes maintains that it would not be the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Hammond, like Forbes, specifically repudiates the Reformed understanding of imputation. Taylor seeks to find a via media between the view posited by Hooker and Davenant and the Roman Catholic view of inherent righteousness.

Bishop Bull argues that justification must be viewed in both forensic and transformational terms. The first justification can be said to have a forensic character: the believer stands before the forum divinum, and based solely on the merit of Christ’s obedience, his sins are remitted and his faith is imputed or credited as righteous. God graciously grants the believer a perfected faith (fides formata) in order to liberate him from the “guilt and penalty” of his sins. However, the “second justification” is a lifelong process in which we are transformed. Similarly, Hooker affirms a forensic process in which God declares the sinner to be not guilty, but he also holds a transformational view in his juxtaposition of the different types of justifying and sanctifying righteousness. Davenant is more restrictive, arguing that justification is declarative and not transformational. Forbes endorses an almost identical view as Bishop

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149 Bull, *HA Diss. Prior* 1.2.5-4.6-7 (*Works* 3.4-7).
Bull, affirming both a forensic and a transformational dimension within humanity’s justification *coram Deo*. In contrast, both Hammond and Taylor ignore the forensic character of justification and posit a transformational view.

For George Bull, the covenantal context of justification is a vital component of any discussion of justification, and this is true for all of these divines with the possible exception of Hooker who does not emphasize this point to the degree that the others do. Davenant acknowledges that there are conditions and rewards associated with every covenant, including the Gospel covenant, but he insists that the reward of that covenant (eternal life) is a gift of grace rather than the administration of justice. Forbes and Hammond hold a view of the covenant that is virtually indistinguishable from Bishop Bull’s position. Taylor differs from Bull when he speaks of the covenants of works and repentance (the latter identified with the Gospel covenant), but he shares the same conviction as Bull that the Mosaic covenant was a renewal of the original covenant of works and was never salvific.

Like George Bull, all of these divines insist that justifying faith is more than mere propositional belief. Yet Bull elaborates to suggest that this justifying faith can be considered a work made possible by the grace of God. In addition, this justifying faith is only one of the principal conditions of the Gospel covenant, so we err to claim that we are justified *sola fide* unless we carefully qualify our statement to avoid the errors endemic to solifidianism. In contrast, Hooker and Davenant suggest that justifying faith is a gift of God’s Spirit that can never be considered a “work.” This gift then becomes the sole instrument by which we receive the further grace of justification. Hence, both Hooker and Davenant argue that justification is *sola fide*. Forbes also speaks of justifying
faith in an instrumental sense, but (like Bull) he views that faith as a work made possible by God’s Spirit. In addition, he insists that since _justificatio sola fide_ is not taught explicitly in the Scriptures and was interpreted differently in antiquity, we should avoid such language. Hammond and Taylor also speak of justifying faith as a work dependent upon the grace of God, and they see this faith as one of the chief conditions of the Gospel covenant. Forbes, Hammond, and Taylor specifically repudiate affirmations of _justificatio sola fide_.

Bishop Bull emphasizes the necessity of works in humanity’s justification _coram Deo_. Our works are made possible by God’s grace, and they are coupled with faith to become a principal condition of our salvation under the terms of the Gospel covenant. In spite of their persistent emphasis that humanity is justified by faith alone, Hooker and Davenant both agree that that justifying faith will always be accompanied by works. They both argue that (at least in terms of ‘inner’ works) one must affirm that works are necessary for justification. Yet, they are particularly careful to insist that “external” works all occur following justification and are never a condition of the Gospel covenant.\footnote{Allison implies that Bull is disingenuous because he cites Davenant in support of his position on the necessity of works in humanity’s justification _coram Deo_. To be sure, Allison’s criticisms would have found early support by the translator of Davenant’s works. In the “Translator’s Preface” to Davenant’s _Justification_, Allport argues that Bull would never have had the temerity to print the _Harmonia Apostolica_ if Davenant’s works had been published in the vernacular (Davenant, _Justification_, 1:x). Allison correctly notes substantive differences between Davenant and Bull on justification, and he concludes that Bull (in his use of Davenant) “deliberately ‘disguised’ his views about justification” (Allison, _Moralism_, 127, 136-137). Perhaps this negative assessment would be warranted if Bull claimed that Davenant fully endorsed every dimension of his argument. He does not. Instead, Bull accurately quotes Davenant in support of his claim that works are necessary for justification. See Bull, _APH Sectio_ VIII.9.354 (Works 4.476). While it is undisputed that Bull understands justification differently from Davenant and Bull’s conclusions may reasonably be questioned, he accurately appropriates Davenant’s thought on this matter.} Forbes rejects this premise, arguing that good works may precede justification and are, in fact, one of the means by which we are prepared for the additional
grace of justification. Hammond’s position is quite similar to that of George Bull. He argues that works are not the result of faith; instead, they are a necessary condition of justification in the Gospel covenant, so certain good works must precede justification. Taylor shares a very similar position and insists that repentance must precede faith.

Bishop Bull’s soteriology places great emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit. He affirms that God’s Spirit grants sanctifying grace to the believer antecedent to justification in what he refers to as sanctificatio prima et imperfectio. This grace is preparatory in nature and is a grace of potentiality not actuality. Consequently, he concludes that the donatio Spiritus Sancti follows the first justification and begins a lifelong process of sanctification. This sanctification makes it possible (by the grace of God) for justified persons to persist in ability to fulfill the conditions of the Gospel covenant and thereby remain justified, so Bull concludes that sanctificatio is inseparable and virtually indistinguishable from the justificatio secunda.

Hooker clearly distinguishes sanctification from justification; however, he muddies the waters somewhat by his discussion of the infused righteousness that precedes the imputation of Christ’s righteousness and his understanding of habitual sanctifying righteousness. Davenant also distinguishes between sanctification and justification, though he conflates sanctification with regeneration, and he suggests that this regenerating or sanctifying grace must be antecedent (at least in terms of order) to justification because it infuses life within us, thereby making faith possible. Forbes, 151

151 Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XX.3.192 (Works 4.265); idem, HA Diss. Prior I.3.6 (Works 3.6). See also Bull, HA Diss. Prior II.5.14 (Works 3.20), and idem, EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.9.77 (Works 4.107).

152 Bull APH Sectio III.4.28 (Works 4.338).
Hammond, and Taylor share views of sanctification that are remarkably similar to Bishop Bull’s view. They agree that sanctification and justification are virtually indistinguishable. They further agree that the work of sanctification must begin prior to justification as a disposing grace, making justification possible, but that sanctifying process continues throughout life.

The ascendancy of Latitudinarian thought in the waning years of the seventeenth century prompts an assessment of guilt by association for Restoration divines like George Bull who have been accused of helping pave the way for greater theological ambiguity within the Church of England. Lettinga grants that one can readily identify an emphasis on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy within “Covenant Anglican theology” after 1660. Yet, he also correctly differentiates between “High Church spirituality” and the theological ambivalence of the Latitudinarians. Though the High Churchmen also emphasized right practice, they did so by acknowledging our responsibility to be obedient to God’s commands. Those commands have been imposed upon us by God; thus, unlike the Latitudinarians, High Churchmen (like Bishop Bull) would argue that God’s commandments are not merely guidelines that can “be discovered by what came naturally to the enlightened man.”

This broad survey of divines in the English church has revealed great diversity of thought in terms of humanity’s justification coram Deo. Despite this diversity,

153 Clifford, Atonement and Justification, 224; McAdoo, Spirit of Anglicanism, 395; Spurr, Restoration Church, 296-97.

154 Lettinga, “Covenant Theology,” 338; Bishop Bull has been identified as a forerunner to the High Church movement within the English Church. George Every, The High Church Party, 1688-1718 (London: SPCK, 1956), 98).

155 Spellman, Latitudinarians, 156.
however, it becomes possible to identify some broad trajectories of thought related to the doctrine of justification within the English church during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Therefore, the next chapter will identify those trajectories in order to determine whether Bishop Bull was a theological innovator whose doctrine of justification deviated from the teachings of earlier English Protestants.
CHAPTER 5

GEORGE BULL:
RESTORING A THEOLOGICAL TRADITION

When George Bull wrote the *Harmonia Apostolica* he sought to chart a course that would enable the English church to safely navigate between the dangerous errors of those who “leaned too much to Popery or Judaism, others to Antinomianism and Libertinism, some again to Pelagianism and Socinianism, and others, lastly, to Manichaeism and Fatalism.” To do so, he turned to the Fathers as his principal sources of authority and sought to answer a vital question: what is the relationship between faith and works in humanity’s justification before God? Ironically, in his quest to provide greater clarity on this matter based on the teachings of antiquity, he was accused of theological novelty (*doctrina novitas*). Bull mocked that claim, defending his reliance upon the Fathers as consonant with the hermeneutic affirmed by another Caroline divine, John Fell: we interpret the new through the lens of the old, because the early church more accurately captured that which is true (*id verum quod primum*). Rather than novelty, Bull

1Robert Nelson, *The Life of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, with the History of those Controversies in which he was Engaged and An Abstract of those Fundamental Doctrines which he Maintained and Defended in the Latin Tongue* (London: Printed for J. Parker; and Law, and Whitaker; and Ogles, Duncan, and Cochran, 1816), 72-74. Waterland summarizes Bishop Bull’s methodology to include the following order of priority: (a) first, to conduct careful exegesis of Scripture; (b) second, to consider his interpretation in light of the “verdict of the primitive church”; (c) third, to consider his interpretations in light of post-Reformation confessions of faith; and (d) fourth, to further consider the “Articles, Catechism, Liturgy, and Homilies of the Church of England.” Only then did he believe he could write with integrity. Daniel Waterland, "A Vindication of Christ’s Divinity: Being a Defence of Some Queries, Relating to Dr. Clarke’s Scheme of the Holy Trinity, In Answer to a Clergyman in the Country," in *The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland, D.D.*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: University Press, 1856), 1:271-72.
insists that his dependence upon antiquity reveals that he is among the *genuini ecclesiae filii*.

Controversies over justification were rare in antiquity, but while the Fathers may not have addressed this matter as fully as might be desired, Bull believed that he was able to glean a comprehensive body of evidence upon which he might develop his argument.

The distinctive theological statement of the Reformation of the sixteenth century is *justificatio sola fide*, and the crux of this doctrine hinges upon the relationship between faith and works; therefore, Bull’s quest to protect the church from erroneous teachings on justification takes on greater significance. For Bull this question represents the heart of the Gospel message. Yet, in direct opposition to Reformed Protestant orthodoxy, Bull insists that works of repentance are essential to justification. That is, unless we carefully qualify our words, we cannot say that justification occurs *sola fide sine operibus*. He turns to Basil of Caesarea in support of this claim. While acknowledging that Basil affirmed that we are justified *sola in Christum fide*, Bull insists that we must read those words with discernment, because Basil never intended to exclude repentance from the business of justification:

> From that which he has written elsewhere, it is abundantly certain, however, that it never occurred (*numquam in mentem venisse*) to Basil that a person is justified, that is, he is granted the remission of sins and considered accepted unto salvation, by faith as a single virtue alone before true repentance. For he clearly affirms, “Faith is not sufficient without repentance.”

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Like Basil, argues Bull, we must acknowledge that faith cannot justify unless it is accompanied by works of repentance. Therefore, he concludes that contemporary misunderstandings fueled by solifidian excesses make it necessary to be more circumspect in our language than previous generations.

In addition to an explication and analysis of Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification in chapter 2, Chapters 3 and 4 examine the works of a remarkably diverse group of divines within the Church of England. Those written works reveal the content and character of the theological debates that shaped Anglican views on justification during and antecedent to the Restoration era. The present chapter seeks to determine whether George Bull is a theological innovator whose doctrine of justification deviates substantively from the teachings of earlier English Protestants. If not, is it possible that Bull’s views fall within a trajectory of thought derived from representative leaders within the established church? The thesis of this chapter is that the distinction between Bull’s teaching and earlier professions of justification _sola fide_ is one of nuance and emphasis _when examined within the context of the English Reformation_. Rather than a wholesale abandonment of the gains of the Reformation, Bull’s teaching falls within the broad parameters characteristic of doctrinal development within the Church of England.

The first order of business in meeting this final objective is to determine whether one can reasonably identify distinctive theological pathways related to the question of justification within the English church. Is there one and only one way that these divines described justification? The evidence suggests that this question cannot be answered affirmatively; yet, while noting the extraordinary diversity that characterizes the thought of these different divines, the evidence also reveals significant elements of
continuity, shared beliefs that make it possible to construct a theological roadmap that provides a way to identify common doctrinal trajectories among these divines.

**Doctrinal Trajectories**

These shared beliefs make it possible to identify boundaries beyond which one may no longer claim to be an heir to the English Reformation. All of the divines discussed in this study seek to articulate a genuinely Protestant doctrine of justification. They explicitly repudiate errors associated with Roman Catholicism and the teachings of the antinomians and other heterodox groups. Yet, they do not merely cast aspersions on their opponents; instead, they ground their teachings in Scripture and the counsel of the Fathers. Figure 1 identifies three foundational elements shared by all of these writers and a fourth shared by many of them. First, all of these divines build their understanding of justification upon an anthropological conviction: because of the absolute sinfulness of humanity, our relationship with a holy God is irrevocably broken, and we find ourselves in a dire position with no remedy for sin outside of God’s grace. Second, all of the divines insist that Christ’s obedience made it possible for this broken relationship with God to be restored through God’s gracious gift of justification. That is, the sole meritorious cause of our justification may be found in Christ alone. Nothing we do can earn or merit our justification before God. Third, they all insist that justification is dependent upon the preparatory work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and/or in the prevenient grace offered by the Spirit that enables sinful humans to respond to God in

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4Though it is beyond the scope of this project to validate this argument, I am convinced that Bishop Taylor’s teaching falls beyond the pale of these doctrinal “boundaries”; therefore, he will not be included in the following analysis.
faithful obedience.⁵ Fourth, many of the divines examined in this study affirm that there are federal foundations that frame the discussion of justification.⁶ For those divines, justification cannot be understood if examined outside of the context of God’s covenantal relationship with humanity.⁷

![Figure 1. Foundations for justification](image)

Although there is significant agreement on these foundational elements, Figure 2 demonstrates that opinions diverge more dramatically when one examines the means by which we receive or appropriate God’s gracious gift of justification. Cranmer,⁸ Hooker, Forbes, and Bull differentiate between “first” and “second” justification, emphasizing an “already” and “not yet” dimension of a life-transforming process.

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⁵While there is a significant difference between Bishop Bull's view of prevenient, sanctifying grace and contrasting views on the role of the Spirit in regeneration, the Holy Spirit nonetheless plays a pivotal role in the soteriological schemata of these divines.

⁶This conviction was explicitly endorsed by all of the seventeenth-century divines examined in this study and by Tyndale and Hooper in the sixteenth century.

⁷Figures 1-3 are intended to be descriptive, not prescriptive. Hence, I am not arguing for the validity or superiority of any of these elements. Instead, I am seeking to provide greater clarity on the development of a very diverse tradition within the English church during this period.

⁸This teaching is explicit in The Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man, but it must be noted that Cranmer avoids this distinction in his later works.
The others eschew this distinction even if they understand justification to be a process rather than a singular event. In addition, when speaking of the non-meritorious conditions of justification or the instrumental means by which we receive this gift of God’s grace, the majority of the divines insist that justification occurs by faith alone. Only the later Caroline divines (Forbes, Hammond, and Bull) insist that this cannot be the case, affirming instead that justifying faith must be accompanied by charity and other works of repentance. Hence, these divines speak of *fides formata*, a perfected faith which encompasses faith, repentance, and other conditions of the Gospel covenant. To be sure, all of the other divines agree that repentance and other “inner” virtues like charity are necessary for salvation and can never be separated from justifying faith. They insist,
however, that repentance follows faith (at least in terms of order). Yet, due to the subtleties involved in this debate, the lines separating these positions often are blurred; therefore, this nuanced debate will be discussed further below.

In terms of the nature of justification, Figure 3 reveals even greater diversity. Two primary traditions, Augustinian (including Cranmer, Tyndale, Latimer, Jewel, Hooker, Forbes, Hammond, and Bull) and Classical Reformed (including Barnes, Hooper, and Davenant), emerge within the post-Reformation Church of England. The former affirms a factitive or transformational nature of justification (i.e., we are made righteous before God); thus, justification, at least to some degree, must be seen as a life-changing process initiated by God.\(^9\) Within this Augustinian view, one can distinguish further between those holding exclusively to a factitive view (i.e., Tyndale and possibly Latimer\(^10\)) and those holding to the union of both a factive and declarative view (i.e., Cranmer, Jewel, Hooker, Forbes, Hammond, and Bull). By contrast, the position identified as “Classical Reformed” affirms the beliefs most often associated with later Protestant orthodoxy. This position rejects a transformational view of justification. Instead, these divines hold solely to a declarative view, teaching that justification is a forensic or judicial act that changes the believer’s status or legal standing before God.

\(^9\)There is diversity of thought within the “Augustinian” camp, suggesting that one might identify a “Semi-Augustinian” position as a third tradition. Clifford holds this position. Alan Clifford, *Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640-1790, An Evaluation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 226. Clifford has a different focus and also addresses the inclusion of baptism in the “first” justification as a distinguishing mark of the Augustinian position. Both Hooker and Bull clearly articulate this position, but Clifford includes Hooker in the “Augustinian” camp, while Bull is included in his list of “Semi-Augustinian” divines. I am using this category with a focus on the transformational nature of justification only. Therefore, Clifford’s distinction is not necessary here since all of those who might fall into the Augustinian or “Semi-Augustinian” camps affirm the transformational nature of justification.

\(^10\)See pp. 109-12 above for a discussion of the ambiguity related to Latimer’s position.
all cases, this latter group of divines insists that justification is antecedent to any moral transformation. God justifies sinners by making a forensic declaration in the foro divino.

Figure 3. The nature of justification
The most divisive issue separating these divines relates to the “formal cause” or the overarching principle of justification. Tyndale, Hooker, Davenant, Forbes, and Bull affirm (with differing emphases) that there is a true sense in which we can be said to possess inherent righteousness; however, all of these divines reject any claim that this inherent righteousness is ever meritorious. The agreement ends there. Barnes, Hooper, Hooker, and Davenant affirm that the alien righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer in justification, and our sins are forgiven posterior to that imputation. Latimer is ambiguous on this matter, and Cranmer and Jewel make no explicit reference to imputation, referring instead to the *remissio peccatorum* or the non-imputation of sins as the governing principle of justification. Similarly, Tyndale does not mention the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness, but in addition to the remission of sins, he suggests that God “imputes our faith” as righteousness; that is, our imperfect faith is reckoned by God as righteousness. Bishop Bull explicitly denies that we are justified by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, and he endorses a position virtually indistinguishable from Tyndale’s view on the imputation of faith as righteousness. Likewise, Forbes and Hammond repudiate any claim that Christ’s righteousness is imputed to the believer but (like Cranmer and Jewel) point instead to the non-imputation of sin as the overarching principle governing justification.

All of the divines suggest that the principal consequence of God’s gracious activity in justification is God’s acceptation. This acceptation means that the barriers erected by our sin have been removed and our relationship with God has been restored. Cranmer, Jewel, Hammond, and Bull also speak of renovation or renewal occurring in the process of justification. Yet, all of the divines affirm that additional works of
righteousness accompany our sanctification, a process that necessarily follows justification (or “first” justification).

The evidence belies any claim that there was a unified consensus on justification that bridged the first two centuries of the Reformation in England. To the contrary, the theological diversity within Anglicanism is evidenced in the diverse understandings of justification from the earliest days of the Reformation in England. One might reasonably argue that later Protestant orthodoxy exerted significant influence on doctrinal development during the first half of the seventeenth century in England, leading to a broad (though not universal) acceptance of the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness as the governing principle of justification. However, to assert that this view is absolute or normative and that failure to embrace it places one outside of the realm of the Protestant Reformation in England seems arbitrary since several of the most influential leaders of the Reformation in England failed to explicitly address imputation. If Bishop Bull and other Caroline divines are condemned for abrogating such a consensus, then one must at least acknowledge that they remain within the broad parameters of thought which characterize the Protestant Church of England. While his exegesis may be flawed and his positions may be found wanting, in each of the key areas identified in Figure 3 Bishop Bull shares common ground with men whose allegiance to the Reformation has not been seriously questioned.\footnote{The one exception that might be raised at this point is Bull’s reticence to affirm that justification occurs \textit{sola fide}. Though he shared this bias with Forbes and Hammond, this difference alone is enough for many to convict him of abandoning the Reformation.} Hence, one may reasonably conclude that Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification emerges from within the English Reformation and remains faithful to the underlying convictions that shaped the discussion.
of justification within this broad theological tradition.

Even if this conclusion is granted, however, other questions remain. For George Bull, two key areas must be addressed in order to correctly interpret biblical teachings on justification. The first deals with the relationship between faith and works. Is it metaphysical subtlety to affirm that we are justified \textit{sola fide} but justifying faith can never be alone? Can we ever suggest that we are justified \textit{sola fide sine operibus}? The second area of discussion is related to the first: as soon as one begins to speak about the relationship of faith and works, the question of merit arises. If one alleges (like Bishop Bull) that charity and other works of repentance are essential to the justification of humanity coram Deo, is he not effectively asserting that humans deserve or merit their justification because of some action on their part?

**Justifying faith:**

\textit{Justificatio sola Fides sine Operibus?}

John Davenant acknowledges that some Protestants avoid any suggestion that “\textit{good works are necessary for justification: or that good works are necessary for salvation}” because they fear that these statements undermine “the doctrine of gratuitous justification and salvation.” Other Protestants do not see any conflict between simultaneously affirming the necessity of good works and gratuitous justification or salvation. “Some of our own Divines affirm it, some deny it; differing in the form of words, yet agreeing as to the substance of the matter.” Yet, in light of misconceptions by the “Romanists,” Davenant suggests that it is best to avoid stating that works are necessary for justification or salvation. In particular, such statements should be avoided in “popular discourses” that are “intended for an illiterate audience” without very careful
Bishop Bull would heartily endorse Davenant’s concern that this question should not be indiscriminantly discussed with the laity; however, he would strongly disagree that we should temper our discussion because of the potential for misunderstanding by Roman Catholics. To do so is to neglect essential biblical teachings and to open the door to further error. In light of the controversy that followed the publication of the *Harmonia Apostolica*, Bull might also question Davenant’s suggestion that English divines agree on the “substance of the matter” whether they affirm or deny the necessity of works in justification; however, Davenant’s assessment is fundamentally correct. Within the context of the Church of England, the diverse affirmations on the necessity of works in humanity’s justification *coram Deo* often are distinguished more by emphasis and nuance than by substantive differences.

Is this true of Bishop Bull’s theology, however? Scholarly opinion is divided, though many would answer this question negatively. In order to respond to this query, one must first assess Bishop Bull’s teaching on the relationship of faith and works, and in order to complete that assessment, two of his conclusions must be examined. First, he

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13 George Bull refused to authorize the translation of his Latin works for this very reason.

14 For a discussion of the nature and scope of this problem, see pp. 11-13 above.

15 The rhetoric characteristic of polemical debates often transcends the realm of ideas and attacks the character of the opponent, and this question of Bishop Bull’s faithfulness to Protestantism is no exception to this rule. Nearly 120 years after Bishop Bull’s death, John Browne, the Archdeacon of Ely, criticized Bull’s *Harmonia Apostolica*. Browne raised valid questions concerning many of Bishop Bull’s assumptions and conclusions. The Archdeacon’s tone was respectful, but in the opening comments of his Appendix he suggested that Bull’s position is closely aligned with “popery,” and later he implied that one facet of Bishop Bull’s exegesis could be identified with the Socinians. John Henry Browne, *On
believes that many of the errors promulgated by solifidianism are derived from the fallacy that faith can be considered a *simplex virtus*. Bull argues instead that when the Apostle Paul claims that we are justified by faith, he uses the word as a metonymy or synecdoche; hence, for Paul, the word “faith” encompasses all of the gospel graces. Bull insists that the Fathers use the word “faith” in the same way; that is, they understand faith in terms of *fides formata*, perfected faith. Such a faith is inseparable from charity and other works of repentance. Therefore, George Bull insists that we are guilty of metaphysical subtleties if we seek to distinguish between his claim that we cannot receive justification *sine operibus* and the competing claim that one is justified *sola fide* but justifying faith is dead without works. The end result is the same: we are not justified

“White House,” when they refer to a statement released by the President of the United States of America. Similarly, a synecdoche is a figure of speech in which a part is said to represent the whole. Hence, a rancher might speak of 100 “head” of cattle when he obviously means the entire beast. In this case, Bull is suggesting that the word “faith” represents not only faith but charity and other works of repentance.

16 George Bull, *Harmonia Apostolica, seu, Binae Dissertationes, Quarum in priore Doctrina D. Jacobi de Justificatione ex operibus Explanatur ac Defenditur: In posteriore, Consensus D. Pauli cum Jacobo Liquido Demonstratur* (London: Printed for William Wells and Robert Scott, 1670), Diss. Post. VI.6.96-9.99 (Works 3.115-18); idem, *EC Resp. ad Animad.* XV.7.135 (Works 4.187). A metonymy is a figure of speech in which one word represents another. Hence, reporters can speak of the “White House,” when they refer to a statement released by the President of the United States of America. Similarly, a synecdoche is a figure of speech in which a part is said to represent the whole. Hence, a rancher might speak of 100 “head” of cattle when he obviously means the entire beast. In this case, Bull is suggesting that the word “faith” represents not only faith but charity and other works of repentance.

without faith and works. Perhaps one might affirm *justificatio sola fide* if, like the Fathers, he understands that “faith” encompasses all of the saving virtues. Any other understanding is absurd.\(^{18}\)

In this conception of the character of justifying faith, Bishop Bull shares common ground with Forbes and Hammond;\(^{19}\) yet, this thinking certainly represents a paradigm shift from the views of the earlier divines. All of the other divines agree that justifying faith is inseparable from other saving virtues and cannot be reduced to simple belief. Yet, without exception, the earlier divines conclude that one can reasonably examine faith apart from other virtues as the instrumental means by which the other virtues are given birth. Thus, while understanding faith in terms of right belief, trust, confidence, and hope, all of the other divines insist that love, obedience, repentance, and other virtues always follow faith in terms of logical order.\(^{20}\) They reject any assertion that

\(^{18}\)Bull does not dispute that the Apostle Paul excludes certain works from consideration as conditions of justification. However, these excluded works are “works of the law,” that is, they are the Jewish ceremonial laws, the fulfillment of rabbinical traditions, works performed without the grace of God, or works performed with the intent to merit God’s favor. Bull, *HA Diss. Post.* XII.8.253-54 (*Works* 3.215); idem, *HA Diss. Post.* 18.2.324-25 (*Works* 3.279-80).


this distinction is absurd or little more than pedantic quibbling. To the contrary, they argue that this is the only way to make sense of biblical teachings on faith.

Second, Bishop Bull believes post-Reformation debates on the relationship of faith and works ultimately are related to the *causa sine qua non* of justification, and he insists that both faith and works are indispensable covenantal conditions “requisite for justification.” Bishop Bull is unyielding in this argument. The very nature of the covenant suggests that there are conditions that must be met before one is able to receive the blessings or reward of the covenant. Conversely, if those conditions are not met, one is subject to the “threatenings” or or curses or penalties associated with the covenant. Faith, considered alone as a *simplex virtus*, can never justify. All of the covenantal conditions must be fulfilled.

This emphasis on the conditionality of humanity’s justification emerges as a vital component of the teachings of earlier English divines, but there are some key differences between their positions and that of Bishop Bull. Tyndale’s position, much like that of Bishop Bull, is shaped by the conditionality of the covenant: if we refuse to fulfill those conditions, God may withdraw “his Spirit of mercy and grace.” Yet, while he is clear that we can never be justified without works of repentance, those works ultimately

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21 Bull, *APH Sectio III.11.33 (Works 4.345).*
are derivative: they emerge as a consequence of our justification, never as a cause.\textsuperscript{22} Archbishop Cranmer agrees that the forgiveness granted in justification is contingent upon repentance. He attempts, however, to maintain a distinction between the “office of justifying” and the process of salvation, implying that good works (including repentance), though necessary for our salvation, are not a condition of justification.\textsuperscript{23} Hooper shares a very similar position, acknowledging the necessity of works of repentance as a condition of the covenant, but insisting that those works are the evidence of justification and can never precede justification.\textsuperscript{24} Likewise, Hooker teaches that works of repentance are among the conditiones sine quibus non of salvation, but he insists that these works must be viewed from the context of sanctification, not justification.\textsuperscript{25} Davenant’s view is quite similar to that of Hooker: good works are necessary for salvation, but justification is always antecedent to those works.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, these earlier divines share Bishop Bull’s conviction on the conditionality of the covenant, but they do so with a more complex ordo salutis in mind. For George Bull, justification is synonymous with salvation; hence, while the process of salvation


\textsuperscript{23}Cranmer, \textit{Of Salvation}, 129-32. See p. 101, n. 72 above for Bull’s response to Cranmer’s comment about the “office of justifying.”


\textsuperscript{25}Hooker, \textit{Justification}, 20.25; 29.47-48; and 32.52.

\textsuperscript{26}Davenant, \textit{Determinationes}, 227; 408; and 415; and idem, \textit{Justification}, 1:288-90, 1:306-08.
includes other facets, to be justified is to be granted God’s precious gift of salvation. In principle, the other English reformers would agree that one cannot be justified if he is not also saved, but they insist upon a priority of order that views justification as one part of the process of salvation. Nonetheless, these earlier divines do not share an absolute consensus on these matters, and the Church of England has never insisted upon conformity with an established ordo salutis as a test of orthodoxy, so Bishop Bull’s position on the conditional nature of justification cannot be viewed as a substantive departure from the Reformation in England. Instead, in light of the similar views of the conditionality of the Gospel covenant by earlier divines, Bishop Bull’s position differs more in emphasis than substance from those divines.

The linchpin to this conclusion, however, is not found in differing views of the ordo salutis; instead, it is found in the question of merit. Bishop Bull argues that certain conditions are indispensible to our justification coram Deo, but those conditions are causae sine quibus non; they are never meritorious causes. For this reason, he concludes that when Reformed creeds refer to justification sola fide, the ultimate intent of that statement is to affirm that justification occurs sola gratia; that is, there is nothing we can do to merit our justification. Although we must fulfill the conditions of the covenant, we receive the priceless gift of justification by God’s grace alone based solely on the meritorious obedience of Christ.

This question of merit becomes the single most important variable in determining continuity or discontinuity with the traditions of the Reformation in England.

27 For an outline of Bishop Bull's ordo salutis, see pp. 37-46 above.

28 Bull, HA Diss. Prior VI.2.41-43 (Works 3.61-63).
in the question of humanity’s justification coram Deo. Bishop Bull insists that the foundation for our justification and for the accompanying gift of eternal life “is established in the meritorious satisfaction of Jesus Christ,” and he supports this argument by citing Melanchthon’s teaching that the underlying principle of any claim to justification sola fide is an unequivocal affirmation that justification is merited solely because of the work of Christ.  

Therefore, for earlier generations to insist that we are justified by faith alone is not to exclude other virtues from the business of justification; instead, it is merely to reject any claim that human action can ever be meritorious.

All of the divines examined in this study place great emphasis on this question of merit. Without exception, they all affirm that the obedience of Christ is the sole meritorious cause of humanity’s justification. In addition, Tyndale, Cranmer, and Jewel specifically support Bull’s assertion that to say that we are justified sola fide is to

29 It is striking that Bull turns to one of the Reformers rather than to the Fathers for this defense. Though he is an anti-Calvinist, Bishop Bull affirms that Calvin was highly capable (viri excellentis ingenii) and provided a great contribution to the reformation of the church. In terms of the continental Reformation, however, he more closely identifies Melanchthon as one who promoted a “renewed and purer Christianity.” Bull, APH Sectio VII.31.110 (Works 4.460). In reference to this question, Bull summarizes Melanchthon’s position as follows: “When we say we are justified by faith . . . we say that because of this one (i.e., Filium Dei) reconciliation is given to us, and we take away (any) merit of (this) reconciliation by our (own) virtues.” Bull, HA Diss. Post. V.5.92 (Works 3:111). There is merit to Bull’s assessment of Melanchthon’s position. In his Loci Communes Melanchthon writes: When “we say that we are justified by faith, we are saying nothing else than that for the sake of the Son of God we receive remission of sins and are accounted as righteous.” Thus, when “we say that we are justified by faith . . . we take away the merit of reconciliation from our own good works.” Melanchthon elaborates, suggesting that when theologians “say that we are justified by faith alone,” they mean that we “attain the remission of sins freely, by faith for the sake of Christ, not by our own worthiness. Nor does the particle ‘alone’ (sola) exclude contrition or the other virtues, as if they should not be present, but it denies that these things are the causes of reconciliation, and it transfers the cause to Christ alone. We must understand these expressions as being correlative: By faith (fide), that is, by our trust in Christ, we are righteous. In other words, we are righteous for the sake of Christ—freely, that is, not because of our own worthiness.” Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes, trans. J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 90, 93. It is undisputed that Bull’s appropriation of Melanchthon’s thought is selective. Bull obviously rejects Melanchthon’s later emphasis on imputation.
respond to this question of merit.\textsuperscript{30} Alan Clifford suggests that the “chief thrust of the Reformation theology in the controversy with Rome was not that man must do nothing, but that he can do nothing of meritorious value in the sight of God.” Consequently, Clifford concludes that George Bull did not reject the tenets of the Protestant Reformation in England; instead, Bull was actually restoring insights anticipated by earlier English reformers.\textsuperscript{31}

Clifford’s assessment is fundamentally correct. One might find fault with Bishop Bull’s assumptions and conclusions. He was adverse to theological subtlety because of its potential to breed confusion among the laity, and this bias may have influenced his biblical exegesis and his reticence to affirm justificatio sola fide. His functionally driven soteriological schema was built upon his conviction that orthodoxy cannot exist without orthopraxy. His favorable bias toward the teachings of antiquity and his antipathy to the perceived excesses of divines during the Interregnum may have prompted a reticence to accept some of the contributions of the continental reformers to the question of justification. His pastoral concerns related to the decline of public morality and the proliferation of antimomian literature within his own parishes may have prompted him to place greater emphasis on the necessity of charity, repentance, and other virtues in the process of humanity’s justification coram Deo than earlier generations. Ultimately, while Bishop Bull’s works reveal a departure from earlier professions that we


\textsuperscript{31}Clifford, \textit{Atonement and Justification}, 178. Clifford specifically identifies Cranmer and Coverdale whose insights George Bull helped restore.
are justified *sola fide*, and while his works also reveal a departure from the priority placed on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness that grew during the first half of the seventeenth century, his thought nonetheless finds great affinity with earlier theological traditions within the Church of England.

**Remaining Questions**

By necessity, the scope of this project has been extraordinarily narrow. Alister McGrath’s monumental work on the history of the doctrine of justification provides a persistent reminder of the remarkable range of teaching on this question, and debates continue to rage on every facet of humanity’s justification *coram Deo*. McGrath is correct to remind us that works of “historical analysis” are not necessarily works of “theological prescription.” This examination of George Bull’s doctrine of justification in the context of the English church is no exception to this general rule. The sixteenth and seventeenth-century debates on justification should inform contemporary discussions, and this analysis of George Bull’s teaching adds another piece to this puzzle. However, these discussions do not exhaust our work. We must persistently seek to fully explicate the Scriptures on these matters.

Numerous questions remain unanswered. While George Bull’s preference for the Fathers over the reformers of the sixteenth century has been noted, additional study is required to determine whether he correctly appropriated their thought. In addition, while Bishop Bull continued to influence teachings within Anglicanism well into the nineteenth century, the extent of that influence remains to be studied. Should this prolific divine be

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ignored beyond the immediate context of the Restoration Church of England? Or has he placed an indelible stamp on later doctrinal development within the English church? More study is needed.

If one were to expand this analysis to include the Independents in England during the middle years of the seventeenth century, it would be fruitful to carefully contrast Bull’s thought with the teachings of Richard Baxter. Much like Bishop Bull, Baxter rejects Reformed teachings on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness in favor of the imputation or reckoning of faith as righteousness. He affirms a distinction between first and second justification and insists that both faith and works are non-meritorious causae sine quibus non of justification. Certainly there are parallels between the thought of George Bull and Richard Baxter, but there are differences, also. Are they of one mind, or do these divines differ in substantive ways? More study is needed.

If we fast forward to the nineteenth century, we certainly will find parallels between Bishop Bull’s thought and the teachings of John Henry Newman. It is

33 Bull and Baxter were both opposed by Thomas Tully who believed that they (and Bellarmine) were among the greatest “adversaries of the faith.” Nelson, Life, 196 (Works 7:209). In his principal works on justification, Bishop Bull alludes to Baxter in passing but does not examine his thought. See, for example, Bull, EC Appendix Animad. XVII.6.154 (Works 4.212) and Bull APH, Praefatio.4.3 (Works 4.304). For a brief discussion of Baxter’s thought, see Appendix 3 below.

undisputed that Newman approves of Bishop Bull’s teachings on justification. There is scholarly debate, however, on the extent of Newman’s dependence upon Bull in the formulation of his doctrine of justification. In a dated study, Felix Arnott argues that Bull’s discussion of justification in the *Harmonia Apostolica* “formed the basis of Newman’s Lectures on the subject.” More modestly, Alister McGrath suggests that Newman follows Bull’s lead in certain dimensions of his thought. Peter Nockles affirms that Newman’s doctrine of justification was an attempt to synthesize the teaching of High Churchmen like Bishop Bull. Yet, Peter Toon, who would acknowledge Newman’s debt to Bishop Bull, denies that Newman’s doctrine of justification can be reduced to an attempt to revive earlier Anglican teachings like that of Bishop Bull. Again, further study is needed to determine whether or not Bull’s influence was substantial or merely tangential in the development of Newman’s thought.

Even in the current debates one finds broad similarities between the teachings in George Bull’s works and N. T. Wright’s emphasis on covenant, his forensic imagery, 

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37 McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, 299.


39 Peter Toon, *Evangelical Theology 1833-1856: A Response to Tractarianism* (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1979), 146. Toon concludes instead that Newman’s teaching is a “new synthesis.” This can be illustrated by Newman’s teaching on the “idea of an implanted ‘presence of God’ attached to, or affiliated to, the soul (and thus commonly called ‘an adherent righteousness’).”
his understanding of the present and future implications of justification (i.e., “final justification”), his views on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness, and his distrust of seventeenth-century preoccupation with questions of causality. Yet, there are significant differences in the teachings of these two Anglicans that transcend generational differences and the contemporary discussions of second temple Judaism. Was the second half of the seventeenth century a watershed for theological development within today’s Church of England? Perhaps, but a host of questions remain.

Restoring a Theological Tradition

John Wesley concluded that Bishop Bull dissented “from the fundamental Articles of the Church of England” by his refusal to affirm justificatio sola fide. Is there merit to Wesley’s assessment and to more recent claims that Bishop Bull abrogated an early consensus on the doctrine of justification and abandoned the gains of the Reformation in England? While there is no question that Bull’s thinking differs from earlier divines at many points, his persistent argument that faith, charity, repentance or any other virtue will never enable a person to merit justification coram Deo places him

40For a helpful summary of Wright’s thought, see N. T. Wright, Justification: God’s Plan & Paul’s Vision (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2009). Although the focus of this project is limited to Anglicanism, contemporary disagreements about the doctrine of justification certainly are not limited to that communion. The reaction to Norman Shepherd’s teaching on justification make it clear that this debate is more extensive than any single tradition. For a summary of Shepherd’s understanding on justification, see Norman Shepherd, The Call of Grace: How the Covenant Illuminates Salvation and Evangelism (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2000).


42For a concise statement of this view, see Bull, EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.3.69 (Works 4.95). He wrote, “Catholica doctrina est, fides, poenitentiam, speram, dilectionem, caeterasque virtutes et bona opera nostra nequaquam per se aut merito suo ad id valere ut quis justificetur, hoc est, a peccatis suis prius commissis absolvatur, a Deo tanquam Justus tractetur, ipsisque ad salutem vitamque aeternam gratum et acceptus habeatur; sed illud totum unice debere meritoriae Jesu Christi satisfactioni, utpote qua sola
squarely within the fold of earlier divines within the Church of England. Rather than abandoning the Reformation, Henry Hammond would have argued instead that Bull was actually helping to restore a theological tradition that had been co-opted by the solifidians:

The characters or discriminative markes of the English Reformation are principally two, one the conforming all our doctrines to Primitive Antiquity, receiving all genuine Apostolical traditions for our rule both in matters of faith and government; the other in uniting that καλὴν συνωρίδα, a fair, beautiful pair of Faith and Works, in the same degree of necessity and conditionality both to our justification and salvation, and to all the good works of justice and mercy which the Romanist speaks of, adjoining that other most eminent one of humility, attributing nothing to ourselves, when we have done all, but all to the glory of the mercy and grace of God, purchased for us by Christ.43

Evangelicals within Anglicanism may reasonably dispute any suggestion that solifidianism and a commitment to the teachings of the Continental reformers necessarily imply a rejection of the teachings of antiquity. Davenant’s massive work on justification makes it evident that the Fathers had not been forgotten or ignored by those who were unabashedly “Reformed” in their thinking. Nonetheless, in spite of differences of emphasis, the evidence suggests that Bishop Bull’s teachings find great affinity with the teachings of divines like Tyndale, Cranmer, and Jewel during nascent days of the Reformation in England. Therefore, the evidence suggests that George Bull is indeed restoring emphases associated with the first two generations of the Reformation in England; yet, he makes no slavish attempt to merely mimic earlier pronouncements. He seeks to capture the spirit or intent of the early English reformers while simultaneously

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43 Henry Hammond, A Paraenesis, or Seasonable Exhortatory to all True Sons of the Church of England, Wherein is Inserted a Discourse of Haeresy in Defence of our Church against the Romanist (London: Printed by R. N. for Richard Royston, 1656), 2.25.30-31.
responding to the theological and moral crises of his own day.

This does not, of course, suggest that his thinking should be accepted uncritically or as representative of the English church as a whole. To the contrary, there are opportunities for criticism at multiple levels of his thought. One might reasonably question his assumption that obedience cannot exist without coercive force. One might question his biblical exegesis and the very foundation of his argument that the Apostle Paul should be interpreted through the lens of the Apostle James. One might question his reductionistic assumption that later Reformed teachings on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness necessarily end in antinomianism. Nonetheless, despite these (and other) limitations, Bishop Bull sought to be faithful to the persistent teaching of the Scripture and of antiquity that right belief cannot be divorced from right practice. In so doing, he worked to restore, not to undermine, his theological tradition.

George Bull concludes the *Harmonia Apostolica* wanting to ensure that his readers would not “deviate (*aberrares*) from the truth.” Rather than fall prey to endless theological and philosophical speculation, he encouraged them to be faithful to their covenantal obligations. He writes, “Concede (*permitte*) scholastic trifles, laborious nonsense, and learned foolishness, to those who passionately pursue such things. You, if you are acquainted (*noveris*) with these things [i.e., his teachings about justification], will be wise; and if you conduct your life in harmony with them, you will be blessed.”

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Bull’s Use of the Fathers

Bishop Bull argues for the superiority of antiquity over the novelty of contemporary opinion, and he frequently cites the Fathers in support of his argumentation. Further, he insists that the Canons of the Church of England support this bias.

The following list catalogues direct references but does not include possible allusions to the Fathers; however, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to validate the accuracy of these citations;

Dates were obtained from second edition of The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.

Ambrose (d. 397)


Augustine (d. 430):  


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1Bull, EC Resp. ad Praef. 3.3 (Works 4.3).

(Works 4.10): Paul is obscure in teaching on faith; EC Resp. ad Animad. I.6.12 
(Works 4.16): James helps interpret Paul; EC Resp. ad Animad. II.5.19 (Works 4.26): Love is a universal virtue that defines faith; EC Resp. ad Animad. II.6.20 
(Works 4.28): The supremacy of love; EC Resp. ad Animad. II.6.21 (Works 4.28-29): Repentance without love is useless; EC Resp. ad Animad. XIII.15.113 
(Works 4.157): To believe in God is to love God; EC Resp. ad Animad. XIII.15.113 (Works 4.158): Trust is in the intellect; EC Appendix ad Animad. 

Basil (d. 379) 
HA Diss. Post. VII.14.113 (Works 3.133): We are commanded to do the possible; 
EC Resp. ad Animad. I.3.8 (Works 4.10): Paul is obscure in teaching on faith; 
APH Sectio IV.9.43 (Works 4.359): Only meritorious Works are excluded when affirming sola fide; faith is not a single virtue; APH Sectio IX.3.129, 9.133 
(Works 4.486, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate; APH Sectio IX.17.149 
(Works 4.513): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Bernard (d. 1153) 
HA Diss. Post. XVIII.5.327 (Works 3.281): God is not indebted to us; HA Diss. 
Post. XVIII.13.356 (Works 3.310): We must choose a middle way between Pelagianism and Manichaeism; EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.20.167 (Works 4.230): Humans not equally culpable for all sins

Chrysostom (d. 407) 
HA Diss. Prior. II.7.17 (Works 3.23): Works of repentance are complex; HA Diss. 
Post. VII.14.113 (Works 3.133): We are commanded to do the possible; HA Diss. 
Post. IX.4. 180 (Works 3.148): The Mosaic Law was defective; HA Diss. Post. 
IX.12.188 (Works 3.156): Paul’s use of the first person does not imply that Rom. 
Quoted in the Homily on Good Works; the thief would lose his grace if he had lived and failed to perform works; EC Resp. ad Animad. I.3.8 (Works 4.10): Paul 
is obscure in teaching on faith; EC Resp. ad Animad. II.3.16 (Works 4.22): 
Supports Bull’s interpretation that ἐνέγρωμεν should be interpreted passively 
new law; APH Sectio IV.11.45-46 (Works 4.362-63): True faith is perfected by
love; *APH Sectio* VII.6.79 (*Works* 4.415): The thief would lose his grace if he had lived and failed to perform works; *APH Sectio* IX.3.129, 9.133 (*Works* 4.486, 492): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Clement of Alexandria (d. 215)

*EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII.9.157 (*Works* 4.217): Humans able to fulfill God’s commands by grace

*APH Sectio* IX.4.130, 9.133 (*Works* 4.487, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Clement of Rome (d. 96)

*HA Diss. Post.* V.4.89 (*Works* 3.108): Justifying faith excludes all personal merit;

*HA Diss. Post.* XII.27.271 (*Works* 3.231): Not all works are excluded from justification

Cyprian (d. 258)

*HA Diss. Post.* XVIII.4.326 (*Works* 3.280): God is not indebted to us; there is no personal merit in our works; *APH Sectio* IV.6.41 (*Works* 4.357): One cannot be justified without repentance; *APH Sectio* IX.4.129, 9.133 (*Works* 4.489, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Cyril (d. 386)

*APH Sectio* IX.4.129, 9.133 (*Works* 4.489, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Dionysius (d. 268)

*EC Resp. ad Animad.* XIX.10.188, 189 (*Works* 4.258, 260): No justification in Mosaic Law

Dorotheus (6th century)

*APH Sectio* IX.4.131 (*Works* 4.489): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Ennodius (d. 521)

*APH Sectio* IX.4.131 (*Works* 4.489): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Hilary (d. 449)

*APH Sectio* IV.8.42 (*Works* 4.358): Faith is opposed to the Mosaic Law in *sola fide*

Irenaeus (d. 200)

*EC Resp. ad Animad.* I.4.9 (*Works* 4.12): Good works are necessary for salvation;

*EC Resp. ad Animad.* I.5.10 (*Works* 4.14): Paul is obscure on justification;

*EC Resp. ad Animad.* XII.6.90 (*Works* 4.127): Christ completed/expanded the law;

*EC Resp. ad Animad.* XIX.5.10.181 (*Works* 4.248): The Mosaic Law was added to repress idolatry, not as a means of justification; *APH Sectio* IV.5.39 (*Works* 4.353): In *sola fide*, faith is to do God’s will; *APH Sectio* IX.3.129, 9.133 (*Works* 4.486, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate
Jerome (d. 420)

*HA Diss. Post. IX.12.188 (Works 3.156)*: Paul’s use of the first person does not imply that Rom. 7 refers to the regenerate; *HA Diss. Post. XVIII.9.348 (Works 3.303)*: Supports *fides formata*; *HA Diss. Post. XVIII.12.355-56 (Works 3.310)*: Cannot be saved without grace; *EC Resp. ad Animad. I.3.8 (Works 4.10)*: Paul is obscure in teaching on faith; *EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.11.159 (Works 4.219)*: Humans able to fulfill God’s commands by grace; *EC Resp. ad Animad. XXI.5.7.199 (Works 4.274)*: The kingdom of heaven is not promised under the Mosaic Covenant; *APH Sectio VII.21.97 (Works 4.440)*: Post-regeneration sin is possible

Justin Martyr (d. 165)

*HA Diss. Post. VI.3.94 (Works 3.114)*: Christ fulfilled that which was good in the Law and negated that which was not; *HA Diss. Post. VII.14.112 (Works 3.132)*: God does not command the impossible; *HA Diss. Post. XVII.7.320 (Works 3.275-76)*: Mosaic Law did not offer true forgiveness; *EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.6.153 (Works 4.211)*: Christians held to a higher moral accountability than unbelievers; *EC Resp. ad Animad. XIX.5.10.181 (Works 4.249)*: The Mosaic Law was added to repress idolatry, not as a means of justification; *EC Resp. ad Animad. XXII.5.4.203 (Works 4.279)*: No righteousness in the Mosaic Law; *APH Sectio IX.4.129-30, 9.133 (Works 4.486-87, 491)*: Rom 7 refers to unregenerate

Macarius (d. 390) (NOTE: There are two)

*APH Sectio IX.3.129, 9.133 (Works 4.486, 491)*: Rom 7 refers to unregenerate

Nazianzen (d. 389)

*EC Resp. ad Animad. I.3.8 (Works 4.10)*: Paul is obscure in teaching on faith

Oecumenius (d. 6th century)

*EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.10.79 (Works 4.109)*: Contra imputation, Christ treated as a sinner; *APH Sectio IX.3.129 (Works 4.486)*: Rom 7 refers to unregenerate

Origen (d. 254)

*HA Diss. Post. IX.22.202 (Works 3.169)*: In support of difference between Rom 7 and Gal 5; *EC Resp. ad Animad. I.3.8 (Works 4.10)*: Paul is obscure in teaching on faith; *EC Appendix ad Animad. XVII.9.157-58 (Works 4.217-18)*: Humans able to fulfill God’s commands by grace; *APH Sectio IV.6.39-40 (Works 4.353-54)*: Use of faith implies *fidem formata*; *APH Sectio IV.6.41 (Works 4.356)*: Some works are necessary for salvation; *APH Sectio IX.3.129, 9.133 (Works 4.486, 491)*: Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Pacian (4th century)

*APH Sectio IX.4.131, 9.133 (Works 4.489, 491)*: Rom 7 refers to unregenerate

Prosper (d. 463)
EC Resp. ad Animad. II.5.19 (Works 4.26): Love is a universal virtue that defines faith; APH Sectio VII.19.95n (Works 4.437n): Justification/salvation may be lost

Tertullian (d. 225)

HA Diss. Post. XI.3.238 (Works 3.201): The Law was given to help resist idolatry; HA Diss. Post. XVIII.13.357 (Works 3.312): We are accountable for our sins; EC Resp. ad Animad. II.3.16 (Works 4.22): Supports Bull’s interpretation that ἐνεργοῦμένη should be interpreted passively; EC Resp. ad Animad. XIX.5.10.181 (Works 4.249): Mosaic Law was added to repress idolatry, not as a means of justification; APH Sectio IV.9.44 (Works 4.361): Direct connection between baptism and justification; APH Sectio IX.3.129, 9.133 (Works 4.486, 491): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate

Theodoret (d. 466)

APH Sectio IX.3.129 (Works 4.486): Rom 7 refers to unregenerate

Theophylact (11th century)

HA Diss. Post. XVII.1.316 (Works 3.272): In support of argument contra unnecessary Jewish ritual practices; EC Resp. ad Animad. XI.10.79, 11.82 (Works 4.109, 113): Contra imputation, Christ treated as a sinner; APH Sectio IX.3.129 (Works 4.486): Rom 7 refers to the unregenerate
APPENDIX 2

THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION
AND THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN

The focus of the fourth chapter of this investigation is on the teachings of a representative group of divines; however, a survey of the Church of England would be incomplete without an acknowledgement of at least two very disparate documents that contributed to the religious landscape of the second half of the seventeenth century. The first is the *Confession of Faith* penned by the Divines of the Westminster Assembly. The second is an anonymous devotional work entitled the *Whole Duty of Man*. While the latter was far more influential within the Restoration Church of England, both of these documents framed some of the key parameters of discussions on justification among divines within the established church.

The Westminster Assembly of Divines was convened by order of the Parliament in the midst of the Civil War (1643). The primary objective of the Assembly was a revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles; however, this focus shifted to the development of an entirely new confession of faith following the agreement with the Presbyterian Church of Scotland (outlined in the Solemn League and Covenant).¹ The most significant

¹The Solemn League and Covenant was crafted (in part) as a tactical move by the Parliament to gain military support from Scotland during the Troubles. Its overtly Presbyterian character made it particularly attractive to the Scots and initially found a receptive audience in England because of popular opposition to the prelacy.
fruit of the Assembly’s labor was the publication of the *Westminster Confession* in 1646.²

Like earlier works, anthropological convictions form the foundation for the *Confession’s* teachings on justification. Adam’s fall resulted in the loss of “original righteousness,” a malady so pervasive that Adam (and all his posterity) could subsequently be described as “dead in sin.” That is, as a result of Adam’s sin, all humanity is “wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.” The “guilt of this sin was imputed” to all of Adam’s posterity, and this guilt, coupled with the effects of actual sin, made us subject to God’s wrath and the “curse of the Law.” Consequently, Adam and all of his posterity were “made subject to death, with all miseries spiritual, temporal, and eternal.” Thus, without some remedy, humanity has no hope of salvation. Thankfully, by God’s grace, Christ made satisfaction for our sins, making possible our salvation. Thus, it can be said that “Christ, by his obedience, and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified.”³

The justification of humanity includes the remission of sins and “accounting and accepting” believers as righteous before God. This righteousness is not dependent upon any personal righteousness but is imputed to us “for Christ’s sake alone.” Both the active obedience and passive suffering of Christ are imputed to the believer so that our

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³*The Confession of Faith, Together with the Larger and Lesser Catechisms*, 4th ed. (London: Printed for the Company of Stationers, 1658; reprint, (Glasgo: Robert Sanders, 1675), 6.2.19 (page references are to the reprint edition). References include chapter number, paragraph number, and page number. The divines added, “From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed actual transgressions.” Ibid., 6.3.19-20; 6.4.20; 6.6.21; 11.3.37.
righteousness is an external “gift of God” that is not inherent within us. It is true that God’s decision to justify the elect occurred in eternity; however, just as Christ’s death occurred at a specific time in history, so the *application* of justification to the individual believer occurs in time. In addition, although our sins are forgiven in justification, God continues to forgive sins committed following justification, and it is impossible for a person once justified to lose that justification before God.⁴

In the *Confession*, the doctrine of justification is framed by a covenantal understanding of God’s relationship with his people. God’s first covenant with Adam was the covenant of works, an agreement that promised life “upon condition of perfect and personal obedience.” As a direct result of Adam’s sin, however, humanity lost the capacity to comply with that requirement, so God initiated a second covenant, a covenant of grace. This second covenant was far more extensive, promising life, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and the capacity to believe; yet, the sole condition of this covenant was faith in Christ Jesus. The Mosaic Law falls under this covenant of grace, but God has administered that covenant differently during the different dispensations of the Law and the dispensation that followed Christ’s satisfaction for our sins. However, the current dispensation of grace does not mean that the moral law of God was invalidated by Christ’s victory over sin and death. It is just as binding now as it was in the Mosaic dispensation.⁵

Faith is a gift of grace and is the sole instrument for our justification; yet, one must never think that this faith can be divorced from “other saving graces.” Justifying

⁴*Confession*, 11.1.35-36; 11.4-5.38.

⁵Ibid., 7.2-3.22-23; 7.5.23-7.6.25; 19.1.56; 19.5.58.
faith is more than mere belief; instead, it is a very real trust that includes “Accepting, Receiving, and Resting upon Christ alone for Justification, Sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the Covenant of Grace.”

Repentance, like faith, is also a gift of grace that, while never meritorious, is absolutely essential to forgiveness. We are obligated to obey God’s commands, but we are helpless to obey in our own strength. Instead, we are empowered to perform good works by the Holy Spirit, but they cannot be performed antecedent to our justification. To the contrary,

Works done by unregenerate men, although, for the matter of them, they may be things which God commands, and of good use both to themselves and others: yet, because they proceed not from an heart purified by faith; nor are done in a righteous manner, according to the Word; nor, to a right end, the glory of God; they are therefore sinfull, and cannot please God.

Thus, good works are “the fruits and evidences of a true and lively faith.” Yet, as a consequence of the pervasiveness of sin, those good works can never be “wholly unblameable and unreproveable in God’s sight,” and the disparity between those works and the glory of God is so great that those works will never merit forgiveness of sins. Nonetheless, God chooses to accept the sincere works of those who have been justified, however imperfect, as pleasing.

The Confession reflects an attempt to make a tectonic shift in the

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6 *Confession*, 11.2.36-37; 14.1.41; 14.2.42.

7 Ibid., 15.3.44. The divines insisted that “none may expect pardon without it.”

8 Ibid., 16.3.47.

9 Ibid., 16.7.49.

10 Ibid., 16.2.46; 16.5.48-16.6.49.
ecclesiological foundations of the Church of England. In addition to a more overtly Reformed theological perspective, this document reflects the Puritan distrust of the episcopacy and an absolute rejection of the Laudian priorities that held sway prior to the English Civil War. There is little doubt that the Confession exerted significant influence within the English church, but it was not universally received. Lettinga argues that Hammond’s Practical Catechism was written primarily in reaction against the Confession, and it is arguable that perceptions among Restoration divines that the Confession fostered antinomianism contributed to a rejection of its soteriological elements.

In contradistinction to the overtly theological cast of the Westminster Confession, the Whole Duty of Man (1657) represents an emphasis within the Church of England on religious practices that foster the growth of personal piety. Although no one ever claimed credit for this work, it is most probable that it was penned by Richard Allestree (1619-81), a divine who served as the Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford following the restoration of the monarchy. Allison identifies Duty as more “influential

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perhaps than any other single work, with respect to the subsequent understanding of the Christian Gospel among Anglicans.”

*The Whole Duty of Man* seeks to define the behavior that characterizes holy living. As such, it does not directly address religious controversies, including the debates on justification. Instead, it develops a way of thinking that seeks to help believers know how to fulfill their duties or responsibilities to God, themselves, and their neighbors. In the process, however, several theological presuppositions emerge.

The author of *Duty* builds his soteriology on the twin foundations of his

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15The author suggests that Titus 2:12 sums up the essence of his teaching (i.e., “That we should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world”). Richard Allestree, *The Whole Duty of Man, Laid Down in a Plain and Familiar Way, for the Use of All, but Especially the Meanest Reader* (London: Printed for the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1841), 1.9.17. For references other than the Preface, the format includes the week, paragraph, and page number. Hence, 1.9.17 indicates Sunday, Week 1, para. 9, p. 17.) Though he prescribes specific behaviors in terms of active devotion, there is always a sense of restraint in an effort to avoid legalism. For example, he is quick to point out that while excessive eating and sleeping can be detrimental to one’s spiritual health, there is no way to define in detail exactly what “moderate” means in terms of the amount eaten and the number of hours slept, because we all have differing needs. Allestree, *Duty*, 9.2.164.
theological anthropology and a covenantal understanding of God’s relationship with humanity. Adam was created without sin, and God entered into an agreement or covenant with him that promised Adam the capacity to resist sin. If Adam remained faithful to that covenant, God promised him that he “should never die, but be taken up into heaven.” Thus, in concert with the other divines of the church, Duty argues that God created Adam with the capacity to know and obey God’s will. Therefore, if he were willing to do so, Adam could perfectly “perform all that was required of him” by God.\footnote{Allestree, Duty, Preface 12.7.}

The condition of this first covenant was Adam’s perfect obedience of all of God’s commands. If Adam failed to remain obedient, however, the consequence of his disobedience would be the loss of the capacity to perfectly obey God; he would become “subject to death,” and he would suffer “eternal damnation in hell.” Adam’s subsequent failure placed him in a hopeless condition, and since all of Adam’s progeny for all generations were created in his image, we have all suffered the same consequences of his disobedience. However, God did not leave Adam (or his descendants) without hope.\footnote{Ibid. See also Ibid. Preface 13.8-14.9. In addition, following his last section, Allestree published guidelines for devotions. In “A Prayer for Grace” he acknowledges that he is a “wretched creature” who is incapable of even thinking “a good thought” without the grace of God. Ibid., 317.}

In spite of Adam’s condemnation, God entered into a second covenant with Adam immediately after the fall. The condition of this new covenant is to repent of our sins and have faith. For the author of Duty, this is a reasonable expectation. Just as a patient who has been cured from a “desperate disease” by the skill of a physician would obey the physician’s commands if they were necessary for his continued wellbeing, so we

\begin{quote}
\textit{比重内容的空白部分}
\end{quote}
should obey God for the wellbeing of our souls.\textsuperscript{18} Hence, we must conclude that we will not receive the benefits offered by Christ until we fulfill the conditions imposed upon us.\textsuperscript{19}

In his second covenant with Adam, God promised to send his Son to make satisfaction for our sins. Christ’s satisfaction for our sins ultimately makes possible our forgiveness so that we might be redeemed. In addition, this remarkable gift of Christ’s satisfaction also gives “us the \textit{strength} to do what God requires of us.” Yet, we, unlike Adam, are not obligated to perfect obedience but are required to provide “an \textit{honest} and \textit{hearty endeavour}” to obey God’s commands. Nonetheless, even this effort is impossible without the grace of God; therefore, God gave us the Holy Spirit “to govern and rule us.”\textsuperscript{20}

Rejecting Lutheran protests of \textit{simul iustus et peccator}, \textit{Duty} posits a fundamental axiom that a “religion or opinion cannot be of God which allows in men any wickedness.” Hence, God must begin a new work in us, granting us the grace necessary to repent of our sins and believe so that we might be saved. In addition to this prevenient work of grace, it is only by God’s sustaining grace that we are able to continue the process of our salvation, and \textit{Duty} envisions this grace to be sacramental in character. At our baptism, God ratifies with us the covenant of grace given to Adam after the fall and makes it necessary for us to fulfill the conditions of that covenant. In the celebration of the Eucharist we “repeat and renew that covenant we made with God in our baptism.”

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{18} Allestree, \textit{Duty}, Preface 25.12.
\item\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 1.1.15.
\item\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., Preface 17-21.9-10.
\end{itemize}
accomplish this renewal, it is necessary for us to fully understand the nature of that covenant, we must know where we have violated that covenant, and we must “resolve upon strict observance of it for the rest of our life.”

The first condition of our covenantal obedience to God is faith or belief. This faith includes but is never limited to an intellectual affirmation of truth. Instead, faith must be coupled with such duties as hope, love, the fear of the Lord, trust (a total dependence upon and confidence in God), humility, the honor and reverence of God, and worship. Thus, *Duty* clearly implies that faith is a work (or duty) that does not differ in nature from these other graces. In addition, *Duty* speaks of the absolute necessity of repentance to our salvation. This repentance includes “turning from sin to God, the casting off all our former evils, and instead thereof, constantly practising all those Christian duties which God requireth of us.” Yet, it is imperative for us to see that even our repentance is a gift of grace and cannot occur merely “at our command.”

Nelson notes that when George Bull called his family to prayer every morning and evening, he would read prayers, expound upon Scripture, and on Sundays he would read a chapter from *Duty*. In addition, after his elevation to the episcopacy, Bishop Bull encouraged his clergy to read and imitate the sermons of eminent divines and to occasionally read a chapter of *Duty* to the people. Though one cannot demonstrate

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21 Allestree, *Duty*, 1.4.16; 3.1-2.65; 3.3.66.

22 Ibid., 1.14.18; 1.23.22.

23 Ibid., 5.26.109; 5.30.111.

24 Robert Nelson, *The Life of George Bull, D. D., Lord Bishop of St. David’s, with the History of those Controversies in which he was Engaged and An Abstract of those Fundamental Doctrines which he Maintained and Defended in the Latin Tongue* (London: Printed for J. Parker; and Law, and Whitaker; and Ogles, Duncan, and Cochran, 1816), 56-57; 358-59; 371.
direct dependence upon this work on Bishop Bull’s doctrine of justification, it is apparent that this work helped shape Bishop Bull’s view of the Christian life.
APPENDIX 3

JOHN OWEN AND RICHARD BAXTER

This project intentionally neglects the teachings of nonconformists who scrupled against certain liturgical practices within the English Church while remaining faithful to the doctrinal statements in the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Homilies. I am indebted to Gerald Bray for his suggestion that the inclusion of an arguably heterodox (though outwardly conforming) divine like Jeremy Taylor while bypassing Puritans like John Owen and Richard Baxter may distort the conclusions of this study. This appendix seeks to determine whether the addition of teachings on justification by influential divines like Owen and Baxter would alter the conclusions of this project. The teachings of both of these men are carefully nuanced, and the scope of this query is limited; therefore, more study is needed to thoroughly contrast their thought with Bishop Bull’s theology.\(^1\) Nonetheless, the preliminary evidence suggests that Owen and Baxter corroborate the polarities already noted within the English church on the doctrine of justification. That is, this brief analysis further undermines arguments for the existence of a broad consensus on the doctrine of justification within the English church and reveals the existence of diverse theological trajectories (with seemingly contradictory impulses) within the Church of England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

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\(^1\) Bishop Bull never mentions John Owen in his principal works on justification, and he mentions Richard Baxter only in passing. See, for example, Bull, *EC Resp.ad Animad.* XVI 5.141 (*Works* 4.195); *EC Appendix ad Animad.* XVII 6.155 (*Works* 4.212); and *APH Praefatio* 4.3 (*Works* 4.304). As noted in chapter 5 above, however, there are intriguing parallels between the thought of Baxter and Bull.
John Owen (1616-83) completed his Masters of Arts at Queen’s College, Oxford. His tutor was Thomas Barlow, one of Bishop Bull’s more vocal and prestigious critics following publication of the *Harmonia Apostolica*. Since he maintained a “lifelong friendship” with Barlow, it is likely that Owen would have been familiar with Barlow’s criticisms of George Bull, but he never directly mentions Bull in his work entitled *Justification by Faith* (1677). Owen’s *Justification* provides a thorough overview of his mature doctrine of justification and validates his reputation as an unwaivering proponent of Reformed orthodoxy.

Owen affirms that the doctrine of justification provided the primary theological impetus behind the Reformation, and he concurs with Luther’s assessment that justification is the “*Articulus stantis aut cadentis Ecclesiae*.” Regrettably, however, in addition to persistent Roman Catholic and Socinian attacks on Reformed teachings on justification, Reformed thinkers faced a more insidious threat from within: antinomian abuses undermined the credibility of professions of justification *sola fide*. Owen’s

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2See p. 24 above.


4Owen rejects the argument of “some of late” who published works suggesting that James was written to clarify Paul. While this certainly could be an allusion to George Bull, Owen does not identify his opponents in *Justification*, so (without additional evidence) it would be conjecture to assume that he had Bull in mind. See John Owen, *The Doctrine of Justification by Faith Through the Imputation of the Righteousness of Christ, Explained, Confirmed, & Vindicated* (London: Printed for R. Boulter, 1677), 560-62.

5Owen, *Justification*, 83. Owen acknowledges that the doctrine of justification has been abused by those who insist that there is no need for “personal Holiness, Good Works, and all Gospel Obedience.” Ibid., “To the Reader,” n.p. In addition, he grants that justification by faith alone is a doctrine that has often been abused by those who believe that “bare assent unto the Gospel” is adequate unto salvation. Ibid., 548. Steve Griffiths notes that Owen repeatedly opposes the errors associated with antinomian thought by
attacks on antinomianism were unyielding and seem to belie the criticisms of Bishop Bull, Richard Baxter, and others that Reformed theology necessarily leads to antinomianism.

Owen grounds his teaching on justification within his anthropological convictions. As a result of Adam’s lapse into sin, all persons, even the “best of men,” are incapable of standing before God. Like Adam, humanity is in a “lost, forlorn, hopeless condition”; through Adam our “understandings were darkened, and our Reason debased” and we have fallen “under the curse and the wrath of God.” Unless God intervenes by justifying us, the consequence or penalty for our sin is “Eternal Death.”

Owen insists that our justification is incomprehensible outside of a forensic context. To “be justified is to be freed from the Guilt of sin, or to have all our sins pardoned, and to have a Righteousness wherewith to appear before God, so as to be accepted with him, and a Right to the Heavenly Inheritance.” Owen insists that the essence of this understanding of justification has the full support of antiquity; however, he acknowledges that etymological issues surrounding the Latin translations of the Greek led Augustine and others to err when they embraced a factitive understanding of justification. To avoid this misunderstanding, Owen concludes that one must acknowledge the connection between “Jus and Justum.” These terms relate to “an Act of Jurisdiction, rather than a Physical Operation or infusion. Justificari is Justus conferi, specifically rejecting any notion of justification from eternity. Steve Griffiths, Redeem the Time: Sin in the Writings of John Owen (Fearn, Great Britain: Christian Focus Publications, 2001), 72-74.

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6 Owen, Justification, 1-2; 11; 54; 101; 347. He elaborates that the human condition is “not only a state of Guilt and Wrath” but also points to “the Depravation of their Nature.” Hence “the power of sin is prevalent in them, and their whole Souls are defiled.” Ibid., 162.

7 Ibid., 1; 160.
pro juste haberi; to be esteemed, accounted or adjudged Righteous.” For that reason, we speak of justification in only one sense: “to absolve, acquit, esteem, declare, pronounce Righteous, or to impute Righteousness, which is the Forensick sense of the word.”

Consequently, in this singular juridical act, God alone is the one who justifies; nothing we do will influence this decision. As we stand “before his Tribunal” we either are condemned for our sin or we are acquitted by “a meer Act of Soveraign Grace.” Further, our acquittal is based upon the merit of Christ alone. Therefore, Owen insists that “no Acts or Works of our own are the Causes or Conditions of our Justification.” To the contrary, our justification is based on the grace of God and is granted solely “through Jesus Christ, as Mediator and Surety of the Covenant.”

In addition to this forensic context, the heart of the question of humanity’s justification before God is built upon two interconnected aspects of our relationship with God: the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness and our union with Christ. Ultimately, God justifies the ungodly, not the godly. We are not justified by any inherent righteousness; that is, we are not justified because of a righteousness we can consider our own, even if we acknowledge that some degree of personal righteousness is received as a

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8 Owen, Justification, 9; 78; 170-72. If one grants that justification must be understood “under a juridical Scheme, or Forensick Tryal and Sentence” at least ten facets are involved. First, this view presupposes an actual judgment; second, God sits alone as the judge at the bar; third, the “Tribunal whereon God sits in Judgment, is the Throne of Grace”; fourth, as sinners, we are the ones who stand guilty before God; fifth, we are accused by the Law, our own consciences, and by Satan; sixth, the charge is leveled against us by the Law; seventh, a “Plea is prepared in the Gospel for the guilty person. And this is Grace, through the Blood of Christ, the Ransom paid, the Atonement made, the Eternal Righteousness brought in by the Surety of the Covenant”; eighth, the sinner must acknowledge that he is defenseless before God; ninth, we have an “Advocate with the Father who makes our “Plea effectual”; and tenth, the “Sentence hereon is Absolution, on the account of the Ransome, Blood or Sacrifice and Righteousness of Christ; with Acceptation into favour, as persons approved by God.” Ibid., 187-88.

9 Ibid., 8-9; 105; 162-65; 400. The “whole of our Acceptation with Him seems to be assigned unto Grace, Mercy, the Obedience and Blood of Christ; in opposition unto our own Worth and Righteousness, or our own Works and Obedience.” Ibid., 33.
gift of God’s grace. Instead, God justifies humanity “on the ground and consideration of a perfect Righteousness made theirs by Imputation.” Thus, God views the elect as perfectly righteous because of Christ’s active and passive obedience. Simultaneously, God also effects the “Renovation of their Natures” by the sanctifying work of his Spirit; however, justification is always antecedent (at least in terms of order) to this transforming work.¹⁰

The application of imputation in justification is twofold: first, our sin is imputed to Christ, freeing us from the guilt of sin; and second, Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us, enabling us to be “accepted as righteous” before God. Yet, we must acknowledge, elaborates Owen, that there “is a great difference between the Imputation of the Righteousness of Christ unto us, and the Imputation of our sins unto Christ; so as that he cannot in the same manner be said to be made a sinner by the one, and we are made Righteous by the other. For our sin was imputed unto Christ only, as he was our Surety for a time, to this end, that he might take it away, destroy it and abolish it.”¹¹

While it is beyond the scope of this brief addendum to adequately explore his understanding of union with Christ, Owen develops that concept within a covenantal framework in his discussions on justification.¹² He juxtaposes the “Covenant of Works” with the “Covenant of Grace.” The old covenant of works entailed that, “upon our

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¹⁰Owen, Justification, 174.

¹¹Ibid., 48; 78-79; 174; 246; 285. He acknowledges that there are differences of opinions among Protestants on the nature of justification, but he suggests that most of those differences are little more than quibbles. He argues that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is “usually distinguished” within the Church of England and is affirmed by “the Articles of Religion, and “Books of Homilies, and other Writings publickly authorized.” Ibid., 79; 229.

personal obedience, according unto the Law and Rule of it, we should be accepted with God, and rewarded with him.” There was “no Mediator,” and “nothing but perfect sinless obedience would be accepted with God.” In contrast, the new covenant is truly a “new, real, absolute Covenant, and not a Reformation of the Dispensation of the old.” Therefore, the new covenant differs in “Essence, Substance, and Nature” with the old. It is characterized by grace and by the necessary involvement of a mediator. Unlike the old, this new covenant is not a covenant of perfect obedience. It is granted to us as a gift of God’s grace alone.

Ultimately, we receive this free gift of justification by faith alone. Owen grants that the word “faith” carries several different connotations, and he concludes that “every Faith, whereby men are said to believe, is not justifying.” Justifying faith, however, bears little semblance to other forms of faith and is the only means “whereby we are justified.” This instrumental sense must be understood from within the context that we are justified as a sovereign act of God alone; hence, by “instrument” we do not mean that our faith is meritorious or that our faith predisposes us for some form of righteousness. It is merely ordained by God as the means by which we receive justification. Owen grants that there is a sense in which one might speak of this faith as a “Condition of our Justification,” and he is unwilling to argue about semantics as long as there is agreement in what this means; that is, faith is “the Duty on our part which God requireth, [so] that we may be justified.”

13 Owen, Justification, 396-99.

14 There is, for example, a kind of “faith” that believes but does no more (e.g., Simon Magus in Acts 8) that is often called “Historical Faith.” Further, if persons “profess they believe the Gospel, and yet live in all manner of sins,” they have a “dead Faith.” Faith is also attributed to an impact on the “Affections,” but there is no lasting change. This is called a “temporary Faith.” Ibid., 93-95. For discussion on the instrumentality of faith, see ibid. 101-02; 147; 150-51.
We must reject, however, any claim that anything other than faith is a condition of our justification. We are justified *sola fide*.

Nonetheless, while we “are justified by Faith *alone*,” Scripture teaches that “we are not justified by that Faith which *can be* alone.” God requires believers to demonstrate “a sincere Obedience” made possible by “the Aids of Grace supplied unto them by Jesus Christ.” Yet, while these works of repentance necessarily accompany justification, one cannot describe them as “Conditions of Justification.” Similarly, works of repentance are not “formal dispositions” by which a person is prepared for justification. One might legitimately affirm faith and works of repentance as *causae sine quibus non*, but even that expression must be qualified in terms of instrumentality alone.

John Owen insists that we must interpret the Apostle James on justification through the interpretive grid of Paul’s teaching. James, he insists, did not write to clarify or explain Paul; instead, James wrote to correct misunderstandings of the biblical doctrine of justification. Hence, in spite of an apparent contradiction between the apostles, no actual contradiction exists. Owen argues that James and Paul have totally different purposes, and they have different definitions of faith and of justification in

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15Owen, *Justification*, 92; 154; 419.

16Ibid., 95; 103-04; 157; 214. “Justifying Faith includeth in its nature the entire principle of *Evangelical Repentance.*” Ibid. 300. Nonetheless, one must not speak of repentance as a condition of justification, as if our justification is in some way influenced by our repentance. Similarly, we cannot suggest “the *Necessity of our Sanctification, or Regeneration, or Renovation* by the Holy Ghost, *antecedently* unto our Justification.” To the contrary, justification has “priority in order of nature,” but all of these graces are inseparable from that justification. He acknowledges that there is a limited sense in which we have inherent righteousness, but that righteousness follows justification. Much like Hooker and Davenant, he differentiates between habitual and actual righteousness, but insists that neither are a part of justifying righteousness. Ibid., 183-84; 326.
mind. He insists, however, that they hold to the same definition of works as “Works of Obedience unto the moral Law.”\textsuperscript{17} We cannot evade the force of the text by limiting Paul’s prohibition to the ritual or ceremonial Law.

Owen claims that he maintains “no other Doctrine herein, but what is the common Faith of the most Learned men in all Protestant Churches.”\textsuperscript{18} This may be a bit of hyperbole: his position encapsulates the essence of later Reformed thought on justification, but this project has demonstrated that this position was anything but normative during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the English church. That becomes particularly evident when Owen’s views are contrasted with those of Richard Baxter.

Richard Baxter (1615-91) was a contemporary of John Owen whose ministry flourished after he became the curate at Kidderminster on the eve of the Civil War. Although he supported the Parliamentary Army, Baxter remained loyal to many of the theological and liturgical ideals of the English church. Ultimately, however, he was ejected from his living by the Act of Uniformity in 1662, and he remained outside of the established church for the remainder of his life. He became one of the more prolific Puritan writers, but he wrote less as a controversialist than as a pastor concerned for the welfare of his parishioners. In particular, like Bishop Bull, Baxter believed that errant views on justification necessarily led to antinomianism; therefore, in his convictions on justification, he was unyielding in his rejection of any interpretation that might support

\textsuperscript{17}Owen, \textit{Justification}, 558-62.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 51.
antinomian arguments.\textsuperscript{19}

In his \textit{Aphorismes}, Baxter sought to distill the salient tenets of the doctrine of justification,\textsuperscript{20} but his views garnered immediate opposition by divines like Tully who believed that Baxter and George Bull were cut from the same bolt of cloth.\textsuperscript{21} Beougher notes that although Baxter eventually retracted the \textit{Aphrismes}, he “later claimed that he felt ‘the main doctrine of it sound.’” Baxter continued to write on humanity’s justification before God, tirelessly seeking to clarify his teaching and to refute error.\textsuperscript{22}

Baxter grounds his soteriology in his anthropology, arguing that the chief consequence of the fall is that we have been deprived of original righteousness. In the process, we “cast away” the image of God and became incapable of fulfilling the Law.\textsuperscript{23}

Therefore, we are unrighteous, and without the mediation of Jesus Christ, we have no hope of salvation. By his faithful obedience, however, Christ made satisfaction for our


\textsuperscript{22} Beougher, \textit{Richard Baxter}, 60. For his retraction, see Richard Baxter, \textit{A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness} (London: Printed for Nevil Simons and Jonathan Robinson, 1676), 22; 172. Packer notes that Baxter “wrote more on this \textit{locus} than on any other. It was here that his orthodoxy was most suspect among his fellow-Puritans, and it was here that he supposed himself to be making his most valuable contribution to theology.” Packer, \textit{Redemption}, 241.

\textsuperscript{23} Baxter, \textit{Aphorismes}, 75. See also Richard Baxter, \textit{Two Disputations of Original Sin} (London: Printed for Robert Gibbs, 1675), 67. Packer argues that the “key to his (Baxter’s) thought about redemption was his doctrine of man.” Packer, \textit{Redemption}, 401.
sins and made union with Christ possible. Therefore, “whosoever will accept of him, and believe in him, who hath thus satisfied, it shall be as effectual for their Justification, as if they had fulfilled the Law of Works themselves.” That is, by the forgiveness of our sins, Christ restores our original righteousness before God upon the condition of our faith.

Baxter frames his discussion of humanity’s justification in forensic terms. In justification God acquits “us from the charge of breaking the Law.” Yet, there is a twofold sense to this process. The first justification is received immediately upon belief in a formal sense (i.e., “in Title and the Sense of the Law”). Yet, second or final justification is not received until the last judgment. Because of Christ’s satisfaction on our behalf, it is possible for us to speak of being justified in this life; yet, we ultimately are not fully justified until we stand before God “at his publique Bar” during the judgment. Thus, for Baxter justification is principally a declarative act, but it also is a process which remains incomplete until the judgment.

In keeping with Protestant ideals, Baxter teaches that nothing we do can merit our justification. Instead, Jesus Christ alone merited our justification before God. He suffered the penalty of death imposed by the Law and bore our infirmities for us. However, Baxter rejects a view of the atonement which suggests that Jesus made a direct exchange or payment for sin. If this were the case, he insists, God (as the creditor) would

24Baxter, Aphorismes, 126-27. Boersma argues that Baxter “inclines to the view that justification does not extend beyond remission of sin, since justification only restores us to the same condition that we would have been in if Adam had persevered in the state of integrity.” Boersma, Peppercorn, 91-2.

25Baxter, Aphorismes, 135; 183-88; 233.

26Even if we perfectly fulfill the conditions of the covenant, our obedience is not meritorious. Baxter, Aphorismes, 137.
be placed under obligation to the debtor and would be unable to refuse payment. The debt must be discharged. Instead, Baxter argues that Christ made satisfaction for our sins. That is, God (as the creditor) is willing to accept something other than an exact payment for the debt. Consequently, God is not placed under obligation to accept that which is offered to satisfy the debt. Since the payment was not identical to the penalty imposed, Baxter concludes that Christ did not offer a payment in the strict sense, but he made satisfaction for sin, a payment God willingly accepted.  

As he describes the nature of justification, Baxter rejects teachings on the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness posited by many Reformed divines. He argues that errors such as “Antinomianism, Libertinism, and Ungodliness” are the logical consequence of this teaching. He concedes that all adherents of this view do not hold such extreme positions but insists that this is only because they “see not the nature and consequences of their own opinions.” Consequently, Baxter rejects claims that one must affirm the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness as a fundamental doctrine of

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27 Baxter, *Aphorismes*, 19-35. When he explores the ramifications of this question, Baxter asks whether we are justified by Christ’s “Passive Righteousnesse, or also by his Active.” He clarifies that Christ’s passive righteousness includes not only his suffering on the cross but “the whole course of his humiliation from the assumption of the humane nature to his Resurrection.” His active righteousness is derived from “his Actions, as they were a perfect obedience to the Law.” Baxter identifies the majority view among divines to be that, in God’s eyes, by virtue of our status in Christ, we “were in Christ obeying and suffering, and so in him wee did both perfectly fulfill the Commands of the Law of Obedience.” Thus, he believes that most divines affirm that Christ’s passive righteousness has been imputed to us to free us from the penalty of sin and his active righteousness made it possible for us to inherit the kingdom. Baxter insists that this view is problematic for a host of reasons, and he concludes (following Grotius and Bradshaw) that we must follow a middle way. He concurs (though he grants that he had not always held this position) that we are justified by both Christ’s active and passive righteousness, but in satisfaction of our sin, not in an exact payment for those sins. Ibid., 44-56.

28 Baxter, *Treatise*, 91. He follows this assertion with forty-two additional arguments against the legitimacy of later Reformed thinking on this matter. Ibid., 91-103.
faith. Nonetheless, if defined appropriately, Baxter endorses the doctrine of biblical doctrine of imputation. Rather than Christ’s righteousness, however, Baxter argues that God imputes or “reputes” our faith as righteousness. Thus, God justifies us by an act of grace, but he requires faith as a condition of his covenant with humanity. While our faith will never be blameless, God chooses to accept our imperfect faith as righteousness.

Baxter illustrates this claim with an example of a tenant who is unable to pay his rent. The landlord, in an act of grace, pays the tenant’s accrued debt and then writes another lease in which the rent is reduced to nothing more than a “pepper corn” per annum. This “pepper corn” can be said to have been “imputed to the Tenant” as acceptable, even though it obviously has no significant value. Similarly, our faith is imputed as righteousness, even though it has no inherent value or efficacy.

Baxter frames his discussion of justification in covenantal terms. A “meere Covenant,” argues Baxter, may exist only between equals because it must be consensual. Hence, when we speak of God initiating a covenant with humanity, we must grant that it

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30 Ibid., 18-19. He asserts that he shares a view similar to that of Davenant who was more moderate in his language.

31 Ibid., 28-29. In contrast with this view, McGrath argues that John Owen “taught that the formal cause of justification was the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.” Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 2005), 287. However, Baxter rejects this view. Instead, he defines the formal cause of justification as “the acquitting of the sinner from the Accusation and Condemnation of the Law, or the disabling the Law to accuse or condemn him.” Owen and Baxter would agree that the meritorious cause is Christ’s satisfaction for sin, but the two divines differ in emphasis in their understanding of the causae sine quibus non justificationis. Owen identified the causae as faith and repentance. Baxter elaborates that the causae also include Christ’s satisfaction. Nonetheless, he does not wish to draw the lines on the different forms of causality too closely because he believes that it “is a vaine thing to quarrell about the Logickal names of the Causes of Justification.” Baxter, *Aphorismes*, 213; 219.

is unique: when the sovereign Lord makes a covenant with humanity, he does so without our consent. Nonetheless, God’s covenant is conditional: unless we fulfill the requirements of the covenant, God will not grant us the promised reward. God’s initial covenant with Adam (and the renewal of that covenant with Moses) was a covenant of “perfect obedience” that threatened “death upon the least disobedience.” However, Adam’s sin made it impossible for us to fulfill the conditions of that first covenant; therefore, God initiated a second covenant, a covenant of grace that was not a covenant of perfect obedience.  

The new covenant, however, did not “absolutely annul or repeal the old.” To the contrary, God “super-addeth” the new covenant as “the only possible way of Life. The former still continueth to command, prohibite, promise, and threaten. So that the sins even of the justified are still breaches of that Law, and are threatened and cursed thereby.” The “new Covenant threateneth not Death to any sin but final unbelief, or, at least, to no sin without final unbelief.” Our “deliverance is conditionally from the curse of the Law; viz. if we will obey the Gospel.” That is, because Christ “made sufficient satisfaction to the Law, Whosoever Will repent and believe in him to the end, shall be justified through the Satisfactiō from all the Law did charge upon them…. But whosoever fulfilme not these conditions, shall have no more benefit from the blood of Christ” and actually incur a “far greater condemnation.”

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33 Baxter, Aphorismes, 13-15; 74.

34 Ibid., 78-79. He grants that “this Assertion is disputable and difficult,” but he believes that it most faithfully captures the teachings of Scripture.

35 Ibid., 85; 87.

36 Ibid., 89-90. Baxter rejects the antinomian argument by those like Saltmarsh who insist that
of the Gospel by his grace, and Baxter maintains that our obedience to the “new law” implemented by Christ and our performance of the conditions of the covenant, actually become “our Righteousness, in reference to the Law and Covenant.”

Baxter defines justifying faith as “the hearty accepting of Christ for our only Lord and Saviour.” He views this faith, therefore, as trust rather than a mere intellectual affirmation of dogma, and he also specifically rejects an instrumental view of faith in favor of his confidence that faith is a condition of the covenant, an act of obedience. Further, the “bare Act of believing is not the onely Condition of the New Covenant: but severall other duties also are parts of that Condition.” Therefore, he amplifies his understanding of justifying faith to include repentance, love, and “sincere Obedience.” Nonetheless, he insists that we can still speak of justification by faith alone because faith presupposes the presence of these other virtues. This must be true, claims Baxter, because it is “beyond all dispute, that our Actual, most proper, compleat Justification, at the great Judgment, will be according to our Works, and to what we have done in flesh, whether Good or Evil: which can be no otherwise then as it was the Condition of that

there are no conditions to the New Covenant.

37 Baxter, Aphorismes, 115; 141.
38 Ibid., 96.
39 Ibid., 261. He differentiates this justifying faith from a mere intellectual affirmation of belief. Beougher argues that Baxter’s view of justifying faith is best summarized as “fiducia” which unites “both the understanding and the will.” Beougher, Richard Baxter, 62.
40 Baxter, Aphorismes, 219. In part, he rejects any notion of instrumentality because God is the principal actor in our justification, and the concept of instrumentality implies that the instrument has an effect on producing the effect. Since our faith does not influence God in his actions, we cannot hold that it has any instrumental force.
In response to critics who affirm that the Apostles James and Paul hold conflicting positions, Baxter argues that James holds the same view of justification as Paul (i.e., *justificatio in foro Dei*). Yet, in contrast with Owen, Baxter maintains that the “plain expression of Saint James should terrifie us from an interpretation contradictory to the Text; and except apparent violence be used with his Chap. 2.21.24, 25, &c. it cannot be doubted, but that a man is justified by Works, and not by Faith only.” The apostles are not contradictory; both “professedly exclude the Works of the Law only from Justification.”

Baxter’s thought is difficult to categorize. Packer argues that Baxter’s “general attitude and standpoint was typical of the little group of Puritan Churchmen headed by Usher, of which Davenant, Hall and Gataker were the most notable members.” Yet the parallels with Bishop Bull’s thought are striking. Most significantly for the purposes of this examination, however, Baxter’s doctrine of justification stands in stark contrast with Owen’s teachings. Both divines affirm that justification is a gift of God’s grace made possible only by Christ’s active and passive obedience: nothing we do can ever merit this gracious gift. In addition, both of these divines can be placed within the broad theological

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41 Baxter, *Aphorismes*, 235-38; 317-18. It is beyond the scope of this brief summary to clarify Baxter’s distinction between “Evangelical” and “Legal” righteousness. However, it will suffice here to note that Baxter argues that “Faith is our Evangelical Righteousness . . . as Christ is our Legal Righteousness.” That is, “Those only shall have part in Christ’s satisfaction and so in him be legally righteous, who do believe, and obey the Gospel, and so are in themselves Evangelically Righteous.” Baxter, *Aphorismes*, 107-08; 125. Therefore, Baxter concludes that our “Evangelical Righteousness is not without us in Christ, as our legal Righteousness is: but consisteth in our own actions of Faith and Gospel Obedience.” Ibid., 108. To suggest that faith and Christian obedience are conditions of the New Covenant is to say that they are conditions of justification. Ibid., 310; 313.

42 Ibid., 135; 292-93.

43 Packer, *Redemption*, 400.
legacy of the Church of England. Yet, John Owen and Richard Baxter would not share a common trajectory of thought within that tradition. Therefore, this admittedly brief overview suggests that the inclusion of the thought of these divines within the primary analysis of this project would have confirmed the conclusions of this project rather than potentially undermining those conclusions.
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ABSTRACT

BISHOP GEORGE BULL’S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

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George Bull was a key figure in the vanguard of the High Church party who was a staunch defender of trinitarian orthodoxy within the Restoration Church of England; yet, the doctrine of justification described in his earliest scholarly works has met with substantial criticism. Scholars continue to question the orthodoxy of Bishop Bull’s views on justification and to condemn the moralism that allegedly pervades his theology.

Bull argued for a forensic understanding of justification from within a covenantal context. His description of the relationship between faith and works restored earlier Augustinian emphases within the Church of England. In the process, he sought to purge the church of error by rejecting excesses intrinsic to both the Roman Catholic and Reformed traditions. His insistence that justification can never be considered *sola fide sine operibus*, his undisguised anti-Calvinism, and his unrelenting repudiation of the imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness in justification made him a lightning rod for controversy, but this project contends that Bishop Bull’s rejection of justification by faith is one of nuance and emphasis when examined within the context of the English Reformation.
Chapter 1 provides a brief biographical sketch of Bishop Bull’s life and ministry and outlines the methodology of the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides an exegesis and analysis of Bull’s earliest scholarly publications. Chapter 3 sheds light on the content and character of the theological debates that shaped Anglican views on justification antecedent to the Restoration era. In addition to the formularies of the Church of England, this chapter contrasts Bull’s thought with the teachings of a representative group of sixteenth-century English divines including Thomas Cranmer, William Tyndale, Robert Barnes, Hugh Latimer, John Hooper, and John Jewel.

Chapter 4 examines Bull’s teachings in contrast with those of a representative group of seventeenth-century divines who remained within the established Church of England. That group includes Richard Hooker, John Davenant, William Forbes, William Hammond, and Jeremy Taylor. Chapter 5 concludes the study and evaluates the strength of allegations that Bull was a theological innovator whose doctrine of justification deviated from the teachings of earlier English Protestants.
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