INTERTEXTUALITY AND ALLUSION IN THE
STUDY OF THE HEBREW BIBLE

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APPROVAL SHEET

INTERTEXTUALITY AND ALLUSION IN THE
STUDY OF THE HEBREW BIBLE

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<tr>
<td>BZAW</td>
<td>Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentlich Wissensschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBQMS</td>
<td>The Catholic Bible Quarterly Monograph Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAT</td>
<td>Forschungen zum Alten Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAT 2. Reihe</td>
<td>Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2. Reihe</td>
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<td>JAJSup</td>
<td>Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplements</td>
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<td>JSJSup</td>
<td>Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism</td>
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<td>JSNTSup</td>
<td>Supplements to the Journal for the Study of the New Testament</td>
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<td>JSOTSup</td>
<td>Supplements to the Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHBOTS</td>
<td>Library of the Hebrew Bible Old Testament Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSTS</td>
<td>Library of Second Temple Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBLDS</td>
<td>Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBLSymS</td>
<td>Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series</td>
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<tr>
<td>STDJ</td>
<td>Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah</td>
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<td>VTSup</td>
<td>Supplements to Vetus Testamentum</td>
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PREFACE

In his review of Michael Fishbane’s *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, James Kugel describes the many competencies required of anyone who aims to define the field of inner-biblical interpretation. I remember the first time I read Kugel's description, knowing I desired to contribute to this field. Immediately I was overcome with an intense feeling of inadequacy. I am not the person Kugel describes, nor can I hope to have an impact in the field of biblical studies as profound as that of Fishbane. I can hope only that my limited training and aptitude are capable of nudging the field in a slightly more productive direction.

I am grateful for those who have nudged me to be a slightly more productive thinker and scholar. Kevin Youngblood was the first person who taught me about critical biblical scholarship, and I have continued to encounter friends and mentors—not the least of whom being Charles Halton and Timothy Michael Law—who have influenced and encouraged me along the way. Everyone who pursues a PhD is deeply indebted to the librarians who facilitate their research. I was employed at the SBTS library during my program and had the privilege of working for Bruce Keisling and alongside Christi Osterday. Their dedication to their jobs enabled me and many of my peers to have an incredible library experience. I also formed a
special bond with Marsha Omanson who, among her other roles, works as the style consultant at SBTS. While all PhD students can appreciate her role in helping them improve their dissertation, I came to appreciate her friendship and have enjoyed our cordial (but no less serious) grammar debates. I have also benefited from the feedback, criticism, and encouragement of numerous scholars, a few of whom I have not yet had the privilege to meet in person, who have been gracious to interact with me through a most unconventional medium of scholarly dialogue—Facebook. Finally, my wife has been a much-needed support and companion throughout my degree, and I am excited that she now gets to pursue an incredible opportunity working on her own PhD. I dedicate this work to her.

Joseph Ryan Kelly

Louisville, Kentucky

December 2014
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

What happens when such a radically iconoclastic term [“intertextuality”] enters the biblical-scholarly lexicon, as it began to do in the 1980s? The unraveling of biblical scholarship as we know it, fixated as it is on sources, influences, and ‘the myth of filiation’? Not in the least. What happens for the most part is business as usual, the ongoing preoccupation with Pentateuchal source-paternity, inter-Isaianic textual intercourse, Synoptic ménages à trois, and all the other intensely intersubjective authorial exchanges that elicit quiet excitement in the average biblical scholar.¹

With their less-than-subtle satirical critique of mainstream biblical scholarship, Stephen Moore and Yvonne Sherwood cleverly capture a critical fault in an otherwise critically obsessed discipline. Intertextuality, a subversive term in literary theory, reconceives how meaning is produced. Biblical scholars, however, have come to use it to signify mere literary influence.² Moore and Sherwood draw attention to the fact that critical theory, of which intertextuality is a part, functions in biblical studies as a “garnish, a soupçon of Zeitgeist spice, on modes of critical practice that remain fundamentally unaffected by it.”³ In so doing, they echo the


³Moore and Sherwood, Invention, 11.
criticisms of many before them who have attempted, however unsuccessfully, to establish a new kind of critical practice in biblical studies.

The year 1989 saw the publication of the first book devoted to intertextuality in biblical studies. Among the contributors in this volume, Ellen van Wolde first exposed the chic application of a potentially innovative mode of study, a “trendy intertextuality.” Bible scholars who had been interested in “the comparative study of texts”—an outmoded subject at the time—were generating renewed interest in the subject by adorning it with the garb of intertextuality. According to van Wolde, this amounted to nothing more than an embellishment, “a modern literary theoretical coat of veneer over the old comparative approach.” The use of the term ‘intertextuality’ was problematic, not for any shortcoming in the theory behind it, but in the glib way biblical scholars were appropriating the term. It was against those who use the term as one uses an ornament to adorn an otherwise modest tree that van Wolde directed her essay: “Intertextuality does not contribute much to bible exegesis when it uses literary theory merely to supply labels. It becomes significant only when it causes a change in our understanding of texts.” The first and most fundamental test of any intertextual study emerged from von Wolde’s early insights:

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6 van Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?,” 43.

7 van Wolde, “Trendy Intertextuality?,” 43.
Intertextuality, if it has anything to contribute to biblical studies, should change our understanding of the biblical text.

Hans-Peter Mai would raise a critique similar to that of von Wolde two years later in another book to be published on intertextuality and biblical studies.\(^8\) Mai writes, “At its least presumptuous, the word ‘intertextuality’ merely indicates that one text refers to or is present in another one. Such a linguistic short cut is convenient but tends to become predominantly ornamental – and hence is not particularly conducive to a better understanding.”\(^9\) The conflict between “divergent interpretive interests,” interests that are theoretically irreconcilable, appears more crystallized in Mai’s presentation of the debate taking place among biblical scholars and among literary critics alike. With this conflict in view, Mai proposes a kind litmus test for appraising the usefulness of intertextuality as a concept in academic discourse. He recommends focusing on the results of intertextual studies and the means by which scholars arrive at them. In applying this to one study in particular Mai writes, “but except for his general theoretical prelude on intertextuality, . . . the author could have dispensed with the term altogether.”\(^10\) From this a more concrete criteria emerges for evaluating the usefulness of the concept of intertextuality for

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\(^10\) Mai, “Bypassing Intertextuality,” 45.
biblical studies. Where scholars can establish their theses without reference to the concept of intertextuality—either by means of other concepts or through more traditional terminology—the presence of intertextuality is a (strictly authorial) convenience that does not change our understanding of the biblical text.

Despite these concerns expressed soon after the introduction of intertextuality in biblical studies, the word has come to dominate the field of biblical studies for those interested in literary allusions. Occasionally a scholar issues a clarion call for biblical studies to adopt alternative verbal habits, but the ornamental use of intertextuality continues unabated. In the hopes of nudging biblical studies beyond this impasse, I examine in this work numerous theoretical issues surrounding the term ‘intertextuality’ and assess the actual uses to which it is put. In chapter 2, I discuss theoretical concepts of ‘text’ in biblical studies, both as a prelude to the debates surrounding the use of the term ‘intertextuality’ in literary and biblical studies and as a topic relevant to the discussion of methodology in chapter 5. In chapter 3, I establish a basis upon which to evaluate and critique the use of the term ‘intertextuality’ in biblical studies. I discuss the nature of linguistic signs, the early history of intertextuality, and the many ways in which scholars appropriate the term

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in biblical studies. In chapter 4, I evaluate the three most prominent alternative terms and categories to intertextuality, namely inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, echoes, and allusion. Critiques of the two former categories lead me to recommend the language and theory of allusion as the most viable alternative to intertextuality according to its dominant use in biblical studies. In chapter 5, I discuss the question of methodology and the often paramount role of shared language for identifying literary allusion in the Hebrew Bible.
CHAPTER 2

IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS DISCIPLINE?

Introduction

On the first day of the new semester a colleague at Johns Hopkins University was approached by a student. . . . She put to him a question: “Is there a text in this class?” Responding with a confidence so perfect that he was unaware of it . . . my colleague said, “Yes; it’s the Norton Anthology of Literature,” whereupon the trap (set not by the student but by the infinite capacity of language for being appropriated) was sprung: “No, no,” she said, “I mean in this class do we believe in poems and things, or it is just us?”

Without a clear understanding of the various concepts of ‘text’ it is a bold enterprise to talk about intertextuality.

What is a text? The answer to such a question may at first seem too obvious for scholarly reflection. In biblical studies, texts permeate our discipline. We immerse ourselves in book, chapter, and verse. We pore over tablet, column, and line number. We compile, we translate, we commentate, we dissertate. These scholarly endeavors are made possible by our familiarity and engagement with texts, the objects of our research. It is this significance of the term ‘text’ that first resonated with the Johns Hopkins professor when his student asked, “Is there a text in this

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1Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 305.

class.” Without hesitation, the professor names a textbook that will serve as the object of study in the course. His response indicates one interpretation of text as it belongs to the lexicon of everyday language. In this respect, a text is equivalent to writing. What the professor did not anticipate was that this student had already participated in a class in which this ordinary language was subjected to an apparently unsettling academic appropriation. At that particular moment the student was unconcerned with identifying the assigned literature for the course. More significant were the theoretical beliefs of this professor. “Do we believe in poems and things, or it is just us?” Her follow up question betrays an altogether different significance of the term ‘text.’

This story illustrates there are different ways to answer the question, “What is a text?” It draws attention to the fact that the meanings of words are not fixed, and this raises a question of significance for biblical studies, “Is there a text in this discipline?” As Hans-Peter Mai observes, the concept of text is—or rather should be—fundamental to the discussions and debates surrounding intertextuality.³ By asking if there is a text in the discipline of biblical studies, we are investigating the nature of the language we use and the meanings the use of such language evokes. This discussion will serve as an instructive prelude to the debates surrounding the use of the term ‘intertextuality’ in literary and biblical studies. The different ways our discipline understands textuality can inform, if only in part, why

³Mai identifies no fewer than five conceptions of the word “text.” Mai, “Bypassing Intertextuality,” 36.
there is so much disagreement surrounding intertextuality. This discussion of textuality will further become relevant to this project as the focus of the discussion shifts from an abstract nominalization to concrete theories and critical methodologies for understanding literary allusion in biblical literature.

**Text as Everyday Academic Language**

The first thing to observe about the word ‘text’ is that it belongs to the lexicon of everyday language. Unlike intertextuality, the word ‘text’ was not born within the wards of academia. Consequently, its adoption by the academic guild produces a peculiar semantic category, what Konrad Ehlich refers to as “everyday academic language” (alltäglicher Wissenschaftssprache). These are commonplace words subsequently employed for academic application. The mundane quality of these words enables scholarly complacency. There is no need—or so it may seem—to define a term whose occurrence is ubiquitous and whose meaning obvious. But everyday language achieves this prevalence by being semantically fluid. Like water that takes the shape of its container, everyday language conforms to its verbal context. Everyday language lacks the denotative quality that characterizes academic

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language. Consequently, everyday academic language must exist in-between. Academic vocabulary needs to possess semantic precision, but everyday academic language must convey this extraordinary significance despite being ordinary.

As a consequence of it being everyday academic language, we struggle with the term ‘text’ existing in between. Common usage creates verbal habits difficult to overcome, and sophisticated applications are not always forthcoming. As cataloged by the Oxford English Dictionary, the common use of the term ‘text’ signifies “the wording of anything written or printed; the structure formed by the words in their order; the very words, phrases, and sentences as written.” In general, everyday speech allows for anything written or printed (in the traditional sense) to be a text. However, where wording and word order are of particular significance, a secondary definition emphasizes originality: “The very words and sentences as originally written.” Wording—word order—originality. One or more of these concepts characterize a more specialized albeit common use of text. In light of this specialized sense, a text in the general sense often requires qualification. Examples from the Oxford English Dictionary—“good text,” “bad text,” “corrupt text,” “critical text,” “received text”—demonstrate this qualification implies the primacy and/or relative

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8The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “text, n.”
superiority of the original text. Much work in biblical studies adopts this conception with little concern for the theoretical questions such notions raise in other disciplines. Biblical studies is just beginning to explore theoretical dimensions of the concept of text. By further attending to these theoretical dimensions as they are developing in biblical studies, it is possible to distinguish between different notions of text that operate within different conceptions of intertextuality.

The Text in Lower Criticism

According to a traditional division of the discipline, biblical studies consists of two critical modes—lower and higher criticism. The inadequacies of this bifurcation increasingly impress themselves on contemporary scholarship. Nevertheless, the discipline remains indebted to this construct insofar as the text is concerned. This is because scholarship tends to regard lower criticism, otherwise

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known as textual criticism, as the critical study of the text as a particular arrangement of words. Once the boundaries of the text are defined by textual criticism—these-words-and-in-this-order—only then can one critically engage the text as history, literature, etc. John Barton’s influential textbook for biblical interpretation, *Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Studies*, lacks a discussion of textual criticism. This absence implies that textual criticism operates as a precursor to the act of reading or interpreting, not as a component of it. However, as biblical studies continues to evolve, new possibilities emerge and trends begin to develop. Below I survey a classic expression of the discipline of textual criticism along with more recent developments in the field. In one case, these developments attempt to preserve the common significance of the word ‘text’ that implies the primacy and/or relative superiority of the original text. In other cases, the developments in textual criticism require the reconsideration of the very idea of the concept of text.

**The Original Text as Autograph**

In his pragmatically titled book, *Textual Criticism*, Paul Maas describes the

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12Emanuel Tov defines the “textual praxis” as both “the analysis of the textual data” and “their use in biblical exegesis.” Thus, Tov places the study of the Bible as literature (i.e., biblical exegesis) under the umbrella word “textual.” But as for “textual criticism proper,” this is restricted to “collecting Hebrew readings and reconstructing them from the ancient versions” and “evaluation of these readings.” Emanuel Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 265.

aim of the discipline: “The business of textual criticism is to produce a text as close as possible to the original (constitutio textus).”\(^\text{14}\) Maas is giving expression to the Urtext theory often attributed to Paul de Lagarde.\(^\text{15}\) Maas identifies the “original” as the document produced by the hand of the author—the autograph.\(^\text{16}\) While he refers to the documents that descend from the original as texts (in the general sense outlined above) he does so infrequently. These non-original texts he refers to primarily as “witnesses.” Doing so implies their relative inferiority to the original or quintessential text. The job of textual critics, according to Maas, proceeds in two steps. They must first use the available witnesses to construct a recension (“recensio”). Second, they examine this recension to determine whether and to what degree it replicates the original (“examinatio”). Without conceding the ultimate significance of the original, Maas recognizes a methodological shortcoming. The surviving witnesses of classical literature descend from an intermediate text, one several textual generations removed from the original. Any recension is, therefore, an archetype, the form of the text that is “free from all errors arising [thereafter] and closer to the original than the text of any of the witnesses.”\(^\text{17}\) In examining the archetype, textual critics determine if the tradition appears corrupt and, in such


\(^{16}\)Maas further states, “A dictation revised by the author must be regarded as equivalent to an autograph manuscript.” Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 1.

\(^{17}\)Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 2.
cases, resort to conjecture (*divinatio*).\(^{18}\)

An oft-cited standard in the field, Maas’s work represents a stemmatic approach to textual criticism. In his own words, “The diagram which exhibits the inter-relationship of the witnesses is called the *stemma*. The image is taken from genealogy; the witnesses are related to the original somewhat as the descendants of a person are related to their ancestor.”\(^{19}\) Stemmatics operates on certain assumptions about the origin and transmission of texts. The textual stemma presumes a single original from whom all witnesses descend. Maas momentarily entertains the possibility there could have been “two versions of the original.”\(^{20}\) He does not expound on this idea. It is likely he believes that the scribe who transmits this pluriform original will collapse the tradition into a single form, thus “contaminating” it. It is clear he believes this will have occurred in the archetype.\(^{21}\) This reflects an additional assumption of the stemmatic approach. “In what follows it is assumed (1) that the copies made since the primary split in the tradition each reproduce one

\(^{18}\)Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 1, 11–19.

\(^{19}\)Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 20. Maas has misgivings about the genealogical simile. “But the essential point, the aim of reconstructing the original, is not brought out by this comparison.” He goes on to suggest the image of a river whose water takes on different shades of color as it divides, branches, and passes through various influxes. Gary Martin offers a helpful explanation for why a genealogical model of textual production and transmission is less than adequate, though Maas’s own misgivings remain unknown. Gary Martin, *Multiple Originals: New Approaches to Hebrew Bible Textual Criticism*, Text-Critical Studies 7 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 19–20.


\(^{21}\)“We must also consider the possibility that there were two versions of the original; admittedly the two versions would then have to have been already ‘contaminated’ in the archetype.” Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 18.
Maas concedes that, if this assumption “does not apply, that is, if individual scribes have ‘contaminated’ several exemplars, the process of eliminatio within the area of these ‘contaminations’ is greatly hindered, if not made impossible.”

Paul Maas’s stemmatic approach to textual criticism has served as a point of reference for text-critical scholars of classical literature for much of the twentieth century. Many of its characteristics are fundamental to various contemporary approaches to Hebrew Bible text-critical scholarship in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. At the same time, new discoveries compel scholars to develop and adapt these characteristics for an increasingly complex collection of witnesses. This complexity gives rise to multiple approaches to and interpretations of the data. Each approach offers a unique perspective on identifying the text in biblical studies.

**The Original Text as a Final Draft**

The preeminent voice advocating for the reconstruction of the original text as the proper goal of Hebrew Bible textual criticism belongs to Emanuel Tov. It is difficult to overstate his influence in the field, marked as it is by his role as Editor-in-Chief of the Dead Sea Scrolls Publication Project (1990-2009), his role as editor of

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22Maas, *Textual Criticism*, 3.


24For further discussion on Stemmatology and Hebrew Bible textual criticism, see Martin, *Multiple Originals*, 20–24.
the Hebrew University Bible Project, and his voluminous publications on the subject at hand. Those who have closely followed Tov’s prolific career identify an evolution within his own thinking on the matter of an original text.25 For the sake of simplicity, I focus exclusively on his presentation of the original text as advanced in the third edition of his now classic textbook, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible. This selection is appropriate because it is among his most recently published, widely accessible, and exhaustively developed works on the subject. In this book, Tov maintains that the proper goal of textual criticism is the reconstruction of the original text, though his model accommodates developments in biblical studies not yet perceived by Maas and his model.

From Maas to Tov, the pursuit for some kind of original form or original text prevails in the discipline. Tov writes, “Textual criticism deals with the nature and origin of all the witnesses of a composition or text. . . . This analysis often involves an attempt to discover the original form of details in a composition, or even of large stretches of text, although what exactly constitutes (an) ‘original text(s)’ is subject to much debate.”26 Beginning his book in this way, Tov underscores the significance of an original text for his understanding of text-critical work on the Hebrew Bible. At the same time, Tov is redefining the concept of an original text.


26Tov, Textual Criticism, 1.
Tov proposes two main models for conceiving the original text. Either one assumes “multiple pristine texts” or “an original text or a series of determinative (original) texts.” Tov recognizes these models arise from theoretical arguments and no easy resolution to this discussion is forthcoming. Of the two options, he prefers and expands upon the latter model. Though he retains the notion of an original text, Tov does not believe the biblical texts reflect the *ipsissima verba* of the biblical authors traditionally conceived. The word ‘original’ in Tov’s lexicon does not refer to a moment of origin but to a telos, the conclusion of the literary growth and development of a text. It is a final-draft. “We focus on the written text or edition (or a number of consecutive editions) that contained the finished literary product (or one of its earlier stages) that stood at the beginning of the textual transmission


28“In our view, the question of the original text of the biblical books cannot be resolved unequivocally, since there is no solid evidence to aid us in deciding in either direction. As a result, the textual praxis may never be described in a definitive way and each generation has to redefine the issues involved.” Tov, *Textual Criticism*, 162.

29There is a significant problem worth mentioning concerning Tov’s discussion and critique of “multiple pristine texts.” In describing the scholarly literature promoting this model, Tov cites relatively dated material (1951-88). He suggests that these scholars have “never formulated clearly the nature of these texts and their relation to the development stages of the biblical books.” Tov, *Textual Criticism*, 163. This judgment unfortunately neglects Gary Martin’s more recent contribution to the subject. This neglect is especially unfortunate when one considers that Martin sees Tov’s questions from an earlier edition of his textual criticism handbook as the impetus for his own study. “This book seeks to continue the discussion that Tov directs . . . by formulating alternative models to the assumption of a single original text.” Martin, *Multiple Originals*, 49. Though listed in the bibliography dedicated to this section—notably Tov’s singular reference to Martin’s work!—this book’s contribution to the theory and argument of the multiple originals model receives no substantive engagement by Tov. Because of these concerns, Tov’s rejection of a competing model appears dated and uncritically dismissive.
As the product of a process and not necessarily of an individual, Tov’s model of an original text accommodates extended periods of literary development spanning generations of scribes. Textual criticism becomes the method by which Tov reconstructs the final product of this period of literary growth, a product whose significance is underscored by the authority attributed to this textual form. “At the end of the composition process of a biblical book stood a text that was finished at a literary level and subsequently was considered authoritative. . . . The finished composition stood at the beginning of a process of copying and textual transmission, creating genetic variants in a linear way.” Tov admits there are complications associated with this proposal. Textual witnesses from Qumran and in the Old Greek suggest ongoing literary activity occurred throughout the Second Temple Period until the first century CE. Tov argues that “each of these [earlier] compositional stages was accepted as authoritative when it was produced, as recognized by their preservation in some textual sources.” Thus, Tov allows for the original text category to span a series of authoritative or determinative text forms. Regardless of whether this final text is singular or serial, it marks the conclusion of the stage of

30 Tov, *Textual Criticism*, 165.

31 Tov, *Textual Criticism*, 166; see also 283–85.


33 Tov, *Textual Criticism*, 167.
literary composition and achieves an authoritative status.

An original text requires a moment in history when a text achieves an authoritative status; consequently, scribal activity for that text transitions from literary growth to literary transmission.\textsuperscript{34} Tov distinguishes “authors-scribes” and “editors-scribes” from “copyists-scribes,” attributing the activity of literary growth to the former categories of scribe.\textsuperscript{35} At the same time, he attempts not to oversimplify this distinction by admitting that “copyists-scribes” felt a “freedom” to engage in many of the same activities—exegetical and linguistic-stylistic changes, insertions of synonymous readings, harmonizations, and textual additions—characteristic of author- and editor-scribes.\textsuperscript{36} Ambiguity surrounds this moment of transition from literary growth to literary transmission, even for Tov. “There is a large gray area between the activity of copyists-scribes analyzed in this chapter and that of authors and editors presented in ch. 7.”\textsuperscript{37} In chapter 7, he suggests the distinction between these two roles is “based on the assumption that copyists were not involved in large-scale content changes” and that these large-scale changes evident in the textual witnesses “were created at the final literary stage of the biblical books.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34}Observe Tov’s distinction between “literary activity” and “scribal activity.” Tov, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 167.

\textsuperscript{35}Tov, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 240.

\textsuperscript{36}Tov, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 240–62.

\textsuperscript{37}Tov, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 240.

\textsuperscript{38}Tov, \textit{Textual Criticism}, 283–84.
By describing literary growth as achieving its telos in each biblical book, Tov preserves the notion of an original text given an increasingly complex collection of textual witnesses. He perpetuates the understanding of text that privileges a particular text form. Despite his own confidence in his model, Tov admits that the question of the original text “cannot be resolved unequivocally,” concluding that “the textual praxis may never be described in a definitive way and [that] each generation has to redefine the issues involved.” Indeed, a new generation of biblical scholars are already redefining the issues involved and creating an alternative understanding of text.

The Text as Dynamic, Fluid, Pluriform

One can observe a distinct shift in the way in which a younger generation of scholars, many of whom specialize in the study the Dead Sea Scrolls, understand textual criticism of the Hebrew Bible and the concept of text. No longer interested in maintaining the notion of an original text or of a privileged text form of the Hebrew Bible, these scholars embrace the plurality of the textual witnesses as the object of textual criticism, an end to itself. This is already evident, however partially, in the philosophy of the forthcoming Hebrew Bible: A Critical Edition (formerly the Oxford Hebrew Bible) where the editors will occasionally preserve variant literary

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39 Tov, Textual Criticism, 162.

40 The redefinition of these categories is not restricted to the study of the Dead Sea Scrolls or to textual criticism proper. These issues have also become significant to those engaged in the study of reception history. Breed, Nomadic Text.
editions of a text in parallel columns.\textsuperscript{41} While “thinking beyond” the three main critical editions of the Hebrew Bible currently in progress, Eibert Tigchelaar suggests their purpose should not be “to print the best text, or to restore the earliest one, but to present the variety and complexity of the text as it has been transmitted.”\textsuperscript{42} Through their apparatuses or through the inclusion of variant literary editions, these editions represent this variety, albeit while often privileging one particular form of the text. Privileging one form may remain necessary for some scholarly endeavors. Corrado Martone writes about the need to establish, “if not the original text of the scriptures, at least the text to be translated.”\textsuperscript{43} This does not mean that a particular text form distinguishes itself for translation. Martone discourages the adoption of a single text form for all Bible translations, preferring instead to see greater diversity and more transparency about which text forms are being selected. Despite the need to privilege one or another text form for certain projects, no single text form possesses an inherent and essential superiority to other text forms.

When scholars abandon the quest for the original text, privileged forms


cede to pluriformity. When speaking of this pluriformity, the word ‘original’ is not excised from the scholarly lexicon. Bénédicte Lemmelijn writes,

> It seems possible to me—e.g. in the establishment of ‘preferable’ readings—to indicate, against the background of a thorough text-critical study of the textual evidence itself, that one variant is ‘more original’ than the other, without hereby defining which text or which phase in the textual growth or transmission is exactly reached.\(^{44}\)

Judgments about what is “more original” do not necessarily imply a text-critical preference for original readings.\(^{45}\) Mark Smith demonstrates this with Deuteronomy 32:8-9. What scholars can reasonably conclude to be the more original reading—“sons of God” (DSS 4QDeut\(^ 1\) and LXX 848, 106c) as opposed to “angels of God” (LXX most manuscripts) or “sons of Israel” (MT, SP, Targum, Peshitta, Vulgate)—does not determine what reading scholars ought to prefer. Each is a significant text form for understanding the text as it has been interpreted in its various settings.

> “Textual versions do sometimes enshrine different interpretations, and in these cases texts constitute both words and their interpretations.”\(^{46}\) Hindy Najman argues this

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\(^{44}\)Lemmelijn, “What Are We Looking for,” 77, emphasis original.

\(^{45}\)Tov argues that “those who claim that a certain reading is preferable to another one are actually presupposing an original text, since they claim that that reading better reflects the original composition from the point of view of the language, vocabulary, ideas, or meaning.” Emanuel Tov, *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 162–63; also 280. Perhaps Tov is correct insofar as the word “preferable” implies a value judgment for earlier texts, but Tov’s “original” text is not an origin point, and one can apply Lemmelijn’s “more original” logic to stages in the textual tradition that pre-date Tov’s final-original without presuming an earlier original text. For this reason, Tov’s argument does not hold.

\(^{46}\)Smith, “What Is a Scriptural Text,” 273, emphasis added. For the discussion of these text forms and their implied interpretations of the text, see pp. 279-85. Further justification for Smith’s judgments are born out by his discussion of the inner-biblical and DSS interpretations of this text, pp. 286-95.
prospective approach—studying the interpretive developments of biblical texts—does not preclude a more traditional retrospective approach interested in archetypal texts or families of text. But she emphasizes that being able to move backwards and forwards does require that “we stop thinking in terms of compositional processes that culminate in the production of fixed texts.”\textsuperscript{47} The text itself is not fixed, but certain text forms betray earlier or later varieties of the text. Together, Smith and Najman are pushing the concept of text beyond the common sense found in the Oxford English Dictionary that privileges a particular—typically original—text form toward a more pluriform reality.

The pluriformity of the biblical tradition in the late Second Temple period has impacted the way scholarship understands the relationship between lower and higher criticism, and thus the concept of a text.\textsuperscript{48} Variant literary editions conclusively demonstrate that scribes were active participants in the literary development of the textual tradition until 70 C.E. Evaluating the textual tradition in light of these variant literary editions requires textual critics to employ literary-critical skills more characteristically associated with the higher critic. Scholars who remain committed to an original text also recognize this impact, even if it does not

\textsuperscript{47}Najman, “Configuring the Text,” 7–8, emphasis original.

imply for them the end of privileging a particular text form.\textsuperscript{49} Arie van der Kooij considers the enlargement of the critical repertoire of the textual critic in the post-Qumran era as a “promotion,” with the textual critic now a participant in higher criticism.\textsuperscript{50} George Brooke argues for more comprehensive critical implications to the discipline:

The character of the evidence has caused . . . a significant change in how all critical approaches to the Bible might pose their questions, so that textual criticism is not seen as a complex preliminary to the literary analysis of texts but an indispensable part of such analysis when undertaken so that there is a holistic account of the evidence.\textsuperscript{51}

When scholars see textual criticism as an indispensable part of the literary analysis of texts and not as a complex preliminary, the question of a privileged text form tends to become a moot point. The concept of text transcends the peculiarities of any particular text form—these-words-and-in-this-order. A text exists as a dynamic, fluid, pluriform reality made up of both words and their interpretations.

\textbf{The Text according to Higher Criticism}

As one observes the ongoing dissolution of lower and higher criticism, a


\textsuperscript{50}van der Kooij, “The Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible,” 175.

more complex concept of text is permeating the entire realm of critical scholarship. The text according to higher criticism at one time possessed qualities which, as was true of textual criticism, motivated scholars to look behind the received text to discover its origins, a more pristine form of the biblical story. This is particularly evident in the scholarly efforts to understand how the Pentateuch came to be. From the “original memoirs” (mémoires originaux) of Jean Astruc to the “documents” (urkunden) of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (J and E) and Julius Wellhausen (J, E, D, and P), texts of various shape and scope—sources that give rise to the Pentateuch in its so-called final form—occupied the core interests of Pentateuchal scholarship for over a century. Studying how scholars have understood the formation of the Pentateuch provides a window into scholarly imagination, a view of the text according to higher criticism. Comparing this with recent developments in the field, I will demonstrate that similar notions of text are developing across both higher and lower facets of critical biblical scholarship.

**Literary Values of the Text**

Higher critical notions of text first emerge from the history of the formation of the Pentateuch. Of the many theories to emerge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—documentary, fragmentary, and supplementary—the

documentary hypothesis as developed by Eduard Reuss, Karl Heinrich Graf, Abraham Kuenen, and ultimately by Wellhausen dominated biblical scholarship well into the twentieth century. The theoretical documents it hypothesized were attractive because they offered solutions to critical questions that had long intrigued biblical interpreters. Source documents could explain the presence of contradictions, doublets, and discontinuities identified in the pentateuchal text. Instead of studying a narrative riddled with inconsistencies, documentarians could reconstruct the original, pristine forms of these narratives. For a historian like Wellhausen, dating these documents functioned as a starting point for reconstructing the history of Israel. Such an activity was of greater interest to nineteenth century scholars than investigating the “literary qualities” or “essential content” of these texts, not to mention that of the Pentateuch itself. Another reason these historians fixated on pentateuchal sources was because, like their Romantic peers, they believed “the ‘ideal’ period for historians was not the most recent but the

53Too often Wellhausen is identified as the sole genius of the Documentary Hypothesis. It would be more accurate to recognize the role his work played in developing and establishing the insights and arguments of Reuss, Graf, and Kuenen. Douglas A. Knight traces their influence on Wellhausen in the Scholars Press reprint of Wellhausen’s magnum opus. Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of Israel, v–xvi.


55Ska, Introduction to Reading the Pentateuch, 109.
A similar bias for the more distant past would occupy theologians in the twentieth century who disassembled the pentateuchal sources to discover “the original core of Israel’s faith.” The object of these kinds of investigations did not exist in the received form of the Pentateuch, which reflected the corruption of Israel’s faith from a religion of gospel and grace to one of law and works. These historical and religious biases against the later stages of Israel’s history and the final stages of the formation of the Pentateuch left critical scholarship largely uninterested in the received form of the Pentateuch until the late twentieth century when literary critics like Robert Alter drew attention to the art of biblical narrative.

Despite waning influence, the documentary hypothesis still possesses a literary influence over contemporary scholarship. Critiques from the latter half of the twentieth century raised concerns about the ability of the documentary hypothesis to explain the complications that arise from a critical study of the Pentateuch. While it

56Ska, Introduction to Reading the Pentateuch, 109.

57Ska, Introduction to Reading the Pentateuch, 116.

58Ska, Introduction to Reading the Pentateuch, 111, 119.


no longer achieves a consensus in biblical studies, it is far from forgotten. A recent surge of neo-documentarian scholarship refuses to abandon the explanation that four source documents occupy the penultimate stage in the formation of the Pentateuch.  

Joel Baden demonstrates how neo-documentarianism is reevaluating and responding to the criticisms of its detractors. He presents the documentary hypothesis as a “literary solution to the literary problems of the Pentateuch,” disentangling it from the fields of history and theology.  

As a hypothesis designed to address literary problems, the documentary hypothesis implies the existence of an ideal literary form. This ideal shapes the literary expectations of those who read the Pentateuch with documentarian commitments. According to Baden, “The critical study of the composition of the Pentateuch begins . . . with the attempt to read the pentateuchal narrative from beginning to end as a unified whole.” He describes a unified literary work in this way:

The hallmark of a unified composition, one created by a single author, is

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63Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch, 32.

64Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch, 13.
internal consistency: consistency of language and style, consistency of theme and thought, and above all, consistency of story. Every narrative makes certain claims about the way events transpired—who, what when, where, how, and why. When these elements are uniform throughout a text, there is no pressing need to inquire as to its unity.\textsuperscript{65}

The Pentateuch’s failure to achieve this ideal—its contradictions, doublets, and discontinuities—occasions the need to inquire into its literary past, giving rise to documents that avoid these literary problems.

The J document—like all the documents in the Pentateuch—is founded on a variety of traditions, some, if not all, of which were originally independent oral traditions. Yet the written text, the literary work, is so thoroughly interconnected and interdependent; continuous and coherent and well-developed in plot, character, and concept; and full of explicit cross-references and thematic consistencies that it cannot but be considered a unified piece. . . . The connections observed above cannot be removed from the text without doing irreparable harm to the sense and substance of each passage.\textsuperscript{66}

Baden’s J document achieves the ideal to which the Pentateuch falls short. Like the original form many textual critics aspire to (re)construct, pentateuchal sources remove the errors introduced subsequent to a text’s ideal incarnation.

The ideal text envisioned by documentarians has contributed to the weakened status of the documentary hypothesis. As Norman Whybray pointed out in his influential critique, it is not clear why one should assume the authors of the biblical sources valued unity and consistency if the redactors who compiled the sources apparently did not concern themselves with these literary values. “It seems more logical to conclude that ancient Israelite ideas of consistency were different

\textsuperscript{65}Baden, \textit{The Composition of the Pentateuch}, 16.

\textsuperscript{66}Baden, \textit{The Composition of the Pentateuch}, 81.
from those of modern western man: that the Israelites were in fact to a large extent indifferent to what we should call inconsistencies.” Whybray correctly identifies an overlooked element in the documentarian case: they can establish opportunity—the plausibility of weaving together distinct sources—but they neglect to explain motive. If unity and consistency are what make the existence of hypothetical documents plausible, how does one explain why an actual text does not possess these same qualities?

Whybray’s objection to the emphasis which the documentary hypothesis places on unity and consistency is less effective as a critique of the hypothesis itself and more effective as a critique of its narrow concept of text. This narrowness is understandable given the literary environment in which biblical studies operates. By contrast with pentateuchal narratives, ancient Near Eastern narratives are typically relatively unified and coherent. As Seth Sanders observes, “The Pentateuch stands out from every other pre-Hellenistic text from the ancient Near East in its narrative incoherence.” Furthermore, “the process [of constructing narratives by interweaving multiple sources] is alien to the whole of ancient Near Eastern narrative art, and one cannot find interwoven texts [like the Pentateuch] in Hurrian, Luwian, Hittite, Sumerian, Phoenician, Moabite, Egyptian or Elamite.”

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68Seth L. Sanders, “What If There Aren’t Any Empirical Models for Pentateuchal Criticism?,” in *Orality and Literacy in Ancient Israel*, ed. Brian Schmidt (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, forthcoming). This book is due to be published in 2014, but as of my writing, the page proofs were unavailable for page citations.

69Sanders, “Empirical Models for Pentateuchal Criticism?”
solution is to identify a stratification of literary values in the textual tell of the Pentateuch. “For there to be highly coherent strands evident in the Pentateuch which have been interwoven, there needs to be one set of values that created the coherent strand, but a different later set of values that created the incoherent interwoven source.” From the various iterations of the Gilgamesh epic to the Pentateuch, and from the Pentateuch to late biblical and early Jewish texts like Chronicles, the Temple Scroll, Jubilees, Philo, and Josephus, Sanders argues “this external evidence attests three different sets of values—from coherence to comprehensiveness to harmony—that dominated three stages of Hebrew literature. These values can be ordered in a relative chronology.” By introducing a discussion of the diverse literary values that can influence the production or compilation of a text, Sanders broadens the dimensions of higher criticism’s construct for a text. Insofar as literary values are concerned, there is no ideal text form that a work either falls short of or achieves. It is possible to conceive that a work like the Pentateuch could develop over time according to different—even competing—literary values.

**Literary Characteristics of the Text**

The documentary hypothesis operates with a near single-mindedly literate understanding of Pentateuchal formation and the scribal culture behind it. One can compare the scribal workshop in ancient Judah as imagined by documentarians with

70Sanders, “Empirical Models for Pentateuchal Criticism?”

71Sanders, “Empirical Models for Pentateuchal Criticism?”
the “scriptoria of the medieval monasteries.” The compilation of these documents into a single work, the Pentateuch, would have been a complicated feat of scribal engineering. Susan Niditch sardonically depicts the scenario,

At the heart of the documentary hypothesis . . . is the cut-and-paste image of an individual pictured like Emperor Claudius of the PBS series, having his various written sources laid out before him as he chooses this verse or that, includes this tale not that, edits, elaborates, all in a library setting. If the texts are leather, they may be heavy and need to be unrolled. Finding the proper passage in each scroll is a bit of a chore. If texts are papyrus, they are read held in the arm, one hand clamping or “supporting” the “bulk” of the scroll, while the other unrolls. Did the redactor need three colleagues to hold J, E, and P for him? Did each read the text out loud, and did he ask them to pause until he jotted down his selections, working like a secretary with three tapes dictated by the boss?

According to documentarian scribalism, tradents manipulate what is already written. Authors—more often referred to by scholars as redactors—do not provide the
“creative genius” or serve as the “intellectual source” of the textual material. As Karel van der Toorn describes it, “an author does not invent his text but merely arranges it; the content of a text exists first, before being laid down in writing.” Source criticism proved an effective method of uncovering editorial activity and explaining the textual history of the Pentateuch. Much as one might reverse engineer a quilt—ripping it apart at the seams and segregating the various fabrics—

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74 van der Toorn, *Scribal Culture*, 47.

75 van der Toorn, *Scribal Culture*, 47.
interpreters like Wellhausen could find the seams in the text and use these to isolate
the various textual fabrics of J, E, P, and D. But source criticism was incapable of
explaining the origins of these literary textiles, thus raising a new question. Where
do the Pentateuchal sources originate?

The documentary hypothesis gave rise to the idea that the written sources
of the Pentateuch succeeded the oral traditions of ancient Israel. If we conceive the
written sources that lie behind the Pentateuch as assorted fabrics, the independent
episodes that constitute these narratives in oral form are the threads by which these
fabrics were woven together. Hermann Gunkel pioneered the study of these oral
threads, what he termed “legends” (Sagen), in his commentary on Genesis. According to Gunkel, legend and history are sharply distinguished from one another
as belonging to different genres (Gattungen) of tradition, oral and written. “Circles
unaccustomed to writing transmit legend. Historiography, however, a type of
scientific endeavor, presumes the practice of writing.” Even after they are written
down, Gunkel insisted one could identify the oral forms of the preliterary stage of
the traditions. “A popular legend exists by nature in the form of an individual

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76 “It became clear that for much of the literature the oral stage was the creative stage and
that traditions could also be united in to cycles or small compositions still at the oral level. These
materials tended to be committed to writing near the end of an era for purposes of preserving them
for later generations.” Douglas A. Knight, Rediscovering the Traditions of Israel, 3rd ed., Studies in

77 Hermann Gunkel, Genesis, trans. Mark E. Biddle (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1997). Hugo Gressmann soon after extended Gunkel’s method to the traditions surrounding Moses in
Exodus and Numbers. Moses und seine Zeit: ein Kommentar zu den Mose-Sagen, vol. 18, FRLANT
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1913).

78 Gunkel, Genesis, viii.
legend. . . . Even in their present form, the legends of Genesis give clear evidence of this process.”

Thus, Gunkel explained where the biblical traditions in the Pentateuchal sources originated from, attributing to the oral tradents “the artistic work that literary critics had always assumed could only be accomplished at the writer’s desk.”

Diachronic assumptions about orality and literacy in the documentary hypothesis reveal the essential literariness of the text in higher criticism. Even as David Carr aims to counter the juxtaposition of orality and memory with written textuality—recognizing implications this has for a theoretical understanding of text—he continues using the term ‘text’ according to its common, everyday significance. “Many good arguments have been made for extending the words ‘text’ and ‘textuality’ to encompass ‘texts’ that are never written but just remembered, transmitted, and performed over time. In this study, however, I use the term ‘textuality’ as shorthand for ‘written textuality.’” As a written document, the ‘text’ absorbs those traits associated with the written word and repels traits associated with orality and memory.

Recent work in biblical studies challenges the diachronic succession of


80Knight, *Rediscovering the Traditions of Israel*, 65.

81For his initial objections to the juxtaposition of orality and memory with written textuality, see Carr, *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart*, 6–8.

82Carr, *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart*, 14.
orality and literacy. Niditch argues the diachronic approach is “misguided, devaluing the power of oral cultures and misconstruing the characteristics of orally composed and oral-style works.” In her study *Oral World and Written Word*, she describes an oral-written continuum, with many biblical texts (obviously written) displaying variations she attributes to the oral register. These variations—repetitions, formulas, convention patterns of content—refer not to a work’s mode of composition but to its style, which could be “handed down, preserved, and possibly even composed in written form.” Niditch makes the case that orality and literacy coexisted and mutually influenced one another in ancient Israelite culture. She discusses the function of literacy in traditional cultures and concludes that “Israelites live in a world heavily informed by the oral end of the continuum.”

Whereas Niditch emphasizes the characteristic traits of oral-style writing and an oral-written continuum, Carr critiques the juxtaposition of orality and literacy by investigating the characteristic function of orality and memory in textual transmission. His work surveys comparative evidence from the ancient Near East to illustrate how writing functioned in the transmission of culture. He argues that “written copies were a subsidiary part of a much broader literate matrix, where the

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focus was as much or more on the transmission of texts from mind to mind as on transmission of texts in written form. Both writing and oral performance fed into the process of indoctrination/education/inculturation.”

He compares writing in the ancient world with musical notation today. Few people possess the ability to sight read music and perform it flawlessly without significant practice. Musical scores serve as memory aids to pieces that the musician has practiced and internalized. Likewise, the goal for scribes was “to be able to both write down and accurately recite—probably musically in some cases—the lists and standard literary works that were the foundation of his scribal education.”

According to Carr, the tablet of the heart is the ultimate medium of cultural transmission. Writing is, among other things, an aid to memory.

The role of memory in textual transmission stands out in Carr’s more recent book, *The Formation of the Hebrew Bible*. He argues that “the documented growth and revision of ancient long-duration/literary texts . . . were written by authors who typically accessed precursor texts by means of memory.” Because scribes accessed texts by memory, slight variations in wording, word order, or adaptations to the tradition—what Carr identifies as “memory variants”—occurred in the process of transmission and are manifest in the biblical texts. These memory

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87 Carr, *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart*, 5.


variants are evidence of the phenomenon of writing-supported memory. Carr demonstrates the likelihood that repetitions among Proverbs and the use of Deuteronomy and Leviticus in 11QT vary, not as a result of different traditions, but rather as a result of scribal memory. These memory variants lead Carr to observe, "What would have counted the 'same' in early stages of Mesopotamian and Jewish Transmission of textual tradition was looser than what counted as the 'same' in later stages." Carr's discussion of writing-supported memory and of the presence of memory variants in biblical texts does not mean that scribes never graphically consulted a work being copied. It does indicate, however, that Israelite culture tolerated scribal habits that could produce both fluid and static text forms. These recent developments in higher criticism's understanding of literacy, orality, and memory complicate higher criticism's historical one dimensional concept of text.

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Conclusion

Is there a text in this discipline? The answer of course will vary depending on whom you ask. Traditionally speaking, interpreters of the Bible believed the text was embodied in the form originally intended by an authorial figure. All other text forms were considered derivative and inferior. A growing and increasingly complicated collection of textual witnesses along with higher critical insights into the prehistory of the received form of the biblical text required more complicated theories of transmission and production to preserve the notion of one superior, fixed text form. While this notion represents how biblical studies came to understand the concept of a text, it is not likely to prevail into the future. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that trends in lower and higher criticism are increasingly tolerant of more dynamic, fluid, and in some cases pluriform concepts of text. The way Niek Veldhuis describes Babylonian scribal culture in Assyria also aptly describes the way many biblical critics are coming to think of the scribal culture in Israel/Judea: “The history of the transmission of these texts [seems] not so much a river or a stream, but rather a complex web of trails, not to be abbreviated in a neat linear stemma.”

The conflicting ways in which it is possible to understand text as an academic concept resembles the multiple ways of understanding the concept of intertextuality. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, literary critics first used the

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term ‘intertextuality’ to give expression to a dynamic concept of text, one that encompasses culture and the entity of a linguistic system. By contrast, biblical studies generally appropriates the term to signify the relationship between two fixed and stable text forms. While this chapter does not establish how biblical studies should understand the concept of text, and thus a related concept like intertextuality, it does identify a trend toward more dynamic and fluid categories of text. I will establish in the next chapter why biblical studies should reserve the term ‘intertextuality’ for discussions built on these less traditional notions of text.
CHAPTER 3
A DISCIPLINE BY ANY OTHER NAME?
INTERTEXTUALITY

What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And for that name which is no part of thee
Take all myself.
(Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet 2.2)

Introduction

In the balcony scene of Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare expresses an idea similar to a foundation of modern linguistics: the arbitrary nature of the sign. The name “Romeo” makes the person Romeo no less or more the object of Juliet’s desire. By any other name, Romeo himself would retain those qualities that captivate young Juliet. According to the field of semiotics—generally speaking the study of how meaning is produced—relationships like that between the name “Romeo” and the person Romeo are entirely arbitrary. “Romeo” could have been my own name, and Shakespeare might have otherwise named his protagonist “Joseph.”

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1In this chapter, individual words in quotation marks indicate the discussion of a term or signifier, and italics indicate a concept or a signified. Words that appear with neither when they elsewhere appear in either quotation marks or italics indicate the whole sign (signifier + signified). The language is explained in the section below.
For those who dispute over the use of academic terminology, the arbitrary nature of the sign raises a challenging question: On what basis can one evaluate and critique the academic appropriation of linguistic signs? How can we articulate a justification for our use of language over against other alternatives when we recognize this arbitrary association between the words we use and the concepts we mean to discuss? There are few disputes where this question is more relevant than the dispute over the significance and appropriation of intertextuality in biblical studies. I maintain the appropriation of intertextuality as generally observed in biblical studies is problematic, departing from a more justifiable use of the term found in its native discipline of literary studies.

To establish my thesis I begin by elaborating on the arbitrary nature of the sign and its consequences, exposing a problematic argument on either side of this debate. I use this discussion to identify criteria by which to evaluate and critique the appropriation of intertextuality. These criteria establish the relevance of understanding the emergence of intertextuality in literary studies. I demonstrate how intertextuality, when it entered the broader academic lexicon via literary studies, introduced new perspectives for textual analysis in a wide array of fields. I further demonstrate how the introduction of intertextuality to biblical studies largely renamed existing fields of study without significantly impacting their critical practice. I conclude that the use of intertextuality as generally practiced in biblical studies fails to improve upon or otherwise justify itself against the use of the term as
it emerged in literary studies.

Saussurean Linguistics and the Arbitrary Nature of the Sign

Those who insist as I do that intertextuality as generally practiced in biblical studies does not enhance scholarly discourse must reckon with the arbitrary nature of the sign. It was Ferdinand de Saussure in the early twentieth century who articulated this arbitrary relationship as a theory of language. His work laid the foundation for the contemporary field of semiotics. He conceived of language as a series of signs, each sign consisting of two components. Any sound we use to communicate ideas, for example the sound produced when one reads the word ‘Romeo,’ he called a signifier. The idea associated with this signifier, the person _Romeo_ in our example, he called a signified. Every word according to Saussure, written or spoken, is a sign composed of “signifier” (the sounds) and _signified_ (an idea). Contemporary linguistics emerges from or defines itself against the “signifier”/_signified_ constitution of the linguistic sign.²

Saussure demonstrates that the linguistic relationship combining signifier and signified into a single sign is entirely arbitrary.³ Juliet offers a poetic example: “That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet.” There is no intrinsic reason for “rose” to signify the concept of a sweet smelling _rose_. Any

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³Saussure, _Course in General Linguistics_, 67–70.
sequence of sounds could function as a signifier if adopted by a particular speech community; for example, one can signify that same rose in Modern Hebrew using “רד.”

**The Genetic Fallacy**

In the absence of an inherent relationship between signifier and signified, it is the conventions of a speech community that make communication with linguistic signs effective. Because my speech community recognizes a rose using the signifier “rose,” I am able to communicate to those in my speech community using the linguistic sign, rose. These social conventions are not fixed; they evolve over time. Consequently, the significance of linguistic signs evolves along with social convention. In the debates surrounding the term ‘intertextuality,’ some argue that we ought to resist this evolution and respect the original intention of Julia Kristeva who coined the term. (I discuss Kristeva’s contribution to this discussion below.) Leon S. Roudiez writes in the introduction to a collection of Kristeva’s essays, “The French word [intertextualité] was originally introduced by Kristeva and met with immediate success; it has since been much used and abused.”

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implies that social convention ought not depart from a word’s original significance. David I. Yoon argues that biblical studies should abandon intertextuality because the way it is currently used in our field departs from its “origins” and “authorial intent.” Both of these arguments amount to special pleading. Since we do not hold every word in our vocabulary to this genetic standard, it is a fallacy to apply this standard to intertextuality. Absent any additional considerations, this fallacy fails to appreciate how social convention operates as a dynamic force shaping the significance of a linguistic sign.

The Problem of the Undifferentiated Signified

If one argument against the use of intertextuality in biblical studies fails to appreciate the dynamic role of social convention in shaping the significance of a linguistic sign, arguments in favor of the way it is generally appropriated fail to recognize the role additional concerns may introduce for evaluating and critiquing social convention. While observing contemporary patterns of scholarly use for determining lexical significance can be a helpful guide, contemporary usage is often fraught with disparity and conflict—intertextuality being a case in point. Such discordant situations motivate us to consider what makes language meaningful and significant beyond mere habits of speech or writing.

By shifting our focus from the signifiers of scholarly discourse to the

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signifieds, we enter a conceptual space wherein we may evaluate and critique linguistic signs, especially those subject to conflicting use in academic contexts. To enter this conceptual space, we must recognize another consequence of the arbitrary nature of the sign: Language is not a nomenclature applied to universal concepts, to ideas that exist prior to and independent of literary signs. Because our language does not refer to universal categories of thought, translation often proves difficult. As Jonathan Culler observes, “Each language articulates or organizes the world differently. Languages do not simply name existing categories; they articulate their own.” Given this consequence of the arbitrary nature of the sign, it is illegitimate to assume the existence of an academic concept like *intertextuality* prior to and independent of its conception and development within scholarship. Consequently, scholars should not defend their use of such a concept on the assumption that it simply exists to be named; rather, they need to demonstrate that such a concept better organizes the world or otherwise offers the potential to enrich academic discourse.

How does a scholarly concept enrich academic discourse? Let us consider further the nature of the literary sign. According to Saussure, “Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results solely from the

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7 Culler, *Ferdinand de Saussure*, 31.
simultaneous presence of the others.” In other words, the value of a sign is non-referential. A sign does not positively identify something by referring to an otherwise autonomous object. Rather, signs exist in a system where the differences within this system establish each sign’s relative identity. Saussure underscores the importance of differences within this system: “In language there are only differences. . . . Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system.” Culler describes it in this way: “Identity is wholly a function of differences within a system.” Thinking of language as a system of interdependent terms in which differences within the system establish the relative identity of an individual term can help us consider how a scholarly construct like intertextuality can enrich academic discourse. Adding new vocabulary to the scholarly lexicon does not in itself enrich academic discourse because such additions may accomplish nothing more than the “unnecessary renaming of known phenomena.” In order to enrich academic discourse, new vocabulary should introduce some kind of conceptual difference, either by providing a more compelling explanation of what is already being discussed or by giving expression to that which

8Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 114.

9Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 120.

10Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure, 38. See pp. 33–39.

has never before been explained. When scholars neglect to provide a significant conceptual difference in introducing new vocabulary, they commit what I am calling the problem of the undifferentiated signified.

I propose that biblical studies in general has committed the problem of the undifferentiated signified in the way it has appropriated the language of intertextuality. There are certainly exceptions, but these exceptions have not been widely influential in our discipline, nor are they the object of my critique. The two criteria I discussed in the introduction for evaluating the usefulness of the concept of intertextuality effectively test for this problem. The first criterion says that intertextuality, if it has anything to contribute to biblical studies, should change our understanding of the biblical text. When a new concept like intertextuality does not change our understanding of the biblical text, it cannot represent a more compelling explanation of what is already being discussed, much less give expression to that which has never before been explained. This failure to differentiate the signified intertextuality from other concepts already operating in biblical studies voids any claim that intertextuality somehow enriches academic discourse. The second criterion says that where scholars can establish their theses without reference to the concept of intertextuality—either by means of other concepts or through more traditional terminology—the presence of intertextuality does not change our

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understanding of the biblical text. This second criterion provides a concrete means of testing for this problem.

In what follows, I explore the origins of intertextuality and demonstrate that this neologism was coined to give expression to new ways of addressing concerns in literary criticism. Intertextuality was not introduced as a synonym of other concepts already generally a part of academic discourse. Its introduction signaled a change in ways literary studies could understand its own discipline and is often regarded as part of the turn to poststructuralism.\(^\text{13}\) I contrast this with the way in biblical studies generally appropriated the term to signify business as usual within the discipline. I demonstrate that the term was not adopted to affect any meaningful change in the discipline (for better or worse), and that it essentially functions as a synonym for a variety of more traditional terminology which I discuss in the next chapter.

**Intertextuality as a Neologism in Literary Studies**

As I develop yet another narrative of the emergence of intertextuality in literary criticism, a familiar dictum comes to mind: “Of the making of many books, there is no end” (Eccl 12:12b NRSV). Multiple essays and entire books document the history of intertextuality, situating it in its different intellectual and historical contexts.\(^\text{14}\) Additionally, most studies that discuss intertextuality in biblical studies

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\(^{13}\) McKay, “Status Update,” 85–86.

begin with a brief—occasionally superficial—history of the term. The narrative I provide focuses on the earliest chapter of intertextuality. Using the criteria discussed in the previous section, I demonstrate the distinctiveness and integrity of this early conceptualization that justifies the introduction of the neologism to literary studies.

**Julia Kristeva, Theorist and Mediator**

Julia Kristeva emerged onto the French intellectual scene during a period of civil unrest and intellectual ferment in the mid-to-late 1960s. She studied among avant-garde intellectuals in Paris and joined the editorial board of the experimental journal, *Tel Quel*. While she is known to many biblical scholars for having coined the term ‘intertextuality’ (*intertextualité*), this hardly captures the depth and scope of her research. Not only is it possible to speak of Kristeva as a linguist, sociologist, philosopher, psychoanalyst, and feminist, she is a true theorist in whom these fields mingle and coalesce. Intertextuality represents but one area of interdisciplinary activity in Kristeva’s writing.

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The word ‘intertextuality’ first appears in an essay Kristeva wrote in 1966, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” in which she transposes the work of Russian formalists—principally Mikhail Bakhtin—into French Sassurean linguistics.\(^{16}\) To say that Kristeva transposes this work goes beyond acknowledging her role in translating the work of this then-obscure figure and his colleagues writing behind the iron curtain.\(^{17}\) She is writing herself and her own ideas into her rewriting of Bakhtin.\(^{18}\) The topic at hand is a case in point. While the word ‘intertextuality’ belongs uniquely to Kristeva, she identifies it as an insight introduced into literary theory by Bakhtin, thus mediating and transforming the work of Bakhtin to the French structuralist scene. Understanding Kristeva’s role in transposing Bakhtin's then-unknown work helps to clarify how intertextuality signaled a change in ways literary studies could understand its own discipline. I will also briefly examine discussions from two other works by Kristeva. My focus remains narrowly on her work which has been available in English translation since the early-eighties, because few if any


\(^{17}\)Mary Orr provides a more thorough bibliographic reference to Kristeva’s sources than what was provided in the first footnote of the English translation. Orr details problems that were created by this change. Intertextuality, 25.

\(^{18}\)Clayton and Rothstein, “Figures in the Corpus,” 18–19; Orr, Intertextuality, 27; Allen, Intertextuality, 52–55; Juvan, History and Poetics of Intertextuality, 97–98.
biblical scholars writing on intertextuality engage her untranslated material.  

**Textuality as a Three-Dimensional Space**

Writing “Word, Dialogue, and Novel” during a time when many are beginning to challenging the scientism of structuralism, Kristeva is attracted to Bakhtin because she identifies his writing as the most advanced work in addressing these kind of challenges to structural analysis. As Michael Worton and Judith Still observe, this essay “illustrates the way in which post-structuralism already inhabits structuralist discourse.” Kristeva believed that Bakhtin successfully replaced the traditional static model of structuralism with a more dynamic model by conceiving the literary word in a relational sense. The literary word is “an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: that of the writer, the addressee (or the character), and the contemporary or earlier cultural context.” She abandons one-dimensional conceptions of meaning—fixed points—for a three-dimensional textual space made up of writing subject, addressee, and exterior texts. According to Kristeva, meaning is produced where these “textual surfaces” intersect with one another along two axes. “The word’s status is thus

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19 For a broader discussion of Kristevian intertextuality, see Orr, *Intertextuality*, 20–32.


defined *horizontally* (the word in the text belongs to both writing subject and addressee) as well as *vertically* (the word in the text is oriented toward an anterior or synchronic literary corpus).”

Examining these two axes reveal interesting dimensions to Kristeva’s understanding of words and intertextuality.

**The horizontal axis.** In her three-dimensional textual space, Kristeva identifies the horizontal axis with the way both addressee and subject/writer/author (she uses these terms interchangeably) mutually possess the literary word, and she associates this axis with Bakhtin’s idea of dialogism. The horizontal axis raises the question of how one should understand the role of the subject. Many scholars have assumed that Kristeva’s intertextuality is a corollary of Barthes’s “death of the author” where Barthes famously argues, “The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”

In other words, an author ceases to function as a figure whose intentions limit a text’s potential significance. Initially in “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” the writer functions as an active agent. Kristeva describes Bakhtin’s notion of text as historically and socially situated; history and society “are then seen as texts read by the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them.”

Reading and writing become activities that exist along a single continuum for

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Kristeva. Subsequently, the lines between subject-addressee and text begin to fade. “The addressee . . . is included within a book’s discursive universe only as discourse itself. He thus fuses with this other discourse, this other book, in relation to which the writer has written his own text.” As the agency of the writer recedes into the text, the writer becomes a subject of narration that is “reduced to a code, to a nonperson, to an anonymity”:

He becomes an anonymity, an absence, a blank space, thus permitting the structure to exist as such. At the very origin of narration, at the very moment when the writer appears, we experience emptiness . . . On the basis of this anonymity . . . the he/she of the character is born. . . . In this coming-and-going movement between subject and other, between writer (W) and reader, the author is structured as a signifier and the text as a dialogue of two discourses.

In describing the writer as being reduced to a code and, at the same time, being born as a character and structured as a signifier, Kristeva has raised the question of whether and how the author-as-character born into the text also exists as a writer who exists outside the text.

According to Susan Stanford Friedman, these developments in Kristeva’s understanding of the writer “effectively eliminate the writer from the analysis of intertextuality and anticipate the knot that ties intertextuality with the death of the author.” Mary Orr counters that “both Bakhtin and Kristeva honour the author as

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26Juvan, *History and Poetics of Intertextuality*, 57.


29Friedman, “Weavings,” 147–48; see also 150.
funnel, so that textuality enters into dialogue with other determining elements,” and concludes that for Kristeva, “the author is not dead, but in rememoriam.”

This discussion becomes especially relevant in the face of gender, race, and postcolonial studies where the death of the author disinherits women and sexual, racial, and ethnic minorities of their agency. Orr believes that Kristeva has been disinherited of her own—admittedly “unpolished”—idea. To further explore Kristeva’s understanding of agency, one should attend to the psychoanalytic discussions of the subject that emerge in Kristeva’s second book, Revolution in Poetic Language. While it is beyond the purposes of this analysis to pursue this question any further, it is important to observe that Kristeva’s discussion of intertextuality introduced a new dynamic to how we understand the relationship between author, reader, and text, regardless of whether one follows Friedman’s or Orr’s analysis. In this way, Kristeva differentiates her concept, the signified *intertextuality*, from the existing categories of her day.

**The vertical axis.** In her three-dimensional textual space, Kristeva identifies

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30 Orr, *Intertextuality*, 26, 32.


the vertical axis with the way the word in the text is oriented toward an anterior or synchronic literary corpus, and she associates this axis with Bakhtin’s idea of ambivalence. If the horizontal axis of the word raises a difficult question about agency, the vertical axis raises a controversial debate about the fundamental nature of intertextual analysis. When Kristeva writes, “The word in the text is oriented toward an anterior or synchronic literary corpus,” many biblical scholars assume she has in mind a text’s historical orientation to literary sources. But the literary corpus Kristeva has in mind—the ambivalence of a text—encompasses the entire linguistic system, whether conceived of diachronically, as it exists and evolves over time, or synchronically, as it exists at one moment in time. When Candida Moss, in her article on the Martyrdom of Polycarp, discusses the tendency of New Testament scholars to identify an allusion to the passion narrative in either Matthew or John’s gospel, she counters the identification in ways that illustrate this notion of ambivalence. She discusses how the characterization of Polycarp’s endurance depicts him as a philosopher akin to Socrates and that this depiction does not allude to any single literary portrait of the infamous philosopher.

That the figure of Socrates was diffused through four hundred years of culture only makes the situation more complicated. There is no way to distinguish cultural portrait from literary depiction. If we want to argue that there is an allusion to Socrates in this account, then it must be to a composite cultural portrait. If a member of the audience understands the allusion to Socrates, it is


because he or she has a non-literary image in his or her mind.\textsuperscript{36}

Moreover, she identifies “Polycarp’s manly self-control” with similar depictions in
the Gospel of Luke and the \textit{Gospel of Peter}, arguing that \textit{Polycarp} “should be treated
as part of a second-century reading tradition that cast Jesus as the philosophical
sage.”\textsuperscript{37} According to Moss, \textit{Polycarp} does not allude to either Matthew or John’s
gospel; the text is oriented diachronically to a four-hundred-year-old evolving
portrait of the philosophical sage and synchronically to a contemporary tradition of
associating Jesus with this philosophical portrait.

Kristeva continues to use language easily confused with the pursuit of
sources when she describes Bakhtin’s contributions to literary theory—his concepts
of dialogue and ambivalence—as bringing to light the fact that “each word (text) is
an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read. . . .
Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and
transformation of another.”\textsuperscript{38} In light of the word ‘quotations,’ the language
‘intersection of words (texts)’ sounds like the shared vocabulary typically discussed
in the context of allusive language. But when read in light of her interaction with
Bakhtin and Saussure, what may appear to be a discussion of sources is actually a
discussion about the double nature of poetic language. Kristeva makes this explicit

\textsuperscript{36}\textsuperscript{36}Moss, “Nailing Down and Tying Up,” 130.

\textsuperscript{37}\textsuperscript{37}Moss, “Nailing Down and Tying Up,” 133.

\textsuperscript{38}Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 66. I have emended the first occasion of “words”
in this quote where the singular form “word” occurs in the source text.
when she writes: "The notion of *intertextuality* replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least *double*. . . . Dialogue and ambivalence lead me to conclude that, within the interior space of the text as well as within the space of *texts*, poetic language is a ‘double’."

The double of poetic language represents the hermeneutical complexity (which I will expand on in the next section) that replaces a simple transaction between author and reader. This idea that poetic language is read as double is crucial to distinguishing intertextuality from the study of literary sources. Not only does intertextuality distinguish itself from intersubjectivity, the idea that communication occurs directly from one subject to another (recalling the question raised in the previous section), it also distinguishes itself from the study of sources by depicting a new understanding of the kinds of textual relationships—diachronic and synchronic—that operate within poetic discourse.

**Textuality as Inherently Intertextual**

Kristeva develops intertextuality—the double of poetic language—as an inherent quality of texts and not as the occasional instance of a literary reference. In this way one can easily distinguish Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality from the study of sources. Her discussion draws on insights from both Saussure and Bakhtin. While Saussure first expressed the dual nature of the linguistic sign—signifier and signified—it is not this dyad but rather the “multidetermined” sense of the sign that

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accounts for the double of poetic language.\textsuperscript{40} In describing the sign as multidetermined, Kristeva identifies in the sign a plurality of values. In this way she rejects the application of Aristotelian logic to linguistics, the idea that “any logical system based on a zero-one sequence (true-false, nothingness-notation) [can] account for the operation of poetic language.”\textsuperscript{41} By way of example, she mentions Saussure’s anagrams, a concept akin to rhyme, alliteration, and assonance. Anagrams exemplify one way in which it is possible to approach language as “an infinite pattern of echoes and repetitions, where readers are confronted with the problem of determining which of numerous possible patterns to pursue, which to endow with significance.”\textsuperscript{42} Kristeva defines poetic language by this “infinity of pairings and combinations,” rejecting any logical system that reduces this plurality.\textsuperscript{43} She associates such reductive systems with Bakhtin’s concept of monologism, a label he applied to forms of discourse that attempt to reduce the sign to a single value. By contrast, dialogical discourse “implies a categorical tearing from the norm and a relationship of nonexclusive opposites.”\textsuperscript{44} Bakhtin observed this tearing in the carnivalesque structure—a transgression of the “rules of linguistic code and social

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40}Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 69.
\item \textsuperscript{41}Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 70.
\item \textsuperscript{42}Culler, \textit{Ferdinand de Saussure}, 127.
\item \textsuperscript{43}Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 69.
\item \textsuperscript{44}Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” 71.
\end{itemize}
morality”—in the works of Rabelais, Swift, and Dostoyevsky. Kristeva further explains that, while words are inherently dialogical, it is “only through certain narrative structures that this dialogue—this hold on the sign as double, this ambivalence of writing—is exteriorized in the actual organization of poetic discourse on the level of textual, literary occurrence.” In other words, she maintains it was only in recent history that authors began self-consciously exploiting the inherent dialogism of the sign at the larger structural levels of discourse.

While “Word, Dialogue, Novel” represents Kristeva’s earliest and most extended discussion of intertextuality, she further discusses the inherent intertextuality of texts in two other works that have been translated into English. In her essay “The Bounded Text,” she defines the text as “a productivity,” which she describes as “a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.” According to Kristeva, texts are constructed by redistributing language from anterior and synchronic utterances, utterances which belong to the historical and social text. These utterances intersect and neutralize one another “as an interactive leveling” according to Orr: “Prior text materials lose special status by permutation with others


in the intertextual exchange because all intertexts are of equal importance.”  

Consequently, texts are not read as independent or isolated works; they must be analyzed “within the general text (culture) of which they are part and which is in turn, part of them.”  

As Culler describes it, “Intertextuality thus becomes . . . a designation of [a work’s] participation in the discursive space of a culture: the relationship between a text and the various languages or signifying practices of a culture and its relation to those texts which articulate for it the possibilities of that culture.”  

Kristeva understands semiotics—the study of signs and their use—as the study of the text as a productivity, a permutation of texts, an intertextuality.  

Because intertextuality is inherent to Kristeva’s concept of text, it is not a unique attribute of allusive literary works. She emphasizes this point in her book, *Revolution in Poetic Language*.  

The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of “study of sources,” we prefer the term transposition . . . . If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that its “place” of enunciation and its denoted “object” are never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated.  

While it is true that the redistribution of language from anterior and synchronic

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utterances Kristeva spoke of in “The Bounded Text” includes instances of literary allusion, intertextuality does not concern the peculiarities of literary allusion. Every text, according to Kristeva, is a redistribution of language, a transposition of various signifying systems. While allusions are naturally plural, shattered, and capable of being tabulated by virtue of their two fields of signification (the marked text and the evoked text), Kristeva is interested in the way this is true of all texts—regardless of the presence of literary allusions—since all texts are made up of language from the general text of culture. To use the language of intertextuality exclusively with reference to literary allusion is to ignore the inherent intertextuality of texts to which Kristeva gives expression.

Assessing Intertextuality as a Neologism

In Kristeva’s writing intertextuality names a complex of critical interests in words and texts, a way of addressing Kristeva’s combined interests in French Saussurean linguistics and the Russian formalist Bakhtin. As one might expect given her enthusiasm for Bakhtin, there is an inherent dialogical quality to Kristeva’s use of intertextuality. It can signify a word and larger structures of discourse, something inherent and extrinsic, something intended and unintended. This irreducible complexity emerges from the double of the linguistic sign, of which the term ‘intertextuality’ itself is no exception.

Did this conceptualization of intertextuality enrich literary studies when it

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52 I develop this understanding of literary allusion in the next chapter.
was coined, either by providing a more compelling explanation of what was already being discussed or by giving expression to that which had never before been explained? Intertextuality was not introduced as a synonym of other concepts already generally a part of academic discourse, though it did resemble some of Bakhtin’s concepts like dialogism and ambivalence. Kristeva coined the term to express her particular synthesis of Bakhtin with French Saussurean linguistics. In so doing, she signaled a change in the way literary studies could understand its own discipline, a change many would see contributing to literary criticism’s turn to poststructuralism. Regardless of whether or not scholars favor this postmodern turn, intertextuality meets the criteria necessary to justify its addition to the academic lexicon.

**Intertextuality as Business as Usual in Biblical Studies**

For many within biblical studies, intertextuality describes nothing more than what represents business as usual for our discipline. Despite its novelty, the vocabulary of intertextuality does not imply a paradigm shift, much less a nudge. This application exemplifies Ellen von Wolde’s trendy intertextuality—scholars using literary theory to provide labels without allowing it to impact how they understand literature.53 When scholars use the term to signify well-established critical practices in biblical studies—at least for what was already established in 1989 when the word appeared in our discipline—they may or may not comprehend the origins of the

term and its significance in critical theory. Their use may imply ignorance of critical theory, willful resistance, or some of both.

For example, scholars will sometimes prooftext Kristeva without seriously and substantively engaging the cited material. An article in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* begins, “Julia Kristeva, the philosopher and literary critic who advanced the concept of intertextuality and coined the term, once opined that ‘any text is the absorption and transformation of another.’ Hyperbolic though it may be, the statement is fundamentally true.” Kristeva’s neologism appears in the title of the article, “Homeric and Ancient Near Eastern Intertextuality in 1 Samuel 17,” and it recurs throughout the article. But this introductory nod represents the sole occasion the authors quote Kristeva or cite her work. She promptly recedes into obscurity as the authors shift their focus to a New Testament scholar whose methodology of imitation (also known as mimesis) forms the basis of their research. The recurrence of intertextuality in the article functions effectively as a synonym for imitation.

Amending the article’s title to read “Homeric and Ancient Near Eastern Imitation in


1 Samuel 17” would affect neither its thesis nor its argumentation. Finally, the flippant attitude with which the authors dismiss Kristeva’s rhetoric as “hyperbolic” demonstrates the degree to which the authors’ interest in engaging Kristeva is merely superficial.

Within biblical studies it has become common to recognize two different orientations to intertextuality. Patricia Willey distinguishes between the “traditionalists” and the “radical intertextualists.”57 Geoffrey Miller refers to these same camps as “author-oriented” and “reader-oriented.”58 Most recently, John Barton uses what he considers to be anthropological emic and etic categories to distinguish between “soft” and “hard” approaches to intertextuality.59 It is also common to see biblical scholars describing traditional/author-oriented/soft intertextuality as diachronic and radical/reader-oriented/hard intertextuality as synchronic. Generally speaking, biblical studies adopts the former orientation—traditionally signified by the diverse vocabulary for literary influence. It associates the latter with recent post-structural trends in literary studies. These kinds of distinctions emphasize the various ways biblical scholars understand different approaches to intertextuality. In what follows, I demonstrate the degree to which traditional, author-oriented, soft, or


diachronic intertextuality represents business as usual for biblical studies and does not change the way scholars understand the dynamics of literary influence in the biblical text. I identify different ways scholars associate the term ‘intertextuality’ with business as usual in biblical studies, pointing out the varying degrees of awareness and intentionality with which they establish this association. Finally, I counter arguments defending this business-as-usual use of intertextuality on the claims that it does represent an innovation, however modest, in our discipline.

Titolar Intertextuality

A few books in biblical studies are affiliated with the study of intertextuality largely, if not exclusively, by virtue of their title. These books do not involve a sustained critical discussion of the term; rather, they are filled with traditional jargon and utilize already established critical methodologies of literary influence. These studies demonstrate how superficial and uncritical the association between intertextuality and biblical studies can be.

In his book *Structuration des grands ensembles bibliques et intertextualité à l’époque perse*, Bernard Gosse summarizes articles he published between 1985 and 1995 that focus on redaction critical issues in individual biblical texts. The book

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synthesizes these studies to propose a Persian era redaction of the Hebrew Bible. For much of the book, one must guess Gosse’s rationale for including the word ‘*intertextualité*’ in the title. The word never appears in the introductory chapter and occurs infrequently throughout the course of the book. Given that the book is based on the author’s previously published material, much of which was written on redaction criticism and published before 1989, it is unlikely that the term is intended to signify a new critical approach to interpreting the biblical text. In his conclusion, Gosse attributes signifying properties to the literary environment of texts and suggests that redactors responsible for their final form modified the meaning of these texts. He writes, “This is why I speak of intertextuality. The study of ‘meaning’ implies a holistic approach to which all meticulous study of the text must return.”

In this respect, intertextuality refers to the text situated in its final arrangement, the “*grands ensembles bibliques.*” Whatever Gosse’s contributions to biblical studies, his use of intertextuality introduces no methodological innovation to redaction or canonical criticism. Intertextuality merely signifies business as usual for the biblical scholar.

Mark F. Rooker similarly applies “Hebrew Intertextuality” as a label to work more traditionally described as inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation.  

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Rooker, a former student of Michael Fishbane, devotes his book in part to his advisor whom he credits for introducing him to “Biblical Intertextuality.”

Neither of the two relevant chapters, “The Use of the Old Testament in the Book of Ezekiel” and “The Use of the Old Testament in the Book of Hosea,” use the term ‘intertextuality’ to describe the subject at hand. These studies, previously published in 1998 and 1993, focus on Ezekiel and Hosea’s “use of the Old Testament,” their “biblical sources,” their “exegetical methods,” and their “references to” or “citations of” earlier biblical passages. At the time of their original publication, Rooker had not come to associate them with the term ‘intertextuality.’ This word appears exclusively in the title of the work, Studies in Hebrew Language, Intertextuality, and Theology, and in the heading of part two where the relevant chapters are located. Rooker explicitly associates intertextuality with inner biblical exegesis and interpretation, a subject that began gaining currency in biblical studies in 1985 with the publication of Fishbane’s volume on the subject. In this way, Rooker uses intertextuality to label a category of literary influence that was already established in our discipline.

In Form and Intertextuality in Prophetic and Apocalyptic Literature,

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63 Rooker, Studies in Hebrew, v. Technically, Fishbane does use the term “inter-textual” twice in his initial study on biblical interpretation, but he also uses “intra-textual” and, with much greater frequency, “inner-textual.” Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 190, 318; 83; and 55, 56, 66, 73, 210, 213, respectively. However, this usage appears to be verbal play on the word “textual,” and is not formally associated with the word as coined by Kristeva or later made mainstream in biblical studies. Fishbane only later came to describe his project with the term intertextuality. For example, Michael Fishbane, “Types of Biblical Intertextuality,” in Congress Volume: Oslo 1998, ed. A. Lemaire and M. Sæbø, VTSup 80 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 39–44.

64 I will discuss inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation at length in chap. 4.
Marvin Sweeney devotes a portion of his introduction to surveying scholarly examinations of “the role of intertextuality, particularly the role played by the reading and interpretation—or reinterpretation—of earlier texts and traditions within the prophetic literature.” Like Rooker, Sweeney associates intertextuality with inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, but more specifically how this discipline is integrated with interest in the formation of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Book of the Twelve. Notably, most of the books that Sweeney references never use the term ‘intertextuality.’ In some cases, this is because these studies were published before the term was introduced into the biblical scholarly lexicon. In at least one case, however, the author—Benjamin Sommer—explicitly distinguishes his work from the study of intertextuality. Most of the chapters in Sweeney’s book were previously published, representing two decades of his scholarly reflections on the subject. While the term ‘intertextuality’ appears more often in Sweeney’s work than in the previous two studies mentioned, the term is still rare, especially given its prominence in the title. More importantly, chapters that do not use the term belong to work from Sweeney’s earlier career, indicating that the term itself was applied to Sweeney’s already established field of study. The book does not engage the term critically, and nothing suggests that Sweeney’s perspective was impacted by its

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65 Marvin A. Sweeney, *Form and Intertextuality in Prophetic and Apocalyptic Literature*, FAT 45 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 5.

Casual Association

Not all work that associates intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies anachronistically applies the term to previously published material or previously established trajectories of study. Nevertheless, scholars can take this association for granted when they neglect to engage—much less acknowledge—the issues surrounding the term and its origins in literary theory. By casually associating intertextuality with more traditional approaches to the biblical text, these authors betray ignorance or disinterest in the debates surrounding intertextuality.

“To the Bible scholar, intertextuality is nothing new.”67 So reads the first line of the volume edited by Johannes C. de Moor, *Intertextuality in Ugarit and Israel*. From the first page of the introduction, this volume casually associates intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies. The editor goes on to discuss a few long-established avenues of scholarly inquiry—source and redaction criticism among them—which “forced exegetes to address the issue of intertextuality long before this postmodern shibboleth was coined.”68 If the word bears any new significance, it is its association with the study of texts “in a much wider context


68 De Moor, *Intertextuality in Ugarit and Israel*, ix. In this, de Moor shares Gosse’s view of the relationship between redaction criticism and intertextuality: “Redaction criticism rests on the supposition that we can trace the molding of transmitted texts into a more or less coherent whole and can describe the motives behind this operation. . . . It would not be difficult to multiply these examples of early intertextual studies in biblical scholarship.”

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than was hitherto common,” a reference to inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, a field of relative novelty compared to the others de Moor mentions.\(^{69}\) The essays in this volume generally reflect the interpretive dynamics at play among texts within the Bible, its versions, or in the case of one essay, a text from Ugarit. As an exception to this general characterization, John Barton’s essay “What Is a Book?” questions whether modern exegesis recognizes and respects where the literary conventions of ancient Israel differ from our modern literary expectations.\(^{70}\) Despite this intriguing moment of literary-critical reflection, the volume as a whole implies that intertextuality does not introduce a literary-critical perspective not already familiar to the exegetical repertoire of the biblical scholar.

The monograph by Catherine L. Muldoon, *In Defense of Divine Justice: An Intertextual Approach to the Book of Jonah*, further illustrates the casual association of intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies.\(^{71}\) A methodological discussion of intertextuality appears midway through the second chapter. Her footnotes in this section—indeed throughout the book—suggest her approach is developed exclusively within the established canons of biblical studies.

\(^{69}\)De Moor mentions work in Isaiah and the Book of the Twelve. *Intertextuality in Ugarit and Israel*, ix.


While discussing intertextuality, she cites only biblical scholars.\textsuperscript{72} Like Sweeney above, Muldoon cites Sommer’s work for its discussion of various elements of intertextuality—this despite the fact that Sommer distinguishes these from belonging to the domain of intertextuality as he understands it.\textsuperscript{73} Sommer’s work is relevant to Muldoon because, as she describes it, “inner-biblical exegesis” is the “sister term” of intertextuality. She describes intertextuality as business as usual for biblical studies when she writes that it “occurs when one biblical text alludes to or quotes another text in a reasonably recognizable way,” and when she further claims that “the dominant mode of intertextual scholarship is the identification of verbal links between texts, ranging from direct quotation, to allusion, to echo.”\textsuperscript{74} The identification and examination of verbal allusions or quotations was already a part of the methodological repertoire of the biblical scholar when the term ‘intertextuality’ was introduced to the biblical scholarly lexicon. Muldoon, like others before her, has used intertextuality as a convenient label to talk about these already established ideas and practices.

Many other recent books in biblical studies casually associate intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies.\textsuperscript{75} They use intertextuality in

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\textsuperscript{72}The one time she cites a literary journal, she cites it as “quoted in” an article by a biblical scholar. Muldoon, \textit{In Defense of Divine Justice}, 46n56.


\textsuperscript{74}Muldoon, \textit{In Defense of Divine Justice}, 42–43.

\textsuperscript{75}Edmée Kingsmill, \textit{The Song of Songs and the Eros of God: A Study in Biblical}
the most general sense that texts are connected to one another, and they further refine their discussion with reference to more focused ideas like metaphor, inner biblical exegesis, and allusion. This use of intertextuality renders these works vulnerable to the critique of irrelevance. The reviewer to one of these books recently remarked, “I simply do not get the point of ‘innertextuality.’ If innertextuality actually does not say much more than that two texts are intentionally connected, that is, somehow related, the term does not contribute anything new and therefore is dispensable.”

Intentional Association

Among those who associate intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies, some recognize that broader perspectives of intertextuality exist. It is common for studies to rehearse the origins of the term and the subsequent controversies surrounding its use. Despite these broader perspectives, some scholars intentionally associate the term with business as usual in biblical studies. Various reasons motivate these scholars. Some scholars reject the critical theory that drives these broader perspectives, and others simply find the terminology appropriate and


convenient for more traditional approaches. The two examples below reflect these two different perspectives.

Kirsten Nielsen wrote one of the first articles devoted to intertextuality in biblical studies.77 She acknowledged the term’s origins in post-structural literary theory, but she clearly took issue with some of its implications. Is critical theory correct that we should abandon traditional notions of text, author, and reader? Nielsen writes, “[In] my opinion, we must still stick to the classical statement that there is a text, a text has an author and this author writes for his readers.”78 Nielsen does not interact with critical theory, so these issues are not further explored, from either perspective. She admits in the quote above that she is offering her opinion, and the article generally lacks argumentation on these matters. What Nielsen associates with intertextuality is business as usual in biblical studies: “Our task as exegetes is . . . to try to trace [the dialogue between older and younger texts], or let us just use the word ‘intertextuality,’ but to trace it through history.”79 She goes on to assert that the object of scholarly analysis is “the intertextuality that comes out of the historical situation in which the text was written, used and reused.”80 Despite


78Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Biblical Scholarship,” 90.


80Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Biblical Scholarship,” 91. She adds “. . . plus the historical situation in which I live as scholar and as person.” It is not clear to me if she is trying to blend her traditional perspective with critical theory, but she offers nothing further to explain this otherwise anomalous comment.
acknowledging earlier in the article that the meaning of a passage cannot be identified with “the intention of the author,” she proceeds to emphasize that “this dialogue between texts is not only the invention of later readers or critics but is intended from the very beginning.”

In an essay entitled “Intertextuality and Hebrew Bible” published a decade after her previous article, Nielsen distinguishes between three “phases” of “intertextual reading.” Interpreters engaged in the first phase attempt to understand the author’s intention, and in the second phase they examine the editorial work responsible for the formation of the Hebrew Bible. These activities represent commonplace practices in biblical studies. In the third phase, Nielsen writes that “the intertexts are clearly of a later date than the biblical texts.” She does not go into much detail about this third phase, and her examples of intertextual reading in the body of her discussion generally move from earlier texts to latter ones. She mentions reading the story of Stephen in Acts 6-7 as an intertext of Naboth’s vineyard, one in which the later text might inform our reading of the earlier one. Her discussion on this matter is brief, “very brief” by her own admission. As soon

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83 Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Hebrew Bible,” 18.

84 Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Hebrew Bible,” 18–19.


as she begins exploring this route, she transitions to a cautionary section, “Autobiographical Reading and Intertextual Reading.” Here she maintains readings like the one she has just proposed “must be able to be included in the academy’s discussion of the texts.” She means by this that one must have an objective basis for her third phase of intertextual readings. She does not specify what objective criteria justify her own reading of Acts 6-7 as an intertext of Naboth’s vineyard, much less what criteria could function generally for such readings. At most she requires that the text function as the “starting-point and point of reference for interpretation,” a concern which she labels “responsible exegesis today.” In other words, intertextuality represents responsible exegesis. This discussion departs significantly from the kind of critical practice Kristeva gave expression to, as Nielsen herself acknowledges: “What I present on the subject of intertextuality does not therefore correspond to Kristeva’s definition, but is nonetheless inspired by it.” Regardless of this latter claim—which I cannot explain—Nielsen intentionally associates intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies.

In his revised doctoral dissertation, *Intertextuality in Isaiah 24-27*, J. Todd Hibbard observes one unifying feature of an otherwise controversial set of chapters in the book of Isaiah, “nearly every scholar who has studied them has noted at least

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87 Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Hebrew Bible,” 30.


89 Nielsen, “Intertextuality and Hebrew Bible,” 17–18, emphasis original.
one common element in these chapters: their intertextual nature.”\(^{90}\) It is immediately apparent that Hibbard associates intertextuality with business as usual in biblical studies; for example, his footnote to the line quoted above begins with work published in 1895. Hibbard understands his application is relatively limited, and he does not deny the legitimacy of alternative approaches. “While recognizing the validity of more theoretical orientations, I operate with a model of intertextuality much more akin to modes of discourse found in traditional biblical scholarship.”\(^{91}\) As made clear by his more friendly attitude to alternative theoretical orientations, Hibbard’s motivations for using the term differ from Nielsen’s. According to Hibbard, theoretical orientations and traditional studies both “represent honest and real attempts to address a variety of questions that properly fit under the umbrella of intertextuality.”\(^{92}\) The umbrella metaphor has become quite popular in biblical studies, perhaps because it does not require the word be used with any consistency or precision.\(^{93}\) But those who speak of an intertextual umbrella, like Hibbard, tend to


\(^{91}\) Hibbard, *Intertextuality in Isaiah 24-27*, 3.


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occupy a small corner of the umbrella’s shadow; they do not attempt to explore the broader shadow cast by the umbrella. Hibbard describes the situation as a justified eclecticism. Hibbard intentionally associates his focus on types of textual reuse and overlap with a larger—though undefined—concept of intertextuality. Because the larger concept of intertextuality does not directly impact what Hibbard is doing, his work remains firmly entrenched in the category of business as usual in biblical studies.

Intertextuality as Innovation in Biblical Studies?

Does intertextuality as generally practiced in biblical studies really introduce no interpretive innovation? The authors of the studies examined thus far make no attempts to define their understanding of intertextuality in ways that distinguish what they are doing from business as usual in biblical studies. Some of these scholars willingly acknowledge the term can signify modes of criticism unfamiliar to biblical studies, but these same scholars do not feel compelled to introduce any interpretive innovation when they discuss intertextuality in the biblical text. However, not all would concede that intertextuality as generally practiced in


94“Inasmuch as no one method of textual analysis is adequate to answer all types of questions related to these issues, the eclecticism that now exists seems justified.” Hibbard, Intertextuality in Isaiah 24-27, 20.
biblical studies has failed to introduce changes to our understanding of the biblical text. Will Kynes has recently published work advocating for the use of intertextuality in biblical studies, arguing the concept represents an enriched understanding of textual relations.\textsuperscript{95} While his arguments are not persuasive, they represent the most recent and assertive defense of intertextuality as generally understood in biblical studies. For this reason, his arguments deserve careful attention.

\textbf{Competing for dominance.} One way in which Kynes mediates the conflict between diachronic and synchronic orientations to intertextuality resembles a competition in which the diachronic orientation is measurably dominant, even as synchronic elements remain. He writes, “The most recent literary criticism often employs intertextuality in ‘soft’ methodological and even diachronic ways.”\textsuperscript{96} His evidence for this claim amounts to a “sampling of literary critical work from the last four years from authors who explicitly align their approaches with ‘intertextuality.’”\textsuperscript{97} However, the sample he provides—an assortment of six studies—does not represent a scientific sampling, nor do any of his examples represent a broad discussion of intertextuality within literary criticism. He claims his examples “suggest that the


\textsuperscript{96} Kynes, \textit{My Psalm Has Turned}, 19.

\textsuperscript{97} Kynes, “Intertextuality,” 204–6.
drive to discuss quotations, allusions, and citations, even authors and intentions, and to say something concrete about what texts mean, is not as idiosyncratic as some might think.”\textsuperscript{98} But this assumes idiosyncrasy is the primary impediment to justifying the appropriation of intertextuality in biblical studies. In this work I have proposed that such justification requires biblical scholars to demonstrate they are using intertextuality to enrich academic discourse and not merely to rename known phenomena. Kynes suggests his examples “to various degrees all . . . recognize that ‘intertextuality’ does expand out into readers’ responses to texts and even the infinite nature of textual intersection.”\textsuperscript{99} But he provides no further explanation for how, in these studies, readers’ responses and the infinite nature of textual intersection relate to the known phenomena that these studies rename. Before coming to a conclusion about the integrity of this broader perspective, one must further examine Kynes’s synthesis of diachronic and synchronic intertextuality.

For three reasons Kynes believes there is enduring value for the term ‘intertextuality’ in biblical studies. The first two reasons involve the way diachronic intertextuality dominates and encapsulates discourse in biblical studies. First, he suggests that intertextuality is so widely regarded as an umbrella term that attempts to use it more exclusively are “unlikely to be effective.”\textsuperscript{100} This suggestion reflects a subjective judgment. It offers no positive rationale for how the term ‘intertextuality’

\textsuperscript{98}Kynes, “Intertextuality,” 205.

\textsuperscript{99}Kynes, “Intertextuality,” 205.

\textsuperscript{100}Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 20.
enriches academic discourse in biblical studies. Consequently, it is immaterial to the
discussion at hand and does not substantially support his argument. Second, he
suggests the use of intertextuality as an umbrella term “fills an important void, since
no word previously existed to encapsulate the many ways texts may be connected.”
This assumes the absence of a word that encapsulates the many ways texts may be
connected impoverishes academic discourse. The advantages of so general a concept
are not self-evident, and theorists generally prefer a more precise application of the
relevant terminology. When understood as an “infinitely pliable concept,” Hans-
Peter Mai argues that intertextuality “is all too easily divested of any heuristic
value.” He also writes, “At its least presumptuous, the word ‘intertextuality’ merely
indicates that one text refers to or is present in another one. Such a linguistic short
cut is convenient but tends to become predominantly ornamental – and hence is not
particularly conducive to a better understanding.” Orr argues that “compromise,
pinching or bagginess” results from treating intertextuality as a one-size-fits-all
denominator. She uses the metaphor of a shadowland to illustrate the relationship
between intertextuality and “[related or rival terms that] describe the processes of
cultural rejuvenation.” She concludes that “theories of influence, imitation and

101 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 20.
104 Orr, Intertextuality, 168.
quotation [e.g., her three primary shadowland terms] offer much more sophisticated tools and methodologies, as well as more precise vocabularies, to respond to this range of highly complex issues.”

In the most recent book to analyze intertextuality, Marko Juvan captures the essential thrust of this chapter:

The meaning of intertextuality thus must be researched in the context of a paradigm shift: it is incumbent upon us to ask how and to what extent the comprehension of text, literature, subject, reality, and tradition has in fact changed after the idea of intertextuality had been introduced. Its theoretical reach would be impeded if it were assigned to be only an overarching designation for traditional intertextual figures and genres or a synonym (hypernym) for influence, source, and such literary terms.

He elsewhere describes the use of intertextuality as an overarching designation to be reductive. According to prominent analyses of intertextuality in literary studies, there is no void to fill when it comes to discussing the many ways texts may be connected. It is the precision enabled by utilizing diverse vocabulary, not a one-size-fits-all denominator, that enriches academic discourse.

A false dichotomy. The third and final reason Kynes believes there is enduring value for intertextuality in biblical studies corresponds to his belief that it “has provided some significant gains over traditional views of influence.” He also believes that “traditional insight [from influence studies] may contribute to more progressive approaches” which “should not be excluded through strict terminological


107 Juvan, *History and Poetics of Intertextuality*, 43.

barriers.”

He claims the distinction between intertextuality and influence—also known as synchronic and diachronic intertextualities—represents a false dichotomy created by the attempts of “progressive intertextualists” to establish “an intertextual ‘orthodoxy.’”

Kynes offers numerous critiques of the distinction between intertextuality and influence. Of these critiques, he makes the legitimate observation that a word’s origin does not establish the normative significance of that word. My own critique of the genetic fallacy above echoes this critique. He makes less legitimate arguments in the way he attempts to discredit the integrity of Kristeva’s conceptualization, arguing that her concept and her practice contradicts the distinction she posits between intertextuality and influence.

Concerning Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality, Kynes writes, “There is the glaring irony of those who deny that meaning is fixed in the author’s original intent attempting to fix the meaning of a word in its original author’s intent.” I would counter that those who insist on preserving the distinction between intertextuality and influence recognize two distinct concepts and are not attempting to fix their meaning. As a concept independent of influence, intertextuality has and will continue to develop. Critical interpretation should not confuse this evolution

109 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 20.

110 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 23.

111 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 22.

112 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 22.
with ignorant or willful reappropriations of intertextuality to rename known
phenomena.

Concerning Kristeva’s practice of intertextuality, Kynes recognizes that
“Kristeva herself . . . practiced source-hunting, even claiming that the particular
edition a scholar used was important.”\(^\text{113}\) But others who have recognized this in
Kristeva’s work have drawn different conclusions. Kynes cites Friedman who writes,
“My point is not to trap Kristeva in an inconsistency but rather to suggest that the
discourses of influence and intertextuality have not been and cannot be kept pure,
untainted by each other.”\(^\text{114}\) The idea that intertextuality and influence are related
does not preclude the observation that they are distinct concepts. Orr’s metaphor of
the shadowland and discussion of influence illustrates how this rival term exists in a
complex relationship with intertextuality.\(^\text{115}\) If Kristeva indeed contradicts in practice
her own theory, one must still contend with Worton and Still, who comment on this
issue saying, “The importance of Kristeva’s work is not so much her reading of
particular poets, or even of particular poetic genealogies, as her formulation of a
theory of the subject and of language.”\(^\text{116}\) It is not a foregone conclusion that
Kristeva’s reading of poets or poetic genealogies applies a more satisfying theory for
intertextuality than the one she explicitly develops.

\(^{113}\)Kynes, *My Psalm Has Turned*, 22.

\(^{114}\)Friedman, “Weavings,” 154.


Kynes also believes that Kristeva’s desire to fix a distinction between intertextuality and influence is contradicted by the way she “reinterpreted Mikhail Bakhtin’s term ‘dialogic’ to fit her new system.” Kynes equates her reinterpretation to her interpreters’ reappropriation of intertextuality to signify influence. This is an unfair equation. Kristeva transposes Bakhtin’s concept into a new context while further developing it. Interpreters who cite Kristeva as though she were discussing traditional influence betray their own ignorance, and those who willfully reappropriate intertextuality generally rename known phenomena, thus committing the problem of the undifferentiated signified. In the end, Kynes’s many critiques of the distinction between intertextuality and influence do not make for a persuasive argument.

**Intertextualities in dialogue.** As an alternative to distinguishing intertextuality from influence, Kynes applies the label of intertextuality to both concepts. He distinguishes diachronic from synchronic intertextuality as a way of distinguishing historical from ahistorical approaches. He considers these approaches “autonomous and interdependent,” “mutually beneficial, even symbiotic.” He synthesizes these approaches into a methodology he calls

117 Kynes, *My Psalm Has Turned*, 22, emphasis original.

118 I understand ‘diachronic’ as a *sequential* way of reading connections between texts, in which the relative dates of texts are important because one author is referring to the work of another, and ‘synchronous’ as a *simultaneous* interpretive approach, in which readers may read texts ‘all at one time’ and pursue textual resonances irrespective of direct historical relationships between them.”

“intertextualities in dialogue.” Kynes does not genuinely incorporate the theory produced by Kristeva or other theorists of intertextuality. Kynes explicitly identifies only one potential contribution of Kristeva. Traditionally, influence studies recognize the influence of earlier writers/texts on later writers/texts. Recent work in influence theory reverses this model by discussing the agency of the writer/text being influenced. “If one says that X [i.e., earlier artist/work] influenced Y [i.e., later artist/work] it does seem that one is saying that X did something to Y rather than that Y did something to X. . . . If we think of Y rather than X as the agent, the vocabulary is much richer and more attractively diversified.” Kynes attributes this reversal to Kristeva, citing an article by Jay Clayton and Eric Rothstein where they describe Kristeva’s reader as “the writer reading another text.” But Clayton and Rothstein do not causally link these developments. Within our own discipline, the transition to focusing on scribal interpretations of earlier texts was initially labeled

120 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 29–59.

121 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 29.

122 Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures

123 Kynes, My Psalm Has Turned, 24–25; Clayton and Rothstein, “Figures in the Corpus,”

124 For their discussion of this development in influence theory, see Clayton and Rothstein,
inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation. This discipline was developed independent of intertextual theory and preceded the introduction of intertextuality to biblical studies. Additionally, it is not a characteristically synchronic insight to focus on how later writers/texts manipulate the earlier writers/texts that (traditionally speaking) influence them. Moreover, of the four steps in Kynes’s methodology labeled synchronic, none represent an innovation introduced by the theory of intertextuality. The footnotes in the sections discussing these steps predominately cite literature in biblical studies. A few footnotes include references to work in literary theory on the topic of literary allusion. Notably Kristeva and other significant intertextual theorists are entirely absent from these discussions. In the end, Kynes does not incorporate into his methodology the theory produced by Kristeva or other theorists of intertextuality. Intertextuality and influence remain distinct concepts.

Conclusion

The field of Semiotics teaches us about the arbitrary relationship between what we talk about and the words we use in the process of communication. Nevertheless, critical scholarship should be intentional in its use of academic language. To this end, Semiotics also teaches us that new vocabulary enriches academic discourse when it introduces some kind of conceptual difference to our lexical repertoire. New vocabulary should either provide a more compelling

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125 See the discussion of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation in chap. 4.
explanation of what is already the object of critical reflection or give expression to new ideas for scholarly contemplation. When Julia Kristeva coined intertextuality and it entered the broader academic lexicon, she introduced new perspectives for textual analysis in a wide array of fields. But the appropriation of intertextuality in biblical studies has generally renamed existing fields of study without significantly impacting our critical practice. Richard Hays was among the first scholars to formally introduce the word ‘intertextuality’ into our discipline. In response to criticism about the way he uses the term, Hays responded, “If Green should insist on denying me permission to use the term ‘intertextuality’ (since my work does not properly reverence its ‘larger purpose’), I will surrender it without a shrug. Nothing is at stake for me in the use of the term.” Intertextuality cannot introduce novelty or clarity to academic discourse if it is so easily surrendered. By merely renaming known phenomena, it invites ambiguity and imprecision while discouraging cross-disciplinary dialogue. The time is overdue for biblical studies to surrender intertextuality to those more interested in its unique dimensions. In the next chapter, I will assess the vocabulary poised to take its place.

CHAPTER 4
A DISCIPLINE BY ANY OTHER NAME?
INNER-BIBLICAL EXEGESIS AND INTERPRETATION, ECHO, AND ALLUSION

Introduction
Ever since Michael Fishbane’s *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, biblical scholarship has significantly increased its interest in a topic for which there is no agreed nomenclature.¹ Fishbane eventually came to identify his work as an exercise of intertextuality.² But in *Biblical Interpretation* the term ‘intertextuality’ does not appear frequently or systematically.³ Rather, Fishbane saw this work as an exploration of “the phenomenon of ‘Inner Biblical Exegesis.’”⁴ When Richard Hays published his book *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*—a reading of Paul against the background of Fishbane’s “inner-biblical exegesis”⁵—he focused on the


language of ‘quotation,’ ‘allusion,’ and ‘echo,’ emphasizing the latter term. Like Fishbane, Hays also associates his study of echoes with “the phenomenon of intertextuality.”\(^6\) Biblical scholarship generally regards these two works as reference points for this field of study coming into its own.

What appears uniform at a general level, however, becomes more fragmented as one focuses on the concrete studies that belong to the field. Navigating this academic terrain requires one develop a broad repertoire of terms—adaptation, allusion, association, citation, echo, elaboration, evocation, exegesis, influence, innertextuality, innovation, interpretation, intertextuality, intratextuality, quotation, reference, reminiscence, resignification, reuse, revision, reworking, and rewriting. In any given article or book on the subject, these words may signify anything from a particular literary device to broad categories for interrelatedness. Biblical scholars often isolate the term ‘intertextuality’ as a category encompassing the widest possible array of relationships including both author-intended relationships and those established on a reader-generated basis.\(^7\) Though common, this use has been and remains controversial.\(^8\)


By continually using terms irregularly or establishing sui generis definitions, biblical scholars create a confusion that has come to characterize this field. In order to resolve the conflicts of the field—or merely move beyond them—I shall examine three primary ways that scholars have categorized or otherwise attempted to define the field, assessing the weaknesses and strengths of their proposals. This chapter continues the aim of the previous chapter: to challenge the discipline-by-any-other-name attitude that promotes the unnecessary plurality and theoretical incoherence of this discipline. As an alternative to this current state of disciplinary chaos, the chapter concludes that one of these three approaches could provide the dominant language for this field of study, and it establishes the theoretical foundation on which I shall build a critical methodology.

**Inner-Biblical Exegesis and Interpretation**

_Biblical Interpretation_ made popular the language of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation in biblical studies. Below I discuss the origins of the idea and assess its development by Fishbane and one of his students, Bernard Levinson.

**Nahum Sarna**

Exegesis," written by his mentor, Nahum Sarna.⁹ In this article, Sarna classifies as an exegetical adaptation the interrelationship of two texts in the Hebrew Bible—2 Samuel 7:4-17 and Psalm 89:20-38. The scribe of the posterior text (Ps 89) interprets the anterior text (2 Sam 7) for its relevance to the Aramean-Israelite invasion of Judea in 735-34 B.C.E., an event Sarna concludes was contemporary to the psalmist. Both terms—‘exegesis’ and ‘interpretation’—occur synonymously throughout the article. Sarna devotes a section of his argument to establishing “the antiquity of exegesis.” The possibility of exegetical activity obtains, according to Sarna, where an attitude toward a text “involves the idea of authority and immutability and, ultimately, of sanctity.”¹⁰ He identifies this attitude generally within the biblical text (e.g., Deut 4:2; Zech 1:4; 7:7), suggesting biblical scribes were predisposed to engage in exegetical activity. He then articulates an understanding of inner-biblical exegesis that finds fuller expression in the work of Fishbane and his students: “Paradoxically, this very idea of authority and immutability itself engenders change. The past is drawn upon to give sanction to the present, and the ancient words, precisely because they are invested with authority, are reinterpreted to make them applicable to the contemporary scene.”¹¹


¹¹Sarna, “Psalm 89,” 34.
Michael Fishbane

Inner-biblical exegesis, as Sarna first conceived it, proved a fertile concept for Fishbane’s prodigious talent. Magnifying the scope of the phenomenon, Fishbane demonstrates a vast network of interpretive moves that span all genres and historical strata of the biblical text. His work introduces new terminology and categories by which he defines the field.

*Traditum and traditio.* Fishbane first introduces two terms, *tradicum* and *traditio*, terms he borrows from Douglas Knight’s study of tradition-history. In Knight’s work, tradition is composed of two aspects: the *traditio* signifies “the process (in its totality and in its details) whereby traditional material is passed from one generation to the next”; the *tradicum* signifies “the traditional material itself that is being transmitted.” Fishbane conceives of inner-biblical exegesis as a literary continuation of a primarily oral understanding of the tradition-historical process. The *tradicum* becomes the “(increasingly) authoritative teachings or traditions whose religious-cultural significance is vital (and increasingly fundamental)” while the the *traditio* focuses on “the concern to preserve, render contemporary, or otherwise reinterpret these teachings or traditions in explicit ways for new times and new

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13 Knight, *Rediscovering the Traditions of Israel*, 5. See pp 5–16.
According to the way Fishbane defines the terms, the *traditio* does not involve rote methods of scribal copying, though these methods undoubtedly were a part of the process by which the biblical literature passed from generation to generation. Such processes are not sufficient in themselves to ensure the *traditum* remains relevant and authoritative in new circumstances. Thus, the *traditio* concerns the particular interpretive techniques that revitalize the *traditum*, ensuring its staying power.

**Scribal, legal, aggadic, and mantological exegesis.** In addition to supplying the terms *traditum* and *traditio*, Fishbane further defines the field by introducing four general categories of inner-biblical exegesis. These four categories provide a typology for understanding Israel’s *traditio*. He begins with “Scribal Comments and Corrections” which amount to the diverse ways in which Israelite and Judean scribes inserted themselves into the *traditum* and “left us a record of their *traditio*.”

Some of their insertions involve lexical and explicative comments that maintain the clarity of the *traditum* for more distant audiences. Such clarifications necessarily involve an element of interpretation, but these interpretive judgments are relatively mild. Scribal exegesis also involves more tendentious corrections motivated by piety and theological reactions to the *traditum*. From a contemporary historical situation, these reactions may appear fanciful; nevertheless, they reflect how scribes

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interpreted their traditum.\textsuperscript{16}

“Legal exegesis,” the second category of inner-biblical interpretation, involves exegetical revisions of earlier legal material that occur in later legal collections and in non-legal texts.\textsuperscript{17} Laws incomprehensive in scope required supplementation; ambiguous laws required verbal or semantic qualification; and laws once sufficient to address their intended audience required modification or expansion to addresses new circumstances.\textsuperscript{18}

Fishbane’s third category of inner-biblical interpretation is more difficult to define than the previous two. “Aggadic exegesis” emerges more clearly when understood in contradistinction to Fishbane’s other three categories. It represents a “range of inner-biblical exegesis which is strictly speaking neither scribal nor legal, on the one hand, nor concerned with prophecies or futuristic oracles, on the other.”\textsuperscript{19} This category does not belong to any one group in ancient Israel or any single genre within the canon; it is “primarily concerned with utilizing the full range of the inherited traditum for the sake of new theological insights, attitudes, and speculations.”\textsuperscript{20} Aggadic exegesis taps into the “latent and unsuspected meanings” in

\textsuperscript{16}Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 76.

\textsuperscript{17}Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 91–277.

\textsuperscript{18}Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 96–97.

\textsuperscript{19}Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 281. See pp. 281–440.

\textsuperscript{20}Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 282.
the *traditum* and “makes this potential actual.” Fishbane describes its formal characteristics as “the dense occurrence in one text of terms, often thoroughly reorganized and transposed, found elsewhere in a natural, uncomplicated form.”

Finally, Fishbane includes “mantological exegesis,” a category concerned with both visual phenomena—dreams, visions, and omens—and oracles. Both of these mantological phenomena “arise from cognitive dissonance, with breakdowns or conflicts of meaning or sense.” Dreams, visions, and omens require immediate interpretation in order to be understood; oracles require interpretation subsequently, in the wake of events that raise doubts about their veracity or continued applicability.

**Assessment.** References to Fishbane’s volume are ubiquitous in articles and books that span diverse areas of research in biblical studies. And yet, despite its enormous impact, there are remarkably few scholars who adopt the terminology and categories it sets forth. Exploring why these terms and categories failed to take hold in biblical studies provides insight into the demands of the field. Further, we must consider why the book impacts the field despite the fact that few have adopted its basic terms and categories.

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In his insightful article review of the book, James Kugel observes that “the more one reads in this rich compendium, the more it is that issues of method and of definition assert themselves as the central ones to ask of the whole undertaking.”

Kugel first draws attention to Fishbane’s inconsistent application of *traditum* and *travitio*. Where two texts share a literary relationship, Fishbane often uses the terms *travitum* and *travitio* to signify the anterior and posterior texts, respectively. This use departs from the programmatic definition for both words found in his introduction and outlined above. Fishbane has not merely defined the terms one way and used them another. As Kugel explains,

> It is far from clear in specific cases whether the author believes that a so-called *travitio* is in fact a *tradition* about what the primary text means, something developed over time and handed down until it found conscious or unconscious reflection in some later text; or whether it is some (scribal or otherwise) attempt to clarify an obscure text, an attempt that has nothing traditional about it; or whether it is a half-dozen other things—a possible allusion, an echo, an actual restatement, an interpretation, a conscious reworking, a polemical distortion, and so forth.

Likewise, Fishbane does not address what constitutes the “traditional material” of the *travitum*, whether it incorporates oral forms of the material or whether only


written texts belong to this kind of investigation.  

When Fishbane speaks of the *tradtum* and *traditio*, his language collapses the issues involved. To achieve greater clarity, one must ask: *What is the object of study for inner-biblical exegesis?* Does the field investigate the ways scribes and tradents *used* traditional material, ways they *preserved* its relevance and authority for subsequent generations, or ways they *explained* the meanings of older texts. These questions are all legitimate in their own right, but Fishbane’s Latin terms leave him ill-equipped to distinguish their particular concerns. If inner-biblical exegesis ultimately concerns how texts are used, the discussion requires the language and insights of literary criticism. By contrast, the issue of preservation requires greater consideration of socio-religious matters. Finally, explanation would require an approach that blends these two perspectives.

Further problems arise with Fishbane’s four categories of inner-biblical exegesis. Scribal, legal, and mantological exegeses identify different literary professions in ancient Israelite and Judean society. When Fishbane distinguishes scribes from other literary “tradents,” he posits an unlikely distinction—scribes as generally disinterested copyists of tradition, other tradents as authors or composers. It is problematic to assume the roles of author and scribe were clearly separated throughout the formation of the Hebrew Bible. As a concluding observation about

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29“A great deal more of the exegesis catalogued in this book might be seen as scribal—legal or narrative harmonizations or blends, mantological revisions or reinterpretations, and so forth.
scribal exegesis, Fishbane admits “The demarcation between scribe and author [is] somewhat artificial.” Rather than argue for a strict distinction, he proposes “a continuum between purely scribal-redactional procedures on the one hand, and authorial-compositional ones, on the other.” Such a continuum undermines the premise that scribal exegesis characterizes the activity of those who belong to a particular profession; rather, it suggests different degrees of scribal activity.

The category of aggadic exegesis presents an additional problem. Rather than function as a fourth, well-defined category, it serves as catch-all for interpretations that do not fit the scribal, legal, or mantological categories. In his introduction to aggadic exegesis, Fishbane is quick to connect aggadic exegesis to Jewish *aggadah*, a rabbinic category for non-halakhic (i.e., non-legal) interpretation of Scripture. Kugel argues that all four categories indicate a desire to establish an organic connection between inner-biblical and rabbinic exegesis. Fishbane confirms Kugel’s suspicions, more or less, in his introduction:

> Is it possible the origins of the Jewish exegetical tradition are native and ancient, that they developed diversely in ancient Israel, in many centres and at

—indeed, arguably most of what the book seeks to catalogue could be viewed as scribal activity, especially when one concedes (as Fishbane does) that ‘scribe’ both means more than humble copyist and likely what not in any case a single, all-purpose office, but at least in some instances one that was genre- and millieu-specific: priestly scribe, prophetic amanuensis, and the like.” Kugel, “The Bible’s Earliest Interpreters,” 275. See also Karl van der Toorn, *Scribal Culture and the Making of the Hebrew Bible* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 27–49.

30Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 85; see also 57.


As an alternative to Fishbane’s four categories, Kugel favors a historical model that explains the development of inner-biblical exegesis. One way to develop this model would involve several studies on individual books of the Hebrew Bible. Notably, two of Fishbane’s students have adopted this model for Deuteronomy and Isaiah 40-66. Other studies of this model are appearing at an ever accelerating rate.

Despite the weakness of Fishbane’s terms and categories, there remains his general insight into and numerous case studies of the interpretive dynamics at work in the Hebrew Bible. A veritable tome, *Biblical Interpretation* makes its most significant contribution by demonstrating how broad in scope is the phenomenon of inner-biblical interpretation. Even if the book does not fully clarify the contours of

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its subject matter, no one having read the book doubts the significant presence of an interesting phenomenon in the Hebrew Bible.

**Bernard Levinson**

Bernard Levinson has made multiple contributions to the study of inner-biblical exegesis. A student of Fishbane, Levinson has applied the insights of his advisor to the legal texts in the Hebrew Bible. His monograph *Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation* explores how Deuteronomy 12-26 reinterprets the Covenant Code (Exod 20:22-23:33). He argues that “Deuteronomy is, on the one hand, among the most radically innovative literary units in the Hebrew Bible and, on the other, among those that most loudly silence the suggestion of innovation.” Sarna first observed the paradox of authority that engenders change. Levinson’s work represents an exploration and development of that paradox.36

Of particular interest to this study is Levinson’s more recent work, *Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel*.37 Levinson aims to spark a dialogue between biblical studies and the humanities, demonstrating how inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation can contribute to and enhance critical theory’s

36Fishbane already anticipated this development when he wrote, “This matter is paradoxical, for while the traditio culturally revitalizes the traditum, and gives new strength to the original revelation, it also potentially undermines it. . . . Where each particular traditum was believed to derive from divine revelation, recognition of its insufficiencies—inhertent in the need for the interpretation of the traditio—decentralizes the mystique of the authority of the revelation.” Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation*, 15.

understanding of the canon. Regarding the former subject, Levinson begins by summarizing the legacy of Fishbane’s contribution: “Interpretation is constitutive of the canon; it is not secondary to the canon in terms of either chronology or significance.”  

He outlines his four-fold thesis as follows,

1. Exegesis provides a strategy for religious renewal;
2. Renewal and innovation are almost always covert rather than explicit in ancient Israel;
3. In many cases exegesis involves not the passive explication but the radical subversion of prior authoritative texts; and
4. These phenomena are found in the literature of ancient Israel before the closure of the canon.

This thesis raises questions about the definition and method of inner-biblical exegesis that deserve careful attention.

Exegesis. The term ‘exegesis’ serves an important function in this study, and Levinson provides an early working definition of the term: “By exegesis or hermeneutics I mean the range of interpretive strategies designed to extend the application of a given canon to the whole of life, even to circumstances not originally contemplated by the canon itself.” This accords with Fishbane’s legal and mantological categories where the exegesis of laws and prophetic oracles ensures their relevance as time passes and circumstances change. But exegesis has a broad semantic range in Fishbane’s lexicon, one that is not focused exclusively on application. He defines scribal exegesis, which he also calls “true exegesis,” as “the 

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38Levinson, Legal Revision, 18.
39Levinson, Legal Revision, 20–21.
40Levinson, Legal Revision, 15, emphasis added.
interpretation of ambiguities, the clarification of obscurities, the reconciliation of variations, etc.”  

In addition to this explanatory activity, many of Fishbane’s examples of exegesis involve one passage borrowing the language of another—a primary characteristic of his aggadic category.

Should the term ‘exegesis’ govern so many different textual relationships? Not according to Benjamin Sommer. Most of Fishbane’s examples Sommer considers allusions, not exegesis. As an alternative definition, Sommer maintains that “an exegetical text purports to explain the meaning of a specific older text. . . . An exegetical text does not take the place of the older text. On the contrary, it is relevant primarily because the older text is available and needs explication.”  

Sommer’s definition focuses on a singular function, what Fishbane called “true exegesis.” According to Levinson, explanation and application collapse into one undifferentiated concept. Remembering that Levinson is interested in an interdisciplinary dialogue, it is unfortunate he does not disambiguate his definition and concentrate on the explanatory function, as this is the function emphasized in contemporary poetics:

*Exegesis* is a term for the methodical interpretation (and interrogation) of texts, . . . used for the sustained application of critical and interpretive technique to any text being studied or searched for its less than wholly manifest or obvious meaning or implication, in order to give—or construct—a more exploded or unveiled or fuller view of it.  

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42Sommer, *A Prophet Reads Scripture*, 23, 25, see also 17–18.
Sommer’s definition appropriates this significance for a pre-critical stage in the history of exegesis, allowing a genuine dialogue to occur between poetics and biblical studies.

Levinson’s understanding of exegesis proves insufficient because his theses generally preclude the explanatory function emphasized by Sommer and contemporary poetics. If, as Levinson suggests, renewal/exegesis is “almost always covert [and] involves . . . the radical subversion of prior authoritative texts,” explanation becomes an outlier function. To explain involves an act of unveiling what is obscure. Levinson proposes that scribes who are engaged in exegesis are typically pulling the wool over the eyes of their audience. When a text is explained, it remains possible to distinguish text and commentary from one another. Levinson maintains that scribes who are engaged in exegesis ordinarily supplant older texts. If Levinson is correct that subversion is the intent and result of inner-biblical exegesis, the phenomenon would be difficult to distinguish from rewritten scripture as a literary genre. This judgment poorly reflects significant cross-sections of work


Levinson, Legal Revision, 20–21.

Not insignificantly, Levinson names the chapter containing an annotated bibliography on inner-biblical exegesis “The Phenomenon of Rewriting within the Hebrew Bible” (emphasis added). For a brief introduction to current theory in rewritten Scripture as a genre, see Molly M. Zahn, “Rewritten Scripture,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Dead Sea Scrolls, ed. John J. Collins and Timothy H. Lim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 323–36. For a more extensive introduction, see Sidnie White Crawford, Rewriting Scripture in Second Temple Times (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). Despite arguments to the contrary, Molly Zahn challenges those who would describe Rewritten Scripture as merely a technique. She relies on recent work in genre theory, emphasizing flexibility, historical location, and most importantly the functional purpose of a text. She identifies three
being done in inner-biblical exegesis, both as commonly understood and as represented in Levinson’s substantial annotated bibliography.\textsuperscript{46} Case in point—Sommer’s study of allusion in Isaiah 40-66, which Levinson praises, distinguishes itself from Levinson’s approach.\textsuperscript{47} Sommer does not deny Levinson’s insights when applied to Deuteronomy, but he contrasts the hermeneutical activity of the Deuteronomists with those of Deutero-Isaiah.

The problems facing the Deuteronomist and Deutero-Isaiah are similar, but their solutions differ. . . . In the eyes of the Deuteronomists, the text of the Covenant Code need not be preserved. Deutero-Isaiah, however, supplements his predecessors rather than annuls them. . . . Deutero-Isaiah is no less innovative, but he is less cavalier in his relation to earlier texts. He positions himself as a “team player” in the prophetic tradition. . . . Deuteronomy, on the other hand, insists on working alone—indeed, it pushes its predecessors off the field.\textsuperscript{48}

Sommer’s work implies, at the very least, that Levinson has exaggerated the emphasis on concealment and subversion in the context of the larger canon of the Hebrew Bible. But this overemphasis, precisely because it precludes the function of explanation that characterizes exegesis in the study of poetics, undermines functional elements of the Rewritten Scriptural genre: “the status of the new work,” “a concern with interpretation of specific scriptural passages,” and “the situating of the new work as part of the same ‘discourse’ or ‘stream of tradition’ as the original work that formed the basis of rewriting.” Molly M. Zahn, “Genre and Rewritten Scripture: A Reassessment,” \textit{Journal of Biblical Literature} 131, no. 2 (2012): 271–88. Levinson’s definition of exegesis, and particularly his work on Deut 12-26, possess the generic elements Zahn identifies.

\textsuperscript{46}Levinson, \textit{Legal Revision}, 95–181.

\textsuperscript{47}Never mind that Sommer distinguishes allusion from exegesis. Sommer, \textit{A Prophet Reads Scripture}, 17–18. What matters is that Levinson himself ignores this distinction and counts Sommer’s work among the many in the field of inner-biblical exegesis.

\textsuperscript{48}Sommer, \textit{A Prophet Reads Scripture}, 155–56; see also 181–83.
Levinson’s attempt to define the field. His definition, inaccurate and insufficient, fails to describe with relative objectivity and interdisciplinary sensitivity the field it purports to define.

**Method.** Like Fishbane before him, Levinson inductively approaches the question of methodology. He writes in the preface, “The goal here [chapter 3] is to map the strategies employed by different cultures to handle the problem of legal change,” doubtless referring to the strategies of renewal/concealment and subversion he mentions in his theses 1 and 3.\(^{49}\) Despite the clarity implied by the image of a map, Levinson scatters the discussion of these scribal strategies throughout his argument. Only in the conclusion does Levinson assemble many of these strategies together: “Ingenuity required striking technical means—dodges both of voice (including devoicing, revoicing, and pseudepigraphy) and of the scribal craft (including Seidel’s law and lemmatic citation and reapplication).”\(^{50}\) Readers must rely on the index to systematically examine where Levinson discusses these strategies earlier in the book. Moreover, Levinson does not develop a programmatic approach for contemporary interpreters to detect these strategies in the text.\(^{51}\)

\(^{49}\) Levinson, *Legal Revision*, xvii. More accurately, the discussion of these strategies spans both chaps. 3 and 4, with discrete aspects of the discussion occurring exclusively in the latter chapter.

\(^{50}\) Levinson, *Legal Revision*, 90. This list must not be exhaustive because Levinson neglects to mention what he earlier described in the book of Ruth as “the author’s coherent literary strategy of archaizing” (43; see pp. 42-45).

\(^{51}\) Levinson points out this same lacuna in Fishbane’s work. “Yet it sometimes remains unclear how [Fishbane’s] approach relates to conventional models in Biblical Studies or what criteria control the direction of literary influence claimed between texts.” Levinson, *Legal Revision*, 19.
As I have already argued, Levinson exaggerates the emphasis on concealment and subversion in defining inner-biblical exegesis. He continues this exaggeration when he describes the strategies of legal revision and renewal as “a rhetoric of concealment.” By generalizing scribal techniques in this way, Levinson distorts the methods he discusses, complicating the question of method in inner-biblical exegesis.

Consider the technique of “inverted citation,” otherwise known as “Seidel’s law.” As Levinson describes it, “Often in the Bible and postbiblical literature, an author will quote a source in inverted order, such that a text sequence A B would recur elsewhere as B’ A.” Levinson references the technique of inverted citation when discussing the principle of transgenerational punishment in Deuteronomy. The principle appears first while Moses recites the Ten Commandments (Deut 5:9-10), and it subsequently reappears in inverted order in Moses’s homiletical discourse (Deut 7:9-10). Levinson argues the homily “transforms the original as to revoke it.”

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51Levinson, Legal Revision, xviii, 48, 92.


53Levinson, Legal Revision, 73.

54Levinson, Legal Revision, 74.
As evidence of this transformation, he emphasizes the homily’s omission of any reference to intergenerational punishment and the alternative warning that God punishes the sinner to his face. Despite these transformations, enough of the lemmas from the original principle are retained in the homily—in inverted order—to act as allusive markers of the original principle. Levinson concludes that “the new teaching is presented as consistent with the very doctrine that it rejects: as an authoritatively taught re-citation of the original theologoumenon.” It is important to distinguish two operations in Levinson’s interpretation. Levinson first detects the presence of a citation in the homily, and secondarily reasons that the citation subverts the cited material. The inversion of the lemmas plays no role in concealing the transformation of the transgenerational principle. Contrary to functioning as a rhetoric of concealment, the inverted citation functions as a marker that reveals the hermeneutical activity of the scribe. Levinson admits as much when he observes that the "reuse of the Decalogue is marked by the ancient scribal technique of inverted citation." Sommer describes this function well: “If an author frequently reformulates marked vocabulary in certain ways, one can verify that a passage from that author’s work contains a borrowing when the ostensible markers there conform to a pattern frequently noted in the author's work.”

56 Levinson, Legal Revision, 75.

57 Levinson, Legal Revision, 73, emphasis added.

58 Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 35. See also 219n11. Pancratius Beentjes also writes, “And by this deviating model he attains a moment of extra attention in the listener (or the
Assessment. Despite his attempts to define the activity of inner-biblical exegesis and map the strategies of legal change, Levinson neglects to discriminate between his interests in scribal exegetical activity generally and legal revision more specifically. He argues that legal revision in ancient Israel required scribes to act subversively, masking their efforts to amend laws or create new ones. Scribes found it necessary to deploy a rhetoric of concealment because established law was attributed to God and thus considered infallible.\textsuperscript{59} The legitimacy of this position aside, legal revision is not coextensive with inner-biblical exegesis, even as Levinson understands it. In his final chapter—an annotated bibliography amounting to one-half the book’s length—Levinson equates “the phenomenon of rewriting within the Hebrew Bible” with the field of inner-biblical exegesis, implying a different frame of reference. Because Levinson’s work in this field focuses on legal revision (specifically scribal activity in Deuteronomy), his work does not provide a sufficient theoretical or methodological template for inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, especially any work that does not reflect Levinson’s theory of a rhetoric of concealment.

Assessing Inner-Biblical Exegesis and Interpretation

The most prominent voices in inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation have generated significant interest in the field, but their work does not produce a reader, because the latter hears something else than the traditional words.” Beentjes, “Discovering a New Path of Intertextuality,” 49.

\textsuperscript{59}Levinson, \textit{Legal Revision}, 45–49.
programmatic method or articulate a unifying theory. The methods prove
unsystematic and their theories too broad or too narrow. A problem with
terminology further renders this approach unsuitable in the current academic milieu.
I have already addressed the problematic way in which Levinson employs the
language of exegesis, precluding the explanatory function central to its use in
contemporary poetics. Even when we explore the ways biblical texts function to
explain preexisting biblical texts, it remains problematic to describe this exegetical
activity as “inner-biblical.”

When ancient Israelite and Judean scribes engaged in this exegetical
activity, there was no ‘Bible’ in the modern sense of the term. These scribes did not
perceive themselves to be working within a fixed collection of texts. As Beate Ego
observes,

If we want to criticise the term ‘inner-biblical interpretation,’ we have to bear in
mind that the expression ‘biblical,’ as contained in the term ‘inner-biblical,’
seems to be misleading, since it constitutes anachronism. . . . It is self-
evident that there did not exist a ‘Bible’ yet in the period when inner-biblical
exegesis is said to have taken place. 60

This nomenclature introduces similar historical and ideological concerns that have
led scholars of late Second Temple literature to reject the label ‘rewritten Bible.’ 61 As


Timothy Michael Law succinctly describes this emerging consensus, “Before the Bible there was no Bible.” In light of the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, these scholars now recognize that during the late Second Temple period the text of the Hebrew Bible existed in multiple forms, and they increasingly consider its modes of transmission a dynamic force in this regard. In the shifting sands of scholarly discourse, a more fluid concept has emerged—rewritten Scripture. Scholars use the term ‘Scripture’ to signify texts with “a particular authoritative status—especially in the context of writings of a sacred or religious nature.” Given the similar problems raised by the use of Bible/biblical in these two disciplines, it is worth considering if they might also share a similar solution.

As an alternative to “inner-biblical interpretation,” something like “Israelite scriptural interpretation” could serve as an alternative that avoids suggesting ancient Israelite and Judean scribes were interacting with a fixed and circumscribed collection. Despite the advantages of this transition, it falls short of eliminating

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63Anders Klostrergaard Petersen, “Rewritten Bible as a Borderline Phenomenon—Genre, Textual Strategy, or Canonical Anachronism?,” in Flores Florentino: Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino García Martínez, ed. Anthony Hilhorst, Émile Puech, 109
problems with the discipline as it currently stands. By characterizing scribal interpretation as uniquely “scriptural,” this language continues to make assumptions about the subject matter not established by current scholarship—at least not yet. Such a designation requires one to distinguish how scribes interacted with scriptural material from how they interacted with the literature that does not belong to the category of Scripture. While scholars cannot know the full extent to which Israelite or Judean scribes interpreted or otherwise engaged the broader literary world of the ancient Near East, one can identify within their work traces of literature from Egypt to Mesopotamia. This field—whatever one calls it—has yet to determine if and how scribal attitudes toward ancient texts varied based on the cultural proximity and the religious content of the interpreted texts. Yair Zakovitch suggests there is an “indistinct boundary between inner-biblical and extrabiblical interpretation.”65 While he is referring to a degree of continuity between “inner-biblical interpretation” and “rewritten Scripture,” the logic applies more broadly. What reason does one have to believe that Israelite or Judean scribes differed their interpretive methods when engaging geographically foreign and/or religiously distinct literature? Defining this field as unique because it engages in scriptural interpretation begs a question scholars should be asking.

Finally, scholars must ask if the words ‘exegesis’ and ‘interpretation’ are

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valuable technical terms when scholars use them to incorporate vastly different kinds of scribal activity. If Fishbane’s four categories proved unwieldy, the categories proposed by Zakovitch magnify the problem. As “modes of interpretation” he lists the following: “lexical interpretation,” “juxtaposition,” “analogy,” “the filling of gaps,” “resolving contradictions,” “the identification of anonymous figures,” “name etymologies,” “the interpretation of chronologies and chronologies as interpretation,” “genealogical lists as exegesis,” “the incorporation of poetry into narrative,” “the interpretation of narrative poetry,” “poetry creates prose,” and “allegory.”66 This tendency to stretch the language of exegesis and interpretation to encompass such a diversity of scribal modes of cultural production renders the two terms excessively vague.67 It is unclear how such a catch-all category is useful, particularly when this language conveys a nuanced function when applied in other disciplines and when it defines contemporary scholarly exegesis or interpretation. In his recent article on inner-biblical interpretation in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Biblical Interpretation*, G. Brooke Lester proposes inner-biblical interpretation pursue a more focused interest in the study of allusion, as outlined below.68 I concur that scholarly interests in this discipline need to narrow in order to improve


67The tendency to stretch the language of a discipline to the point that it becomes excessively vague is also a problem in the Rewritten Bible/Scripture debates. Bernstein, “Rewritten Bible,” 187.

scholarly use of literary-critical tools, but I do not believe “inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation” or a variation like “Israelite scriptural interpretation” should continue to designate this field.

**Echo**

Although primarily a figure in New Testament scholarship, the echo commands our attention because of its prominence in the influential monograph by Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul.*\(^69\) Like Fishbane before him, Hays invigorated scholarly interest in the allusive dimensions at work in the Bible, specifically between the Pauline letters and the Old Testament.\(^70\) The language of echo appears in a few articles in Hebrew Bible and ancient Near Eastern studies, though these works do not explore the theoretical foundations of the echo as a literary figure.\(^71\) Christopher B. Hays proposes a broader application of Richard Hays’s seven principles for identifying echoes, appropriating these principles for ancient Near Eastern studies where literary borrowing occurs, often across linguistic

\(^69\)Hays, *Echoes of Scripture.*

\(^70\)I depart from the language of Hebrew Bible here because Hays’s project is explicitly Christian, operating from a two-Testament canon of Scripture.

barriers. The influence of Richard Hays’s work in Hebrew Bible studies, specifically his introductory material that address questions of methodology, warrants our careful attention.

**Defining the Figure of Echo**

In *Echoes of Scripture*, Hays builds upon the work of John Hollander, *The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After*, to develop a model for approaching “intertextual allusions” suited to the character of the New Testament. Both Hollander and Hays develop the figure of echo alongside the terms ‘intertextuality,’ ‘quotation,’ and ‘allusion.’ According to Hays, the echo exists opposite quotation at one end of “a spectrum of intertextual reference,” which moves “from the explicit to the subliminal” as seen in figure 1. Hays distinguishes between allusion and echo in a general way: “The concept of allusion depends both on the notion of authorial intention and on the assumption that the reader will share with the author the requisite ‘portable library’ to recognize the source of the allusion; the

![Figure 1. Intertextual reference (Hays)](image)

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notion of echo, however, finesse such questions.” What does it mean to finesse such questions? In the course of discussing Paul, Hays distinguishes allusion from echo by referring to the former in cases of “obvious intertextual references” and to the latter in cases of “subtler ones.” There is no further clarity beyond this distinction.

Where Hays speaks of a spectrum, Hollander proposes a “rhetorical hierarchy.” The quotation functions as the “literal presence of a body of text,” followed by the allusion which “may be fragmentary or periphrastic.” These are followed by the echo which is “a metaphor of, and for, alluding, and does not depend on conscious intention.” These three “forms of citation” are, at the same time, “related and clearly distinct” as seen in figure 2. Despite claiming the distinctiveness of allusion, Hays and Hollander both frequently uses the term ‘allusion’ as an adjective—allusive echo—and Hollander even brackets all three categories under “the heading of allusiveness.” Hays prefers “intertextual” as the

78 Hollander, *The Figure of Echo*, 64.
79 Hollander, *The Figure of Echo*, 72.
80 Hollander, *The Figure of Echo*, 72.
Despite these tendencies, “intertextual” and “allusive” occur interchangeably when Hollander and Hays describe echoes.

The proliferation of nouns and adjectives, many of which occur interchangeably, muddle the discussion of the figure in question. The preceding paragraphs essentially reduce to these observations: the echo exists on a gradient with quotation and allusion and is characterized by its subtle and subliminal qualities.

What makes an echo more subtle than an allusion? According to Hays, “As we near the vanishing point of the echo, it inevitably becomes difficult to decide whether we are really hearing an echo at all, or whether we are only conjuring things out of the murmurings of our own imaginations.”

Hays essentially suggests that echoes are merely speculative allusions. Perhaps more significant to Hollander and

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Hays is the subliminal quality of the echo. According to Hollander, “The revisionary power of allusive echo generates new figuration.” In a vein similar to those who speak of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, Hollander describes how this new figuration is achieved: “The rebounds of intertextual echo generally, then, distort the original voice in order to interpret it.” The interpreter who discerns an echo hears more than the presence of familiar voices in an unfamiliar context; distortions give rise to new meaning. Readers perceive this meaning only if they first perceive the reverberations of the echo—“the interpretation of a metalepsis [an echo functioning as a diachronic trope] entails the recovery of the transumed [unstated or suppressed] material.” Hays summarizes Hollander’s theory and offers a more programmatic definition of this phenomenon: “Allusive echo functions to suggest to the reader that text B should be understood in light of a broad interplay with text A, encompassing aspects of A beyond those explicitly stated.”

Hollander and Hays attribute another dimension to the subliminal quality to echoes. Hays better clarifies the questions involved: “If echo is a metaphorical way of talking about a hermeneutical event, an intertextual fusion that generates new meaning, in whose mind does that even occur, and how are claims about intertextual meaning effects to be tested?” Hays proceeds to list five different possibilities. The

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83 Hollander, The Figure of Echo, ix.
84 Hollander, The Figure of Echo, 111.
85 Hollander, The Figure of Echo, 115.
86 Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 20.
87 Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 26.
locus of the hermeneutical event can occur in the authorial mind, the minds of the original readers, the text itself, one's personal act of reading, or a community of interpretation. For each of these possibilities, Hays describes how one might test for these effects.\textsuperscript{88} Hays does not commit himself to a single approach, preferring instead to “hold them all together in creative tension.”\textsuperscript{89} Hollander intends to distinguish echo from “overt allusion” precisely by bracketing out questions of actual or putative audience and of intentionality. He does not believe these questions are incapable of being answered; he simply sees such answers as extraneous to his own investigation. “Whether these figurative echoes constitute a kind of underground cipher-message for the attentive poetic ear, or perhaps a private melody or undersong hummed during composition by the poet as a spell or charm, matters less to me than that the revisionary power of allusive echo generates new figuration.”\textsuperscript{90}

Both Hollander and Hays purport to shy away from a methodological approach to echoes. Hollander acknowledges he has “not attempted anything like a systematic taxonomy of allusive echoic patterns,” and describes his work as an “intuitive and personal essay.”\textsuperscript{91} If anything, Hollander sees himself performing the service of a literary historian, not that of a theorist. Hays prefers the idea of “sensibility” over that of “method,” suggesting that interpreters learn “the discipline

\textsuperscript{88}Hays, \textit{Echoes of Scripture}, 26–27.
\textsuperscript{89}Hays, \textit{Echoes of Scripture}, 27.
\textsuperscript{90}Hollander, \textit{The Figure of Echo}, ix.
\textsuperscript{91}Hollander, \textit{The Figure of Echo}, ix–x.
of tuning our ears to the internal resonances of the biblical text.”92 These “impressionistic judgments” can tend toward an I-know-it-when-I-see-it approach to echoes.93 As a potential counterpoint to this analysis of Hays’s approach, the seven criteria “for testing claims about the presence and meaning of Scriptural echoes in Paul” which Hays outlines in his introduction might suggest a methodological orientation to his book. However, Hays does not use these criteria programmatically in the course of his argument.94 Most scholars who follow Hays, by contrast, employ his tests as though they were an “intertextual method.”95 This has become the legacy of Hays’s book, even in his own mind.96

92Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 21.


94“I do not use these criteria explicitly in my readings of the texts, but they implicitly undergird the exegetical judgments that I have made.” Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 29.

95For the language of “intertextual method,” see David A. Shaw, “Converted Imaginations? The Reception of Richard Hays’s Intertextual Method,” Currents in Biblical Research 11, no. 2 (2013): 234–45. In answering the question, “How does one recognize references to Scripture in Paul’s letters?” the participants in the SBL Paul and Scripture Seminar generally “[accepted] the seven criteria for identifying echoes that Richard Hays laid out in Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, though questions were raised about the validity or usefulness of some of the criteria.” Christopher D. Stanley, “What We Learned—and What We Didn’t,” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. Christopher D. Stanley, Early Christianity and Its Literature 9 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 323–24.

96In the foreword to the English edition of Reading the Bible Intertextually, Hays writes, “Biblical critics are sometimes a little slow on the uptake with regard to such cultural fashions [i.e., intertextuality], but once we get wind of a new ‘method,’ we are sure to pursue it relentlessly for all it is worth—and maybe then some. My own book, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, published almost twenty years ago, contributed something to the gathering wave of interest in this topic.” Richard B. Hays, Stefan Alkier, and Leroy A. Huizenga, eds., Reading the Bible Intertextually (Waco,
Assessing Echo

The theoretical discussion of the figure of echo in the works of Hollander and Hays is problematic. According to their proposals, the echo is not an isolated literary figure. In developing its unique properties, both scholars assume the literary-critical integrity of other categories—intertextuality, quotation, allusion—and their relationship to the figure of echo. They do not attempt to critically assess or defend these constructs. Their proposals combine formal and functional qualities in problematic ways that undermine the critical integrity of their work. They also insufficiently address what generates the echo, which unhelpfully collapses different kinds of critical inquiry.

Hollander and Hays both present an underdeveloped way of formally distinguishing between quotation, allusion, and echo which is further complicated because these distinctions are merely assumed. Hays posits a spectrum from the explicit to the subliminal; he does not explore what makes a quotation explicit, an echo subliminal, or what it means for an allusion to exist in between. Likewise, Hollander distinguishes quotation from allusion by describing the former as the literal presence of a text and the latter as a fragmentary or periphrastic presence. Hollander does not specify what it means for a text to be present—literally, fragmentarily, or periphrastically—in another text. These distinctions appear to involve formal qualities for each figure, but these formal qualities are understated. While alternative taxonomies exist in the secondary literature for distinguishing...
between these figures, Hollander and Hays merely assume the integrity of their own
categories and neglect to explain why their taxonomy should be preferred. The
discussion of allusion below will present an alternative view, one I commend as
preferable to the Hollander/Hays model.

In addition to the ambiguous description of the formal qualities
distinguishing quotation, allusion, and echo, there is an additional ambiguity—if not
inconsistency—concerning how they function. Because Hollander and Hays use
formal attributes to distinguish what Hollander describes as “forms of citation,” they
imply these forms possess a common function related to citation. This inference is
supported by the fact that both Hollander and Hays frequently qualify echoes as
allusive—implying they function similarly to allusions—and Hollander locates all
three under the heading of allusiveness. These facts aside, both scholars make
functional distinctions when it comes to echoes. Hollander distinguishes a functional
significance when he attributes to echoes alone transumptive qualities that create
new figuration. Hays does not define allusion, and nowhere does he specify that
allusions necessarily lack transumptive qualities. For Hays, this particular distinction
may or may not exist. Both scholars, however, preclude conscious intention as a
prerequisite for echoes. Eliminating intention as a necessary condition for echoes
does not mean that authors cannot intend to echo; it means that the function of echo
operates regardless of authorial intent. This unique function distinguishes the echo
from quotation and allusion, both of which require conscious intention according to
Hollander and Hays. By making this functional distinction for echoes, they establish what must be regarded as a distinct literary figure, one that is generated in a distinct way from quotation and allusion.

Neither Hollander nor Hays provides a necessary condition for generating an echo, and this lack of clarity creates confusion about the nature of the study of echoes. Hollander’s disinterest in the question of echogenesis suggests the means by which they are produced are irrelevant to their critical examination. Hays adopts an alternative position, raising the critical question and listing five possible answers. He maintains the possibility of embracing all five loci in creative tension, with no single locus being necessary. On this matter, Hays has sparked a lively debate.97 Stanley E. Porter argues contra Hays that the author must be the determining factor in identifying echoes.98 He takes exception to Hays’s non-authorial, audience-oriented loci because his approach to the study of echoes has a biographical aim: “If one is interested in establishing a given author’s use of the Old Testament, it would appear

97 Initial reactions to Hays’s project with a response from Hays are published in Craig A. Evans and James A. Sanders, eds., *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel*, JSNTSup 83 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993). The broader discussion and debates that have emerged in the wake of Hays’s book are found in Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley, eds., *As It Is Written: Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture*, SBLSymS 50 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008); Christopher D. Stanley, ed., *Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation*, Early Christianity and Its Literature 9 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012).

imperative to orient one’s discussion to the language of the author, rather than
supposed, reconstructed ‘knowledge’ of the audience.”
Christopher D. Stanley alternatively insists that the study of echoes is incomplete without an investigation of
the rhetorical impact of this literary figure: “Literary analysis can tell us what Paul
assumed about the recipients of his letters (the ‘implied readers’), but it cannot tell
us whether these assumptions were well-grounded.” For this reason, Stanley
argues that the literary competencies of Paul’s audience are a necessary element in
the discussion of echo, and on this matter he critiques Hays’s optimistic
assumptions. Stanley does not believe Paul’s audience would have been capable of
perceiving the kinds of echoes Hays identifies in the letters of Paul. This debate
between those whose sympathies reside with either the author or the early audience
question whether it is possible to hold Hays’s five loci in creative tension without
being more specific about the nature of the critical project.

The echogenesis debate between Porter and Stanley involves only two of

100 Christopher D. Stanley, “Pearls before Swine’: Did Paul’s Audiences Understand His Biblical Quotations?,” Novum Testamentum 41, no. 2 (1999): 144.
Hays’s five loci, which suggests that broader hermeneutical questions must be asked of Hays’s larger project. Is an echo that existed in the minds of the original readers (Hays’s second locus) similar to an echo that exists only in the mind of a contemporary communities of interpretation (Hays’s fifth locus)? Hays’s willingness to hold these loci in creative tension presumes so, but these are different kinds of hermeneutical interests, and they require unique critical competencies. Historically oriented scholars need not address whether a particular reading of Paul “offers a good account of the experience of a contemporary community of competent readers,” and such communities need not necessarily address whether Paul intended such a message or whether his readers could have understood it.102 While Hays appreciates that these different kinds of hermeneutical possibilities exist, uniting them under a single framework overextends the critical capacity of the figure of echo.

Finally, by distinguishing quotations, allusions, and echoes in both formal and functional ways, Hollander and Hays raise the question of the relationship between form and function. When Hays summarizes Hollander’s discussion of transumption and provides a functional definition for echo, nothing about his definition requires the formal qualities he has already associated with echoes. Are not-so-subtle allusions incapable of figuration? I can see no reason why such allusions as outlined by Hollander and Hays should preclude the function they

102The quote comes from Hays’s test, “Satisfaction,” and the second clause isolates two questions Hays includes in his fifth text, “Historical Plausibility.” Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 30–32.
attribute solely to the figure of echo. Hollander and Hays appear to use two separate frameworks to distinguish quotations, allusions, and echoes, but the boundaries of each framework do not align. Other scholars have recognized and attempted to refine Hays’s problematic distinctions between quotations, allusions, and echoes, but these alternative proposals perpetuate the confusion of formal and functional qualities, and this only further exacerbates the problem.  

The discussion of allusion below will correct this problem and eliminate the formal/functional confusion. 

Despite the prominence of Hays’s work and its enthusiastic reception in the field, the figure of echo Hays develops in his introduction is problematic. It is important to clarify that this critique does not address Hays’s exegesis of Paul’s letters. Due to its limited scope, this project does not examine the degree to which Hays’s theory and method implicitly undergirds the exegetical judgments that he makes, though he admits he does not use his own criteria explicitly. It is also peripheral to this study to evaluate the cogency of those judgments. The viability of Hays theory is a matter separate from the persuasiveness of Hays’s exegesis. Both Hollander and Hays combine formal and functional qualities in problematic ways and insufficiently address what generates the echo. These weaknesses invite a more productive theory, an alternative critical framework.

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104 Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 29–32.
Allusion

What is an allusion? To answer this question—particularly to answer this question for the field of biblical studies—one should identify what the field generally assumes about allusion and consider how literary theory would have us critically evaluate these assumptions. In order to foreground what distinguishes the way biblical studies understands allusion, one must provide a generic conceptual backdrop. Joseph Pucci has written the most thorough historical study of allusion, and he identifies three working premises that “are part of the immutable fabric of Western conceptualizing about allusion.” He writes, “The allusion is (1) a species of reference that (2) refers, covertly or not, by (3) borrowing.” With this preliminary definition in mind, the distinctive emphases and assumptions of allusion as generally understood in biblical studies will stand out in relief.

Allusion in Biblical Studies

Scholars in biblical studies generally recognize and privilege three attributes of allusion: an identifiable form, an active and intentional author, and a passive and receptive reader. Armin Lange and Matthais Weigold provide this kind of definition in the introduction to their book-length catalog, Biblical Quotations and Allusions in Second Temple Jewish Literature. They write, “Allusions are employments of anterior texts in which the anterior text is still linguistically

recognizable in the posterior text but not morphologically identical with it.\textsuperscript{106} The emphasis on morphological similarity highlights the formal features of the allusion. The posterior text resembles the linguistic structure of the anterior text. Though obscured by a nominalization, the author is active in this definition as the agent who employs anterior texts. By contrast, the reader is a passive figure who recognizes the allusion. Hollander and Hays’s understanding of allusion also recognizes these formal, authorial, and readerly attributes of allusion. Regarding its form, Hays situates the allusion on a spectrum between explicit quotations and subliminal echoes.\textsuperscript{107} He says that the allusion, though presumably implicit, is still more “obvious” than the echo, and this is likely due to the allusion’s greater degree of formal correspondence with the anterior text.\textsuperscript{108} Hollander emphasizes form by describing the allusion as a “fragmentary or periphrastic” reference.\textsuperscript{109} Both Hays and Hollander identify authorial intention as an essential feature of allusion. As Hays expresses it, “The concept of allusion depends both on the notion of authorial intention and on the assumption that the reader will share with the author the requisite ‘portable library’ to recognize the source of the allusion.”\textsuperscript{110} This


\textsuperscript{107}Hays, \textit{Echoes of Scripture}, 23.

\textsuperscript{108}Hays, \textit{Echoes of Scripture}, 29.

\textsuperscript{109}Hollander, \textit{The Figure of Echo}, 64.

\textsuperscript{110}Hays, \textit{Echoes of Scripture}, 29. See also Hollander, \textit{The Figure of Echo}, 64.
understanding of allusion, like the one before it, presents the author as an agent who intends and the reader as a passive figure who recognizes the allusion.

The understanding of allusion that emphasizes an identifiable form, an active and intentional author, and a passive and receptive reader proves inadequate even from within biblical studies. A comparison of the book produced by Lange and Weigold with the book produced by Hays help illustrate the inadequacy of this definition. Lange and Weigold’s book contains lists for whenever a Second Temple text quotes or alludes to an anterior biblical text. They provide no commentary on the identified quotations or allusions beyond indicating the trajectory of the literary influence. The definition for allusion above—what I call the formal definition—demands nothing more of them than that they make this formal identification. Despite its own formal definition for allusion, Hays’s book is remarkably different with little interest in lists or mere identification and with greater interest in providing extended commentary exploring the figurative effects of echoes. The formal definition for allusion does not take into account these figurative effects—how are they generated? how are they perceived? what are their interpretive boundaries, if any?—which is why Hays’s introduction contains an additional definition with different attributes: “Allusive echo functions to suggest to the reader that text B should be understood in light of a broad interplay with text A, encompassing aspects of A beyond those explicitly echoed.” As observed above,

nothing about this definition should be unique to the figure of echo. The fact that Hays qualifies echoes as *allusive* while accentuating their figurative effects suggests that he is attributing to the figure of echo a function that is actually native to the concept of allusion.\textsuperscript{112} While Hays devotes a fair amount of his introduction to developing a methodology that serves—at least in part—his formal understanding of allusion and echo, he admits that his book is less occupied with this methodology and thus with the formal features of the allusions and echoes he identifies.\textsuperscript{113} Beyond his introduction, Hays explores the allusive function of Paul’s use of the Old Testament that is featured in this alternative definition. Hays own work establishes the need to formulate a functional definition for allusion, one that accounts for realities beyond form.

The functional definition Hays provides for allusive echo is worth comparing to the three attributes described above in the formal definition of allusion in biblical studies. As already observed, Hays’s functional definition trades the traditional focus on literary form for literary function. Nothing in the functional definition describes any formal criteria for recognizing textual interplay. It does acknowledge that the association with text A is broader than what explicitly appears in text B—perhaps suggesting fragmentary or periphrastic borrowing—but nothing else in this definition implies anything about literary form. Just as form disappears in

\textsuperscript{112}I agree with Porter’s pragmatic judgment that in Hays’s work the “echo is tantamount to allusion.” Porter, “Allusions and Echoes,” 36.

\textsuperscript{113}Hays, *Echoes of Scripture*, 29, 32.
the functional definition, so also does the author as an agent who intends. The definition contains no verbs for which the author could function as agent. The reader, by contrast, has grown in prominence as the agent of a main verb. It is significant, however, that Hays chooses a passive construction, as though the reader must remain passive. The allusive echo is the agent of a suggestion to which the reader is direct object and passive recipient. Only implicitly will the grammar acknowledge the agency of the reader as one who understands a broad interplay between texts. By altering the construction from passive to active, the radical implications for the reader come into greater focus: an allusion functions to suggest that the reader understand text B in light of a broad interplay with text A, encompassing aspects of A beyond those explicitly echoed. This definition does not stipulate any limits to which the reader’s understanding may be subjected. This raises interesting questions about agency and the roles of author and reader. Compared with the three attributes biblical scholars traditionally associate with allusion, the attributes that emerge from Hays’s alternative definition are subversive.

Just as Hays’s project demonstrates the need from a New Testament perspective for an understanding of allusion that pushes beyond literary form to focus on function, this same need exists for work in Hebrew Bible. Given the numerous concerns I raised above concerning the language of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, scholars should seriously consider the degree to which the language of allusion could serve as its replacement. With Hays’s functional definition
in mind, consider the language Kugel uses as he reacts to Fishbane’s inaccurate use of the term exegesis. Though Kugel is focused on a single example, he eventually applies the point broadly: “The interesting question to ask about these two texts is \textit{how one might go about formulating their relationship}. It is certainly not what one might properly call exegetical. . . . \textit{It is an evocation, an argument by analogy.}”\textsuperscript{114}

Kugel and Hays are both interested in the relationship—the interplay, evocation, or analogy—which the reader perceives. This function is what Kugel identifies as Fishbane’s larger project. Citing Kugel’s critique, Sommer recommends replacing Fishbane’s use of exegesis with allusion to more accurately describe the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{115} It may not be possible to designate as an allusion every textual relationship Fishbane and others have identified in their contributions to the study of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, especially considering some of its broader conceptualizations. But I concur with Sommer that allusion is the operating category when, in keeping with Fishbane’s original project and specifically his category of aggadic exegesis, allusion is understood more narrowly. Adopting allusion in this way would methodologically unite Hebrew Bible and New Testament studies together along with those who study non-biblical Second Temple Literature (e.g., exemplified in the broader focus of Lange and Weigold’s project) and those

\textsuperscript{114}Kugel, “The Bible's Earliest Interpreters,” 280, emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{115}More precisely, Sommer recommends replacing inner-biblical exegesis with inner-biblical allusion, but I have already expressed my concerns about using inner-biblical in the discussion of these matters. Sommer, “Exegesis, Allusion and Intertextuality,” 488n23.
who study the literature of the ancient Near East. Additionally, by making allusion the operating category for biblical studies and related disciplines to discuss what is otherwise known as intertextuality, inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, and echoes, we create a space for cross-disciplinary dialogue with literary studies.

It remains for biblical studies to assess critically its different conceptions of allusion, specifically to address the balance between form and function and the conflict between the agency of author and reader. A recurring theme in this work is that biblical scholarship has a tendency to engage literary theory superficially, employing avant-garde terminology as though it were conventional discourse and citing innovative theoreticians for less-than-innovative—if not idiosyncratic—purposes. In *Legal Revision*, Levinson claims that “contemporary theory has all but divorced itself from the study of Scripture” and that “this absence of dialogue with Biblical Studies impoverishes contemporary theory in disciplines across the humanities and deprives it of intellectual models that would actually advance its own project.” Though Levinson is talking about the study of canon and not directly that of allusion, I question whether it is fair for Levinson to assign blame solely to contemporary theory. As I have demonstrated, biblical studies has a tendency to

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116 Christopher Hays desired to do this with Richard Hays’s category of echo. Hays, “Echoes of the Ancient Near East?”

divorce itself from the practices of other disciplines. By neglecting to dialogue with literary theory about allusion, biblical studies has deprived itself of intellectual models that would advance its own project. In what follows, I aim to reinvigorate a cross-disciplinary dialogue between biblical studies and literary theory on allusion.

**Allusion in Literary Theory**

Work in literary theory, while often neglected in biblical studies, is not entirely unrepresented. For example, Hays engages the work of Hollander and essentially adopts his understanding of the figure of echo. By attending to figurative aspects of allusions and echoes emphasized in Hollander’s work, Hays has enriched the field of biblical studies. But when an individual interlocutor like Hollander does not represent the broad interests of allusion in literary theory, the dialogue between fields of study is impoverished.\(^{118}\) Alternatively, Sommer's book *A Prophet Reads Scripture* represents a more enriched understanding of allusion. He relies primarily on Ziva Ben-Porat's article “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” which exemplifies broader concerns that have been raised in literary theory.\(^{119}\) Additionally, Sommer’s work engages other theorists who enrich his overall understanding of allusion.\(^{120}\) Developments in the ongoing discussion of allusion in literary theory require us to

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\(^{118}\)Hollander’s failure to achieve his specific aim and to impact literary theory is discussed in Pucci, *The Full-Knowing Reader*, 20–21.


continue the dialogue Sommer began. In the discussion below, I engage the work of scholars who represent diverse interests and productive trends in the study of allusion. The purpose of this dialogue is to enable biblical scholarship to address better the relation of form and function and to mediate the conflict between author and reader.

**Relating form and function.** The discussion above of allusion in biblical studies revealed a disconnect between form and function. In some instances, as with Lange and Weigold, scholars focus exclusively on form and neglect to address the unique interpretive dimensions of allusion, namely how an allusion functions in a text. In other instances, as with Hays, scholars discuss both form and function but fail to address how form and function are related to one another. In the case of Hays, the formal divisions that he identifies do not align with the functional distinctions he observes. Biblical scholarship can gain a better grasp for how one might relate form and function by broadly engaging literary theory.

There is a difference between common intuition and theory where allusion is concerned. “Literary critics refer to [allusion], usually, basing their usage of the term on their linguistic intuition rather than on a clear notion of what ‘allusion’ signifies as a technical term in literary study.”\(^{121}\) When Ben-Porat wrote this comment, the representative definition for allusion in literary theory could be found in the *Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*: “Tacit reference to another literary work,

\(^{121}\)Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 105.
to another art, to history, to contemporary figures, or the like.” Describing allusion as a covert or implicit form of reference captures only the most basic instincts of the English term. Ben-Porat and other literary critics aimed at exploring more theoretically informed possibilities for understanding allusion.

Theoretical reflection on allusion since the 1970s has has focused on how allusion functions by virtue of its two fields of signification. The two scholars primarily responsible for this emphasis are Ben-Porat and Gian Biagio Conte. Ben-Porat defines allusion as

a device for the simultaneous activation of two texts. The activation is achieved through the manipulation of a special signal: a sign (simple or complex) in a given text characterized by an additional larger ‘referent.’ This referent is always an independent text. The simultaneous activation of the two texts thus connected results in the formation of intertextual patterns whose nature cannot be predetermined.

In Ben-Porat’s definition, the reader perceives a marker in a text that functions as a sign referring to another text. Carmela Perri, building upon Ben-Porat’s work, describes the sign as a double reference, one that “refers within its text’s world as well as allusively, to some referent outside this text.”

Ben-Porat further argues the
referents within these two worlds are independent and potentially incompatible with
one another.126 These two worlds are always incompatible, at least to some degree,
according to Conte. He compares allusion to a rhetorical trope (e.g., a metaphor), a
figure that is produced by dislodging a term from its familiar semantic environment
and situating it in a new and unfamiliar semantic setting. “Thus allusion works in
just the same way. . . . The gap in figurative language that opens between ‘letter’ and
‘sense’ is also created in allusion between that which is said (as it first appears), a
letter, and the thought evoked, the sense.”127 Both Ben-Porat and Conte recognize
within allusion two simultaneous fields of signification.

The theory of the French structuralist Michael Riffaterre complements
Conte’s perspective in helpful ways, framing the discussion particularly from the
perspective of a reader.128 For Riffaterre, “semantic indirection” occurs within the
poetic text—or in our case the allusive text—and this indirection “threaten[s] the
literary representation of reality, or mimesis.”129 He refers to the features that create


127Gian Biagio Conte, The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and

128Richard Garner, who adopts Conte’s equation of allusion and metaphor, likewise
incorporates Riffaterre’s work. Richard Garner, From Homer to Tragedy: The Art of Allusion in
Greek Poetry (London: Routledge, 1990), 5.

129Riffaterre is developing a “semiotics of poetry,” but he specifically lists as one of “three
possible ways for semantic indirection to occur” the indirection produced by displacing, which is
“when the sign shifts from one meaning to another, when one word ‘stands for’ another, as happens
with metaphor and metonymy.” Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry, Advances in Semiotics
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 2. Literary critics and biblical scholars alike have
semantic indirection as “ungrammaticalities.” These features undermine the reader’s experience of verisimilitude or otherwise introduce contradiction and nonsense.  

When readers fail to make sense of the text according to its plain sense, they pursue alternative solutions. According to Riffaterre,

> The ungrammaticalities spotted at the mimetic level are eventually integrated into another system. As the reader perceives what they have in common, as he becomes aware that this common trait forms them into a paradigm, and that this paradigm alters the meaning of the poem, the new function of the ungrammaticalities changes their nature, and now they signify as components of a different network of relationships. . . . Everything related to this integration of signs from the mimesis level into the higher level of significance is a manifestation of *semiosis*.  

Riffaterre describes this semiotic process as the result of two stages of reading. Readers in the “heuristic” stage apprehend the plain sense of the words, phrases and sentences of the text, what Riffaterre refers to as their meaning. In so doing, they discover ungrammaticalities in the text that create an obstacle to mimesis, forcing readers to discover a fuller or figurative sense. Readers in the “retroactive” stage of reading now discover, through comparison or combination, the thematic or symbolic relationship between the plain and fuller senses of the text, what Riffaterre refers to as its significance. Riffaterre stresses that, “whereas units of meaning may be words


or phrases or sentences, *the unit of significance is the text.*”¹³²

Regarding the significance or meaning created by an allusion, Ben-Porat and Conte propose distinct ideas. Conte speaks of a “competition” between the literal and figurative senses that “produces a single more complex reality.”¹³³ The allusion according to Conte reflects a triadic arrangement, thesis (literal), antithesis, (sense), and synthesis (single more complex reality). Whereas Conte understands the complex effect of the allusion as singular and thus determined, Ben-Porat allows for greater indeterminacy. The reader identifies a sign containing something of another text, something that evokes elements from the evoked text not directly referenced by the allusion. These indirectly evoked elements form “intertextual patterns,” which means they do not predetermine in a singular way how a reader must understand an allusion. To speak in Kristevian terms, Ben-Porat’s allusion is dialogical; it has a double value. Different patterns of meaning are possible for readers who perceive the allusion, and it is the function of allusion to signify in this way. Regardless of whether one favors Ben-Porat or Conte, both theoretical conceptions of allusion function or signify by virtue of two simultaneous fields of signification.

One can illustrate the discussion thus far by applying the theoretical dimensions of allusion to the Yhwh creed that appears in Exodus 34:6-7 and Jonah

¹³²Riffaterre, *Semiotics of Poetry,* 6, emphasis original.

4:2. I have elsewhere argued that Jonah 4:2 is directly dependent on Exodus 34:6, not indirectly through Joel 2:13 as Hebrew Bible scholars generally argue.\textsuperscript{134} While readers may instinctively recognize the shared language, this recognition alone—a formal observation—does not constitute an allusion. Using Riffaterre’s terminology and concept, Cynthia Edenburg identifies the extended nature of Jonah’s dialogue in 4:2 as an ungrammaticality because it contrasts with Jonah’s otherwise generally concise dialogue.\textsuperscript{135} More significant to my mind is the distinction she makes between the liturgical nature of the Yhwh creed and the non-liturgical transformation it experiences in the mouth of Jonah. This amounts to what Conte describes as ironic allusion in which “the foreign body remains distinct from, and hostile to, the coherent design of the whole work within which it ‘refuses’ to be integrated.”\textsuperscript{136} To reframe Conte’s description for the purposes of this illustration, the liturgical language of Jonah’s dialogue remains hostile to its narrative context where Jonah is accusing and not praising or confessing Yhwh. This allows the Yhwh creed to function by virtue of two fields of signification. Within the first field lies the immediate literary context, the narrative of the reluctant prophet Jonah and his angry accusation. Within the second field lies the distant or anterior liturgical


\textsuperscript{136}Conte, \textit{The Rhetoric of Imitation}, 88.
literary context of covenant renewal, the revelation to Moses of the divine name and the positive traits of Yhwh’s character that give new hope to Israel despite their unfaithfulness. Conte speaks of a single more complex reality created by the tension between these two fields, a synthesis of the two contexts. Thomas Dozeman suggests this reality may be the knowledge “that Yahweh’s gracious character and even covenant renewal itself have universal implications.”137 I have suggested that significance can be found in the fact that Jonah intentionally truncates the Yhwh creed at the word ‘faithfulness’ (אמות). Jonah son of Amittai (בן-אמתי) refuses to recognize the one divine attribute after which he has been named because Yhwh has allowed Yhwh’s gracious and compassionate character to spare Israel’s Assyrian enemies. Jonah believes that Yhwh has not acted in faithfulness to Israel.138 Who is to say which allusive reading is the correct one? Perhaps Ben-Porat is correct that the allusion itself cannot predetermine the nature of the intertextual patterns that arise from an allusion, and it is unnecessary to attempt to mediate between two strong allusive readings. I will discuss this matter further in the section on mediating author and reader. This brief example illustrates how one could apply literary theory to a well-known allusion in the Hebrew Bible.

What remains in this discussion of relating form and function is specific attention to the question of form and its relative importance as a characteristic of


allusion. According to Ben-Porat, the formal aspects involved in the process of recognizing and interpreting the allusion are minor: “Identification of veiled referents and realization of by-products do partake in the actualization of a literary allusion; but they constitute only a small part of the process.”¹³⁹ She also implies that the form of the marker, by which she means “the element or pattern belonging to another independent text,” can take a variety of forms: “In terms of the end product, the formation of intertextual patterns, the marker—regardless of the form it takes—is used for the activation of independent elements from the evoked text.”¹⁴⁰ According to Ben-Porat, one should not define allusion exclusively on the basis of its form since form is a minor aspect of the larger concept, and her theory suggests that a variety of forms could contribute to the function of an allusion. Pucci argues that Conte and other critics (presumably Ben-Porat) have conceptualized allusion in ways that are too broad and subjective. On the question of what form borrowing takes, he aims to “restrict and limit the notion” claiming “(1) that the borrowing involved in literary allusion always involves language shared between two literary works; (2) that this borrowing is specific and verifiable, that is, it points to a discrete moment in a prior work; and (3) that this borrowing cannot be quantified.”¹⁴¹ While Pucci’s claims provide definition to the question of form, I am uncomfortable with them insofar as


¹⁴⁰Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 108–9, emphasis added.

¹⁴¹Pucci, The Full-Knowing Reader, 30. See pp. 30–32.
they sever the theoretical link between literary allusion and other modes of cultural allusion. Furthermore, Pucci’s first two claims do not readily apply to the multilingual literary environment of the ancient Near East where allusions may transgress the boundaries of a single language. In the next chapter, I articulate criteria for identifying and tracing literary allusion and reevaluate how biblical studies should understand the role of shared language. Despite problems with Pucci’s more restrictive view, his third point justifiably calls into question the basic methodology of the Lange and Weigold book, which relies exclusively on a quantitative methodology, thus privileging form over function. Therefore, one can conclude on the basis of this survey of theoretical perspectives that the primary characteristic of an allusion is the way in which it functions by virtue of two fields of signification and that form is a matter of secondary importance.

Mediating author and reader. In Lange and Weigold’s formal definition of allusion, the author functioned as an agent who intends and the reader as a passive figure who recognizes the allusion. This authorial agency was also true in Hays’s formal definition, but his functional definition set up a conflict in that it transformed

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142 At the 2013 annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Christoph Uehlinger presented a paper addressing possible ancient Near Eastern text-iconographic allusions. I remain open to allowing a mutual influence between literary and other modes of allusion, especially at the level of theory. Christoph Uehlinger, “Subtle Citations? Identifying and Evaluating Interplays between Images and Texts” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Baltimore, MD, November 26, 2013).

the reader into an active agent and neglected to address the author’s agency, either positively or negatively. A primarily functional understanding of allusion necessarily entails a more active role for readers by introducing “dynamic elements” into the discussion which “[force] active interpretation.” Emphasizing function leaves us with the question of how to mediate between the agency of a reader and author.

Of the theorists discussed above, Conte emphasizes the author’s creative agency in a way that minimizes—if not nearly eliminating—the creative agency of the reader. Conte acknowledges that “the concept of allusion is frequently extended far beyond its legitimate confines” and he aims for his work to “purge any excess of intentionalism.” In other words, he is interested in distinguishing unmotivated associations between texts from genuine authorial intention. Conte emphasizes the motivated dimension of the allusion by contrasting it with Saussure’s notion of the arbitrary nature of the sign: “Whereas the literal meaning of a term . . . is normally arbitrary, that is, imposed by the arbitrary conventions of the language, its figurative expression, subjected to the trope . . . is substantially motivated; it is the result of a choice, not of an imposition, and it is a poet’s way of avoiding the imposition of conventional language.” By contrasting the substantially motivated trope with the normally arbitrary linguistic sign, he closes the door Saussure opened to structural indeterminacy, establishing the allusion as a figure operating within a closed system.

144 Garner, *From Homer to Tragedy*, 5.

145 Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation*, 50, emphasis original.
Within this closed system it is only the poet or author who operates; the reader observes from without.\textsuperscript{146} Having established the poetic or authorial motivation behind the creation of the allusion, Conte equates this motivated intention with the significance or meaning created by the allusion. This equation unites the poet’s known intentions with the reader’s interpretation: “In the art of allusion, as in every rhetorical figure, the poetry lies in the simultaneous presence of two different realities that try to indicate a single reality. The single reality can perhaps never be defined directly, but it is specific and is known to the poet.”\textsuperscript{147} While Conte’s understanding of allusion stresses the allusion’s two fields of signification and requires the presence of a reader capable of transcending and synthesizing these two fields, the reader as agent does not contribute to the figural dimensions of the allusion.

As observed above, Ben-Porat understands the significance or meaning created by an allusion in a way distinct from that of Conte, and this distinction ultimately stems from an alternative understanding of the relationship between author and reader. Unlike Conte, Ben-Porat does not explicitly invoke authorial agency in discussing allusion, though one can infer that some authorial agency is involved in creating the allusion. By examining how Ben-Porat frames the role of the reader, we can identify the unstated operations of the author and mediate between

\textsuperscript{146}Pucci, \textit{The Full-Knowing Reader}, 38.

\textsuperscript{147}Conte, \textit{The Rhetoric of Imitation}, 38.
the agency of reader and author in her poetics of literary allusion. I will continue to use the allusion to Exodus 34:6 in Jonah 4:2 to illustrate the application of Ben-Porat’s theory to an allusion in the Hebrew Bible.

Ben-Porat heuristically outlines four stages a reader experiences in determining the presence of and interpreting an allusion.148 In the first stage, readers recognize a marker that refers to an independent text. This marker may or may not correspond verbally to the marked material in the evoked text; verbal correspondence, where it occurs, can vary by degree. Jonah’s allusion to Exodus (Jonah 4:2//Exod 34:6) reverses terminology and truncates the marked text, replacing key terms with additional allusive markers.149 This variability does not ultimately prevent readers from actualizing the allusion. Second, readers identify the evoked text. This second stage distinguishes itself from the first stage when a text contains an obvious marker but its referent is not immediately obvious. Scholars have long debated whether Jonah is directly alluding to Exodus 34:6 or whether his words allude more directly to Joel 2:13-14 (which would itself then be a direct allusion to Exodus 34:6). The need to determine the trajectory of influence in a case like this represents Ben-Porat’s second stage.150 In the third stage, readers modify


149 See Figure 1 in Kelly, “Joel, Jonah, and the Yhwh Creed,” 807.

150 I work this particular problem out in my article, Kelly, “Joel, Jonah, and the Yhwh Creed.”
their understanding of the marker in the alluding text based on their interpretation of the marked in the evoked text. The interaction between the two texts generates a new understanding of the marker, an understanding not achieved when the marker is interpreted exclusively within the frame of reference of the alluding text. For Ben-Porat, once readers complete the third stage they have confirmed the presence of an allusion. Both Dozeman and I have proposed interpretations, briefly mentioned above, that could not be achieved if the marker of the Yhwh creed were understood exclusively within the frame of reference of the alluding text. The fourth stage represents an unnecessary though common feature of literary allusions. In it, readers’ focus shifts from the marker and the marked to their corresponding texts as related wholes. The reader incorporates features beyond the marker or the marked when considering the significance of the interplay between alluding and evoked texts. My interpretation demonstrates this, to a degree, in that I identify the absence of a word from the marker, present in the evoked text, as hermeneutically significant and meaningful.

Of the four stages Ben-Porat outlines for the reader’s process of actualizing a literary allusion, the author’s agency plays a determining role only in the first two stages. In the first and second stages, readers recognize an author’s marker in the text, and the author’s place in literary history precludes the identification of a literary work that did not yet exist or would not have been accessible to the author. Perri, who builds upon Ben-Porat’s poetics of allusion, discusses speech act theory to
express the conventions underlying allusion, and she lists a number of illocutionary rules for alluding. Among these rules she includes “the alluding author and his audience share the same language and cultural tradition” and “the author intends that the allusion-marker’s echo will identify the source text for the audience. (We need this rule to disqualify unconscious echoes from counting as allusion-markers.)”

Neither Ben-Porat or Perri recognize the author’s agency beyond establishing the historical structure that gives rise to the allusion. The allusion becomes present only after a reader completes Ben-Porat’s third stage which “results in the formation of intertextual patterns whose nature cannot be predetermined.”

It does not necessarily follow that an author will not have understood the interaction between the two texts in a particular way, only that the author has no way of reducing the intertextual patterns of this interaction to a singular value. For Ben-Porat, an author’s agency is dominant in establishing a connection between two texts, but an author cannot predetermine the significance or meaning a reader will construct from this allusion.

Pucci represents the most contemporary voice reflecting on and advocating for the agency of both author and reader in an allusion. Like Ben-Porat and Perri, his understanding of allusion requires both author and reader, but he is more explicit in acknowledging their roles, distinguishing them from one another, and identifying

\footnotesize


how they occasion interpretive constraint and freedom. According to his theory, the
dual-intentionality of the allusion allows the author and reader to share creative
agency. The author “intends the potential for meaning” while the reader “intends the
actualization of that potential.” In this way he avoids making the text itself an
agent of the allusion (i.e., this text intends to allude . . . ); the allusion “is not some
free-floating mass of literary potential, autotelically actualizing itself, but rather a
discrete literary phenomenon that partakes of the intentionalites of both reader and
author, a phenomenon that arises in the collusion of literary works, desires, and
intents—not despite them.” By attributing to the reader intentions of interpretive
significance, he avoids making an author’s intentions the only relevant matter to
consult for ascertaining the significance of the allusion. Furthermore, the critic’s
access to the author’s intentions are limited to the author’s language alone which
“makes possible but does not determine the creation, function, or conceivable
interpretations of the allusion.” According to Pucci, the creation of the allusion
also involves the reader who recognizes, associates, and fully engages two similar
literary works. “This unique engagement is the expansion of reading, wherein the

153 Pucci, The Full-Knowing Reader, 40.

154 Pucci, The Full-Knowing Reader, 46. See also Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory:
Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: TCU Press, 1976), 30.

155 The failure to avoid this error is known as the intentional fallacy, classically expressed
in W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon:

156 Pucci, The Full-Knowing Reader, 36.
reader considers specific images, themes, symbols,” which allow the reader “to consider a panoply of potential meanings for [the allusion], some of them grounded in the language of the allusion, some of them grounded more liberally in an interpretive free for all occasioned, but not controlled, by the allusion’s language.”

While he recognizes the creative agency of both author and reader, it is ultimately the reader whose agency is responsible for the interpretive significance of the allusion. To this end he speaks of a reader’s “full-knowledge” which does not exhaust the potential significance of an allusion but highlights “the gusto, the power, the purity of the moment in which the allusion’s meaning is constructed, its limitlessness, the burgeoning of potential meanings, all playing for attention.” In the final analysis, Pucci’s offers this definition for allusion:

The literary allusion is the verbal moment in a subsequent text of a specific and verifiable verbal moment in a prior text, generated through the collusion of authorial and readerly intent, neither controlled nor limited by the language that constitutes it, in which a bundle of potential meanings obtains, retrievable at any given time only in part.

The burgeoning of potential meanings that Pucci speaks of raises a concern for critical interpretation, which more often than not aims to produce persuasive readings. Critical interpretation does not celebrate meaning as an essentially subjective matter, so how can it accommodate an understanding of

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158 Pucci, *The Full-Knowing Reader*, xi; see also 43–44.

159 Pucci, *The Full-Knowing Reader*, 47.
allusion that remains open to many diverse readings? According to Gregory Machacek in his review of Pucci’s book,

The next step in allusion studies must be the acknowledgment not only of the reader but of interpretive communities and traditions. A reader notices an allusion because he or she shares a literary tradition with the alluding author. A critic may attempt to make his or her reading of a particular allusion a part of the interpretive tradition of the work in question. This attempt is no less legitimate than any other interpretive effort, but it involves an act of persuasion that cannot be circumvented by simply assuming full-knowing like-mindedness on the part of the critical community.¹⁶⁰

It is important to point out that Machacek is not arguing that interpretive communities or traditions establish the only legitimate kind of interpretive effort; rather, he is suggesting that such communities may discover or create the conditions upon which critics within a discipline may attempt to persuade others that their reading belongs to a particular community or tradition.

Biblical studies traditionally values the reconstruction of the past, which is why it tends to privilege the intentions and agency of the author. For this reason, the discipline would likely prefer the theory of Conte over that of Ben-Porat, Perri, and Pucci. But I suggest this concedes too many valuable insights concerning the agency of the reader that should not be precluded from the discussion. Stephen Hinds, who appreciates the authorial subjectivity permitted by Conte, provides another option. His discussion allows the essential insights of Ben-Porat and others to remain but suggests that this understanding of allusion should

[embrace] the fact (i.e. rather than occluding it) that one of the most persistent ways in which . . . readers construct the meaning of a poetic text is by attempting to construct from (and for) it an intention-bearing authorial voice, a construction which they generally hope or believe (in a belief which must always be partly misguided) to be a reconstruction; and the author thus (re)constructed is one who writes towards an implied reader who will attempt such a (re)construction.\textsuperscript{161}

What Hinds proposes does not deny the importance of the agency of the reader and the limitation of an author’s actual intentions to the language of the text, but it further recognizes authorial and readerly assumptions about meaning that invite humble attempts at reconstructing authorial intent. He goes on to insist that critics “must remain intuitively resistant to the conceptualization and description of actual authorial initiative” and that their vocabulary “can never be truly hospitable to the possibilities of tendentiousness, quirkiness or shear surprise which add spice to the allusive practices of real authors.”\textsuperscript{162} In other words, critics can never access or accurately reconstruct the real intentions of real authors. Nevertheless, they can belong to a literary tradition that speaks of an intention-bearing authorial voice and submit their readings to the critical analysis of this interpretive community.

\textbf{Assessing Allusion}

This discussion has revealed assumptions about allusion in biblical studies as well as ways in which literary theory can enhance how biblical scholars carry out the study of allusion. First, biblical scholars must speak primarily of the function of

\textsuperscript{161}Stephen Hinds, \textit{Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry}, Roman Literature and Its Contexts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 49.

\textsuperscript{162}Hinds, \textit{Allusion and Intertext}, 50.
allusion, how it signifies by virtue of two fields of signification. A primarily functional understanding of allusion requires that matters of form occupy a secondary status. Second, biblical scholars must attend to how they understand the agency of both author and reader. On this point, the theoretical discussion allows those in biblical studies to explore multiple options. Does the intention-bearing authorial voice determine the figural limits of an allusion, or might a reader actualize the potential of meaning constructed by the author? In the latter situation, is the object to construct an intention-bearing authorial voice that will persuade an interpretive community or is it to explore—without exhausting—the allusion’s potential for meaning? By attending to these questions raised by the understanding of allusion in literary theory, biblical studies is better situated to adopt a critical understanding of allusion while benefiting from and contributing to a cross-disciplinary dialogue.

**Conclusion**

Saussurean linguistics teaches us that words, as linguistic signs, do not have any positive meaning, that they consist of an arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified. Juliet’s question—What’s in a name?—could be understood as a challenge to the purpose of these past two chapters. Why should biblical studies concern itself with whether scholars adopt the vocabulary of intertextuality, inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, echoes, or allusion? Why not embrace a discipline-by-any-other-name mentality that welcomes all of these perspectives? This
mentality assumes that despite the diverse nomenclature, biblical scholars are essential signifying a single field of study. Simply put, they are not. This chapter has demonstrated that with each name the basic understanding and assumptions of this discipline change and that many of these assumptions are problematic and require reconsideration. As the field currently exists in its plurality of forms, there can be no vocabulary that allows us to speak of it in a comprehensive way.

I have suggested biblical studies overcome the unnecessary plurality and theoretical incoherence within the discipline by adopting the language and theory of literary allusion. By making allusion the operating category for biblical studies and related disciplines to discuss what is otherwise known as intertextuality, inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, and echoes, a space opens up for an enriching and mutually beneficial cross-disciplinary dialogue with literary studies. Having discussed the theoretical concepts associated with literary allusion, it remains for me to address the question of methodology.
CHAPTER 5
IDENTIFYING ALLUSIONS

Introduction

We might for our purposes define parallelomania as that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction. . . . It seems to me that we are at a junction when biblical scholarship should recognize parallelomania for the disease that it is. It is time to draw away from the extravagance which has always been a latent danger.¹

Without a basic model of literary production, I would argue, the philologist’s collecting of comparative and contrastive materials (loans, debts, parallels, etc.) suffers from what I may disrespectfully name “comparisonitis”—collecting for the sake of collecting.²

It should be possible for an interpreter to dismiss some similarities between texts as historically insignificant, lacking literary filiation. Connections may be coincidental, similarly focused but independently derived, products of stock language, or evidence of a shared cultural repertoire.³ But occasionally an


³Or, as Sandmel puts it, “It would seem to me to follow that, in dealing with similarities we can sometimes discover exact parallels, some with and some devoid of significance; seeming parallels which are so only imperfectly; and statements which can be called parallels only by taking them out of context.” Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” 7.
interpretive psychosis or an inflamed comparative methodology sets in, and scholars who succumb develop a certain lack of restraint when analyzing parallels and making comparisons. According to Samuel Sandmel, paralleloomania exaggerates the conclusions otherwise sane interpreters would draw regarding the sources and derivations of alleged parallels. It is interesting that Sandmel portrays this extravagance as a *psychological* disease. Romantic literary critics believed a psychological relationship linked discrete texts with the literary stream of tradition, and we have seen this view rearticulated in contemporary poetics through Harold Bloom’s *Anxiety of Influence*.⁴ One could argue that Sandmel’s disease is merely the critic experiencing and extending the anxiety of the poet, as Bloom does.

Every poem is a misinterpretation of a parent poem. A poem is not an overcoming of anxiety, but is that anxiety. Poets’ misinterpretations or poems are more drastic than critics’ misinterpretations or criticism, but this is only a difference in degree and not at all in kind. There are no interpretations but only misinterpretations, and so all criticism is prose poetry.⁵

However interesting this line of investigation, the fundamental question at hand concerns mechanics more than it concerns mentality.⁶ *How does one identify and trace literary allusion?* According to Gian Biagio Conte, interpreters suffer an inflamed tendency to collect comparative and contrastive materials in their natural state. The solution to controlling these inflamed tendencies, one could argue, is a

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⁶In his foreword to Gian Biagio Conte’s book, Charles Segal helpfully contrasts the “psychological” and the ‘literary’ ways of relating the discreteness of literary texts to the continuity of literary history,” Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation*, 7.
sound methodology.

“Theory, insofar as it has been assimilated at all in biblical studies, has been assimilated mainly as method. Theory has fueled the biblical-scholarly susceptibility to methodolatry and methodone addiction. Method is our madness.” 7

When Stephen Moore and Yvonne Sherwood accuse biblical studies of an obsession with method, they highlight as a prime example biblical studies’ appropriation of intertextuality and obsession with developing intertextual methods. 8 This obsession is understandable in the light of epidemic abuses like Sandmel’s parallelomania and Conte’s comparisonitis. Moore and Sherwood object to method functioning as “a cipher for ‘objectivity,’ ‘neutrality,’ ‘disinterestedness,’ and all the other related and foundational values of biblical studies as an academic discipline.” 9 In what follows, I discuss criteria for identifying allusions that do not guarantee objectivity, that function best when used judiciously as both guide and caution. I begin with a discussion of the most popular criteria used to identify allusions, and then I discuss the interplay of general and specific criteria.

Shared Language


8Moore and Sherwood, Invention, 34–35.

9Moore and Sherwood, Invention, 40.
Shared language is the most common general criterion upon which scholars claim to have identified a literary allusion, but it is often applied in ways that require reconsideration in light of the theory of allusion articulated in the previous chapter. The principle can be stated in this way: *When a text contains language similar or identical to an earlier text, this may indicate the patterning of the posterior text on the anterior text.* Interpreters generally tend to rely on the presence of shared language as the primary criteria for identifying an allusion. Armin Lange and Matthias Weigold’s book, *Biblical Quotations and Allusions in Second Temple Literature*, exemplifies an approach to identifying allusions that relies primarily on key-word association. The book contains an extensive catalog of “quotations and allusions” in Second Temple literature. The authors consulted lists already published, but the cumulative material was not as comprehensive as the catalog they desired to create, nor could they ensure the completeness and accuracy of these lists. They compiled their catalog with the aid of the software program Accordance. For each verse of the Hebrew Bible they performed a search for shared words. The criteria varied based on language and genre, but they required anywhere from two to six shared words while permitting one word ignored from the source text and one word added in the target text. While not all scholars interested in allusion rely as exclusively or mechanically on shared vocabulary, this resource

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underscores its fundamental significance for biblical scholarship.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{An Insufficient Criterion}

The exclusive or near-exclusive use of shared language as a criteria for identifying allusion creates a problem for the theory of allusion as developed in the previous chapter. When an allusion patterns itself on the text it evokes, this shared language represents a formal feature of the allusion. But identification based on formal features is insufficient considering the importance of the allusive function of shared language. Recalling Ziva Ben-Porat’s four stages of actualizing a literary allusion, a reader who identifies shared language can only have completed the first two stages: recognizing a marker and identifying the evoked text.\textsuperscript{12} Successful identification of an allusion turns on the third stage: readers must modify their understanding of the marker based on their interpretation of the marked in the evoked text. Only once an allusive function of the marker is detected can readers claim to have identified an allusion.\textsuperscript{13} Benjamin Sommer suggests that readers who do not transition from the second to the third stage identify an echo, a formal literary figure with less interpretive significance than allusion.\textsuperscript{14} Readers who identify

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13}Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 110–11.
\item \textsuperscript{14}According to Sommer’s proposal for categorizing a literary echo, the marked in the
\end{itemize}
shared language, no matter how extensive, cannot complete this third stage without additional considerations. This raises an important observation: the identification of allusions is a cumulative judgment on the part of a reader.¹⁵

A Nonessential Criterion

Given the progressive nature of Ben-Porat’s four stages, it makes sense to focus *initially* on formal criteria, like shared language, that help to establish literary borrowing or patterning before transitioning to questions of allusive functioning.¹⁶ A criterion based on shared language proposed by biblical scholars usually prefers relatively extensive shared language. Already, we have seen Lange and Weigold creating a verbal threshold below which they do not consider shared language allusive. In Michael Fishbane’s discussion of “aggadic exegesis,” a category Benjamin Sommer observes is more appropriately recognized as allusion,¹⁷ Fishbane proposes “the identification of aggadic exegesis . . . is proportionally increased to the extent evoked text does not impact interpretation. This differs from allusion which “consists not only in the echoing of an earlier text but in the utilization of the marked material for some rhetorical or strategic end.” Benjamin D. Sommer, *A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66, Conversations: Jews and Other Differences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 15, see also 15–17, 30–31.


¹⁶“Identification of veiled referents and realization of by-products do partake in the actualization of a literary allusion; but they constitute only a small part of the process.” Ben-Porat, “The Poetics of Literary Allusion,” 109.

that multiple and sustained lexical linkages between two texts can be recognized.”\textsuperscript{18} Citing Fishbane’s proposal, Jeffery M. Leonard praises the principle of shared language for providing “the most objective and verifiable criteria for identifying allusion.”\textsuperscript{19} All eight of his methodological guidelines concern shared language. Richard Hays’s criterion of “volume” is also relevant to this discussion: “The volume of an echo is determined primarily by the degree of explicit repetition of words or syntactical patterns.”\textsuperscript{20} He goes on to suggest other factors of consideration that I discuss below, but the emphasis in biblical studies generally belongs to shared language.

While shared language may help as an initial indication of a literary allusion, there is no need for allusions to meet a certain threshold of shared language. In cases like the use of Exodus 34:6 in Jonah 4:2, extensive shared language makes the identification of literary borrowing easy to recognize.\textsuperscript{21} But the reference to Exodus 34:6 would not be any more allusive if Jonah 4:2 provided a fuller reference by incorporating the noun “faithfulness” (נפש) from Exodus 34:6.


Nor would it be any less allusive if in addition to “faithfulness” (אמת) Jonah 4:2 also omitted “and exceedingly kind” (ורב חסד)? The marker of an allusion may involve a single word, a name perhaps (e.g., the names “Enoch” or “Lamach” in Genesis 5 alluding to the occurrence of those names in Genesis 4). Given the cumulative nature of identifying allusions and their functional significance, the theory of allusion does not require a certain length or degree of verbal precision of its markers.\(^{23}\)

Resistance to substantial shared language as a criterion of allusion has come primarily from scholars who study ancient Near Eastern literature where allusions tend toward brevity and subtlety. For example, Jeffrey H. Tigay writes,

> As a safeguard, this demand for complexity or pattern seems so reasonable that few would want to challenge it. Although there is a danger that the principle might cause us to overlook some real parallels, on the whole, when applied judiciously, it seems a handy criterion for ruling out the spurious. *It is when it is applied too rigidly, when it is given the status of inviolable law, that the principle threatens to exceed its usefulness.*\(^{24}\)

Christopher B. Hays is more assertive in resisting the need for substantial shared language when he discusses the relevance of Richard Hays’s criterion of “volume” for literary borrowing in ancient Near Eastern literature: “it is predominantly the quieter

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\(^{22}\)For example, Neh 9:31 (cf. 9:17). See also the elements typically found in allusions to Exod 34:6(-7) that are omitted in Num 14:18 and Nah 1:3. Kelly, “Joel, Jonah, and the Yhwh Creed,” 807.


echoes of the ancient Near East that remain to be noticed, and other criteria might outweigh sheer volume. . . . One should not despair or set the bar unduly high for ‘commensurate terms’. ” Taking his cue from Tigay’s work, Charles Halton identifies three such “quiet” allusions that require minimal shared language between the allusion and the evoked text. For example, he identifies a Neo-Assyrian oracle that alludes to *Adapa and the South Wind*.

**Prophecy 1.1 from *Assyrian Prophecies***

> “what wind (is there) which has risen against you, (and) whose wing I have not clipped?”

**Adapa and the South Wind**

> “Adapa broke the wing of the south wind”

Figure 3. ANE Allusion

Halton admits, “The allusion to *Adapa* in this oracle seems quite tangential. In fact, apart from the semantic parallel between breaking the wind’s wing there is hardly any similarity.” He identifies four points of weakness for identifying this allusion on the assumption that shared language is important for identifying allusion. The

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word for wind in each text is different; “wing,” the only common word shared between the texts, occurs in a different form in each; the verbs that express the subjugation of the wind in each text are different; and the oracle omits the name Adapa. Halton goes on, however, to demonstrate these differences are significant. The prophecy uses a more general term for wind than Adapa, thus expanding the scope of Ištar’s royal protection. Furthermore, the prophecy uses a less intense verb to express the subjugation of the wind, one that does not imply utter destruction. As Halton observes, “A prophecy that at first seems more like a bright-eyed platitude is actually a sensible word of encouragement. The king will not lack opponents, but Ištar will ensure their eventual subjugation.” In the absence of substantial shared language, Halton must appeal to other criteria to establish the validity of this allusion. In so doing, he demonstrates Christopher Hays’s insight that other criteria can outweigh sheer volume and justifies Tigay’s caution against turning shared language into an inviolable law when identifying allusion.

Non-Referential Shared Language

One additional cautionary matter concerning shared language deserves careful attention. It does not follow that shared language necessarily indicates reference or literary borrowing between two texts. Paul R. Noble writes, “They could be purely coincidental; or, each text might have independently drawn upon the same

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stream of traditions (written or unwritten); or, the second, later text may be alluding to yet a third text, which independently treats themes similar to those in the first text.”

Noble is unpersuaded by attempts to establish a literary relationship between the narrative of Judah and Tamar in Genesis 38 and the Succession Narrative in 2 Samuel 11 through 1 Kings 2. Without denying these texts resemble one another in certain ways, Noble accuses scholars of being selective and focusing on striking correspondences while ignoring otherwise significant incongruities. On the bases that some have linked Genesis 38 to the succession narrative, Noble proposes that one could make similar arguments for linking Genesis 38 to the stories of Samson and of Lot, links which he argues are equally tenuous.

It is important for those interested in allusion to recognize non-referential shared language and distinguish it from referentially significant occurrences of shared language. Noble listed three non-referential alternatives to explain the presence of shared language—coincidence, independent traditions, and a third, distinct source. In Sommer’s book on allusion in Isaiah 40-66, he places non-referential shared language at the forefront of the methodological discussion. He distills his concerns into this principle: “we cannot view an older text as a source for a passage in Deutero-Isaiah if both utilize stock vocabulary, exemplify a literary form

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such as lament, or treat a subject that calls for certain words.”

He catalogs eight items—vocabulary clusters or motifs—that belong to traditions in Deutero-Isaiah common to contemporary Mesopotamian literature. In the absence of other allusive indicators, he does not consider the presence of these items in Deutero-Isaiah formal referential markers, even if they closely resemble language in Jeremiah (e.g., Isa 41:8, 10//Jer 1:8). John Choi raises concerns about “stock or common vocabulary,” particularly in “psalms and poetic material.” He writes, “When faced with similar lexical content, we cannot automatically assume that the similarity signifies anything other than the fact that there may not have been any other way to say something, or conversely, the fact that there is only one way of saying something.”

Elsewhere, I have raised concerns about the link commonly posited between Ecclesiastes 9:7-9 and Siduri’s advice to Gilgamesh in an Old Babylonian recension of the Gilgamesh epic. While the vocabulary and structure between the two texts resemble one another, this vocabulary is not uncommon in skeptical ancient Near Eastern wisdom traditions. These examples suggest that non-referential shared language appears throughout the Bible. Sommer attributes this to the “highly traditional” character of

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33Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 32, see also 218 n5–7.

34Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 33–34.


36Choi, Traditions at Odds, 30.

Shared Language as a Criterion for Borrowing

Recognizing that shared language is a non-essential criterion and that non-referential shared language exists, meaning that shared language does not always indicate literary borrowing, it is appropriate to highlight how shared language can prove advantageous in identifying literary allusions. Much depends on the nature and volume of the shared language.

Unique lexical congruity. When verbal correspondence concerns unique lexical congruity, there are fewer explanations that would preclude literary borrowing. Consequently, unique lexical congruity represents a stronger form of reference than correspondences based on commonplace vocabulary. However, modern interpreters must remember that what appears unique from a contemporary perspective does not necessarily reflect language that was unique to ancient authors or audiences. The boundaries of canon or the accidents of history may arbitrarily

38Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 32.

narrow our field of vision and impoverish our cultural repertoire. What appears unique to us might have been more commonplace to ancient audiences and less likely to have triggered allusive patterning for ancient readers.\textsuperscript{40} That said, it is valuable to observe from a contemporary vantage point the recurrence of otherwise unique language and make cautious and modest judgments about the likelihood of literary borrowing.

When verbal correspondence concerns distinctive lexical congruity, similar prospects and problems obtain. Compared to the recurrence of commonplace vocabulary, language that is distinctive of a particular corpus, though not unique to it, suggests fewer explanations that would preclude literary borrowing. And yet, what appears distinctive to modern interpreters may have been commonplace to ancient audiences. Moreover, the claim that language is distinctive of a particular text can involve a subjective judgment on the part of the modern interpreter. Would all ancient audiences agree with William Tooman that מָצָא + בַּר is distinctive of Genesis 1:1 over against its other occurrences (Jer 26:1; 27:1; 28:1; 49:34; Hos 9:10),\textsuperscript{41} or does this represent a bias of those who inherit the canonical Hebrew Bible alongside traditions that assign significant weight to the first chapter of Genesis?

Again, it is valuable to make observations about distinctive language from a

\textsuperscript{40}“Recurrent use of rare, but not unique, expressions may support an argument for literary interrelationship, but should not be viewed as decisive evidence since our knowledge of the language of the biblical authors is limited to a closed corpus of texts, and what appears to be rare within the framework of those texts, may have had wider actual usage.” Edenburg, “How (Not) to Murder a King,” 72. I essentially agree with Edenburg, though I believe this caution applies equally to unique

\textsuperscript{41}Tooman, Gog of Magog, 28.
contemporary vantage point, but interpreters must employ what David Carr refers to as “methodological modesty” when issuing such judgments.  

**Volume of shared language.** As the volume of shared lexical material between two texts increases, the explanations that preclude literary borrowing decrease. Consequently, a larger volume of shared material represents a stronger form of reference than correspondences based on minimal shared vocabulary. Volume can be measured in different ways, from the accumulation of shared vocabulary terms to the recurrence of phrases and clauses.  

It is important to consider the relevance of volume alongside one of Leonard’s other methodological guidelines: “Shared language is more important than nonshared language.” Leonard considers shared language determinative in cases involving a seemingly significant volume of shared material. He attributes minimal significance to the nonshared elements in such cases. Regarding Psalm 78, he argues this text directly depends on the plague narratives in Exodus, despite the presence of distinct language, a distinct sequence, and material in Exodus disregarded in the Psalm. Leonard is correct that an allusion need not slavishly and comprehensibly

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42 The need for methodological modesty arises from the gap that exists “between ontology and epistemology.” David M. Carr, *The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction* (New


reproduce the evoked text. But he overextends his argument by precluding any role these nonshared elements might play in disqualifying the alleged allusion. On the relationship between Psalm 78 and the Pentateuch, the absence of Sinai in a Psalm otherwise concerned with divine commandments and the covenant suggests the Psalmist is not literally dependent on the Pentateuch as a source text. While arguments from silence can be problematic, the question of relevance justifies this line of investigation. Choi writes, “The absence of an element that appears to be highly relevant to the discussion at hand likely indicates something is amiss.” Choi also considers the plague list in Psalm 78 problematic because it lists only seven plagues and they appear in an alternative order to the plague narratives in Exodus. Choi’s argument demonstrates how nonshared language can serve an important role in discouraging the identification of literary dependency.

The Interplay between General and Specific Criteria

Beyond the criterion of shared language, scholars generally rely on Richard


46 Choi, Traditions at Odds, 117–21.

47 Choi, Traditions at Odds, 34. See also 33–34.

Hays seven criteria “for testing claims about the presence and meaning of scriptural echoes in Paul.”

1. **Availability.** Was the proposed source of the echo available to the author and/or original readers.
2. **Volume.** Determined primarily by the degree of explicit repetition of words or syntactical patterns, but other factors may also be relevant: how distinctive or prominent is the precursor text within Scripture, and how much rhetorical stress does the echo receive in Paul’s discourse?
3. **Recurrence.** How often does Paul elsewhere cite or allude to the same scriptural passage? This applies not only to specific verses that are cited more than once but also to larger portions of Scripture to which Paul repeatedly refers.
4. **Thematic Coherence.** How well does the alleged echo fit into the line of argument that Paul is developing?
5. **Historical Plausibility.** Could Paul have intended the alleged meaning effect? Could his readers have understood it?
6. **History of Interpretation.** Have other readers, critical and pre-critical, heard the same echoes?
7. **Satisfaction.** Does the proposed reading make sense?

Hays's criteria are an undeniable force to reckon with. A few have challenged one or more of Hays’s criteria, though no one has been more critical about these criteria than Stanley Porter. Porter’s objections to Hays’s project stems from a fundamental
disagreement over the locus of an echo, specifically whether Paul’s readers should play any role in identifying echoes. As David Shaw has pointed out in response to Porter’s objections, five of Hays’s criteria “establish the likelihood that Paul intended the allusion.”  

Both Shaw and Alec Lucas point out weaknesses in Porter’s objections, demonstrating the enduring value of Hays’s criteria.  

As general criteria, Hays’s seven tests should not be “slavishly applied” and function best when they guide or caution biblical critics. Hays’s emphasizes the need for scholars to develop a hermeneutical sensibility over slavishly following a method. His criteria are not explicitly evoked to defend his exegesis, but he acknowledges they implicitly undergird his exegetical judgments. For Hays, “exegesis is a modest imaginative craft, not an exact science.” This overly methodological caution is appropriate, except insofar as Hays unites methodologically the kind of historical inquiry fundamental to the figure of allusion and the potentially ahistorical nature of the figure of echo as he develops it. While


Shaw, “Converted Imaginations?,” 241.


Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture, 219n12.

Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 21.

Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 29.

Hays, Echoes of Scripture, 29.
the figure of allusion as I developed in the previous chapter can have indeterminate literary effects, it still represents a “diachronic trope.” For this reason, the figure of allusion should not be imaginative in the same way Hays’s figure of echo can invite the imagination of contemporary communities of interpreters to perceive for themselves otherwise unhistorical intertextual echoes. Such an enterprise requires a different hermeneutical framework. This is less an issue with Hays’s criteria as it is with his five loci. Therefore, the seven criteria Hays has developed can function well for biblical studies when used judiciously, as general principles to guide and caution the biblical critic.

Is it possible to develop more specific criteria to help biblical scholars identify literary allusions? In James Kugel’s review of Michael Fishbane’s *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*, Kugel suggested that further studies in the field of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation should focus on individual biblical books. Two of Fishbane’s students have applied this approach, Bernard Levinson with Deuteronomy and Benjamin Sommer with Deutro-Isaiah. Kugel suggested that such an approach would allow the author to do a “survey of the materials and synthesize the results, pointing out precisely what kinds of exegesis and reuse are

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58Hays commends the criterion of availability because he maintains “echo is a diachronic trope: analyses of literary echo are possible only where the chronological ordering of different voices is known.” Hays, *Echoes of Scripture*, 30. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, his theory of echo is not consistently diachronic.


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typical of which authors or documents or periods, what sorts of options continued to be exercised, nay developed further, and what sorts were for this or that reason, abandoned.”61 In other words, focusing on an author or historical period would reveal specific habits not necessarily characteristic of other authors or historical periods. Levinson identified in Deuteronomy a “rhetoric of concealment,” though as I discussed in the previous chapter I believe he has applied this insight too broadly in his book *Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel.*62 Sommer identified different ways Deutero-Isaiah uses Jeremiah, including reversal, positive and negative reprediction, historical recontextualization, fulfillment of earlier prophecies, typological linkages, and echos; and he identifies stylistic patterns that emerge from these uses, namely the splitting up of phrases, sound play, word play, and the preservation of word order.63 Sommer observes that these patterns that emerge from Deutero-Isaiah’s use of Jeremiah are not necessarily common outside of Isaiah 35 and 40-66.64 They function as criteria, but only within specific parameters. Sommer describes his method as “an examination of several passages [which] yields information on the areas where use of earlier material may be expected; the result becomes hypothesis, which is validated by the degree to which they generate other


62Bernard M. Levinson, *Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For further discussion of Levinson’s rhetoric of concealment, see the discussion in the previous chapter.


examples.\textsuperscript{65} This “hypothetico-deductive method,” as he calls it, illustrates the habits and patterns that Kugel predicted would characterize the work of a particular author or historical period.

In order to develop more specific criteria for identifying literary allusion, scholars should follow Sommer and undertake similarly focused studies on particular works or historical periods. General criteria like shared language or the seven tests developed by Hays function well as an initial guide or caution. As the use of these general criteria enable scholars to generate hypotheses about the peculiar habits and patterns of their passages, they can then turn these hypotheses into more specific criteria and test their validity to generate further insights or examples. Rather than aiming to apply these insights as generally applicable or universal criteria, scholars will advance the study of allusion in the Hebrew Bible by identifying the peculiar characteristics of different works or historical periods.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have discussed how method can function as a guide and caution, not as a checklist for producing guaranteed results. Interpreters have often turned to the criterion of shared language with overconfidence in its ability to establish the identity of an allusion. In light of the theory of allusion developed in the previous chapter, shared language is neither sufficient nor necessary to identify a literary allusion. When applied with judiciously, it can function as a guide to

\textsuperscript{65}Sommer, *A Prophet Reads Scripture*, 72.
identifying literary allusions. Despite some resistance, the criteria developed by Hays function well as general criteria to guide or caution biblical critics. These general criteria can serve as an initial guide for interpreters focused on a particular work or historical period, and a hypothetico-deductive approach like the one employed by Sommer allows critics to move beyond general criteria to establishing specific criteria based on the particular habits and patterns of their passages. The future of allusion studies lies with scholars who will move away from developing methodologies aimed at universal applicability discover the unique results that come from focused studies.
Since Michael Fishbane’s *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel* and Richard Hays’s *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*, biblical studies has developed a fascination with the literary relations within Scripture. Different theories developed to provide nomenclature and a framework for understanding these relationships, and biblical studies has enjoyed a robust period of scholarly experimentation. Despite occasional suggestions that scholars avoid certain avenues while pursuing others, biblical studies remains fragmented. A majority of scholars prefer the term ‘intertextuality,’ but this language, according to its dominant use in biblical studies, does not signify a cohesive theory of literary relationships and generally renames known phenomena. For these reasons, and for the fact that this verbal practice discourages mutually beneficial cross-disciplinary dialogue, the term ‘intertextuality’ does not enhance academic discourse. Those who continue to rely on this language are not likely to pave the future of this discipline.

Alternatives to intertextuality represent substantial bodies of research, but not all are equally promising. With a history slightly longer than that of intertextuality, inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation first captured the interest of contemporary biblical scholarship. Despite the significant contributions that scholars...
in this field have made to understanding the formation of the Hebrew Bible and to legal theory, their work, typically too broad or too narrow in scope, has not articulated a unifying theory for understanding literary relationships across the biblical canon. When one further considers the deeply imbedded and problematic assumptions in the language of inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, its seems advisable to pursue a more promising alternative. New Testament studies in particular favors the theory of echo, though more often than not in tandem with the term ‘intertextuality.’ As scholars have developed this alternative, they combine formal and functional qualities in problematic ways and conflate different kinds of critical inquiry that require distinct hermeneutical approaches.

A third alternative—allusion—has greater promise. It signifies a long recognized literary figure studied across numerous disciplines, thus creating the potential for mutually enriching cross-disciplinary dialogue. The category does not invite the mere cataloging of literary relationships established on the basis of formal similarities; it asks readers to identify the hermeneutical function of a work’s two fields of signification. In biblical studies, this will require further discussion about the agency of authors and readers. If readers occupy the role of actualizing the potential of meaning constructed by an author, is their object to construct an intention-bearing authorial voice that will persuade an interpretive community or is it to explore—without exhausting—the allusion’s potential for meaning? The greater promise of allusion for biblical studies concerns not only its more defined
characteristics, but also the opportunity it presents biblical studies to explore different hermeneutical goals and clarify the essential—or inherently pluralistic—aims of the discipline.

I propose that the best future for biblical studies lies in uniting these disparate fields under the single category of allusion. (In the case of intertextuality, this will make the term available to those interested in its poststructural iterations without creating conflict or confusion.) But in order to ensure allusion truly enhances academic discourse in biblical studies, scholars need to attend to the theoretical issues—function over form and questions of agency. Moreover, rather than attempting to construct universal and overly complicated methodologies for identifying allusions, scholars should focus on discrete literary corpuses or historical periods and create profiles of their particular characteristics. What are the peculiar habits or patterns that reveal the distinct literary strategies of these works or historical periods? This is the future James Kugel envisioned for biblical studies shortly after the publication of Fishbane's work, and it remains to this day a worthy goal for the future of the discipline.


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When biblical studies adopted the language of intertextuality, it began using it in conjunction with other vocabulary—inner-biblical exegesis and interpretation, echoes, allusion—all of which it uses to signify when a biblical text refers to another text that appears elsewhere in Bible. This study examines the way such academic language is shaped by and shapes the assumptions of biblical scholarship. It examines the nature of linguistic signs and applies the insights of this examination to evaluating the language of reference in the study of the Hebrew Bible. The study concludes that the language and theory of literary allusion is best suited for enriching academic discourse on the relationship of referential texts in the Hebrew Bible. It discusses methodological criteria for detecting allusion informed by a theoretically developed understanding of literary allusion.
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