

THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD
FOR THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of the

Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

in

Partial Fulfillment

of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Theology

by

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February, 1947

Louisville, Kentucky

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PREFACE

PREFACE

A thesis is an adventure in learning on the part of the author. Seminal ideas are presented with an air of tentativeness. Therefore, the student does not feel any compulsion to perfection in the event that additional information, constructive criticism, and the mellowing of maturing years should indicate a revision of his ideas.

Likewise, a thesis is purportedly a "contribution to knowledge." Therefore, the reader should expect to learn something new, to confront "unheard of ideas" as he reads. His task, then, lies in evaluating the ideas as to their basis in fact and in detecting gaps in the factual information, rather than in reacting emotionally to the fact that the conclusions presented are not customary or conventional.

The title of this thesis is admittedly "unheard of," for the name of Freud is usually associated with the antithesis of the Christian faith. Therefore, it is important that the author give his reasons for having chosen such a subject.

The primary reason why a Christian student should study Freud and his significance for the Christian faith is that Freud has done more than any other one person in the last hundred years to secularize the ministry of the reconciliation of man with himself and man with his fellows. This ministry was originally the concern of only the Christian minister. Freud staked a claim for science on this territory. The following pages will show that Freud and the Christian minister deal with the same subject matter: life and death, love and hate, and

strength and weakness in human nature. Freud and the Christian minister confront the same problem: the plight of humanity. And Freud and the Christian minister are engaged in the same task: the re-making of human nature. The difference is that Freud has secularized all these concerns of the Christian minister. He has, like Prometheus, "stolen fire from heaven" and given it to men. The Christian student of theology, therefore, should study Freud in an effort to see what he teaches that is inherent in the Hebrew-Christian heritage. This will involve the examination of the actual experiences being described by both the psychoanalyst and the Christian minister. Such an examination will remove terminological barriers and increase mutual understanding.

The second reason for the present study lies in the fact that many secular scientists have found a common meeting place in the teachings of Freud. The hitherto isolated disciplines of internal medicine, psychiatry, psychology, sociology and anthropology have been drawn into a more cooperative understanding as a direct result of the questions Freud raised and the methods he used. Therefore, a student of the contemporary Christian's life in society cannot ignore the influence of Freud on these other sciences which have also participated in the secularization of modern man.

The third reason for the present study is that the clinical method of Freud is an indispensable ally of the Christian minister as a personal counselor. The abiding principles of the Christian faith are eternal, but the methodology of the minister is to be adapted to his generation. The clinical approach to the problems of

theology, to the practice of the pastor, and to the ethical issues of group life is rapidly becoming a recognized part of theological education. In his use of this method, the Christian student of theology cannot evade the contribution of Freud. The results of Freud's labors are pertinent to the minister's work as a counselor because of the basic problems that he raised concerning the practice of psychotherapy. The author of this thesis has arrived at the present evaluation of Freud, not merely through books, but through four years of intensive clinical experience as a counselor in three different general hospitals, three mental hospitals and in a consistent counseling ministry to his students. The results of this pastoral work under highly controlled conditions permeate all the following pages, but a more specific discussion of Freud's contributions to the minister as a counselor will be found in the chapters on "The Clinical Method."

Furthermore, the mutual light that the teachings of Freud and the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures throw upon each other affords another reason for the author's choice of this subject. Freud, from his childhood to his old age, had an abiding affection for the Old Testament of his fathers. He confessed the influence of the Scripture on the course of his life. His last work was a biographical study of Moses. Dr. W. Hersey Davis once told the author that proper exegesis of the Scriptures apart from psychological insight is impossible. Psychological insight must lay hold of the verifiable findings of scientific investigators in psychology, of whom Freud was the most closely akin to the Biblical psychology. Constant re-

course, therefore, will be made to a comparative study of the relation between Freudian concepts and Biblical concepts.

Again, Freud is one of the first scientific investigators to assume that the human soul, as it is structuralized in the development of character, behaves according to law and regularly takes a functional structure. Thus human nature was viewed as the natural consequence of definite causes, rather than a vague entity behaving according to chance and magic. This is the psychological approach to religious experience, and whereas many other investigators have brought this approach to bear upon religious thought, Freud did so most forcefully and effectively. Consequently, his contribution to a doctrine of man, a religious anthropology, will be described and evaluated in these pages, especially in the chapters on "The Structure of Personality."

But finally, Freud attracts the attention of this author because of his personal integrity and his life-long devotion to a cause which he considered supremely worth while. He was possessed by such a sense of mission that he attracted personal disciples who now speak of him and act toward him with a religious-like fidelity and affection. As will be seen, there is a religious-like character in the history of the psychoanalytic movement. From the point of view of the sociology of religion, the psychoanalytic movement is of sufficient interest in itself to cause the student of religion to investigate the character and teachings of the man who could live so well so long and enlist the personal loyalty of so many intellectually vigorous followers as did Sigmund Freud.

With these thoughts in mind let it be understood that this thesis is not an attempt to baptize Freud either with the fires of denunciation or with the waters of approbation. He has had enough such baptizers. And those baptizers have with one accord lacked the objectivity of thought and feeling which naturally grows out of a factual knowledge of the life and teachings of Freud set into the framework of a well-oriented historical and cultural perspective. Such an objectivity is the guiding principle of the research of this author.

In the following pages I am indebted to the following persons:

Dr. Gaines S. Dobbins, my teacher and co-worker, who has followed the development of this work from the beginning, advising, suggesting, correcting and guiding me in the details of research.

Reverend Ralph Bonacker, Chaplain of the Norton Memorial Infirmary, who introduced me to the study of Freud in the only way that Freud can be properly understood: in a personal, face-to-face ministry to people who have an acute sense of need for spiritual help in time of trouble.

Dr. Olin T. Binkley, for the historical and scientific method of the study of religion which he made a part of me and for the detailed help with this manuscript and continued encouragement which he gave me.

Dr. Anton T. Boisen, for his mature suggestions concerning Freud and for his guidance of me in the practice of the ministry of

a pastor to his people.

All the students at Wake Forest College and the Southern Baptist Seminary whose patient endurance of my teaching for four years was my opportunity to develop the ideas and interpretations which are my own personal contribution to this thesis.

My wife, who has listened to almost every page of this thesis, helping me to eliminate the more subjective flourishes of my own personal prejudices and enthusiasms, and who has made home a place of rest, contemplation, and calm affection as I have written these pages.

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PART I
A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY

THE LIFE OF SIGMUND FREUD

The life of a thinker is the key to his thought. This fact was demonstrated by Freud as he analyzed the intellectual ideas of his patients. Following this clinical discovery, Freud experimented with a new approach to the writing of a biography. He wrote a brief biography of Leonardo Da Vinci in which he delineated the dynamics of the artistic genius of his subject.¹ The life of Freud himself can be studied in much the same way. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to give an exposition of the fundamental facts of the life of Freud in order that the dynamics of his psychological genius and his philosophical and religious ideas may be clearly understood, interpreted and evaluated in succeeding chapters.

I. THE CULTURAL PATTERN

The cultural pattern of the community of which Freud was a part had a marked influence on the casting of his thought. Freud was born in Freiburg, Moravia, a small town in what is now Czecho-Slovakia on May 6th, 1856. Concerning his parental heritage, Freud says: "My parents were Jews, and I have remained a Jew myself."² Racial discrimination was pronounced in the area of Freud's early home life, and had a profound effect on his personality development.

1. Sigmund Freud, Leonardo Da Vinci: A Psychosexual Study of Infantile Reminiscences, Tr. A. A. Brill, (New York: Dodd, 1932).

2. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, Tr. James Strachey, (New York: W. W. Norton Co., Inc., 1935), p. 9.

Especially was he conscious of being a Jew as he entered the University.

He says:³

I experienced some appreciable disappointments. Above all I found I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things. I have never been able to see why I should feel ashamed of my descent or, as people were beginning to say, of my race. I put up without much regret with my non-acceptance into the community; for it seemed to me that in spite of this exclusion an active fellow-worker could not fail to find some nook or cranny in the framework of humanity At an early age I was made familiar with the fate of being put under the ban of a compact majority. The foundations were thus laid for a certain degree of independence of judgement.

At the age of four, Freud came to Vienna, Austria from the place of his birth; here he spent the rest of his life except for a few months at its close. Sachs, who is also a Viennese psychoanalyst, says that both he and Freud belonged to Jewish middle-class families, and that the group of Jews among whom they grew up "were willing to surrender a good part of their religious traditions and orthodox beliefs in exchange for modern thoughts and the European way of life. Their ideal was full assimilation without apostasy."⁴ Sachs further describes the atmosphere of Vienna as that of the general insincerity of the middle Victorian period. Prudishness about sexual matters in scientific and social circles was matched with morbidness and pathology in the sexual life of individuals. Sachs remarks further that the "traditional

3. Ibid., p. 11.

4. Hans Sachs, Freud: Master and Friend, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 22.

pedantry of the schools and the dominating influence of the Catholic Church had blunted for centuries the eagerness for research and the development of independent study."⁵ Thus three salient facts were present in the cultural pattern of Vienna that helped to fashion his personality. First, there was a slavish servility and its resulting sterility in the intellectual life of the community. Second, there was a blind prejudice that condemned Freud because of his racial heritage which, according to Freud's own word, produced a certain independence of judgement and research in him. And finally, this independence of judgement and research took effect in his explosive discoveries concerning the sexual life of people, the area where his contemporaries were most prudish.

II. THE PERSONAL EARLY DEVELOPMENT

The personal early development of Freud must be added to the cultural influences that bore upon him from without. In addition to having been influenced by his environment, Freud had deep personal experiences that contributed to the formation of the character traits of independence and rebellion which have already been noted. In his The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud reveals that much of his insight was gained through a sustained analysis of himself. Consequently, he includes much autobiographical material in his work,

5. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

and says:⁶

I have in my case been more open and frank in some of my writings (such as The Interpretation of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life) than people usually are who describe their lives for their contemporaries or for posterity.

The conditions of Freud's birth are recorded in The Interpretation of Dreams. He was his mother's eldest son and was born before she was twenty. His mother was his father's second wife, and there was a much older brother by his father's first wife.⁷ Freud says: "It is said that I came into the world with so much black curly hair that my mother declared that I was a little Moor."⁸ He goes on in another place to tell a story about his birth:⁹ "At my birth an old peasant woman prophesied to my happy mother . . . that she had brought a great man into the world." Freud says that he heard this story often when he was a little child and wonders if it is possible that his thirst for greatness originated from this source. He tells another infantile experience which ties up closely with his desire for greatness:¹⁰

I am told that at the age of two I still used occasionally to wet the bed, and that when I was reprovved for doing so I consoled my father by promising him to buy him a new red bed in the

6. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, p. 151.

7. Sachs, op. cit., p. 21 and p. 165.

8. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Tr. A. A. Brill, (New York: Modern Library Series, 1938), p. 339.

9. Ibid., p. 257.

10. Ibid., p. 274.

nearest large town All the megalomania of a child is contained in this promise. . . . The psychoanalysis of neurotics has taught us to recognize the intimate connection between bed-wetting and the character trait of ambition.

Another reminiscence from his childhood serves to show the trait of aggressive ambition and independence asserting itself in the life of Freud at a very early age. He tells about a nurse of his who, when Freud was two and a half years of age, scolded him harshly and repeatedly for not having showed "sufficient understanding of the necessity for personal cleanliness."¹¹ He repeatedly points out, too, in his own analysis of other people that children regularly use the time of training in personal cleanliness as a way of expressing aggression, temper, and ambition in the control of the family situation. His father, however, must have had a good bit of understanding of this need in the growing son. On one occasion the father, as a way of joking, bought the child Sigmund and his elder sister some books just so they could tear them up. This was when Freud was about five years of age. Concerning the incident, Freud says that "it is the only one from this period of my life that has remained vivid in my memory."¹²

Closely related to these destructive tendencies in the childhood of Freud was his religious speculation about death. He says that when he was six years old, he was expected to believe that men

11. Ibid., pp. 296-7.

12. Ibid., p. 243.

are made from dust and must return to dust. The doctrine did not please him and he began to doubt. Then, he says:¹³

Thereupon my mother rubbed the palms of her hands together — just as in making dumplings, except, there was no dough between them — and showed me the blackish scales of epidermis which were thus rubbed off, as a proof that it is of dust that we are made. Great was my astonishment at this demonstration ad oculos, and I acquiesced in the idea which I later heard expressed in the words: "Thou owest nature a death."

This child was the father of the man who, late in life, enunciated a theory concerning the death instinct. Aggressiveness and destruction are concomitants in the emotional life. Freud at the age of six showed thoughts of much ambition and aggressiveness, feelings of destruction apparent in his memory of tearing up the books, and a philosophical toying with the idea of death. These three trends in his personality development are synthesized in a pattern-setting memory which he dates back to his seventh year.¹⁴

One evening, before going to bed, I had disregarded the dictates of discretion and had satisfied my needs in my parents' bedroom, and in their presence. Reprimanding me for this delinquency, my father remarked: "That boy will never amount to anything." This must have been a terrible affront to my ambition, for allusion to this scene recur again and again in my dreams, and are constantly coupled with enumerations of my accomplishments and successes, as though I wanted to say: "You see, I have amounted to something after all."

This event points unquestionably toward the aggressive-competitive situation that must have existed between Freud and his father. Freud was nearer his mother's age than his father was, inasmuch as his

13. Ibid., p. 266.

14. Ibid., p. 274.

father was an elderly man with a young second wife. Concerning this Freud says:¹⁵

One of the admonitions of my brother has lingered long in my memory: "Do not forget one thing concerning your conduct in life: you belong not to the second generation, but to the third generation by your father." Our father had re-married at an advanced age, and therefore was an old man to his children by the second marriage.

Therefore, it was an act of supreme rebellion for the seven-year-old to go into the bedroom of his parents and exhibit himself sexually. Added emotional tension was heaped upon the trauma by the remark his father made. The result was an exaggerated attempt to compete with the father, to show him up, to eclipse him, and finally, to remove him. The Oedipus situation of which Freud makes so much stands in bold relief in his own life, and it has much of the same boldness of relief in his teachings. It was an embedded problem in his own life.

This embedded problem was held constantly before Freud in the person of his nephew, the child of his half-brother. He tells that his nephew was exactly his own age. He often had the thought: "How much pleasanter it would be had I been born the son of my brother instead of the son of my father."¹⁶ Speaking of his nephew, Freud says:¹⁷

Until the end of my third year, we had been inseparable; we had loved each other and fought each other and, as I have already

15. Sigmund Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Tr. A. A. Brill, (New York: Modern Library Series, 1938), p. 143.

16. Ibid., p. 143.

17. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 408-409.

hinted, this childish relation has determined all my later feelings in my intercourse with people of my own age. My nephew John has since had many incarnations, which have revived first one and then another aspect of a character that is ineradicably fixed in my unconscious memory.

The childhood experience of Freud, then, shows a pronounced pattern of independence and rebellion developing by leaps and bounds. By the time he reached puberty, this was a well-established trait that persisted as the dominant trait of his character.

III. ADOLESCENCE

At puberty Freud began to seek a hero-figure with whom he could identify and become like. He turned to his father for such an ideal and found him a very inadequate person. He tells of an event that happened when he was about twelve years of age. He and his father had been accustomed to taking walks together. At these times the father would share with the son his philosophy of life. One day they were taking a walk and the father was telling the son that the days he had seen were more gloomy than those the son was having to face. Then he told young Freud of an instance when he, the father, was a young man. He said: "When I was a young man I was walking one Saturday along the street in the village . . . I was dressed well, with a new fur cap on my head. Up comes a Christian, who knocks my cap into the mud and shouts, 'Jew, get off the pavement.'" Young Freud asked his father what he did and the father said: "I went into the street and picked up my cap." The younger Freud says that he never could feel that this was a heroic way for

his father to act, and he could never admire his father for being such a coward.¹⁸ He says that he would much rather his father had been like Hannibal's father who made the son swear to take vengeance on the Romans. He says that Hannibal was his favorite hero during the years at the Gymnasium. When the pressure of race prejudice against him as a Jew became greater, he says, the Semitic commander became an even greater hero for him.¹⁹

Hannibal and Rome symbolized, in my youthful eyes, the struggle between the tenacity of the Jews and the organization of the Catholic Church Thus my desire to go to Rome . . . has . . . become the symbol and mask for a number of warmly cherished wishes, for whose realization one had to work with the tenacity and single-mindedness of the Punic General, though their fulfillment at times seemed as remote as Hannibal's life-long wish to enter Rome.

This militant aggressiveness, this tenacity and single-mindedness, characterize Freud's educational and vocational career. All the way through the Gymnasium, he was a rebel when he was placed under "ignorant and unpopular" teachers.²⁰ In mature life, he dreamed of the Pope's death. He identified himself readily with Hannibal-like science teachers. He ultimately broke identification with them likewise and went beyond their discovery.

Part of his aggression in school was directly related to his feelings toward his father. His father, apparently, was not able to supply the bare needs that Freud had while he was in school. Conse-

18. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 260-261.

19. Ibid., pp. 260-261.

20. Ibid., p. 271.

quently, Freud had to get teaching opportunities to supplement his father's support. Concerning this, Freud says that his father's "generous improvidence" caused him to be in bad financial condition. He saw several doors to scientific opportunity closed and had to extend his medical career over several years because of financial stress. He went to the University in 1873, at the age of 17, he says, and was "decidedly negligent" in pursuing his medical studies because it was not until 1881 that he took his "somewhat belated degree as a Doctor of Medicine."²¹

IV. MOTIVES FOR BECOMING A DOCTOR

Freud discusses at length the reasons why he chose medicine as a profession. Here again his father showed a good wisdom by urging him to choose the thing that he himself wanted most to do. Freud attributes his choice of vocation to four influences. First, he says that he was moved by "a sort of curiosity, which was, however, directed more towards human concerns than towards natural objects."²² The second influence is of especial concern to the student of religion. Freud says that the reason he turned his attention towards human concerns rather than natural objects was his "early familiarity with the Bible story." He says that this was a strong influence upon him "at a time almost before (he) had learned the art of reading" and

21. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, pp. 13ff.

22. Ibid., p. 10.

23. Ibid., p. 11.

had "an enduring effect upon the direction of (his) interest."²³ The third factor influencing Freud to enter the field of medicine was the theories of Charles Darwin, "which were then of topical interest." These attracted him, according to his own word, "for they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world."²³ The precipitating factor in the formation of his decision to become a doctor was a deep emotional experience that gripped him. "It was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature read aloud at a popular lecture by Professor Carl Bruhl . . . that decided me to become a medical student."²⁴ Thus, in the light of Freud's own analysis of his motives for the field of medicine as a vocation, an original curiosity and inquiring mind was guided in its development by the Biblical story about God and man, the scientific discoveries of Charles Darwin, and the moral inspiration of a great poet. He began the search for a harmony between the need for freedom and the need for law in human nature. In Freud's decision to become a doctor were the first murmurings of his awareness of the conflict between forces of nature and the inhibitions of society.

V. VOCATIONAL CAREER

The vocational career of Freud intertwines with the history of psychoanalysis. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to

23. Ibid., p. 11.

24. Ibid., p. 13.

emphasize the larger sphere of psychoanalysis, but to discover the different stages through which Freud himself went.

The first position which Freud held was in Ernst Brucke's physiological laboratory. Here he worked from 1876 to 1882, but finally Brucke advised him to abandon a theoretical career and get a job that would pay him more money. He was in a financial position caused by his father's "generous improvidence." Freud says that in the physiological laboratory he found "rest and satisfaction," and men whom he could respect and take as his models.²⁵ He seemed to have been very happy at this work and his thorough grounding in physiology became a valuable tool in his later psychological research.

From Brucke's laboratory, Freud went to the General Hospital in Vienna. Here he became a great admirer of Meynert, who had impressed him in no small degree when he was a student.²⁶ He continued his work in physiology for a time, but soon diverted his interest to the Institute for Cerebral Anatomy where he began to study nervous diseases. At that time there were no specialists in neuroanatomy and neuropathology in Vienna, and the study itself, instead of being a separate specialty, was spread over many other fields. Freud became very proficient in the field, and his work as a diagnostician was attested again and again when his patients were examined by autopsy. Although Freud did not make as great a use of his knowledge of neuroanatomy as

25. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, pp. 14ff.

26. Ibid., pp. 14ff.

did some of his followers such as Wilhelm Reich, he did have this background or training. The reason why he did not go in the direction of neuropsychiatry probably has its roots in a traumatic professional experience he had while he was teaching. His own words tell this well:²⁷

I understood nothing about neuroses. On one occasion I introduced to my audience a neurotic suffering from a persistent headache as a case of chronic localized meningitis; they quite rightly arose in revolt against me, and my premature activities as a teacher came to an end. By way of excuse, I may add that this happened at a time when greater authorities than myself in Vienna were in the habit of diagnosing neurasthenia as brain tumor.

It is apparent that Freud was beginning to feel the inadequacy of the purely organic explanation of mental and nervous disease. He was groping after something even in his mistakes.

In 1885 he received a traveling fellowship which permitted him to go to Paris where he met Charcot, who was doing some important investigation of hysteria symptoms. Through fellowship with Charcot, Freud evolved a plan of study in comparing hysterical symptoms with the symptoms of organic paralyses. Along with this he was profoundly impressed with Charcot's demonstrations of the use of hypnosis with hysterical patients. He saw for the first time the role of psychic factors in producing hysterical impotence of an organ. On his way back home, Freud stopped in Berlin to study for a few weeks. He was concerned with the general disorders of childhood. As a consequence of his study in Berlin, he later published a work on the subject of

27. Ibid., pp. 14ff.

unilateral and bilateral cerebral paralyses in children.²⁸

Freud became associated with Dr. Josef Breuer, an older physician who had also been experimenting with hypnosis as a means of catharsis in the treatment of hysterical patients, and who had been successful in its use. Freud says that after his work with Breuer he began to repeat Breuer's investigations with his own patients. Eventually, after he had done some further work with Burnheim in 1889 and had learned the limitations of hypnotic suggestion, he worked at nothing else. In 1893 he and Breuer issued a paper on "The Psychological Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena," and in 1895 followed it with their book called Studies in Hysteria.

But Breuer was primarily interested in treating symptoms through the use of hypnosis as a catharsis, and not so interested in the development of a theory of the causation of hysteria. Freud's curiosity was more intense, and he began to search for causes. He proposed his theory of the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neuroses. This antagonized Breuer, and Freud says that the older man's attitude toward him changed:³⁰

His attitude toward me oscillated for some time between appreciation and bitter criticism; then accidental difficulties arose, as they never fail to do in a strained situation, and we parted.

Here, in his vocational and professional career, just as it had occurred in his early family experience, Freud revolted against the

28. Ibid., p. 21.

29. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

30. Ibid., p. 48.

timidity of an older man, a "father figure," as he would describe him. He went beyond his discovery, eclipsed him, and supplanted him.

Freud turned away from Breuer as a man and away from his teachings as a scientist. He ceased to worry too much about the symptoms of hysteria and began to delve into the causation of the neurotic condition. In doing so, Freud left hypnosis behind and sought to replace it by some other method which was more substantial. Increasing experience had given rise to two grave doubts in his mind as to the use of hypnosis even as a method of catharsis. He says that the first doubt was that the results of hypnosis were too capricious and that "even the most brilliant results were liable suddenly to be wiped out." The second reason was that "the personal emotional relationship between the doctor and patient was after all stronger than the whole cathartic process."³¹ This departure marked the beginning of the investigative method which has come to be known as psychoanalysis. From this point on, the history of psychoanalysis to the time of Freud's death is the biography of Freud.

A brief summary of Freud's publications reflect his professional development. Between 1899 and 1907 Freud wrote and published The Interpretation of Dreams, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and many of the papers included in his Collected Papers. He had also started the publication of the Journal of Psychopathology and Psychoanalysis. In these works he made an

31. Ibid., p. 48.

original construction on the basis of his clinical material up to that time. This was the first phase of the development of psychoanalysis. In this period, Freud says, "I stood alone and had to do all the work myself."³²

During the second period of Freud's career, 1907 to 1919, he wrote many other papers for the journals and for the meetings of the Psychoanalytic Congress, but his major work was Totem and Taboo. Here he universalized his concept of the Oedipus situation to apply to the race. He says that he "attempted to discuss the problems of race psychology by means of analysis."³³ But, according to Freud, he was not as active in this period as the former one. Here he was not alone but had pupils and collaborators whose contributions and elaborations in the field of psychoanalysis were growing in importance.³⁴ In 1909 Freud and one of his collaborators, C. G. Jung, came to America to lecture at Clark University. Freud says:³⁵

At that time I was only fifty-three; I felt young and healthy, and my short visit to the New World encouraged my self-respect in every way. In Europe I felt as though I were despised, but in America I found myself received by the foremost men as an equal. As I stepped on to the platform at Worcester to deliver my Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis, it seemed like the realization of some incredible day-dream: psycho-analysis was no longer a product of delusion; it had become a valuable part of reality.

32. Ibid., p. 111.

33. Sigmund Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, Tr. A. A. Brill, (New York: Modern Library, Inc., 1938), p. 955.

34. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, p. 111.

35. Ibid., p. 104.

But the pupils and collaborators to whom Freud refers were not conformists by any means. They, too, had a spirit of rebellion and independent research. In fact, psychoanalysis from the beginning has been characterized by a spirit of individualism that is analogous to the sectarianism in Protestant Christianity. During the second period of Freud's professional career, he came to the parting of the way with Adler, Jung, and Stekel. However, a larger group of equally brilliant men such as Abraham, Eitington, Ferenczi, Jones, Brill, Sachs, Pfister, Van Emden, and Reik stayed with him. Concerning these interpersonal schisms, Sachs says of Freud:³⁶

Every rupture with a former friend in Freud's life was final. I have seen him several times go the limit of patience and indulgence for those who passed through a crisis, but I never noticed that he felt inclined to make a step towards reconciliation.

Freud's own commentary on the non-conformists is:³⁷

It is an almost universal characteristic of these "dissenting movements" that each of them seizes upon one fragment out of the wealth of motives found in psychoanalysis . . . and on the basis of this appropriation makes itself independent.

The year 1920 marks a new epoch in Freud's vocational and professional career. It appears that he must have begun to take stock of his findings up to that time and to re-work them in the light of a more mature judgement. He did not "throw overboard" his former conclusions, but apparently sought a closer definition of them. In 1920

36. Sachs, op. cit., p. 123.

37. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Tr. W. J. H. Sprott, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1933), p. 196.

he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in which he developed in detail his doctrine of the polarity between the life and death instincts, between the pleasure and reality principles, and between the principles of love and hate. In 1923 Freud came forth with an epoch-making treatise on the structure of personality which he called The Ego and the Id. This was a more definite and deliberate reconstruction of his older concepts of the unconscious, the pre-conscious, and the conscious. In this work, he presents his concept of the super-ego, based upon his clinical observations of the role of guilt, both conscious and unconscious, in the life of an individual. These are his most mature works, being mel-
lowed re-interpretations of the fundamental clinical discoveries of his earlier years.

Freud started his life with an infantile grappling with the idea of death and the experience of religion. In the latter years of his life, he returned to these two great imponderables. Already it has been seen how he returned to the death-idea in his Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This was followed by his analysis of societal factors and the function of religion in man's struggle for existence. In the latter years of his life, Freud turned philosophical again. The intimations of this turn are seen earlier in the little pamphlet called Reflections on War and Death, written in 1918, at the close of the first World War. The theoretical statement in the form of a scientific concept is seen in the work Beyond the Pleasure Principle. In 1927 he worked out his philosophical and religious assumption in his book The Future of  Illusion, a discussion of which will be given later.

Freud's philosophical speculation continued and resulted in two other treatises. In 1930 Freud wrote his Civilization and Its Discontents. In this work, he expanded his concept of the death instinct to a sociological and racial application. His last book, Moses and Monotheism, was published in 1939. The atmosphere of the times was certainly enough to make him philosophical. His people, the Jews, were being exterminated by the Nazis. His own books were burned in Berlin and his personal freedom threatened. Death was on every hand.

The emotional dynamics of Freud's professional career of singleness of purpose and tenacity of effort had their beginning in his early childhood, his cultural status, and his capacity for sublimation. In an article written as late as 1936, Freud himself says as much:³⁸

To travel so far, to get so well on in life . . . seemed to me then beyond all possibilities. This was a consequence of the narrowness and poverty of our circumstances during my youth This has to do with the child's criticism of the father, with the over-valuation which took place of the under-valuation of early childhood.

The ambitious, aggressive trait in Freud's character manifested itself against the word of "authority figures" who said to him, even as his father had said: "You will never succeed." Just as he did not accept his father's estimate of him, he never accepted other authoritative rejections, such as that of the Vienna Medical Society. He insisted rather on eclipsing and supplanting his contemporaries.

38. Sachs, op. cit., p. 145.

VI. MARITAL ADJUSTMENT

Freud married in 1886, the same year that he settled down in Vienna as a physician. His wife was not Viennese. She spoke German and held her household aloof from the society of Vienna. Sachs says that Freud was disdained by his fellow doctors for his interest in the psychic causation of illness. This contributed to their aloofness from society. In fact, it caused Freud's income to be considerably decreased. When privation because of the ostracism of the profession caused Freud and his family to feel the pinch of want, Freud's whole family -- his wife, his three boys and three girls, and his sister-in-law who lived with them -- fell into line without a grumble. This was when all the children were less than ten years of age.³⁹ Thus it is seen that family solidarity was not threatened by adversity and that the children -- six of them -- were born within the scope of ten years. It seems to have been a typical Hebrew family.

Sachs describes Freud's wife as a typical house-wife, accurate in every detail of home life. She and the children built their routine around the work of the father. "Freud was undoubtedly the head of his family, but also a part of it, and not aloof -- even though his work took first place -- from its life and its incidents, pleasant and unpleasant."⁴⁰ Freud had a desire to extend his identity through his children. He speaks

39. Ibid., p. 73.

40. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

frankly about it thus:⁴¹

It is easy to see how the father's suppressed desire for greatness is, in his thoughts, transferred to his children; one is inclined to believe that this is one of the ways by which this desire is effected.

Freud was very devoted to his children and this devotion appeared in his dream life:⁴² "I awake with . . . the idea that perhaps my children will achieve what has been denied their father" And in the same spirit that permeated his vocational life, he says that he desires "to stand great and undefiled" before his children.

In his study of psychoanalysis, Freud confesses that he learned a great deal about human nature from his own children and from his nephews. He jokingly says that his own children followed each other with such rapidity that it was difficult for him to learn from them, however.⁴³

Indeed, psychoanalysis became a family concern. The children identified readily with their father in his work. His daughter, Anna, has made a scientific contribution in her own right through her psychoanalytical studies of children. She was active during the second World War in dealing with the children of Britain. Her oldest brother, Martin, was the head of the Publishing House of the school for psychoanalysis at Vienna.

41. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 425, 430.

42. Ibid., pp. 425, 430.

43. Ibid., pp. 425, 430.

The picture one gets of Freud's home life is one of natural expression, mutual interdependence, and filial loyalty. The sexual life of Freud himself was expressed completely and adequately within the framework of the institution of marriage and the home.

The religious life of Freud will be discussed at length in the chapter on his religious speculations. The facts presented in this chapter will serve as an emotional preparation of the reader in understanding some of Freud's teachings.

PART II

A STATEMENT AND EVALUATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC WORK OF FREUD

INTRODUCTION

Not enough time has elapsed and the winnowing process of further investigation in the therapy of mental disturbances is not sufficiently mature for making an adequate appraisal of the enduring contribution of Freud. Nevertheless, the present status of his contribution can be discerned. A remarkable unanimity of opinion exists among the recognized authorities as to what Freud's contribution to the science of psychology and psychotherapy is. The editors of the American Medical Journal give this appraisal:¹

Many of his (Freud's) observations have passed the test of scientific scrutiny. The facts of repression, resistance, transference, infantile sexuality and its typical manifestations in family life, the unconscious emotional origins of psychoneurotic and many psychotic symptoms, the principle laws of psychodynamics as observed in such mechanisms as rationalization, projection, and overcompensation form the basis of both normal and morbid psychology.

C. P. Oberndorf, contributing to the American Journal of Urology as early as 1912, suggested that Freud's fundamental scientific concepts worthy of continued use were fourfold: the theory of the unconscious, the fact of infantile sexuality, his method of investigation, and the importance of dreams and other mental mechanisms.²

William Allen White says that the main contribution of Freud lies in the fact that he gave a rational explanation of behavior that

1. Editorial, American Medical Journal, 113:1194-95, October 14, 1939.

2. C. P. Oberndorf, "The Essentials of Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis," The American Journal of Urology, 8:6:309ff., June, 1912.

hitherto had been dismissed as "queer" and without a sensible explanation. "The psychoses and neuroses, no one, be he Freudian or anti-Freudian, any longer considers to be something mysterious that comes from nowhere and settles down like an incubus on the patient."³

This discovery White describes as a "sufficient contribution for any one man to have made to science in his lifetime." Furthermore, White points out that Freud's second great contribution was his scientific method, technically known as psychoanalysis, "by which we are able to delve into the intricacies of the patient's mental tangles and come to a rational understanding of how their disorder has been builded up."³ In the third place, White adds that the mechanisms of psychic adjustment to and defense from life which Freud isolated and described have become a part of verifiable scientific knowledge. In the fourth place, the psychosexual development of personality is a process which Freud originally described and, as White points out, he showed its tremendous significance for an understanding of the psychoses and neuroses.³ Similar conclusions as to the exact nature of the contribution of Freud to scientific understanding of human nature are drawn by such men as W. Beran Wolfe, an ardent opponent of the present-day practices of psychoanalysis,⁴ Emanuel Miller,⁵ and James Jackson Putnam,

3. W. A. White, The New York Medical Journal, 95:19:969ff., May 11, 1912.

4. W. Beran Wolfe, "The Twilight of Psychoanalysis," The American Mercury, 35:140:386, August, 1935.

5. Emanuel Miller, "The Significance of Freud," The Nineteenth Century and After, 126:753:565, November, 1939.

professor of Neurology and Psychology in the Harvard Medical School for so many years.⁶ Karen Horney makes basic changes in the interpretation of the phenomena which Freud described, but she says that the principles of psychoanalysis which still stand the test of clinical experience are: the doctrine of unconscious motivations as being dynamic and strictly determined, the description of the mechanisms of the dynamic processes of mind and the methodological tools for therapy.⁷ She leaves out any estimate of his contributions to a theory of sex which is included in the other authors' estimates. The sociological interpretation of the neuroses characterizes the contribution of Dr. Horney herself and accounts for this omission. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the scientific contribution of Freud should be stated and evaluated in terms of the following constellations of facts:

1. The structure and functions of personality
2. The psychosexual development of personality
3. The dynamic mechanisms of personality
4. The clinical method of psychoanalysis

This second section of this treatise will be devoted to these four subjects. Freud's work may be divided into three general periods: (1) The period of theory development, 1885-1905 (2) the period of clinical application, 1915-1920 (3) The period of philosophical and religious

6. J. J. Putnam, "Comments on Sex Issues from the Freudian Standpoint," New York Medical Journal, 95:24:1248ff., June 15, 1912.

7. Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), pp. 17-36.

reflections, 1920-1939. The first two periods will be the sole concern to which this section is devoted.

CHAPTER I

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

I. THE EARLIER FORMULATIONS

Psychological research before the time of Freud described only the conscious mental functions. Much valuable work was done, but no explanation was given for many common, everyday occurrences in the psychic life of individuals, such as dreams, errors, humor, and the more serious phenomena of mental illness. These puzzled even the masses of the people so profoundly that they worked out all sorts of answers in their religions, philosophies, proverbs, mythologies, folklore, and superstitions. To these phenomena and their everyday explanations Freud devoted much of his attention.

A. REPRESSION

In the early years when Freud was engaged in the task of neurological research, such men as Breuer and Charcot had discovered a therapeutic value in the use of hypnosis, an old but little understood mental phenomenon. Freud and Breuer experimented with the use of hypnosis in the early years of the last decade of the nineteenth century. They treated hysterical patients and discovered that the symptoms of the patients were "related to trauma in the psychic life" of the individual. They perceived that these traumata were not in the normal memory of the patient, and only under hypnosis was the patient able to recall them. In 1893 they published their first paper on The Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena and agreed that these

traumata had been repressed from the memory of conscious life of the individual.¹ This was the first time they employed the now much used term. Upon discovering this fact, they developed the cathartic method of therapy through the use of hypnosis in order that the patient abreact his symptoms:²

By providing an opportunity for the pent-up affect to discharge itself in words, the therapy deprives of its effective power the idea which was not originally abreacted; by conducting it into normal consciousness (in light hypnosis) it brings it into associative readjustment or else dispels it by means of the physician's suggestion.

In concluding the article, these two doctors agreed that they had dealt with the mechanism and not the cause of the hysterical phenomenon.

This mechanism was the fact of repression.

In 1894 Freud wrote another paper in which he sought to clarify this concept of repression. He says frankly, as he feels his way into the problem:³

I do not of course assert that an effort of will to thrust such things out of the mind is a pathological act, nor am I able to say whether and in what manner intentional forgetting is successful in people who remain healthy I only know that this forgetting did not succeed with the patients whom I analysed, but led to various pathological action

B. THE UNCONSCIOUS

Thus Freud started on his way toward a more exact statement of the theory of repression. A more thorough-going discussion of this

¹.
2. Ibid., p. 42.

3. Sigmund Freud, "The Defense Neuro-Psychoses," (1894), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 62.

theory is not in order here, but it is apparent that Freud took the theory of repression as the cornerstone of his concept of the structure and function of the personality. He perceived that repression was not the cause of the illness, but that it was merely the mechanism of the illness and that the cause lay beyond the mechanism. This "beyond" he called the unconscious, as he said: "We obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of repression."⁴ And this led him into his basic doctrine: "The division of mental life into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the fundamental premise on which psychoanalysis is based."⁵

The psychology of Freud begins, then, with a concept of the unconscious motivation for behavior. The German word which Freud chose to use to designate this phase of the structure of personality was "Unbewusst." This is not a spatial term at all and does not refer to a "cellar" in the mind as is pictured in the English word "subconscious," but the word is used to refer to the process of knowing and would better be understood as meaning "the unknown" -- that which is not consciously perceived. It is not a spatial, mechanical term, but a vital and dynamic concept. By way of further definition, Freud suggests:⁶

Some latent ideas do not penetrate into consciousness however

4. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, (London: Hogarth Press, 1927), p. 12.

5. Ibid., p. 9.

6. Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 25.

strong they become The term unconscious . . . designates not only latent ideas in general, however, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity.

The work of Freud is replete with descriptions of the nature of the unconscious as well as such definitions as have been given. He says:⁷

Unconsciousness is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our mental activity; every mental act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not.

Although theories of the unconscious had been postulated by philosophers before Freud, the concept in psychoanalysis must be considered in terms of a scientific theorem and not an attempt at a metaphysics. Freud marshals certain scientific evidences to substantiate his theorem. The first one he suggested was that "both in healthy and sick persons mental acts are often in process which can only be explained by presupposing other acts, of which consciousness yields no evidence."⁸ Among these mental acts Freud lists the dream process; the elaborate rituals of obsessional neurotics; the facts discovered in hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestion; the fact that only a relatively few objects of attention can occupy consciousness at one given moment; the curious acts of forgetting; the slips of the tongue,

7. Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 27.

8. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 99-100.

hand and pen; and the abundant evidences of unconscious conation in the behavior of psychotics. These Freud proposes to make objects of psychological research.

Turning away from a more negative defense of the theory of the unconscious, Freud devotes the remainder of his article on the unconscious to the more positive aspects of the process.⁹

A mental act commonly goes through two phases, between which is interposed a kind of testing process (censorship). In the first place the mental act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs; if upon scrutiny of the censorship it is rejected, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be repressed and must remain unconscious.

This discussion of the structure of the unconscious system leads rather naturally into a description of the function of the unconscious. Freud's great contribution, as Karen Horney says,¹⁰ was not in the discovery and definition of the unconscious, but in his description of its dynamic functions. The unconscious is the reservoir of the energies of the individual. Freud uses a descriptive term for this energy; he calls it the libido. The word "libido" means the undifferentiated energy of the individual. It varies from individual to individual, but must always be defined strictly to mean energy and must not be confused with the instincts which Freud posited. Instincts are endowed with energy, and the energy is the libido.¹¹

9. Ibid., pp. 105-106.

10. Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1939), pp. 23ff.

11. Leland E. Hinsie and Jacob Shatzky, Psychiatric Dictionary, with Encyclopaedic Treatment of Terms, (London: Oxford Press, 1940), p. 318.

Ernest Jones, the English psychoanalyst, says that Freud gives this term a meaning that does not differ greatly from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's "Wille zur Macht," Bergson's elan vital, Shaw's "life force," and the "vital impulse of so many writers"12

In the second place, the instincts are deeply rooted in the unconscious life of the individual, according to Freud, and may be grouped in two great classes:13

The instincts separate themselves into two groups; the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect themselves into even larger unities, and the death instincts which act against that tendency and try to bring living matter back into inorganic condition. The cooperation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end.

The erotic impulses are sexually constituted. It is important that the exact definition of this impulse be derived from the primary sources of Freud's own works:14

In psychoanalysis the term "sexuality" comprises far more (than mere genital behavior in coitus); it goes lower and higher than the popular sense of the word. This extension is justified genetically; we reckon as belonging to the sexual life all expressions of tender feelings, which spring from the source of primitive sexual feelings, even when those feelings have become inhibited in regard to their original sexual aim or have exchanged this aim for another which is no longer sexual. For this reason we prefer to speak of psychosexuality, thus laying stress on the point that the mental factor should not be overlooked or underestimated. We use

12. Quoted by Meyer Solomon, "Review of Conclusions Drawn from the Freudian School," N. Y. Medical Journal, (---), 98:915, , 1918.

13. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, tr. by Spratt, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1933), p. 147.

14. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on a Wild Psychoanalysis," (1910), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 209.

the word sexuality in the same comprehensive sense as that which the German language uses the word lieben (to love). And we have long known that a mental lack of satisfaction with all its consequences can exist where there is no lack of normal sexual intercourse; as therapists, we have constantly to remember that the unsatisfied sexual trends (the substitutive satisfactions of which in the form of nervous symptoms we have to combat) can often find only very inadequate outlet in coitus or in other sexual acts.

This life drive, this love drive, this sexual drive, then, is the Eros instinct which aims at the perpetuation and propagation of life. It is the root of all conjunctive feeling which draws on the libidinal energies for power to construct, to create, to procreate.

Late in life, furthermore, Freud perceived the reality of another contrary instinct — the aggressive impulse which he called the Thanatos. In 1909 he said that he could not bring himself to "assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct alongside the familiar instinct of self-preservation and sex and on an equal footing with them. But in 1923, Freud modified his view of the instincts and said that he "had been obliged to assert the existence of an 'aggressive instinct,' which is opposed to the Eros instinct and finds expression in the familiar polarity of love and hate."¹⁵

An important factor concerning the unconscious life of an individual and the function of the instincts in the mental life is Freud's premise that the unconscious aspect of these instincts works on the principle of pleasure. He says that the starting point of psychoanalysis is the unconscious mental processes. These are older, primary processes,

15. Sigmund Freud, "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year Old Boy," (1909), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 281.

"the residues of a phase of development in which they were the only kind of mental processes." Concerning the principle of their operation, he says:¹⁶

The sovereign tendency obeyed by these impulses . . . is . . . easy of recognition; it is called the pleasure-pain (Lust-Unlust) principle, or more shortly, the pleasure principle. These processes strive toward gaining pleasure; from any operation which might arouse unpleasantness ('pain') mental activity draws back (repression). Our nocturnal dreams, or waking tendency to shut out painful impressions, are the remnants of the supremacy of this principle and proofs of its power.

The aim, then, of the unconscious, is the achievement of satisfaction ✓ and the avoidance of pain. In the unconscious life "no" does not exist, and contrary desires exist along side each other with no difficulty.¹⁷

A three-fold summary of the characteristics of the unconscious system is evident:

First, the central characteristic of the system is that it consists ✓ of dynamic instincts which aim at discharge and release of tension through the achievement of satisfaction. The unconscious operates on the pleasure-principle.

Second, these instinctual energies are "exempt from mutual contra- ✓ diction" and give no evidence of "negation, dubiety, no varying degree of certainty. They are highly motile, and move with force toward their aim."

Third, these energies are not related to the reality of time and ✓ circumstance. They work only in terms of the present with no regard to

16. Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," (1911), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 13-14.

17. Sigmund Freud, "An Infantile Neurosis," (1918), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 559.

the past or future. They are characterized by a certain timelessness and substitute psychic reality for external reality.¹⁸ It can easily be seen that "the content of the unconscious may be compared with a primitive population in the mental kingdom." Indeed it is the primitive aspect of human nature, that which has not yet been differentiated by the molds and patterns of culture. The unconscious is like those tribes of people who live in the hill country of the lands of the world's oldest and most refined cultures. Although they are racial relatives of the more cultured and refined people, and although they exert a powerful influence over the life of the whole country, their existence is either not known or ignored by the more civilized natives.

Sources of information about the unconscious system are suggested by Freud. The conversation and behavior of neurotic people and the study of dreams of both normal and abnormal people, the observation of the slips and blunders of speech and behavior (which Freud calls "the psychopathology of everyday life"), and the study of the overt behavior of children reflects information in abundance about the unconscious motivations of adult people. Freud also adds that there are some normal mental states that serve as prototypes for the morbid affections. A study of these prototypes throws light on the unconscious psychogenesis of abnormal behavior. The process of bereavement or mourning is analogous on the conscious level to the pathological state of melancholia which

18. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 117ff.

works on the unconscious level. Then, too, the normal experience of individuals in love reflects much information about the character patterns rooted deep in the unconscious life. Sleep is another normal phenomenon that sheds light on the unconscious when thought is taken about it. Freud says that in sleep "human beings lay aside their garments, and even their false hair and teeth." And, following this analogy, he says that they likewise "dismantle their minds -- they lay aside most of their mental acquisitions; thus both physically and mentally approaching remarkably close to the situation in which they began life"19 And of course in his study of sleep, Freud concentrated upon the careful analysis and interpretation of dreams. This was to him "the royal road to the unconscious."

C. THE CONSCIOUS SYSTEM

In his earliest formulations Freud made a sharp distinction between the unconscious and the conscious mental systems. This distinction can be best understood by thinking of the mind as a dynamic process of mental acts rather than a static series of spatially conceived compartments. In this light it is seen that²⁰

A mental act commonly goes through two phases, between which is interposed a kind of tasting process (censorship). In the first phase the act is unconscious and belongs to the system of the

19. Sigmund Freud, "A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams," (1916), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 137-38.

20. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 105-106.

unconscious; if upon the scrutiny of the censorship it is rejected, it is not allowed to pass into the second phase; it is then said to be "repressed" and must remain unconscious. If, however, it passes this scrutiny, it enters upon the second phase and thenceforth belongs to the system of consciousness.

In defining the system of consciousness, Freud says that the state of becoming conscious is "a special psychic act, different from and independent of the process of becoming fixed and represented, and . . . appears to us as a sensory organ which perceives a content proceeding from another source."²¹ Thus it is seen that consciousness is an organ of perception, the perception of the difference between the responding subject and the stimulating object. There are two sources of the contents of the conscious system:²²

Consciousness . . . can be excited in waking life from two sources: firstly, from the periphery of the whole apparatus, the perceptive system; and secondly, from the excitations of pain and pleasure which emerge as the sole qualities yielded by the transpositions of energy in the interior of the apparatus.

The sources of the data, however, for perception are not merely external, but arise also from the inner self of the person. These data are just as legitimate an area for investigation as mere sense data, according to Freud. Freud shifted the emphasis from the merely sensory aspect of consciousness and stressed its value as an organ of perception of the self and of society. He conceived of consciousness as being the "growing edge" (to use R. C. Cabot's phrase) of the indi-

21. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Tr. A. A. Brill, (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), p. 224.

22. Ibid., p. 515.

vidual's experience with himself and the real world of society in his search for satisfaction for his innate drives of love and aggression. Consciousness is the point of contact for the individual with the inner realities of himself and the outer realities of the world. Like the pseudopodia of amoebae, it is the area of contact with the external world, an instrument for the testing of reality developed by the individual as he searches for sources of satisfaction other than himself.

Naturally, therefore, the conscious system functions on a different principle from the unconscious system. Whereas the unconscious operates on the principle of pleasure, the conscious operates on the principle of reality. Something in the very nature of the unconscious, being drawn as it is by the peremptory demands of the inner needs, drives it outward because of the unreal and hallucinatory nature of the results of the search for satisfaction within itself. The substitution of the inner psychic reality for external social reality in the very earliest stages of the development of personality does not result in genuine satisfaction. Therefore, instead of feeding upon itself, the individual reaches outward toward the external world of other selves for a more realistic and less fantastic satisfaction.²³

The mental apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the outer world and exert itself to alter them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was conceived was no longer that which was pleasant, but that which was real, even if it should be unpleasant. This institution of the reality principle proved to be a momentous step.

23. Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning," (1911), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 14.

Ernest Groves gives an interesting interpretation of this reality principle when he says that²⁴

✓ Freud comes into contact with the science of sociology in his statement that there are two working principles of the human mind, one the principle of pain-pleasure and the other that of reality Civilization . . . is developed by an increasing manifestation of the contrary attitude (to that of the pleasure principle), the principle of reality. This reality principle does not confine itself to the illusive pleasures of the moment, because the accumulated impressions of the race have taught the individual the need for a wider outlook. The reality principle demands that the significance of the duration of time be taken into account.

This suggestion falls in contrast with the description of the unconscious system in that there is no negation and no sense of time in the character of unconscious feeling. Its aim is immediate, pleasurable satisfaction of the impulse. But in the conscious system, there is a modification of both the aim and the principle. In some instances, such as incestuous and murderous motives, there is a complete negation, although the criminal courts show instances where this negation failed, and the psychoses show instances where even socially acceptable motives are completely negated. But the healthy person's conscious system does not negate all impulses, but brings the pleasure-aim under the time- and-circumstance test of reality. It takes a long-term view of pleasure, and therefore is not in its nature antagonistic to the desires of the unconscious system. That sort of modification comes late in time, as will be seen.

24. Ernest R. Groves, "Sociology and Psychoanalytic Psychology," The American Journal of Sociology, 23:1:115-116, July, 1917.

Not only does the conscious system work on the temporal aspect of reality, but it also aims at a unity between the individual and the social sources of his satisfaction. It is an organ of adjustment. As T. D. Eliot has so fitly said,²⁵ consciousness "may be roughly defined in terms of mental behavior at a point of relation or adjustment between an individual and his environment Conscious thought seems in general to follow the point of stimulation" In the final analysis, the conscious system also operates on the pleasure-principle, too, but in a much different and more intelligent way. The conscious system denies immediate satisfaction for long-term satisfaction; it finds substitute pleasures in the environment; it transforms impulses from their lower and more primitive aims and presses them into the service of cultural and social aims which belong to the group rather than the individual. But when all these fail, it favors the real rather than the pleasurable and knows when to refuse flatly to allow an impulse expression. It often invokes a complete renunciation of the impulses, and in this sense it may be said to be engaged in the task of bringing the pleasure-principle under submission to the reality-principle. This process is aided in the education

25. T. D. Eliot, "A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Group Formation and Behavior," The American Journal of Sociology, 26:3:337, November, 1920.

of the child:²⁶

Education can without hesitation be described as an incitement to the conquest of the pleasure-principle, and to its replacement by the reality principle; it offers its aid, that is, to that process of development which concerns the ego; to this end it makes use of the rewards of love from those in charge, and thus it fails if the spoilt child thinks it will possess this love whatever happens and can in no circumstances lose it.

Art also has a way of bringing the two principles into harmony. Freud says that an artist was originally a person who could not face reality because it demanded an instinctual renunciation of him. The artist then turned inward to his phantasy life in which he allowed full play to his imagination and his erotic and ambitious wishes. By his talent as an artist he depicted these phantasies in literature, sculpture, or painting, or whatever his art was. His art appealed to the dissatisfaction and phantasy in the lives of other people, and they now appreciate his art, laud him, and give him the place in their affections that he originally wanted. Thus his desires are satisfied, and his art has become a way back from phantasy to reality.

In his discussion of an infantile neurosis, Freud suggests that religion can and should perform the task of bringing the pleasure-principle under the voluntary, conscious control of the reality-principle in the life of the individual. The positive function of religion in this case is to put a restraint upon the individual's erotic and aggressive tendencies "by affording them a sublimation and a safe mooring,"

26. Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Concerning Two Principles in Mental Functioning," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 19.

to lower "the importance of family relationships and to protect him from the threat of isolation by giving him access to the great community of mankind." And in this way "the untamed and fear-ridden child became social, well-behaved, and amenable to education." And these are the aims "for which religion should be included in the education of the individual."²⁷ Religion, according to Freud, positively "should afford the believer satisfactions, sublimations and diversions from sensual processes to more spiritual ones, and give him access to social relationships."²⁷

In short, then, the function of the conscious system is that of the achievement of voluntary, conscious control as opposed to compulsory, involuntary behavior. The conscious system tests out reality and maintains working relationship between the individual and the real world. In describing this function, Freud says:

The conscious system normally controls affectivity as well as access to motility; and this enhances the importance of repression, since it shows us that the latter is responsible, not merely when something is withheld from consciousness, but also when affective development and the inauguration of muscular activity is prevented. Conversely, too, we may say that as long as the system of consciousness controls activity and motility, the mental condition of the person in question may be called normal.²⁸

The normality of the mental health of the individual is judged, then, in terms of the degree of his voluntary, conscious intelligent insight into and control over his impulses, in terms of his contented-

27. Sigmund Freud, "An Infantile Neurosis," (1918), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 597.

28. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 111.

ness with and integral relation to the real world about him, and in terms of his capacity for the sublimation of his impulses.

D. THE PRECONSCIOUS SYSTEM

Freud included a third system in his early formulations concerning the structure and function of personality. This system seems to be a sort of hinterland of consciousness, a succession of paling greys between the clear light of conscious knowing and unconscious not-knowing. This system Freud designated as the preconscious. In distinguishing between this system and the system of the unconscious, Freud says:²⁹

We see that we have two kinds of unconscious — that which is latent but capable of becoming conscious, and that which is repressed and not capable of becoming conscious That which is latent and only unconscious in the descriptive and not in the dynamic sense, we call the preconscious; the term unconscious we reserve for the dynamically repressed.

In this observation and definition, Freud apparently has isolated two kinds of forgetting for description. One sort of forgetting is that which is an intellectual or ideational forgetting which allows the idea to remain latent, accessible to association. The other sort of forgetting, however, is different by far: it is that sort in which an emotional resistance will not allow the idea or feeling to come to consciousness, and which actually seems to the conscious mind as if it were alien, utterly strange, and worthy of violent rejection. This

29. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 12.

latter kind of idea has an emotional charge to it, and, by nature of its dynamic significance to the individual, it is sealed out of consciousness.

The former kind of forgetting characterizes the preconscious system, and the latter kind may be thought of as unconscious. The comparative relationship is seen even more clearly in this definitive statement:³⁰

We have now gained the conviction that there are some latent ideas which do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may have become. Therefore, we may call the latent ideas of the first type preconscious, while we reserve the term unconscious (proper) for the latter type which we came to study in the neuroses. The term unconscious which was used in the purely descriptive sense before, now comes to imply something more. It designates not only latent ideas in general, but especially ideas with a certain dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from consciousness in spite of their intensity and activity.

The nature of the associative process, therefore, is the point of definition for the proper understanding of the preconscious. The distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious is that the ideas of the former are not directly amenable to association and must be reached through psychoanalysis, and the ideas of the preconscious are more directly reached through association and become in turn the analyst's stepping stones toward the unconscious. This increases the importance of dreams which are the activity of mind while the person sleeps. The impetus for the dream-formation comes from the unconscious

30. Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 25.

memories. The only access that the unconscious idea has into consciousness is through the preconscious. Thus the preconscious is the way through which dream formations necessarily must "make connection with dream thoughts which belong to the system of the unconscious." There is a weakening of the censorship between the unconscious and the preconscious systems. Therefore, the "royal road to the unconscious" goes through the province of preconscious and the vehicle of travel is the associative process.³¹

II. LATER REVISIONS OF THE THEORY OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF PERSONALITY

Beginning in 1920 with the publication of Beyond the Pleasure Principle and culminating in 1933 with the publication of New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud worked out a theoretical restatement of his views. He did this upon the basis of his own personal readjustments to life, especially after the first World War, and upon the basis of his later clinical investigations. In this restatement, he developed a closer and more understandable and clinically applicable concept of the structure and function of personality.

Freud recognized that the weakness of his first formulations lay in the lack of information about and insight into the structure and function of the repressed elements of the psychic life without paying

31. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 491-92.

enough attention to the repressing agents of the ego.³² In his book, The Ego and the Id, Freud gives the essence of this revision. Here he makes the tripartite division of personality into the id, which represents the instinctual impulses of Eros and Thanatos; the ego, which represents the capacity for social feeling and the testing of social reality; and the super-ego, which represents the internalization of socially acquired inhibitions into the structure of personality.

A. THE ID

The nature and function of the id does not differ greatly from, but at the same time must not be equated with, the observations he published concerning the unconscious. Rather Freud says that it would be best no longer to use the term unconscious in the sense of a system, in order to avoid misunderstanding. He discards this term and takes up the term id, a term which is an impersonal pronoun, as being more descriptively suited for the essential character of this province of the mind. He describes this province as being essentially "foreign to the ego." It seems that the id according to Freud is that impersonal, chaotic, contradictory principle of power, the vital urge of life.

Freud enumerates the characteristics of the id:

1. "It is the obscure inaccessible part of our personality . . . and can only be described as being all that the ego is not."
2. "We can never come nearer the id than with images, and call

32. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 19.

it a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitement."

3. "It is somewhere in direct contact with somatic processes, and takes over from them instinctual needs and gives them expression."

4. "These instincts fill it with energy, but it has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle."

5. "There is nothing in the id that can be compared with negation."

6. "There is nothing corresponding to the idea of time."

7. "The id knows no values, no good and evil, no morality."

8. "Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge, — that . . . is all the id contains."³³

B. THE EGO

The ego in Freud's final formulations has the function of consciousness but cannot be equated with it, and it would be better to discard that loose term for this more specific one. Freud describes much more precisely the nature and function of this system. He gives a general definition:³⁴

One can hardly go wrong in regarding the ego as that part of the id which has been modified by its proximity to the external world and the influence that the latter has had on it, and which serves the purpose of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of living substance surrounds itself.

33. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, pp. 102-105.

34. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

The function of the ego is to represent the external world for the id, in order to protect it, else it would destroy itself, or be destroyed by its environment. It does this by the perceptive process of testing reality. It controls the path to motor activity by interpolating the factor of thoughtful intelligence between desire and action, and makes use of past experience through the memory process. Here again it is seen that the main task is to "dethrone the pleasure-principle by substituting for it the reality-principle, which promises greater security and greater success."³⁴

Contrary to the function of the id, the ego takes into consideration the temporal aspect of behavior and tries to synthesize the incoherent contradictions of the id and to harmonize the id with society. Freud summarizes his discussion of the nature and function of the ego by saying:³⁵ "In popular language, we may say that the ego stands for reason and circumspection, while the id stands for the untamed passions."³⁶

From the dynamic point of view, Freud says, the ego is not very powerful, it is clever and intelligent; by identifying itself with a love-object in the environment, it attracts the inner impulses of the individual away from themselves. This is the intelligent factor in personality at work, and, as Freud avers,³⁶

We may insist as much as we like that the human intellect is weak in comparison with the human instincts, and be right in doing so. But nevertheless there is something peculiar about this weak-

35. Ibid., p. 108.

36. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, (London: Hogarth Press, 1928), p. 93.

ness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. This is one of the few points in which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it signifies not a little.

C. THE SUPER-EGO (THE EGO-IDEAL)

The ego brings the id under the control of the reality-principle through the choice of a love-object for the attachment (cathexis) of the libido-charges of the id. Whenever these love-objects are given up, the ego, in the process of bereavement or melancholia incorporates or reinstates the character of the love object into itself, and the vestigial remains of that love-relationship "leave their mark" or their likeness in the character of the individual.

The ego assumes the features of the object, and forces itself upon the id as a love-object and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying: "Look, I am so like the object, you can as well love me."

Freud reminds his reader at this juncture that this is the meaning of the eating of the totem in primitive religions and may be one of the roots of the practice of cannibalism. He also says that this is the emotional value of the Lord's Supper in which the body is consumed and the blood partaken through oral incorporation symbolizing the spiritual reality of the likeness of Christ having been incorporated into the personality of the believer.³⁷

These character precipitates found in adult experience, however, lead the investigator back to the earliest impressions made on the

37. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 36-37.

character of the individual by those whom he first loved, his parents. Here is the origin of the ego-ideal, or the Super-Ego. The parent-child relationship makes the most significant and lasting effects upon the ego-structure of the individual. This works out in two separate respects for which Freud has gained a great deal of notoriety.

The first of these situations is what he describes as the Oedipus situation. The original quality of love feeling is narcissistic, i.e., the individual loves what he is himself, what he once was, what he would like to be, or someone who was once a part of him.³⁸ This is a primary self-love. But a modification occurs:³⁹

At a very early age the little boy develops an object attachment of his mother, which originally related to the mother's breast . . .; his father the boy deals with by identifying himself with him (i.e., tending to become like him). For a time these two relationships exist side by side, until the sexual wishes in regard to the mother become more intense and the father is perceived as an obstacle to them; this gives rise to the Oedipus complex. The identification with the father then takes on a hostile coloring and changes into a wish to get rid of the father in order to take his place with the mother. Henceforward the relation to the father is ambivalent An ambivalent attitude toward the father and an object-relation of a purely affectionate kind to the mother make up the content of the simple positive (normal) Oedipus-complex in the boy.

This is the formation of the Oedipus situation as it is seen in the little boy. A converse relation to the father would be apparent in the little girl. This constellation appears most vividly when the child is about five to seven years of age.

38. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," (1914), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 47-48.

39. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, pp. 40-41.

The solution of the problem involves a forsaking of the parent of the opposite sex as a sex-partner and the recovery of a purely affectionate relation to that parent through identification with the parent of the same sex. The child realizes himself fully in relation to his mother through his becoming like his father, whom she loves. Thus he learns how to love women by learning how to become a man. This would be reversed in the little girl, of course.

But this breaking involves another problem, the second situation of which mention was made in referring to the formation of the ego-ideal. Often, instead of taking the father as an ego-ideal in the solution of the Oedipus situation, for any of countless reasons, the boy child will fix his affections to his mother and identify himself with her, introjecting a feminine character into himself. Or the little girl will similarly fix her affections to her father and become more and more masculine. This is an inversion which results in a complex of homosexual traits. In men and women Freud called this the castration complex in which the individual develops reaction patterns of extreme inferiority in men, i.e., feelings of castration or fear of castration; and masculine aggressiveness in women, i.e., what Freud calls "penis envy."

The first of these complex-formations, Freud says, results from the lengthened infancy period of the human being. During the years of the infantile psychosexual development of the individual he is thrown

in complete helplessness and dependence upon his parents.⁴⁰ The child's sexual concern develops both in infancy and adolescence far more rapidly than does his economic and emotional independence. The second phenomenon, the castration complex, Freud attributes to the interruption of the sexual development of the child by a latency period (from about seven to the onset of puberty). Both phenomena leave permanent character residues in the life of the individual which he groups under the term Super-Ego.⁴¹

We see, then, that the differentiation of the super-ego from the ego is no matter of chance; it stands as the representative of the most important events in the development of both the individual and the race; indeed, by giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents, it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin.

In this way the character of the individual changes at its lowest depths, "through this formation of the ideal, into what we value as the highest in the human soul."⁴²

Thus the super-ego is the internalized experience of the ego with society, especially the parents of the individual. And Freud says that the experience of the race becomes a part of the individual through this process. Experiences that have been wrought out over and again in the lives of individuals "transform themselves into the experiences of the id."

40. Ernest R. Groves has taken this observation as the main point of departure for his interpretation of the social functions of that family in his book The Family and Its Social Functions, (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1940).

41. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 46.

42. Ibid., p. 48.

Thus in the id, which is capable of being inherited, are stored up vestiges of the existences led by countless former egos; and, when the ego forms its super-ego out of the id, it may perhaps only be reviving images of egos that have passed away and be securing them a resurrection.⁴³

The super-ego, for all practical purposes, then, is a genetic explanation of the conscience. In psychotherapy it is seen as the socially induced inhibitions of the individual that have been internalized as an automatic governor on his behavior. Here the aetiology of guilt is thrown into bold relief:⁴⁴ "The tension between the demands of conscience (the ego-ideal) and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt." This, finally, is the picture that Freud gives of the nature and function of personality: In its origins he sees personality as a bundle of animal impulses; he sees solidified adult character, burdened with the sense of guilt, and torn by conflicting desires. Here is the source of all pathology in the spirit of man: the clash between his sense of the demands of society, his sense of his own ideals, and his sense of need for instinctual satisfaction.

Freud placed his theory of personality into a historical context and described it as one of the three blows to "the general narcissisms of man, the self-love of humanity." These are wounds that have been inflicted by the researches of science. The first of these blows was that inflicted by Copernicus when he established scientifically that the earth is not the center and lord of the universe. The second wound was in-

43. Ibid., p. 52.

44. Ibid., p. 49.

flicted by Darwin when he demonstrated that man is not different from other animals, and that he too is a product and subject of the biological laws of nature. But the third and most painful blow was when Freud himself suggested that man is not the master of his own soul and the captain of his own fate as he had enjoyed telling himself that he was. Man himself is irrational, compulsive, and not so near the gods and so far from the clay as he supposed. Such insight wounded and punctured man's comfortable illusions about his innate goodness and reminded him of the egoistic baseness of his fundamental drives.⁴⁵ ✓

When asked for a reason for emphasizing the more sordid facts about human nature, Freud answered in the following evaluation of his work:

You will fall back upon the argument that surely it is very improbable that we ought to concede so large a part in the human constitution to what is evil. But do your own experiences justify such a statement? I will say nothing of how you may appear in your own eyes, but have you met with so much goodwill in your superiors and rivals, so much chivalry in your enemies and so little envy in your acquaintances, that you feel it incumbent upon you to protest against the idea of the part played by egoistic baseness in human nature?

Then he calls attention to the fact that the average human being when known intimately is found to have great surges of sexual conflict, that the dream life of men shows that they would commit the most heinous of crimes, but prefer to appear respectable and dream about the things that bad men actually do. He points to the awfulness of war as being not only

⁴⁵. Sigmund Freud, "One of the Difficulties of Psychoanalysis," (1917), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 350-56.

a desire of a handful of men, but the fact that millions of individuals agree with them. His conclusion is that he can find no clinical evidence for the exclusion of evil from the mental constitution of men.⁴⁶ ✓

In giving his reason for dwelling upon the pathologies of human beings with greater emphasis, he says that he does so because⁴⁷

others deny it, thereby making the mental life of mankind not indeed better, but incomprehensible. If we give up the one-sided ethical valuation then, we are sure to find the truer formula for the relation of evil to good in human nature.

A closer evaluation of Freud's work in the light of religion is seen in his formulations concerning the ego-ideal:⁴⁸

Psychoanalysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, spiritual side of human nature So long as the study of the repressed part of the mind was our task, there was no need for us to feel any agitated apprehensions about the higher side of mental life. But now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the ego we can give answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man: "Very true," we can say, "and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves."

This, in essence, is representative of Freud's estimation of the particularly religious and ethical significance of his doctrine of personality. In his book The Problem of Lay Analyses, Freud suggests that this sort of approach to personality is a departure from the psychologies

46. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Tr. Joan Riviere, (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1920) pp. 130-31.

47. Ibid., p. 131.

48. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 47.

of mere sensory experience which prevailed, and is a psychology of "the inner man," the "soul," and expresses his hope that his depth psychology will be of "indispensable aid to all sciences which deal with the development of human culture, and such of its great achievements as art, religion, and civilized society."⁴⁹

⁴⁹. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Lay Analyses, (New York: Brentano, 1927), p. 181. (Published along with his Autobiography.)

CHAPTER II

A CRITIQUE OF FREUD'S THEORY OF THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF PERSONALITY

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREUD'S THOUGHT

A critical analysis of Freud must include his criticisms of himself. It is important to notice that at the age of sixty, Freud set about the task of re-defining and modifying his own views.

The inductive survey of his earlier and later conclusions presents some striking contrasts.

In the first place, the earlier tri-partition of personality is loosely constructed and not nearly as definite as the later one. It is an elaboration of the first fact that Freud discovered: the fact of repression. The individual was studied without much regard for society, and the impact of society upon the formation of his character was not properly evaluated. The biological and neurological orientation of Freud's earlier training shows itself in its stress upon the instinctual life of the individual. Darwin is Freud's close ally in this earlier phase of his formulations. But in the latter works the importance of the social influences upon the individual more adequately balances the biological emphasis. Freud evolves his idea of the super-ego as the sum-total of the contributions -- for better or for worse -- of society to the internal structure of the personality.

In the second place, Freud pays more attention to the function of the individual in society in his more mature works than he does in his earlier papers. As Hocking has said, Freud "began with an emphasis

upon the evil of repression," and in the later stages of his thinking he saw the need for an "emphasis upon the necessity of sublimation."¹

The ego as an agent of reconciliation of individual and social interests has a larger place in the later works. It may be said that the later formulations of Freud placed the emphasis upon the social heritage and function of the individual, whereas the earlier teachings more bluntly stated the individual's biological needs.

In the third place, Freud, in his later years, naturally confronted the importance of religion as a means of social control and social change. He was led naturally in his development to the field of religion and felt compelled to draw some conclusion about religion. He could not remain silent on the subject. In turn, he proposed science as a conscious, voluntary instrument of social change. It is significant that a man of his genius could not examine the facts about human nature without coming to grips with the problems which religion raises in the mind of man.

II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF FREUD'S CONCEPT OF PERSONALITY

Freud did not originate his concept of personality, but gave it an original scientific statement. He made it scientifically usable. A proper evaluation of the theory must include a perspective of history.

Freud himself gave his own historical evaluation of the place of his theory, and concluded that his work is a third blow to the human

1. W. E. Hocking, Human Nature and Its Re-Making, (New Haven: Yale Press, 1918), p. 37

race's narcissistic self-love, in that man has realized that he is not the "master of even his own soul." But this is a rather moralistic evaluation inflamed with Freud's estimate of himself. He fails to recognize the technical insights wrought out by philosophers and theologians before him and contemporaneously with him.

Freud's work is the scientific expression of two great historical streams of psychology. The first is the Greek tradition. This tradition may be said to have begun with the work of Heraclitus, who set forth a concept of the unifying, rational principle in the universe and human nature which he called the "logos". He said: "It is wise to hearken, not unto me, but unto the Logos and confess that all things are one." Likewise, he detected the essential contradictoriness of life in his paradoxes. He said: "It is disease that makes health pleasant, evil that makes good desirable, etc..." Life to Heraclitus was dynamic, flowing, and alive, not static and inert. All things flowed, he said. He saw the principle of aggression at work in human life and said that it was the father of all things. And, it may be remarked, he carped at the foibles of popular religion also.²

This dynamic view of life was given more definite statement in the work of Socrates. He emphasized the validity of man's knowledge of the inner world of the self. He said that the truly beautiful life was the one in which the "outward man" and the "inner man" were at one. He saw the necessity for integration of self, and saw that the main source

2. John Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, (London: A & C Black, Ltd., 1930), pp. 133ff.

of disintegration was man's lack of knowledge of himself. He said that the unexamined life was "unfit for man to live." He interpreted ignorance of such an unexamined life as sin.

Plato, in the mythology to which Freud referred, set forth a psychology which was at once realistic and idealistic. In the Ninth Book of The Republic (Book IX), Plato speaks of an "appetitive soul," which is "the wild beast within us." He says that there is "no conceivable folly or crime -- not excepting incest or any other unnatural union, or parricide or the eating of forbidden food -- which ... a man may not be ready to commit." He says that in every person, "even in good men, there is a lawless, wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep." Then he speaks of the element of conscience in character which is to be "fed on noble thoughts and inquiries." The obvious reason for this is that the conscience, too, may not disturb the sleep. He thinks of both the curbing of the conscience and the roarings of the appetites as being irrational. Both are to be brought under the pacifying influence of the third principle, "which is reason." The reason is to feed both the conscience and the desires "neither too much or too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep." Then Plato concludes that if a person will follow these instructions, he "attains the truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions." Plato goes ahead to a further, more social and ethical interpretation of this concept of personality in another part of The Republic (Book IV) and says that the just man can be so evaluated:

Justice...is concerned, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or

any of them to do the work of the others,— he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself: and when he has bound together the three principles within him... and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and cooperates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that at which any time impairs this condition he will call unjust action and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

In the light of this definition of justice, Plato describes evil as the "rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority..."

Greek mythology and drama afforded Freud vehicles of expression for his ideas. The thought of Freud is steeped in concepts from the Greek language and folk-lore. The two dramatic tragedies by Sophocles, Oedipus the King and Electra, are used as exact analogies of the psychic life of the infantile development of the individual. Narcissus is perpetuated in Freud's psychological mythology. Freud consciously drew on the folk-psychology of his day and of antiquity in setting forth his concepts. Emil Brunner is right when he says that one of the causes for the fruitful appeal of psychoanalysis is that it is so near to the heart of the everyday psychology by which the average person more or less unconsciously lives.

In addition to being preceded by this stream of Greek psychology, Freud's psychology of the depths is also akin to the naive psychology of the Hebrews. This psychology saw no division between the psyche and the soma, for man was animated flesh. It spoke of the psychic life of man in visceral terms: "the bowels of compassion," "the reins of the

kidneys," "the soul that panteth", and the "spewing forth" of disgust. The Hebrew psychology furthermore, was a psychology of the self. It spoke of "deep calling unto deep," knowing the truth in "the inward parts," and gaining wisdom in "the hidden parts." The prayer life of the Psalmist is permeated with such ideas as the searching of the heart and the knowing of the thoughts.

Also, the Hebrews saw no essential antithesis between sexuality and religion. They thought of the blessing of potency and fertility as a sure sign of God's favor, and the absence of these as evidence of His displeasure. They did not move so far in the direction of artificiality that they denied the natural sexual needs that sought satisfaction. The family was the flower of their culture. They gave themselves completely to each other and to their God as fathers, mothers and children. Family love under God was not side-tracked for any other considerations such as social prestige, professional training or the fear of responsibility. Even the Apostle Paul, profoundly influenced as he was by Hellenistic inroads upon his psychological realism of the Hebrews, was struck with horror at the unnaturalness of the sexual behavior of the Roman world. The Hebrews felt no conflict between the prayers of their mind and the desires of their body for food and sex, but did see sexual power as the gift of God for dedication to Him in the fulfilment of His purpose for their personal and corporate lives. Correspondingly, the biographies of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Hosea tell so frankly the simple facts of their love-lives that religious leaders in this day of combined prudishness and lewdness feel impelled to "censor" the Scripture when it comes to sexual matters.

Then the "censored" copy becomes the "sure guide to faith and practice."

L. H. Brockington, in summarizing the Hebrew psychology says,³

Man, fundamentally is flesh -- an animated body (Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson's well-known phrase) a complex of physical organs and limbs, each playing its part in both physical and psychical life, out of which emerges a self-identity, individuality, and sense of personal power... The basis of human personality in human thought was flesh...

He continues by showing that historically the concept of God grew from this biological basis and in doing so became a living, personal concept "with a measure of concreteness." With real suggestiveness, Brockington says that this sense of an ego-ideal antedates both individually and racially the "developing sense of individuality and self-hood." The Hebrews developed their social solidarity from their sense of kinship and obligation to Jehovah and the worth of the individual grew out of the corporate life of the people as they lived together in a covenant relationship.

These two streams of Greek and Hebrew psychology mingled with Manichaeism in the psychology of Augustine. The dualism became predominant. Augustine knew a great deal about the results of "too much" sexuality, and as a result he constructed a distorted psychology that demanded "too little" sexuality of his followers. He picked up his Bible and read the first passage that came to his attention, which said: "Make no provision for the flesh." Then, he says: "No further did I read; nor needed I..." And this was true for him. He had experienced the unlimited

3. L. H. Brockington, "The Hebrew Conception of Personality in Relation to the Knowledge of God," The Journal of Theological Studies, 57:185-6; 5, January-April, 1946.

provision for the flesh himself, and as a result he had never discovered the spiritual and personal elements in sexuality itself. And, as Emil Brunner has so fitly said, "The spiritual value of our life is reached through limitation." Sexuality only becomes truly personal when it becomes responsible."⁴ Augustine never discovered this for himself, and naturally his psychology does not reflect it. To the contrary, the dualism of his Manichaeian heritage was foisted upon the life of the church, and the asceticism of monasticism stifled the psychological sincerity of Platonic and Hebraic thought and made the phenomenon of repression the vehicle for pathologies in society which remind the student more of Augustine's earlier life than they do of his later theology. His followers tended to become the sort of persons he had been rather than the sort of persons he taught them to be by simply trying to put into effect what he taught.

Roman Catholic and Protestant asceticism thus turned away from a psychology of the inner life such as was inherent in the Greek and Hebrew heritage. Philosophically, theologically, and scientifically they produced a psychology of the act and more or less disregarded the motive. The function of the conscious mind and the efficacy of reason were objects of emphasis and research. The validity of emotion was more and more discounted, and the sharp distinction between mind and body was overworked. The psychological end-product of this sort of approach was behaviorism, and the religious conclusion was Pharisaism. Just as behaviorism is a psychology of the act, Pharisaic legalism is a religion

4. Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, Tr. by Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), p. 267.

of the act. The moral and ethical result is insincerity, and the psychological result is sexual perversion, criminality, and psychosomatic and neurotic destruction of personality.

A resurgence of the Hebrew and Platonic psychology, however, was inevitable. Philosophically this resurgence came in the work of Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Nietzsche (1844-1900). Schopenhauer and Nietzsche both emphasized the fact of the power of the emotions. They drew vivid pictures of the irrationality and compulsiveness of human nature. The role of wish and will in the determination of thought was magnified, and the sources of personal energy were examined. The masquerade of society was ruthlessly exposed. They perceived the weakness of legalism which passed itself off as religion and called it a "slave morality." The insincerity and sham of culture was especially their concern. They saw the necessity of going "beyond good and evil" in the construction of a robust spiritual experience that enlisted rather than excommunicated the reserves of the individual's personal energies. Nietzsche sneered at the "despisers of the body," and said that their "unconscious envy was the sidelong look of their contempt." He spoke of the pale criminal, driven about by an intolerable madness of guilt, and said that his was a "madness before the deed." He saw through the motivations of much religious Pharisaism when he described his "preachers of death:"⁵

There are the terrible ones who carry about in themselves
the beast of prey, and have no choice except lusts or

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, ed. Manuel Komroff, (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1934), p. 42.

self-laceration. And even their lusts are self-laceration.

They have not yet become men, those terrible ones: may they preach desistance from life and pass away themselves!

They are the spiritually consumptive ones: hardly are they born when they begin to die, and long for doctrines of lassitude and renunciation.

They would fain be dead, and we should approve of their wish! ... They meet an invalid, or an old man or a corpse -- and immediately they say: "Life is refuted!"

But only they are refuted, and their eye, which seeth only one aspect of existence.

As Thomas Mann has said in evaluating the relationship between the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche,⁶

Schopenhauer as psychologist of the will, is the father ✓ of all modern psychology. From him the line runs by way of the psychological radicalism of Nietzsche straight to Freud and the men who built up his psychology of the unconscious and applied it to the mental sciences...

But Freud also had a theological fore-runner whom Thomas Mann overlooked in his historical analysis which is quoted above. That person is Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kierkegaard, like Freud, was born as ✓ the child of his parents' old age. A rather morbid father-son relationship had a great influence on the development of Kierkegaard, who attributes much of the intense suffering he endured to the fact that his childhood was so abnormal. Consequently, he makes much of the infantile development of the individual in his religious psychology. He had strong ambivalent feelings and saw in the contradictoriness of human nature much that Freud saw in the polarities which he said govern the mental life. He saw the dynamic aspects of the unconscious, as it is

6. Thomas Mann, Quoted on the fly-leaf of the Complete Essays of Schopenhauer, Tr. by T. B. Saunders, (New York: Willey Book Co., 1942)

seen in many suggestions like the following:⁷

And, oh, to my thinking this is one expression the more of the dreadful of this most dreadful sickness and misery, namely, its hiddenness --- not only that he who suffers from it may wish to hide it and may be able to do so, to the effect that no one, no one whatever discovers it; no rather, that it can be so hidden in a man that he himself does not know it.

He saw that the sicknesses of the spirits of men were protective mechanisms whereby the "despairing man is in a way secured (but to his own destruction)..."⁸

Kierkegaard lays his finger on the fallacy of a behavioristic pharisaism and disassociates himself from an Augustinian negation of the flesh. He sets forth the teaching that the evil of despair is the "rising up of a part of the soul against the whole" when he says:⁹

The sins of the flesh are the self-assertion of the lower self; but how often one devil is cast out by the devil's help and the last state becomes worse than the first. For so it is in this world: first, a man sins from frailty and weakness; and then --- yes, perhaps he learns to flee to God and to be helped by faith which saves from all sin;...then he despairs over his weakness and becomes either a Pharisee who in despair manages to attain a certain legal righteousness, or he despairs and plunges again into sin.

He says that the error of the "religionists" lies in making virtue the opposite of sin. He corrects this and says that Jesus and Paul made ✓ faith the opposite of sin.

The central psychological problem of the individual, according to Kierkegaard, is that of becoming a self, a person. It is in the ✓ pilgrimage toward self-hood that the individual falls into the slough

7.
8. Ibid., pp. 69-70

9. Ibid., p. 131

of despair over not having become a self or over having succeeded in becoming a self. The experience of Oedipus and Hamlet fascinate Kierkegaard in this sense as they did Freud, and it may be said that Kierkegaard went back to the early Greeks instead of to Augustine for his psychology.

Kierkegaard was the father of modern dialectical theology and Freud the father of modern depth psychology. Kierkegaard stands in contradistinction to Schleiermacher in the psychology of religion in much the same relation that Freud is opposed to Hobbes and Wundt. Likewise he received similar opprobrium at the hands of his critics.

The psychology of religion movement, per se, may be said to extend back to Schleiermacher. The psychological soil in which this movement took root was fertilized with "proud assertions of human rationality (Descartes), goodness (Rousseau) and moral sufficiency (Kant)."¹⁰ At the hands of men like Darwin and Freud in the field of scientific biology and psychology, and men like Kierkegaard, Barth, and Brunner in the field of theology, the psychology of religion movement sponsored by Starbuck, Stratton, James, Coe, Leuba, and others is in a sad state of repair. It has been interesting to observe the simultaneous revival of interest in depth psychology, dialectical theology, and Greek tragedy and philosophy on the wave of the upheavals of the recent war.

The signs of the times point toward reconstruction in the field

10. Walter M. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, An Introduction for Anglo-Saxons, (New York: Harpers, 1938), p. 59

of the psychology of religion on the basis of the primary sources of the work of Sigmund Freud and his successors. A new chapter in the psychology of religion is being written, and in this chapter the substantial gains established by Freud in the labors of his life will play no small part. Just as there can be no Christian sociology apart from the incontrovertible facts unearthed by scientific sociologists, and just as there can be no adequate interpretation of the Scripture apart from the discoveries of scientific archaeologists, neither can there be an adequate understanding of human nature nor a satisfactory psychology of religion apart from the verifiable contributions of scientific psychologists. These sciences will be subject to continual revision, but they teach clearly that the idea and practice of the good cannot be achieved apart from the search for facts prompted by a hunger for truth. The scientific research of Freud is a door to reconstruction in the field of the psychology of religion. The psychologists of religion cannot afford to ignore the storehouse of facts that Freud made available. In doing so, too, just credit and genuine appreciation should be given to Freud by those who draw on his contribution.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREUD'S CONCEPT OF
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF PERSONALITY
FOR THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Freud offers a realistic concept of man to Christian thinking.

As Gregory Zilboorg has said:¹¹

Without knowing it in advance, Freud soon discovered that he was studying the psychological reactions of man in the state of sin; he was at once confronted with the anxiety, the sense of guilt, and the sexual conflicts which burdened mental patients. He discovered that there is no man living who is not burdened with...perennial, unconscious sense of guilt. . . . If we would remove the merely terminological objections which religion raises against Freud, its dogma would find itself supported rather than denied by Freud's psychological findings.

Therefore, the task at hand is to remove "terminological objections" by discovering the things-in-themselves that both Freud and the Christian religion have in common.

A. THE ID

In the first place, Freud drew a clear picture of the nature of man "in the state of sin."

Freud, in his description of unconscious motivation, insists on distinguishing between real and professed motives. Action is a precipitate of motives, and may be justly called merely symptomatic of the inner desires of men. These motives masquerade under the names of others. Freud is not interested at all in the mere professions of men except as they lead him back to their genuine motives. Thus Freud is not merely satisfied in condemning and bemoaning duplicity of motives in men, but

¹¹. Gregory Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine, and Man, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, Inc., 1943), p. 326

in discovering the cause and effecting a cure. He points out the thing that Moses, the prophets, Jesus, and the Apostles have always taught: out of the heart proceed the issues of life. All the catalogues of sins ✓ are lists of results, symptoms, and indications of what is in the mind of man.¹²

Psychoanalysis may thus serve to reveal a person's ✓ true self, and so reinforce religious self-searching.

And, as John Baillie said, it may help in the confession of sin. But notice that the attitude of Freud was one of understanding and therapy, not condemnation and rejection.

Furthermore, a clearer understanding of an unconscious motivation makes possible more of a sense of community within the structure of organized religion. Careful analysis shows that the liberal and the conservative, the radical and the cautious, the authoritarian and the lover of freedom, and, often, the religious zealot and the atheist, are many times prompted by the same motives. Behind the diversities of doctrine often lies a marked similarity of purpose and motive. At the same time this fact may be returned to the successors of Freud in the form of a challenge by asking for clinical explanations of those outstanding historical personalities in whom avowal and fact, profession and practice, belief and action do coincide. Nevertheless, Freud has raised in a scientific way the unavoidable necessity of "letting the eye be single" ✓ so that the whole psychic life may be flooded with light. He has also raised the question as to whether or not hypocrisy of a certain kind

12. Abraham Cronbach, "Psychoanalysis and Religion," The Journal of Religion, 2:6:588, November, 1922.

is a necessity. What would happen in the ordinary religious group if by some miracle each person appeared to the other as he actually is? Some will call that a fantasy.

In the second place, Freud's theory of the structure and function of personality affords religion a clinical description of the contradictory nature of man. Contrary to popular opinion, Freud did not contend that man is motivated by one drive, but that his life works on the basis of essentially contradictory needs: the need for life and the need for aggression, the will to live and the will to die, the need for aggressiveness and the need for passivity, the need for pleasure and the need for society. The instinctual life is not so simple that it can be summed up in the word "sex". Instead, according to Freud, human existence is contradictory. He gives a psychological analysis of the "body of this death" of which the New Testament speaks. As Dr. Emil Brunner says, "the New Testament not only thinks and speaks of growth and progress, but also of death and decline. Human existence is paradoxical and contradictory, mixed, problematical in character."¹³

The contradictoriness of human existence is seen in contemporary religion in the ascendancy of the illogical in religious belief and practice. Cronbach rightly asks: "Why will people accept certain doctrines and rituals while rejecting others at the cost of glaring inconsistency?"¹⁴ "Idiosyncrasy of selection" too often determines religious belief and practice, especially Biblical interpretation. This will be discussed

13. Lecture given at Louisville, Ky., October 29, 1946. See also Brunner's book, Man in Revolt, pp. 20-21

14. Cronbach, op. cit., pp. 596-7.

later, but suffice it to say here that the contradictoriness itself has some emotional value to the person and the religious worker can follow the example of Freud in trying to discover the motivation and significance of the "irrational" element in the belief or practice, rather than merely bemoan "hypocrisy," or "inconsistency," and "back-sliding."

In the third place, Freud has borne in upon the religious worker the lawfulness of the desires and wishes of people. The ethical significance of this cannot be over-estimated. R. W. Pickford has appreciated this and suggested nine laws of desire:¹⁵

1. A frustrated desire tends to store its energy. In other words, mere denial does not mean obliteration of an impulse. It persists.

2. The stronger a need is, the less particular one is about how he satisfies it. In the pressure of circumstance, he will take a less than personal solution to his need. The cannibalism of prisoners of war is an illustration in point.

3. Satisfaction of a need produces an indifference to that need, and awakens higher needs; but excessive indulgence of a need produces disgust and a morbid penitence. For instance, marriage to one woman with excessive sexual intercourse produces disgust and apathy. Too much work can easily produce despair. Morbid repentance engaged in at a time like this "tends to pass away as the satisfied desire returns."

4. Social influence inhibits one set of needs and often exploits another. For instance, certainly the Baptist faith and practice is one of extreme aggressiveness and independence. This need is exploited, while the need for dependence and social support is inhibited completely.

15. R. W. Pickford, "Ethics and Instincts," Ethics, 50:4:389, July, 1940.

5. If a strong need is neglected and remains unsatisfied for a long enough time, the other needs of the individual are paralyzed.

6. Needs which are not satisfied may be replaced by more socially acceptable ones, but these substitutes are not always more desirable from the standpoint of health. For instance, repressed sexual needs may be replaced by needs for food and greediness will be the result.

7. Needs and desires are often at odds with each other and conflict.

8. Needs often tend to combine rather than to conflict with each other, and it is a "practical impossibility to be motivated by a single impulse."

9. "None of our needs can be successfully fulfilled in social isolation."

All these laws of desire point toward the contrast of mental functions which Freud described in his formulations concerning the two principles of mental functioning, the Pleasure-Principle and the Reality-Principle. It is in this contribution, says Ernest Groves,¹⁶ that Freud comes into contact with the science of sociology." The reality principle "does not confine itself to the illusive pleasures of the moment, because the...individual needs a wider outlook."¹⁶ At this point, the function of religion in man's struggle for existence is seen as an evaluative rather than a repressive function. It is the distinction drawn in the New Testament between the "pleasures of sin for a season," and the pleasure of the will of God which "abideth forever." The function of religion is

16. Ernest Groves, "Sociology and Psychoanalytic Psychology," The American Journal of Sociology, 23:1:115, July, 1917.

not to harden the "crustacean" like conscience that has been developed through custom and taboo, but to develop a sensitivity to reality that will serve as an instrument for distinguishing between "fleeting" and "abiding" pleasures. In this sense genuine Christian experience shows that in Christ the believer is freed from the law and bound to God in a more realistic, intelligent sense than he ever was bound to the law. Such a realism in religious experience is rarely achieved, and instead the "idiosyncrasy of selection" in religion is too often at work producing a fantasy-formation which is made in the believers' own image, fostered and sustained by the pleasure principle, and has little of God, Christ, or social consciousness in it.

In the fourth place, Freud has much to offer a religious psychology in his conviction that ALL human behavior has meaning and purpose. On one occasion Freud was asked if people were also responsible for their dream-life. He replied: "Whom else would you hold responsible?"¹⁷ Freud extended the area of human responsibility when he discovered the facts of repression, the unconscious, and ways of therapy. He increased the scope of human responsibility to include all sorts of human behavior for which people had before avoided responsibility. Such easy explanations of behavior as "just" meanness, "just" crazy, "just" the devil in him, and "just" an alcoholic no longer suffice. Rather, all behavior is seen as purposeful adaptations which have an explanation and can be understood. Such understanding has much that is good for the Christian's approach to human problems.

17. Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine, and Man, p. 334

Furthermore, Freud demonstrates that there is no such thing as the successful rising up of one part of the soul against the whole; the part that is neglected will rise up and assert itself against the unlawful tyranny. The rest of the psychic life will not bow itself before the baal of even a pharisaic conscience. Rather it will mock the conscience in the form of perversions, neurotic symptoms, and psychotic delusions of persecution and grandeur. Jesus said: "Nothing is covered that will not be revealed, or hidden that will not be known."¹⁸ Freud said: "The unconscious cannot keep a secret."

But even in the face of these positive aspects of the doctrine of the unconscious, there are some obvious objections and dangers. S. H. Britt has succinctly analyzed these objections, and the criticisms given here, with some amplification, are essentially his.¹⁹ In the first place, the concept lends itself, especially in the popular use, to "reification". This is the tendency of the observer to make a "thing" or an entity of the unconscious. Thus it becomes a mythical being rather than a dynamic process. Any spatialization of personality leads in the direction of the "little-man-in-the-head theory." The unconscious can become to the person who never engages in the clinical experience of counseling and psychotherapy more or less what the pineal

18. Matt. 10:26

19. S. H. Britt, Social Psychology In Modern Life, (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941) (562 pp) pp. 96-7. See also B. G. Hoskins, The Biology of Schizophrenia, (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1946)p.48ff. See Also James W. Woodward, "The Relation of Personality Structure to the Structure of Culture," American Sociological Review, 3:5:642, October, 1938

gland was to Descartes. This is an obvious difficulty met in the process of counseling with students who have studied depth psychology. The student will take the concept of the unconscious as a way of avoiding personal responsibility. If he has a depressive tendency, he will be increasingly depressed if he feels that he has unconscious feelings or thoughts over which he has no control. But let it be said that this process of reification is at work in all technical fields, in that realities necessarily must be symbolized and the symbol then becomes a thing to substitute for reality. It is easier to look at a shadow than to see the sun in any pursuit of insight. This is especially true of psychology and religion. In religious experience, it is easy to reify such dynamic processes as "sin" and "salvation", and forsake the experience for the idea. In the study of psychology this is one way of protecting oneself from the reality of the unconscious; and in the study of religion this is one way of avoiding the fact of guilt. As Emil Brunner has said, "The center of all problems is guilt. We take refuge in abstraction in order that we may no longer know ourselves as a person -- by losing ourselves in the realm of the impersonal."²⁰

The second objection to the theory of the unconscious is that it is not explanatory, but merely descriptive. Jung attempted to explain the unconscious with his theory of the "collective" unconscious. But Freud realized that he was engaged in a descriptive task. The theory of the unconscious was not the capstone of a philosophy but the handle

20. Emil Brunner, Lecture, Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1946. See also Brunner's Revelation and Reason, Tr. Olive Wynn, (Philadelphia: Westminster's Press, 1946) pp. 240-241.

of a method for him. Freud himself would recognize this limitation of his theory and adjust himself to it.

The third objection is the most valid criticism from the point of view of religion and psychology. The term unconscious can take on a moralistic content and be used by the moralizing psychologist as something "sinister". It is easy to exchange a set of theological cliches for a set of psychological ones and use them to accomplish the same purpose. In this sense, there has been a changing of symbols without a change of motive. The a-moral nature of the unconscious is even more difficult to grasp by religious people who use it. But even this is evidence of the first suggestion concerning the unconscious: i. e., it is the motive of the heart that determines the meaning of any concept.

B. THE SUPER-EGO

The super-ego is the sum-total of social and cultural inhibitions that have been bred into the individual in his relation to authority. It is primarily an unconscious function; it is that part of the id which has been turned back upon itself. Just as the individual is more perverse than he thinks when the unconscious motivations of sex and aggression are unmasked, even so, the individual is more moral than he thinks through the effects of his ingrained morality. The standards are not conscious, voluntary, intelligently chosen ethical values, but unconscious, compulsive, socially induced habits of behavior.

The central point of distinction that Freud makes in this contribution seems to be that people are not only blind in their immorality, but also blind in their morality. They do not behave according to a rational ethic, but primarily according to an irrational code. They are in bondage, not only to their desires, but also to their fears.

Freud means much of the same thing by this contention that Paul means when he speaks of "the law" as being "another law" at war with the law of his mind. This makes him "captive to the law of sin" which dwells in his members. Paul sees himself the victim of an inner conflict in which he does things he does not want to do and is powerless to do things he wants to do. He, like Freud, sees this inner legalism as being a power that is "working death in him;" in reality it is death, his own destructive tendencies turned in upon himself. The "body of this death" is more than the driving power of the needs for food, sex and aggression, which are continually impressing themselves upon the consciousness of the

individual. (If the body of this death were only that, salvation could be easily effected.) "The body of this death" is also the combined psychic effect of the socially induced fears and inhibitions that have been written into the hidden layers of the conscience of the individual. Paul calls this inexorable power the "law." Instead of decreasing sin, the law increases transgressions. The only choice of a person under the law, as Nietzsche says, is either lusts or self-lacerations and even the lusts of such a person are self-laceration. Both the irrational desire and the irrational fear must be brought under the dominion of a higher principle.

Both Freud and Paul reject the tyranny of compulsive, irrational morality. They emphasize the necessity of exchanging a childish morality for an adult, rational conscience based upon insight and understanding, love and affection. Both see that this can be done only through the re-living of an old experience in a new relationship of love and understanding rather than one of fear and anxiety. As Flugel says²¹

In both (Christianity and Freudian psychoanalysis) the stern implacable, punishing authority (of law) is replaced by a mild, kind, healing authority (of love), with a view to eventual moral autonomy.

And this stands at the heart of the teaching of Jesus. He saw that genuine goodness is founded upon knowledge and truth which leads not unto the bondage that is unto death, but to freedom that is unto life.

"We have to consider not only the moral law, but the power and the ability to fulfill it... The super-ego is something that is beyond the individual's control..."

21. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals, and Society, (New York: International Universities Press, 1945), p. 272.

we can change the super-ego into a conscious feeling of reasonable duty, so that we see not only what we ought to do, but why we should do it. . . . Self-control and self-knowledge are increased...leading to the freedom of the will in the individual."²²

As the writer of II Timothy says: "God has not given us a spirit of fear, but a spirit of power, and love, and self-control." The most common idol that religious people worship is that of their own imperfectly formed consciences. The customs and taboos of society -- the ethical standards of this generation -- become gods. Just as the Israelites took the odds and ends of their precious ornaments and made a golden calf to worship, modern people have gathered together moral shibboleth and are in bondage to their worship. Otto Rank says that "the unreal need of God on earth forms the greatest obstacle to constructive therapy."²³ In this Freud and all his followers are at one: the individual makes a god of his conscience and in doing so falls ill. ✓

The law is "a spirit of slavery unto fear" and must be superceded by an interpersonal experience of love. Jesus and Paul over-flowed the religion of folkways and mores with the spiritual freedom of a personal faith. In doing so, both of them were accused of being moral free-lancers. Their followers took much criticism for their disregard of certain social customs. And, too, many of their followers, such as the Corinthians, took this abrogation of the law as an "occasion unto the flesh." They felt that they could sin all the more because they had been freed from the law and redeemed under grace. They were antinomian, and anti-

22. William Brown, "The psychological Basis of Ethics," Character and Personality, 7:1:8; September, 1938

23. Otto Rank, Will Therapy (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1929), p.63.

nomianism has been prevalent in Christian history.

Similarly, Freud was accused of immorality when he said that the social customs that shattered and distorted human life were not worth the cost they exacted. Freud's adherents have been accused of being sexual libertines, and the name of Freud is not polite conversation in "respectable" religious circles. And, in truth, some of Freud's followers also have interpreted his teaching to mean that they were free to do as they pleased sexually. Psychoanalysis also has been taken as an occasion unto the flesh. But, as Freud says, if these people had not found psychoanalysis, they would have found some other excuse. And it is remarkable, says Freud, how many people find this avenue without the advice of a physician.

Freud's formulations concerning the super-ego, then, are not new to the Christian theologian. But it is important that this "rough and ready" scientist described in a different terminology the nature and function of conscience. He gave a psychological description of the influence of folkways and mores on the developing moral life of the individual. He saw that institutions are made for man and man is not made for institutions. Thus he sought the way toward a social prophylaxis of great moment which would prevent the destruction of human life.

The ethical significance of this contribution of Freud is that it strengthens the necessity for the Christian re-examination of the ethical teachings of Jesus and the apostles in each new generation. Such a re-examination will clear up the ethical absurdities that spring up when the historical teachings of Jesus are ignored in behalf of the customs and taboos of each generation. In this way, the sterility of legalism and

the rigor mortis of ceremonial religion can be avoided. In turn, such re-examination will leave less justification for Freud's severe criticisms of popular religion.

C. THE EGO

Freud calls the higher principle of rational intelligence the ego. He teaches that the ego is a reconciling agent between the irrational desires and the compulsive consciences of men. Freud does not have as much to say about the ego in his neurotic patients as he has to say about the id and the super-ego. The main reason is that the neurotic ego is ordinarily very weak. Freud is famous for his saying that the "voice of the ego is weak." He likens it in its relation to the id as a horse to the rider. The rider can under ordinary circumstances guide the horse, but the horse is more powerful and can bear the rider away. Freud thinks of the ego as being the reconciling influence between the super-ego and the id, between the individual as he would be and the individual as he is. The ego is a rational principle of intelligence which brings the pleasure-principle under the sway of the reality principle. In Freudian psychology, the ego is the agent of reconciliation residing within the personality. The analyst is the agent of reconciliation without the personality. This reconciliation is the therapy. In this sense, the analyst is the "priest" of the analytic interview. Analogously, the analyst is to the patient what the Christian minister is to the parishioner, a "minister of reconciliation." The reality-principle is to the analyst what Christ is to the Christian minister.

Following through with this analogy, the ego is the reconciler

between the desires of the id and the inhibitions of the super-ego. It is the higher principle which must be strengthened in man. In the Christian religion, it is evident that Christ fulfilled the law in order that the Christian might be free from the law. But the freedom from the law does not suggest freedom to sin. The Christian is bound to a higher principle of reality than himself which binds him to a social responsibility. As Freud says, "the tie which unites each individual with Christ is also the cause of the tie which unites them with each other."²⁴

Correspondingly, one finds Paul saying that it would do him no harm to eat meat, but that for the sake of the immature consciences of other people he would refrain from eating meat. He is keeping the law, but for a different purpose; at first he kept it out of fear for his own well-being and safety; now he keeps it out of concern for other people. The one is the compulsiveness of fear and bondage; the other is the rationality of a voluntarily chosen course of action. The one is a function of the super-ego; the other is a function of the ego.

Thus, in conclusion, four levels of insight into the inner life are apparent in both Biblical and Freudian psychology.

1. A person may have an intellectual knowledge about himself and be able to theorize at great extent -- either theologically or psychologically -- about his insight. Much of the apparent insights of both conventional religion and of psychoanalysis of this sort, and represent, as John Baillie says, only the "top of the mind."²⁵

24. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, (London: Hogarth Press, 1921), p. 42ff.

25. John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 52.

2. There is the insight of the delinquent (to use a term from criminology) or the pervert (to use a psychoanalytic term) or the anti-nomian (to use a theological term). Here the individual sees his inner need, accepts it, and demands that society adjust to him. Society takes the brunt of this kind of insight.

3. There is the insight of cleverness and Machiavellian shrewdness which is at heart a perversion, but aims at a conscious deception of society. Here again society is forced to take responsibility in order to relieve the individual of responsibility. Society does not know it, however, and is kept under deception by the clever brilliance of the individual. Here the individual has much of the wisdom of the serpents, but little of the harmlessness of the doves. It is the author's own opinion that herein lies the greatest single danger in the application of the psychoanalytic method, from the point of view of both the patient and the physician. Analytical insight, as such, does not carry with it any inherent obligation as to the end for which it shall be used. Freud, however, accepted personal obligations as to the ethical use of his method and insight. He said that he prized most highly the opportunity to help his patient, and placed this above all other personal ends. He recognized the danger, but said that the danger was not inherent. Likewise, he said that a thing that will help people should not be avoided merely because it was dangerous.²⁶

4. There is the insight of self-acceptance combined with the insight of social consciousness and ethical values. This involves

26. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on Transference Love," (1915) Collective Papers, Vol. II, p. 390.

renunciation on the part of the individual in favor of society, and a healthy willingness to accept the frustrations that being a socially responsible person involves in order that long-term and abiding pleasures may be achieved. Thus, as Brunner says in a previous reference, life becomes personal only when it is responsible. Accordingly, the healthy person is the one who can love and be loved, depend and be dependable, accept responsibility and delegate responsibility, and give as freely as he has received.

Here the individual is living "beyond the pleasure principle," to use Nietzsche's phrase, he is "beyond good and evil." In the language of Paul, he is a person who is brought from a deathly inner conflict into life. The members of his personality are used, not as instruments of destruction, but as instruments of constructive righteousness. He is not living under the compulsion of sin, but under the free exercise of all of his powers. His first state, as Kierkegaard has said, was one in which the sins of desire were opposed to the virtues of man-made morality. But in true Christian experience the opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith. Sin is a personal existential distinction arising out of the eternal qualitative difference between man and God, and not a legal, casuistic distinction arising out of the relative, quantitative difference between man and man. In the words of the prologue to Tennyson's "In Memoriam:"

"For merit lives from man to man, and not from
man, O Lord, to Thee."

And Freudian psychology has given abundant factual evidence that the life of the Christian and the life of the non-Christian operate on the same basic psychological principles. In theological terms this implies

that the Christian has his treasure in earthen vessels. As Brunner says, "the body of this death is the indissoluble connection of the Christian with the world."²⁷ The practicing counselor sees that the same basic emotional problems are at work in the life of the Christian and the non-Christian. Theologically speaking, there are simply two different kinds of sinners. To say that Christian conversions set aside the laws of psychic functioning is both a theological and psychological error.

The central weakness in Freud's theory of the structure and function of personality, however, is that he simply does not give enough emphasis to his ideas about the ego. As Arnold Green says,²⁸ "Freud only half-heartedly proposed this idea and never developed it." If these things are true, they are the most important facts about human nature. One does not get this impression from Freud. The ego appears in Freud's estimation as a feeble on-looker in the scrimmage between the dynamic forces of the id and the super-ego, more often than it appears as the sustaining principle of personality in which the healthy life coheres. P. E. Johnson is correct in his observation that the reason for this is that Freud never observed the healthy ego, but only the neurotic one.²⁹

Karen Horney properly criticizes Freud by saying that³⁰

In his concept of the "ego" Freud denies...that there are any judgments or feelings which are not dissolvable into...instinctual units.

27. Brunner, Lecture, Louisville, Ky., Oct. 29, 1946. See also Brunner's Man in Revolt, pp. 17-28

28. Arnold W. Green, "Social Values and Psychotherapy," Journal of Personality, 14:3:199-226, March, 1946.

29. P. E. Johnson, Psychology of Religion, (New York: Abingdon Cokesbury, 1945), p. 200.

30. Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, p. 187

The epistemological conclusions of a "consciousness psychology" overlook the role of wish and will in idea, and Freud was a reactionary against this kind of thinking. He corrected it by "over-stating his case" in the other direction, which may be said to be his characteristic method. And the main stream of Freud's present-day followers such as Horney, Fromm, Alexander, French and others agree with their late colleague, Ernest Groves, when he says:³¹

Intelligence as well as emotional pressure must be included in the idea of the human motive. There is a goal-seeking, a conscious quest of satisfaction, which reveals the mental endowment as well as the emotional dynamics of human behavior.

Consequently, Freud overlooked the clinical data apparent in the biographies of such men and women as can be found in the simplified environment of any well-integrated farm community or of such thinkers as William Lyon Phelps or Walter Rauschenbusch or George Washington Carver. Freud himself is a demonstration of the factor of intelligence in human motivation, too, and the previous account of his life is ample evidence that the ego is not as weak as he let himself think.

31. E. R. Groves, The Family and its Social Functions, p. 33.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

The preceding chapter gives a stationary view of the structure and function of personality. The purpose of this chapter is to give a moving view of the development of personality as Freud depicts it. Freud's theory of infantile sexuality has certain corollaries: narcissism, libido, fixation, regression, the nosogenesis of the neuroses, and many therapeutic principles (which will be discussed later).

A. THE TRAUMA OF BIRTH

The first fact about the development of human personality is a biological fact: embryo-development and birth. Freud points out concerning the embryo-development of the human being that¹

The intrauterine life of the human being seems to be relatively abbreviated as compared with that of the majority of animals; the human infant is sent into the world more unfinished than the young of other animals.

This necessitates a lengthened infancy period of helplessness and dependence which raises the major problems of the psycho-sexual development of the individual.²

This biological factor brings into being the first situations of danger and creates the need to be loved which the human being is destined never to renounce.

Following this suggestion a little further, Freud points out

1. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety, Tr. H. A. Bunker, (New York: W. W. Norton, and Co., Inc., 1936), pp. 99-100/

2. Ibid., p. 100.

that³

The process of birth constitutes the first danger situation, the economic upheaval which birth entails becomes the prototype for the anxiety reaction.

In fact, this is the beginning of the process of differentiation of the ego from the id, the first real contact of the individual with society. All succeeding anxiety, then, has something in common with the birth experience in that it is a psychic repetition of the cutting of the umbilical cord and the development of the individuality of the child. Anxiety, in this sense at least, is a symptom of the impending necessity of maturation.

B. THE LIBIDO

The original direction of the love energies of the child is toward itself. This is the most direct way of saying what Freud means by his term "narcissism." Narcissism is the universal "original condition" of the individual.⁴

We have to infer that at the beginning of its development the libido...in each individual is directed toward the self -- as we say, it cathects the self.... The condition in which the libido is contained within the ego is called by us "narcissism," in reference to the Greek myth of the youth Narcissus who remained faithful to his love for his own reflection.

The rest of the development of the person is interpreted by Freud as a history of the love-objects to which he attaches that libido. Freud concludes that two paths of development lie before the human

3. Ibid., p. 94.

4. Sigmund Freud, "One of the Difficulties of Psychoanalysis," (1917) Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 349.

infant:⁵

We may conclude these suggestions with a short survey of the paths leading to object-choice: A person may love:

- (1) According to the narcissistic type:
 - (a) What he is himself (actually himself)
 - (b) What he once was
 - (c) What he would like to be
 - (d) Someone who was once a part of himself
(bereavement or melancholia)
- (2) According to the anaclitic type:
 - (a) The woman who tends; and those substitutes that follow.
 - (b) The man who protects; and those substitutes that follow.

By the anaclitic type Freud means an object-choice of love other-than-the-self in which the individual finds a source of dependence and a response to his love.

The narcissistic or self-love may be likened to a great reservoir from which all object-love is sent out. And love once attached to an object may be drawn back upon the self again. But the narcissistic love is said by Freud to be⁶

The realized primal state in the first childhood, which only becomes hidden by later emissions and is retained at the bottom behind them.

C. INFANTILE SEXUALITY

A very strong objection is raised against Freud's use of the term 'sexuality' to refer to infants. A technical distinction is made by Freud himself with reference to his meaning of the term. By it he

5. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism, An Introduction," (1914), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 47-8.

6. Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, Tr. A. A. Brill, (Modern Library Series, 1938), p. 611.

does not mean "genital" sexual behavior, which is reserved for specific sexual acts leading to coitus and orgasm, usually an adult act. Rather, he uses the term "sexuality" to designate all of those efforts of a child to express its love energies in relation to itself and its environment. The achievement of full genital pleasure is a progressive narrowing-down process which comes comparatively late in life. Freud would say, however, that this process has a beginning point in the very earliest experiences of the child.⁷

Freud's evidence for this sort of sexuality in the child has been questioned, and needs clarification as to the sources of his information. The primary sources of Freud's theory were his analytical studies of the reminiscences of neurotics. In these studies he discovered the significant fact of infantile amnesia which veils the childhood of most people up to the time of the sixth or seventh year. This amnesia is purposive in that it consists of those dynamic (and not merely latent) ideas and experiences characteristic of the unconscious. In one place Freud unequivocally asserts that "the infantile life is the unconscious."

Manifestations of the infant's sexuality are plentiful enough, according to Freud. The infantile sexual aim is the "production of gratification." It accomplishes this through attaching pleasurable value to the mucous membranes of the various apertures of the body, namely, the mouth, the anus and the genitalia. These are called erogenous zones. Such infantile habits as thumb and tongue-sucking are used as evidences of oral sexual gratification; fecal habits such as the pleasurable

7. Ibid., p. 585.

retention of feces and the concern attached to feces are evidences of anal sexual gratification; and the phallic behavior in washing, rubbing and masturbating of the genitalia are evidence of the erotic significance of the third zone. Concerning masturbation, Freud says that infantile occurrences of this phenomenon should be divided into three phases:⁸

The first phase belongs to the nursing period, the second to the flourishing period of sexual activity at about the fourth year, and only the third corresponds to the one which is often considered exclusively as masturbation of puberty.

Freud points out the aetiological significance of the masturbatory experience of the second period:⁸

The details of this second stage of infantile sexual activity leave behind the profoundest (unconscious) impressions in the person's memory; if the individual remains healthy they determine his character, and if he becomes sick after puberty, they determine the symptomatology of his neurosis.

The reason for this is suggested: "Masturbation truly represents the executive part of the entire sexuality and is therefore capable of taking over this fixated sense of guilt."⁸

Freud explains this concern of the individual for the various erogenous parts in a more elaborate theory of the developmental phases of the sexual organization.⁹ This development falls into three phases in the infantile life of the child:

1. The oral phase. Here the child is related to his love-object in a psychic experience of incorporating the nature of his love-object

8. Ibid., p. 591.

9. Ibid., pp. 597 ff.

into his own character. The normal experience of feeding at the mother's breast, depicted in the phrase, "he got those feelings in his mother's milk," is the emotional expression around which this group of pleasurable feelings is collected. The needs of the child for dependence and affection are still strongest at this period. The remnants of this oral-incorporation of a love-object are seen in the normal experience of kissing, the elaborate rituals of food-getting and drinking, and the habits of smoking in adult life. Other more serious kinds of oral behavior are seen in the pathologies of chronic alcoholism and psychically caused disturbances of the eating function such as anorexia, vomiting, etc. In adult life, the need to be loved and the need for emotional security on the psychic level reverts to the practice of oral habits on the physical level, these being physiological expression of the need to be loved.¹⁰

2. The sadistic-anal. In this period the child develops his aggressive-passive traits. Freud points out that the child has not yet reached the point of sexual differentiation between the masculine and feminine, but has a more general analogue, less specifically defined in the traits of aggressiveness and passiveness, respectively. Freud points out that the very character-type that regularly develops from an arresting of the libido here is seen in those persons who "are remarkable for the regular combination of the three following peculiarities: they are exceptionally orderly, parsimonious, and obstinate." He goes on further to state that there is a "systematic

10. The Institute for Psychoanalysis: Ten Year Report: 1932-42, (Chicago, 1943.) pp. 18ff.

relationship between this type of character and the activities of this organ" (the anus and the feces).¹¹

3. The phallic stage. This stage of development in the child becomes more specifically sexual in the genital sense of the term, in that the intellectual and emotional life centers around the genitalia and their significance. The intellectual life of the child awakens and centers itself around many sexual problems. The first of these problems consists of an investigation of the riddle of the Sphinx: i. e., where do children come from. All sorts of theories are worked out. Then, too, children work out sadistic concepts of the sexual act itself. Their curiosity conceives of it as some form of attack. Another constellation of theories is evolved concerning the anatomical differences between men and women, the little boy and the little girl. In this period, the child conceives of "anatomy as being destiny."¹²

This last intellectual theory reflects the emotional problem of the castration-complex which tends to have its genesis in this period. Along with it is the emotional problem of the Oedipus-complex, both of which have been described in the preceding chapter.

This theory of infantile sexuality was not as fully developed by Freud as it was by Karl Abraham and Ernest Jones, other psychoanalysts. The treatment of Freud on the subject is suggestive and not exhaustive. Freud himself criticized the theory in 1913, after having worked it into

11. Sigmund Freud, "Character and Anal-Erotism," (1908) Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 45.

12. Sigmund Freud, "The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Erotic Life," (1912) Collected Papers, Vol. IV., p. 215.

theoretical statement in 1905, in the following manner:¹³

It takes no account of the behavior of other component impulses and is content to single out the...primacy of sadism and anal erotism.

and

It is never complete without taking into account not merely the stage of libido-development at which fixation takes place, but also the stage of ego development.

D. THE LATENCY PERIOD

The analysis of the infantile sexuality of the individual reflects a rather rapid development of the personality up until the sixth and seventh years of the child's life. But Freud observes that since the procreating functions of the human being are postponed, such sexual feelings are not to be used directly for sexual purposes. The formal education of the child begins at about the same time, and the impulses of sexuality are allowed to fallow in a latency, while the energy is deflected in its aim from specifically sexual aims to newer, more culturally necessary aims.

But a more negative process is at work in governing the energies of the individual. If the feelings of the child were expressed directly, he would receive the censure of his social environment and be called perverse, thereby invoking both inner and external displeasure. These energies¹⁴

13. Sigmund Freud, "The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis," (1913) Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 131.

14. Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, p.584.

Therefore, awaken psychic counter-forces (feelings of reaction), which build up the ... psychical dams of disgust, shame, and morality.

This process Freud describes as a reaction formation.

However, the discussion of the theory of sex has no reference to the fact that the biological capacity for the production of children and full sexual satisfaction on a genital level does not come until much later. What Freud's explanation of this might be remains an unanswered question.

Nevertheless, suffice it to say that the latency period was one of the vaguest concepts in Freud's own thinking and that although he said that sexual experience was more quiescent here, he also said that it by no means completely ceased.¹⁵

E. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBERTY

The primary difference between pre-pubertal and pubertal personality is that the earlier phases are predominantly autoerotic and that the later phases initiate the period of the search for an object of love. A new sexual aim of full genital pleasure search takes the place of all other zones, which fall into their place in natural relation to genital, heterosexual behavior. The sexual instinct now becomes an agent of propagation, capable of producing an offspring, and is epitomized in orgasmic potency. Thus the seminal flow takes on psychic as well as biological significance. The important problem of the balance of the bisexual traits in the person is raised again for new conclusions

15. William Healy, A. F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis, (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1936), p. 82.

and the differentiation between men and women is settled in terms of anatomy, and not just in terms of aggressiveness and passivity. The stage is set for the finding of a sexual object.¹⁶

F. FIXATION AND REGRESSION

The thorny mass of problems that can arise at this juncture in the development of personality gives an idea of the importance of the infantile experience of the individual. The necessity for the achievement of maturity tests the emotional fibers of the child which were developed in his earlier experiences. In the analysis of the experience of the nervously and mentally ill people, Freud discovered the foci of pathology, not in the mere symptoms that occurred after puberty in the individual's attempts to establish autonomy of the home and to develop into an emotionally mature person, but in the fixations of early childhood to which the chronological adult regressed in order to avoid the responsibilities and frustrations of emotional adulthood. Therefore, an understanding of the principles of fixation and regression is in order.

In thinking of the stages of development in the individual, one can best understand fixation as being the damming up of the love-energies at one of the stages along life's way. The early surge of life-force becomes fixed at some point for any of several different reasons. As

16. Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, p. 604 ff.

Freud describes it,¹⁷

Single portions of every separate sexual impulse may remain in an early stage of development, although at the same time certain portions of it may have reached their final goal . . . This arrest of a component impulse at an early stage (we will call) a fixation (of the impulse).

Fixation may result from many different exciting factors, such as over-stimulation of the child by a parent with too much physical attachment to the child, or the frustration of the child's need for affection by parental rejection of the child, or by any of a series of accidental factors. Such accidents occur when the child observes its parents in the act of intercourse, or is seduced by an older person such as a maid, a governess, a close relative, or is subjected to some bodily injury that has sexual significance. But if for any reason the libido is dammed up at any point along the way and a subsequent repression makes life in the real world unbearable, Freud says that the energy will flow back into the paths of the unsolved infantile problem.

This "flowing back" is called regression. Freud takes pains to point out that this is not a reversion from a higher stage to a lower stage of development in general. Rather it is the appearance of a lower stage which has existed all along, and infantilism that appears grotesquely in an adult. Repression, technically defined, is¹⁸ "the return of the libido to its former halting-places in development."

This process must be carefully understood in the light of the

17. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p.298.

18. Ibid., p. 300.

mechanism of repression. Two alternatives present themselves as to the form that the regression can take in the life of the individual. If there is no repression, the conscious, voluntary acceptance of the infantilism results in a socially obnoxious perversion. This is the first form that a regression may take.¹⁹

When, therefore, anyone has become a gross and manifest pervert, it would be more correct to say that he has remained one. For he exhibits a certain stage of inhibited development.

Such perversions are seen in the exhibitionist, the homosexual, and other perverts. The trend of adjustment here is not that of a neurotic, but of open delinquency. The mark of distinction is that no repression of the impulse is apparent. "Regression of libido without repression would never give rise to a neurosis, but would result in a perversion."²⁰

G. THE AETIOLOGY OF NEUROSES

This leads naturally to a discussion of the aetiology of the neuroses, for "repression is the process which distinguishes the neuroses particularly."²⁰ They are the second form a regression may take.¹⁹

All psychoneurotics are persons with strongly marked perverse tendencies which have been repressed in the course of their development and have become unconscious. Consequently their unconscious phantasies show the same content as...the actions of perverts.

In order to get a composite view of Freud's theory of the aetiology of the neuro-psychoses, it is necessary to follow the develop-

19. Sigmund Freud, "Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," (1905), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 62.

20. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 301.

ment of his investigations historically.

In 1893 Freud wrote his paper "On the Psychical Mechanisms of Hysteria" in conjunction with Breuer. In this paper they concluded that the mechanism of hysteria was repression, but also said that this threw no light on the causes of hysteria. In 1894 Freud himself wrote his paper on "The Defence Neuro-Psychoses," attempting to provide a psychological theory of acquired hysteria, many phobias and obsessions, and certain hallucinatory psychoses.²¹ He considered the conclusions of Janet and Breuer which assumed that hysterical neuroses are caused by a splitting of consciousness. Janet said that this splitting is dependent upon an inborn weakness in the capacity for the synthesis of an experience into the total psychic life. Breuer said that the condition was the result of a sort of autosuggestion. The result was a 'hypnoid' state of forgetfulness that the physician could cure by hypnosis.²²

Freud does not attempt a refutation of these suggestions of Janet and Breuer, but adds that there are two other forms of hysteria which are not distinguishable in the light of these theories. The first of these is that in which the splitting of consciousness is due²³

to voluntary action on the part of the patient; that is to say, it is instituted by an effort of will, the motive of which is discoverable. By this of course, I do not mean that the patient intends to produce a splitting of the consciousness; the patient's aim is a different one, but instead of attaining its end, it produces a splitting of consciousness. This is defence hysteria.

21. Sigmund Freud, "The Defence Neuro-Psychoses," (1894), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 60.

22. Ibid., p. 60.

The second form of hysteria has little or none of the splitting of consciousness in it. In these cases the appropriate reaction to traumatic stimuli failed to occur. The hysteria could be dissolved by causing the patient to re-live the incident by reacting appropriately to the re-enacted situation. This may be likened to the bomb which falls and does not explode. It lies there with all the possibility of explosion unless someone with skill can uncover it and render it harmless. This condition Freud describes as a "retention hysteria."²³

The symptomatic result in these types of hysteria are certain physical complaints that bear a symbolic relationship to the traumatic event which has been repressed. This process is called "conversion," and Freud draws the conclusion that the splitting of consciousness is not the main factor in hysteria, but the capacity of the patient for conversion.

Feeling his way into the aetiological theory of these neuroses, Freud cautiously suggests in this early paper that "it was in the sexual life that the painful affect had originated."²⁴ The patients themselves said that they had "erected their will in thrusting the idea out of their minds."²⁴ Each time the patient's attention was drawn to the sexual idea, he said firmly: "It is not that. I have thought very little about that."²⁵ Between the patient's effort to repress the sexual idea and the appearance of the symptom there was a gap of time.²⁵ And

23. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

24. Ibid., p. 66.

25. Ibid., p. 67.

in this paper, Freud said that "not all phobias and obsessions are so traceable."²⁶

This theory of the causal importance of sexual traumata was criticized sharply and Freud answered in 1895 in a paper he called "A Reply to Criticisms of the Anxiety Neuroses." He outlined a medical approach to problems of aetiology, saying that a process of over-determination is at work in most disorders. This means that a battery of causes is at work producing the disorder. Four main causes must be listed, according to Freud:²⁷

- (a) Constitutional predisposition.
- (b) Specific cause; The deflection of sexual tension from the psychic field.
- (c) Contributing causes: emotion of panic, etc.
- (d) Exciting or releasing causes: precipitating factors in the environment.

His point of contention was that sexual factors should be raised to the "rank of specific causes of neurosis," and that there is a constant parallelism between "the nature of the sexual factor and the kind of neurosis." And in the light of this he maintained that²⁸

Whether a neurotic illness occurs at all depends on the total load on the nervous system (in relation to its capacity to carry the load). As a rule neuroses are over-determined; that is to say, several factors in their aetiology operate together.

In 1896, Freud had completed the analysis of thirteen cases of

26. Ibid., p. 72.

27. Sigmund Freud, "A Reply to Criticisms of the Anxiety-Neurosis," (1895), Collected Papers, Vol. I, pp. 107 ff.

28. Ibid., p. 117

hysteria. He gives the following summary:²⁹

The experience (of a passive sexual experience) was not lacking in a single case; it was present either as a brutal attempt committed by an adult or as a less sudden and less repugnant seduction, however having the same result. In seven cases out of the thirteen we were dealing with a liaison between children, sexual relations between a little girl and a boy slightly older, generally her brother who had himself been the victim of an earlier seduction, the boy repeating without alteration those practices that he himself experienced at the hands of a governess; because of this origin they were often of a disgusting kind. In some cases there had been both assaults and an infantile liaison.

The date of the premature experience was variable. In two cases it went back to the second year of the child; in my observations the age of predilection was the fourth or fifth year. It may be a matter of chance, but I have the impression... that passive sexual experience occurring after the age of eight or ten can no longer be the foundation of a neurosis.

In another article written in 1896 Freud published the results of the analysis of eighteen more cases and concludes that at the bottom of every case of hysteria will be found one or more experiences of premature sexual experience, belonging to the first years of childhood. He concludes:³⁰

Whatever case and whatever symptom we take as our starting point, in the end we infallibly come to the realm of sexual experience. So here for the first time we would seem to have discovered an aetiological condition of hysterical symptoms.

On reaching this conclusion, he evaluates his experience by pointing out that he came to this with no preconceived opinion. He says that he him-

29. Sigmund Freud, "The Role of Heredity in the Aetiology of Neuroses," (1896), Collected Papers, Vol. I., p. 149.

30. Sigmund Freud, "The Aetiology of Hysteria," (1896), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 193.

self shared with Charcot and Breuer "a personal disinclination to it in the beginning." But he insists that he did not reach the conclusion haphazardly but only "after the most laborious and detailed investigations" was he convinced. He says that he did not pick the cases, but took them as they came to him, and that as he used his method of investigation he found the "participation of sexual impulses an indispensable hypothesis."³¹

After nine more years of investigation, Freud published a revision of his theory. Here he says that during the early investigations he was not able to distinguish between the deceptive memories of hysterics and the memory traces of things that actually happened. He says that in his later investigations he learned how to unravel fact from phantasy. Then he often found that the patient's story was a phantasy defense against the memory of real masturbatory experiences which he had practiced.³²

One outstanding modification is evident concerning Freud's conclusions in the earlier investigations:³³

I believed at that time...that passivity in (sexual) experiences produced a specific predisposition to hysteria, and activity to obsessional neurosis. These views I was later compelled to abandon entirely.... The important thing...was evidently not the sexual stimulation that the person had experienced during childhood; what mattered was, above all, how he had reacted to these experiences whether he had responded to them with repression or not.

31. Ibid., pp. 193-4.

32. Sigmund Freud, "My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses," (1905), Collected Papers, p. 276.

33. Ibid., pp. 277-279 (Italics author's).

Thus there is not an "air-tight" determinism, but an element of individual response to several different alternatives. In 1908 Freud wrote his paper on "Character and Anal Erotism," in which he pointed out the varieties of response that an individual can take in the face of impulses awakened in childhood by these premature experiences. He gave the following formula:³⁴

One can give a formula for the formation of the ultimate character from the constituent character-traits: the permanent character-traits are either unchanged perpetuations of the original impulses, sublimations of them, or reaction-formations against them.

The unchanged perpetuation of the impulses into an adult adjustment characterizes a large group of personalities suffering from an arrested development. Such persons are either over-dependent social parasites, over-aggressive delinquents and criminals, or sexual perverts. In the group who have formed severe reaction-formations against the impulses are the extreme fanatics, reformers, and a large class of neurotics and psychotics. In the group who have found socially acceptable expression for their impulses are the individuals who have pressed their desire into the service of the higher aims of culture: art, education, invention, discovery, and religion. The individuals who have adjusted on an immature level of arrested development have accommodated reality to the demands of the id, and society has taken the consequences. The individuals who have developed patterns of reaction-formation have adjusted in terms of the super-ego (more or less internalizing their problems); in this case,

³⁴. Sigmund Freud, "Character and Anal Erotism," (1908), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 50.

the nervous balance of the individual has taken the brunt of the pressure. The individuals who have been able to press their impulses into the service of society have strong capacity for sublimation. They have adjusted in terms of a more conscious, ego function of consideration for the demands of reality, and society is benefited.

In the light of this discussion of the varieties of human response available for the individual, Freud gives a nosogenetic classification of the types of neurosis. He classifies the neurotics he confronted in his practice in four groups:³⁵

1. The neurotics who are suffering from a situational frustration. The preponderant amount of their anxiety is of an objective, real sort. here an external factor or an objective event has produced a condition of mind which militates against the efficiency of the individual and may be described as a neurosis. An object of love may have been lost as in the case of bereaved individuals and no substitute is forthcoming. A long continuance of this sort of situation may result in an introversion of the psychic energies of the person and produce a more serious intrapsychic disturbance.

2. The neurotics who, because of an intense "inner effort to seize gratification that reality offers and to fulfill the requisitions of reality, are confronted with insurmountable INWARD obstacles." These individuals are usually victims of success, according to Freud,³⁶ and

35. Sigmund Freud, "Types of Neurotic Nosogenesis," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. II, pp. 113 ff.

36. Sigmund Freud, "Some Character-Types Met with in Psychoanalytic Work," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 319ff. Dr. Karen Horney has made much of the competitive neurosis in her book, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time. The essence of contributions of insight included in her work along this line appear to be set forth in this paper by Freud.

are particularly the heirs of the evils of a competitive culture. Freud points out in this paper that some individuals suffer constantly from feelings of inferiority that prevent them from ever succeeding happily. Others, upon having attained a certain goal socially, vocationally, and sexually immediately are "left cold" by their success and carry the new responsibility very poorly. Individuals of this latter sort often begin to depreciate themselves in appearance, worth, and effectiveness in such a way that they lose their hard-earned gains. The secret of these difficulties of both groups of these neurotics is in the developmental history of the individuals, especially in their failure to solve emotionally some of the problems arising out of the Oedipus-situation.

3. The neurotics who experience an outbreak of illness as soon as they pass through the halcyon days of the irresponsibility of childhood. Their illness is due to an inhibition or an arrest of development.

4. The neurotics who fall ill as a result of reaching a certain period of life which regularly calls for biological changes that result in the sudden increase of the libido to such an extent that it upsets the mental balance of the individual. Freud names pubertal and involutinal changes here.

The various adjustments already mentioned all characterized by two reactions that Freud repeatedly met in his practice. The first one is the individual, who, in the presence of the demands of reality, always considers himself an exception, as being different. The claims of reality are applicable to every one else, the patient readily admits, but consciously or unconsciously, he does not feel that they apply to him.

The second reaction is that of the person who is a criminal against society in response to a sense of guilt. The guilt is unconscious and demands punishment. The overt act of the criminal was committed with the unconscious motive of being punished. The guilt preceded the crime and was relieved when the forces of society punished him. This is pathological crime, and results from intrapsychic rather than interpersonal maladjustments. ✓ Such insight is necessary to a proper understanding of many of the "senseless" crimes related in all newspapers daily.

The red thread of the aetiology of the sense of guilt runs through Freud's analysis of character formation and development. Just as in the preceding chapter in which a stationary view of personality was given, so also the developmental picture shown in this chapter has led to the importance of the sense of guilt. The root of neurosis is found to be in the sense of guilt, but not in the sense that the moralists use the term. Most preachers and moralists direct themselves toward the conscious guilts that people tell them about. Freud is concerned with unconscious guilts that the individual cannot tell about for he himself is unaware of them.³⁷

To speak of an 'unconscious sense of guilt' bewilders us far more than the other and sets us fresh problems, especially when we come to see that in a great number of neuroses this unconscious sense of guilt plays a decisive economic part and puts the most powerful obstacles in the way of recovery.

In his last formulations, Freud concluded that neurosis is a result of the clash between the id forces of instinctual needs and the ✓

37. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 33.

ego-ideal of super-ego of the individual. The tension between the demands of conscience and the needs of the instincts becomes unbearable. This theory was the final working hypothesis on which Freud settled. Concerning it, he said;³⁸

If the ego has not succeeded in mastering the Oedipus-complex satisfactorily, the energetic cathexis of the latter, springing from the id, will find an outlet in the reaction-formations of the ego-ideal. The very free communication possible between the ideal and these unconscious instinctual trends explains how it is that the ideal itself can be to a great extent unconscious and inaccessible to the ego. The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now carried on in a higher region, like the Battle of the Huns which in Kaulbach's painting is being fought out in the sky.

The whole meaning that Freud seems to be pointing out is that "the moving finger writes and having writ moves on," and that the child is the father of the man. There is no such thing as leaving a character problem unsolved without serious consequences.

38. Ibid., p. 53.

CHAPTER IV

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF FREUD'S THEORY OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITYI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORY OF
INFANTILE SEXUALITY

A. The positive aspects of the theory:

In the description of the psychosexual development of the child, Freud sets forth in detail the process whereby psychic value overlays biological functions. Here Freud's work comes close to Hebrew psychology which saw no distinction between the psyche and the soma. The Hebrews thought of man as being animated flesh; Freud, another Jew, describes the process by which man becomes animated flesh. This was groundwork for psychological medicine, or the practice of "psychosomatic medicine", which has become a recognized emphasis in medical education and practice. The work of Alexander,¹ Dunbar,² English and Weiss,³ Hinsie,⁴ and other investigators is based upon the fundamentals of Freud's theory of psychosexual development with certain modifications of emphasis especially in

1. Franz Alexander, The Medical Value of Psychoanalysis, Second Edition (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1937).

2. H. Flanders Dunbar, Emotions and Bodily Changes, A Survey of Literature on Psychosomatic Relationships, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Psychosomatic Diagnosis, (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1945).

3. Edward Weiss and O. S. English, Psychosomatic Medicine: The Clinical Application of Psychopathology to General Medical Problems, (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1943).

4. Leland Hinsie, The Person in the Body, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1945).

the work of Dunbar. Stanley Cobb expresses well the conviction that is dawning upon medical men today when he says:⁵

I solve the "mind-body" problem, therefore, by stating that there is no such problem. The dichotomy is an artefact; there is no truth in it, and the discussion has no place in science in 1943. Metaphysicians can argue the problem ad nauseum, and their nausea will be proof of their futility.

The significance of this for religious thought can be seen in the fact that the medical doctor is imperceptibly taking over the functions of a minister, in which he treats his patient's disorder by dealing with his interpersonal relationship. As Franz Alexander says:⁶

At one time, suffering man was divided between priest and physician. Previous to that time, priest was physician. Then came the schism. Now, physician, in psychosomatic medicine, is becoming priest as well as physician.

In the second place, Freud's concept of the stages in the infantile development of the individual throws light upon the meaning of religious symbolism. The main objections that have been aimed at the theory of infantile development are primarily terminological ones in that Freud used physiological symbols rather than more "refined" ones. But it needs to be borne in mind that religious symbolism is replete with physiological symbols. The pertinence of parental and food-getting symbolism is seen clearly in Hosea 11:1 ff.:

When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt....I taught Ephraim to walk;

5. Stanley Cobb, Borderlands of Psychiatry, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. 19-20.

6. Franz Alexander, "Psychological Aspects of Medicine," Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine, 1;1:1, January, 1939.

I took them on my arms; but they knew not that I healed them. I drew them with the cords of a man, with bands of love;...and I laid food before them.

The importance of the symbols of food-getting is set forth in bold relief in both the Hebrew religion and the Christian faith. The need of the people for dependence is seen in the giving of manna in the wilderness to the Hebrews and the feeding of the five thousand in the Gospels. The first appeal made to Jesus in his decisive moments in the wilderness was the appeal to the need for food. He re-lived his child-like need for food and adopted a mature, adult attitude that put the need for bread in its proper place. Instead of becoming a slave to his appetite, he became the Bread of Life and the Water of Life that met the needs of his followers. He appealed to the sense of dependence in his followers when he chose a food-getting symbol as a means of remembrance for himself in the Lord's Supper.

Also, the dependent needs of the individual tend to predominate many conversion experiences. The needs for aggression and for a solution of sexual conflicts may be present, also, but the factor of dependence is predominant. A common clinical picture is that of the genuinely converted alcoholic who ceases to drink after his conversion, but develops stomach ulcers or conversion (using the term in a psychological sense) symptoms of an oral nature instead. The more successful conversions (using the term in a religious sense), however, find a sublimation for their dependent needs in their religious experience. Faith becomes the answer to their needs for security and dependence, the minister becomes the object of the transference of deep affective charges, and the social community of the church becomes the human situation that fills the void of social isolation and insecurity in the new convert. A most recent

cult that shows the therapeutic value of social solidarity for otherwise isolated individuals who have exaggerated dependent needs is Alcoholics Anonymous. And this socio-religious group, according to Dr. Louis M. Foltz, is the most effective answer to the problem of alcoholism yet discovered.⁷ In fact, it may be said that this is one of the primary appeals of all the smaller sects in America: the appeal to the individual's need for security and social support. And the absence of this appeal is one of the causes of the disintegration in the larger denominations. The religious experience of John Henry Newman, so clearly described in his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, is an excellent historical example of the predominance of dependent needs in the religious experience of conversion and church membership. His experience also shows that the moot theological controversy between liberalism and conservatism, heterodoxy and orthodoxy, when carried to extremes is evidently an emotional conflict in the extremists, rather than real conditions in the realm of theological truth. These extremisms become diagnostic cues for the careful counselor as to the nature of the emotional conflict represented in the symbols used.

Correspondingly, the terms Freud used in describing the period of development of aggressive traits in character are offensive to many persons who have never worked clinically with neurotics and psychotics. He called this period the "anal-sadistic" or "anal-aggressive" period of character formation. Freud himself underestimated the importance of these destructive tendencies until late in his life. His biography shows that these

7. Dr. Louis M. Foltz, Lecture Notes, Oct. 5, 1946.

tendencies were his most sensitive spot personally. It is understandable that he resented Adler's reminding him of the aggressive needs of the individual. When terminological objections are removed, however, and when the over-emphasis upon the merely physiological aspects of the aggressive tendencies is placed in proper perspective, the religious significance of the will-to-power becomes apparent. In conversion experiences, this aggressive impulse often becomes the dominant factor. The individual interprets his experience of God in terms of "submission" and humility. Pride, and not a lack of faith and dependence, becomes important to him. He thinks of his will as his own to make it the will of God. He "surrenders" (a militaristic term) himself completely to God. Often this problem of aggression becomes the rallying center of religious controversies such as the pacifist-militarist arguments. Aggression has a Biblical context in that the Hebrews devoted whole books to the exploits of their "heroes". A martial air bristles with aggression in the Old Testament. The conscience of the less aggressive Christian is pricked, but still he feels the need to search around for a "moral equivalent of war." The Christian hymnology reflects this need in the symbols of the Son of God "going forth to war," Christian soldiers "going onward," and men of God "rising up." Probably the outstanding way in which latent infantile aggressions were given a constructive outlet in Christian experience is the life and work of Walter Rauschenbusch, who could "be angry and sin not," and never let "the sun go down on his wrath." Even more instructive are the occasions on which the Apostle Paul used his temper (Acts 15:19; Galatians 2:11).

Finally, the emotional attachment of children to parents stands at the center of sexual conflicts in later life, according to Freud. He

depicted these in his formulations regarding the Oedipus Complex and the Castration Complex. Here again terminological difficulties cloud the issues. The actual reality to which Freud refers in these two formulations is apparent in the ethical teachings of Jesus.

Jesus saw the spiritual necessity that the individual separate himself from his parents in order that emotional independence and higher loyalties may be achieved. In the first place, the Christian life is set forth as beginning with a new birth (John 3); it consists of becoming as a little child (Matthew 18:3ff.). This experience implies the conscious acceptance of an open break of emotional ties to earthly parents. Jesus said,⁸

I have come not to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man's foes shall be they of their own household.

The pairing of these antitheses in the family constellation is much the same as the pairing of the antagonisms that Freud describes: man vs. father, daughter vs. mother, and daughter-in-law vs. mother-in-law. Mythological names are not given to these antitheses, but the fact of the tension is so clearly stated that it cannot be mistaken. The frank recognition and the spiritual dissolution of these inordinate parental attachments are prerequisite to Christian discipleship. But this is not to the hurt of the individual, because in the long run the meaning of the parent for the child is increased a hundred-fold, according to the promise of Jesus. It is in this context that Jesus says that he who

8. Matthew 10:34 ff.

finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life as a Christian disciple shall find it. The psychological importance of religious experience is positively evaluated by Freud in line with this; it "lowers the importance of family relationships by giving the individual access to mankind."⁹

Correspondingly, the mature parent knows that the only way to keep his child is to lose him. Dr. Strecker aptly points out in his recent book that the major cause of neuropsychiatric difficulties in military personnel and draft rejectees in the recent war was the unwillingness of parents to allow the sons to become men in their own right. He draws a sharp distinction between the mother who teaches her child to face reality and the "mom" who never loosens her hold on the life of the child. There must be a cutting of the "silver cord" of the mother's apron strings.¹⁰

In the second place, Jesus taught that a person must separate himself from parental attachment in order to participate successfully in marriage. In the discussion of divorce, he connected the fact of inordinate parental loyalty with the fact of divorce. He says that it was not so intended in the creation. For the cause of marriage a man is to leave his father and his mother and to cleave to his wife. The twain are to become one flesh. (Mark 10:7ff.) Freud gives a scientifically usable statement of this fact that has often been overlooked in the Christian attempts at the construction of a preventive therapy in

9. Sigmund Freud, "An Infantile Neurosis," (1916), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 597.

10. Edwin Strecker, Their Mother's Sons, (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1946).

the face of rising marital discord. Those principles are already implicit in the ethical teachings of Jesus.

Inordinate attachments or antagonisms in the maturing individual's parental relationships are barriers to the development of the Christian's effectiveness as a disciple of Jesus and as an intelligent participant in marriage. Even so the crippling sense of inferiority also can cause the life energies of the Christian to go to waste. Freud again chose an anatomical symbol to describe this sense of weakness; he called it the castration complex. The New Testament phrase for this psychological phenomenon is "eunuch." The question as to whether or not marriage was expedient was a very real one in the Graeco-Roman world. The first chapter of Romans validates the assumption that homosexuality was widespread. The discussion of the feasibility of marriage in connection with the problem of divorce apparently raised the problem of bachelorhood as a form of castration (Matthew 19:10ff). At this point Jesus discussed the several reasons why men are not active sexually. He says that there are three reasons: first is an anatomical inferiority from birth. The second reason is social; There are those who are "eunuchs by men." The original meaning of the word eunuch was that the individual was merely impotent, not necessarily castrated in the physiological sense of the word. The emphasis that Freud placed on the castration-complex is a description of the social sources of this impotence and sense of inferiority as a masculine person. The people to whom he ministered were neurotics who were "made eunuchs by men," in a psychosocial sense of the word. Of course, this sort of psychological castration may result in actual physical castration such as that classic example of Origen. In

this sense, the familiar literal interpretation of the scripture with reference to plucking out the offending eye or cutting off the offending hand breaks its way into reality. But the third reason for not participating in sexual behavior is suggested by Jesus: "and there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven." These latter people have a strong capacity for sublimation and probably do not have as much native sexual endowment as others. They consciously and voluntarily forego marital or sexual experience for the purposes of constructive achievement. Phillips Brooks was such a person who lived a fairly healthy life as a bachelor and made a brilliant contribution to the spiritual treasures of Christendom.

It is the second group, however, with which the psychologist and the religious worker is most concerned. Not much can be done about the first group and the third group are able to take care of themselves. Freud concentrated his attention on the second group, and saw the sense of impotence and fear of failure as "the most prevalent form of degradation in the sexual life." It was closely associated with the perennial forms of masturbation and was usually seen in the context of marital failure. In this sense, the first paragraph of Matthew 19 which discusses divorce and the second paragraph which speaks of the causes of impotence in men stand in relation to each other as effect does to cause.

Often this sense of inferiority is a precipitating cause of profound religious experiences. Paul speaks often of the sense of personal weakness that plagued him. He says that his enemies called "his "bodily presence weak, and his speech of no account." (II Cor. 10:10). He compared himself unfavorably with the Corinthians (I Cor. 4:10). In Romans

5 he says: "While we were yet weak, in due season Christ died for the ungodly." He describes his emotional solution of this in the transforming experience concerning the "thorn in the flesh" in which the Lord told him that His strength was made perfect in Paul's weakness (II Cor. 12:7 ff.). Paul makes the most direct application of the Christian gospel to the solution of this disparity between the sexes when he says that in Christ there is "neither male nor female."

The sum total of all these conclusions is that Freud's most abiding contribution in the formulations concerning infancy is the re-evaluation of the child in modern society. Historically, there have been two parallel developments of attitudes toward children. First, there has been an exploitation and degradation of children. Beginning with the exposure of children in ancient times, continuing with the distortion and castration of children for priestly and sacerdotal purposes, and finding expression in more or less recent industrial exploitation of children under the heel of child labor practices, children have been the object of adult selfishness. Freud, more than anyone else in modern times, showed how neurosis in adulthood could be traced to sexual assaults made by adults upon these same people when they were children. Furthermore, it has been conclusively shown that both juvenile delinquency and alcoholism are results of parental neglect and rejection. And war, the great destroyer, exacts its most devastating toll upon the lives of children.

In contrast to this social treatment of children, the fantasy life of adults is full of a glorification of children. As Dr. G. S. Dob-

bins says, "Wordsworth says that heaven lies about the child in its infancy, and he might have added that everybody else lies about children in their infancy; because no one is willing to face the truth about children." Much censure has been heaped upon Freud for his theories about the thought life of children. But the major principles of his child psychology have been integrated into the sociological principles for the prevention of later pathologies in the adult.

At the same time, the emphasis upon the psychological importance of childhood inaugurated by Freud is giving a new and truer view of child religion.¹¹ As Flugel has said,¹²

Both Christian teaching and psychoanalytic therapy involve some degree of regression to an infantile situation ("except ye be converted and become as little children . . .") as a necessary condition of readjustment.

The most fruitful conversion experiences have been those which opened the door to the reassociation of the unintegrated blocks of infantile experience into the adult life of the convert, instead of being mere reaction-formations of repression, blinding the inner perception of these experiences that come up unsolved in adolescence. Concerning a reconstruction in the psychology of religion, it may be said that the older psychologists of religion dwelled upon the importance of puberty and adolescence to the neglect of the life and thought of the child. In this they followed in the train of theologians. Freud's scientific observations of child thought pave the way for a reconstruction of a

11. Frederick C. Spurr, The New Psychology and the Christian Faith, (New York: Fleming Revell Co., 1925), p. 152.

12. J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society, p. 273.

psychology of religion that will include an adequate appraisal of the child's world and the role of parents in the redemption or destruction of human life.

This points to the necessity for a more adequate childhood religious training. Spurr observes that to "force an adult theology upon a child is a crime."¹³ In making a recommendation along this line, he says:

The essential thing for the adult to remember is the imperative necessity of teaching the child nothing upon which he will look back in later life with scorn and hatred Here psychology is of the utmost aid . . . for it shows how conclusively the natural and spiritual factors blend in one decisive act which lifts the soul into another region and probably determines its orientation in a definite spiritual direction for all time.

An outstanding illustration of this, according to his own description, is Kierkegaard. He says that he was never a child, but was an old man when he was born. In plain, common-sense terms, probably the most effective thing a parent can do for a child in its religious training is to rid the child of the idea that he, or she (the parent), is infallible, a prototype of God. This quickens the child's sense of need for the real God and protects it from the pitfalls of the emotional deification of parents that is natural to the child. The function of parenthood is the interpretation of the real world to the child, and God is the supreme expression of the totality of the reality-principle. For the parent to try to be a god for the child is to distort reality and to set up possible

13. Frederick C. Spurr, The New Psychology and the Christian Faith, pp. 158-59.

neurotic patterns in his life.

The positive suggestion arising from Freud's formulations concerning the development of personality is that Freud shows conclusively that immature refusal to accept responsibility keeps the individual from becoming a person in his own right. He is trammled and shackled by child-like fixation to or aggression against his earthly parents, and thus kept from becoming a "real person." Fritz Kunkel has made this contribution a part of the body corporate of a Christian psychology of religion in his work, In Search of Maturity.¹⁴ Kunkel, however, could have made a greater contribution in this synthesis if he had used the psychological forms of the New Testament rather than the clumsy verbiage which he invented. Paul speaks in simple terms of "putting away childish things," or "growing up into the full stature of Christ," and of the church as a "building, fitly framed together, growing into a holy temple of the Lord," (Eph. 2:31). Freud describes what happens when this maturing process does not occur in his discussion of the "Types of Neurotic Nosogenesis."

B. THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF INFANTILE DEVELOPMENT

The foremost observation to make about the theory of psychosexual development as set forth by Freud is that Freud himself did not develop it and emphasize it nearly as much as did his followers. Freud says

14. Fritz Kunkel, In Search of Maturity: An Inquiry into Psychology, Religion, and Self Education, (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1945).

that S. Ferenczi did the pioneering work in this area in his Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality.¹⁵ Present-day analysts such as English and Pearson¹⁶ make this aspect of psychoanalysis the main plank of their diagnostic and therapeutic theories.

In the second place, Freud noted two outstanding weaknesses in the psychosexual theory. First, he says, the theory of pregenital sexual organization "takes no account of other component impulses and is content to single out the very definite primacy of sadism and anal erotism."¹⁷ The tendency to an over-emphasis of anal character traits is developed to the neglect of the character-traits of dependence in the theory, it seems. The second weakness of the theory, Freud says, is that it does not take into consideration the stage of ego-development as well as the stage of libido development at which the fixation occurs. This criticism provides the point at which elaboration can be made. The degree of ego-development, it seems, would determine the way in which an individual reacts toward a trauma of over-stimulation or parental rejection at any given point in the development. Freud modified his idea about the importance of sexual traumata by saying that it was not the traumata themselves which caused neuroses, but the way in which the individual reacted to them, whether with reference to repression, reaction-formation, or

15. Sigmund Freud, "Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis," (1913), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 131.

16. O. S. English and G. H. J. Pearson, Emotional Problems of Living, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1945).

17. Sigmund Freud, "Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis," (1913), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 130.

sublimation. At this point, it seems, the rigid determinism which has been constructed by later interpreters of Freudian theory would break down.¹⁸

This suggestion is most important for the religious interpretation of this theory of infantile development. At first sight it charms the reader into an all-too-easy generalization, and causes him to overlook other more psychic factors in his haste to conclude that physiological acts of weaning, toilet-training, and genital behavior become a fixed system by which all the rest of the life of the person may be measured. This may or may not be true. Other factors must be taken into consideration, the most outstanding of which is the nature of the pre-existing parent-child relation, whether it is one of rejection or acceptance. This affective relationship is continuative through all the "stages" of the development, and, if it is as it should be, can "cover a multitude" of errors in the training in feeding and toilet habits. This is the primary factor, and it is not biologically but socially and spiritually determined.

In fact, this conclusion suggests an all-inclusive weakness in the theory of psychosexual development. This sort of theory can become a psychological "scapegoat" on which the individual displaces responsibility and clings to his neurotic infantilisms and fear of the reality of a mature walk of life. Otto Rank says that such a trend is the neurotic's desire to avoid the present. "The present is always more pain-

18. T. H. Hughes, The New Psychology and Religious Experience, (London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1933), pp. 72 ff.

ful, because it is present."¹⁹ In this sense, the reification of the infantile theory can contribute to the neurotic's pleasure-seeking desire to avoid the reality of the present. Thus, the psychoanalytic theory goes the way of all flesh.

II. THE SEXUAL AETIOLOGY OF NEUROSIS

The name of Freud has become synonymous with sex in the minds of the populace. It is a fact that both scientific and unscientific people tend to reject, modify, or accept Freud on this one issue. This explains much of the irrational resentments toward Freud.

The inductive survey of the sexual theory of Freud presented in the preceding chapter affords a factual basis for criticism of Freud on this debated issue. A critical evaluation of Freud's own development of thinking concerning sex is to the point. The first thing to notice is that Freud did not begin with this theory. He began with the baffling symptoms that neurotic patients presented to him and Breuer. He discovered (as he and Breuer reported in the paper on the "Psychical Mechanisms in Hysteria") the fact of repression, which became the cornerstone of all his later teaching and remains so today. He and Breuer did not say what was being repressed, but merely noted that the mechanism of repression was at work. The importance of this beginning point suggests that Freud was a scientist at work, and not a faddist with a pet theory that he was trying to prove, and his personal life history shows with clarity that he was not trying to justify a moral defect in himself.

19. Otto Rank, Will Therapy, p. 41.

His scientific and ethical sincerity are thus vindicated.

The second factor in the development of Freud's theory of sex is that he arrived at the idea reluctantly and embraced it as true at great personal sacrifice. He says that he at first shared with Charcot and Breuer "a personal disinclination to the idea in the beginning." And his biography shows that his adopting this theory cost him his friendship with Breuer and cut his practice of medicine to such a point that he had to deprive himself and his family of the necessities of life. These facts further fortress his scientific and ethical sincerity.

The third factor to observe about Freud's development of his theory of sexual causation of neurosis is that after nine years Freud changed his theory. He says:²⁰

These views I abandoned entirely The important thing was evidently not the sexual stimulation that the person had experienced during childhood; what mattered was, above all, how he had reacted to these experiences, whether he had responded to them with repression or not.

Here Freud doubles back to the first premise which he discovered and elevates the factor of repression to the paramount place. This eliminates the idea of an "air-tight" determinism and emphasizes the factor of personal response to traumata. A plain conclusion would be that Freud is saying that it is not what happens to a person, but how he reacts that counts.

The most conclusive evidence concerning Freud's sexual theory is his assertion that the popular interpretation usually given his theory

20. See chapter preceding, Note 33.

is an over-simplification. The problem facing the neurotic, he says, is that his conscience factors and his desire factors are stalemating his productive relation to the real world. To allow either side to win at the expense of the other is to invite symptoms from the other side, and the last state is as bad if not worse than the one before.²¹ This is the reductio ad absurdum of the criticisms of his opponents.

The idea of over-simplification of cause in neurosis implies Freud's concept of over-determination in which he suggests that there are "several factors operating together." There are constitutional, specific, contributing and exciting causes. He raised the factor of sexuality to the rank of a specific cause in neurotic formation. Freud was not so naive with reference to the intricate matters of aetiology as careless opinion would have him be. He was a carefully trained scientist, and developed his theory of aetiology accordingly.

This developmental picture of Freud's theory of the role of sexuality in the aetiology of neurosis adequately represents his view of the individual's experience. However, the most trenchant teachings of Freud on sexual matters were not with reference to individuals, but with reference to the race, or to society.

The first factor in his views is his theory of the instincts. He spoke of the instinctual endowments of the race, not just this individual or that. In this connection, the Thanatos instinct of which Freud speaks so much in his later works is not generally emphasized among popular opinion, nor even in some otherwise scholarly opinion. Freud did not see

21. See the chapter on "Freud's Clinical Method," Note 17.

human nature as being motivated by a single impulse, but by a complexity of impulses. In reality, it might be said that he emphasized three forces in human life; the procreative impulse, the inhibiting impulse, and the self preservative impulse. No one of these was simple, but a compound impulse. The reduction of Freud's concept of instinct to a simple expression of genital sexuality is evidence of insufficient knowledge of the facts of his contribution.

The outstanding contribution of Freud to an adequate view of sex is his social theory, which he based upon his clinical observation of the influence of "civilized sexual morality on modern nervousness." In a paper on this subject, Freud advances some observations which he proposed as a basis for social reconstruction in the sphere of sexual morality.²² This is of most concern to the ethical and religious teacher. Here Freud suggests that the processes of nature in the sphere of sexuality are biological, whereas the processes of civilization are artificial. But, he suggests, the process of civilization has gone beyond artificiality and become unnatural. This thesis is developed in the following way.

The sexual mores of Freud's day and generation were characterized by the limitation of sexual intercourse to marriage and that for the purpose of procreation only. Immediately this is recognized as the traditional decree of Roman Catholic morality. Freud saw the results of this in his patients, and enumerated them:

22. Sigmund Freud, "Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness," (1908) Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 76.

1. Spiritual disappointment and physical deprivation occur within marriage. This spiritual disappointment and physical deprivation expressed itself in men by a "double code" of morality. Men were allowed certain latitude in prostitution and the clandestine adoption of paramours. In women the expression was in neurotic illness. Women seek refuge from the temptations in neurosis. Nothing protects their virtue so securely as illness.

2. Sexual development and activity is retarded by the professional delaying of the time of educational, financial and emotional independence of young people. The delaying of sexual experience much beyond the twentieth year may lead to all sorts of personality injuries. Finally, in the great majority of the cases, these professional persons absorb all "available energy of character in the fight against sexuality," at the specific time in their lives when they need all these energies for making a living and making a contribution to the community. On the whole, strong, robust characters are not developed, but "good" weaklings who later become lost in the crowd that tends "to follow painfully the initiative of strong characters."

3. Such unnatural abstinence is only an apparent morality, because it conceives of goodness and evil only in terms of heterosexual behavior. To the contrary, other forms of sexual behavior take the place of full heterosexual pleasure and produce emotional pathology that cuts back under the foundations of successful preparation for marriage and a happy love experience. These other forms are:

(a) Masturbation: This is the crutch on which many people hobble

to the top of unnatural sexual morality. In marriage, if these individuals ever give up this infantile form of sexual experience which carries with it no social responsibility, "coitus becomes merely an unnatural substitute for onanism."

(b) Homosexuality: Freud regards this as another one of the consequences of an unnatural sexual morality and the causative concomitant of much mental and nervous disorder. These people are "inwardly stunted and outwardly crippled."

(c) Frigidity in women and impotence in men: Freud considered this as the most common degradation growing out of the unnatural sexual morality of his day. Society places such a high premium upon virginity that it keeps the partners of marriage ignorant of the role which they are to play in marriage and the love relationship. Likewise it preconditions the individual against sexual participation in such a way that the individual is incompetent maritally.

(d) Cheap substitutes for genital sexual pleasure: Freud says that kissing and fondling are among these substitutes. Here he scores American courtship. He says that the profuse petting of silly courtship in America is otiose and ethically reprehensible, for it has no responsible objective. Sexual behavior of a purposeless kind is a way of avoiding the seriousness of the sexual life. "It is understood from the beginning that nothing is to happen." To use a figure of speech, Freud leaves the impression that he considers these substitutes as "short circuits"

of the great currents of the sexual life.²³

The moral conclusion of Freud is that the achievement of full genital maturity in a psychosexual union of love is one of the most crucial tests of human character. He generalizes by saying:²⁴

The behavior of a human being in sexual matters is often a prototype for the whole of his other modes of reaction to life. A man who has shown determination in possessing himself of his love-object has our confidence in regard to other aims as well. On the other hand, a man who abstains, for whatever reasons, from satisfying his strong sexual instinct, will so assume a conciliatory and resigned attitude in other paths of life, rather than a powerfully active one.

In another connection, Freud gives a normative view of his feeling about the role of sexuality in human experience:²⁵

The love between the sexes is undoubtedly one of the first things in life, and the combination of mental and bodily satisfaction attained in the enjoyment of love is literally one of life's culminations. Apart from a few perverse fanatics, all the world knows this is true and conducts life accordingly.

Freud has been called the architect of negation, but positive consequences of his ethical teachings concerning the sexual life have been integrated into the practices of sociology, mental hygiene, and psychiatry. Religious education and practice are being influenced by the positive reconstructions of scientists in these various fields. The ethical emphasis upon the necessity of intelligent preparation for and intelli-

23. Sigmund Freud, Reflections on War and Death, (London: Moffat Yard and Co., 1918), pp. 44-45.

24. Sigmund Freud, "Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness," (1908) Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 76.

25. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 389.

gent participation in marriage and parenthood is a part of the positive result of the clinical discoveries and moral challenges wrought out and set forth by Freud. Freud is a moral adventurer in that he developed a scientific method and used it as a way of measuring the worth of contemporary ethical values. He was one of the first to do this, and since his time the sciences of sociology and psychiatry have increasingly taken more seriously the importance of ethical values and religious experience.

CHAPTER V

THE DYNAMICS OF PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT AND DEFENSE

The developing individual must adjust himself to reality, or, having chosen to avoid reality, he must defend himself from it. Freud carefully observed and made therapeutically available a description of the psychological laws of adjustment and defense. These dynamics are of primary concern to the religious worker in his efforts to understand himself and those to whom he ministers, and are probably the most undisputed and whole-heartedly accepted part of Freud's contribution to psychology. These principles are instruments for determining the validity of a religious experience. They are methods of determining whether or not the individual's religious life is a creative way of facing reality, or merely another means of defending himself from the relentless demands of life in a real world of real people. Clinical observation will easily show that every virtue espoused by religion can have its counterfeit in the every-day life of so-called normal people, and can have its grotesque caricature in the compulsions, obsessions, and delusions of the mentally ill.

I. THE DYNAMICS OF ADJUSTMENT

A. The foremost dynamic of emotional adjustment is identification. Identification is an unconscious relationship of positive feeling of one individual with another in such a way that "the ego of the one becomes like the other, one which results in the first ego behaving itself . . .

in the same way as the second; it imitates it, and as it were takes it into itself."¹

The first appearance of this dynamism of adjustment is in the feeding experience of the child. The mother is the first imprint on his character. The second phase of this identification in the normal development of the child is in the development of his aggressive and passive traits in which he becomes civilized in exact ratio to the degree of "civilization" his parents have. But in the identification of the child during the Oedipus period is the most important phase, because he introjects the sexual characteristics of the parent with whom he identifies. If he is not able to identify with the parent of the same sex, he develops an inverted sexual character. Identification is primarily an unconscious process, working in terms of love or hatred; it is not a conscious process wrought out in oral transmission and moralistic instruction. Here the adjustment of the individual to the real world is accomplished in the intuitive depths of the parent-child relationship. The child learns to curb his aggressions in order to keep from feeling alienated from his parents; he adopts their character-traits as it were in his mother's milk and in his father's pipe smoke. This is the child's natural way of learning what the real world is like. These early identifications, also, are the first experiences a child has with an object of worship. As Freud says: "When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves."²

1. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 90.

2. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 47.

The simplest statement of this mechanism of character formation is that the individual is changed into the same image of his ideal, the object of his admiration. Plant describes the process when he quotes Walt Whitman's poem "There Was a Child Went Forth," from Leaves of Grass:³

There was a child went forth everyday,
And the first object he looked upon and received with wonder,
pity, love or dread, that object he became,
And that object became part of him for the day or a certain
part of the day, or for many years, or stretching cycles
of years

His own parents,
He that fathered him, and she that conceived him in her womb
and birthed him,
They gave this child more of themselves than that,
They gave him afterward every day — they and of them became
part of him
These became part of that child who went forth every day,
and who now goes, and will always go forth every day.

The importance of this mechanism for religious insight, practice and education can hardly be over-estimated. Here Freud has laid his finger on the fundamental dynamic of worship, the source of the sense ✓ of guilt, and the recreating nature of the educational process.

The process of identification lies at the heart of the worship experience. The character of the individual becomes like the object ✓ of its admiration. In a real sense, "we are changed from glory unto glory," (or from degradation to degradation) "into the same image" of the object of worship. There is an incorporation of the character of

3. James S. Plant, Personality and the Cultural Pattern, (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1937), p. 11.

the admired ideal into the behavior patterns of the individual. A look at the process of identification from a theological point of view reveals the dynamics of the principle of incarnation. The Word is made flesh in the individual through identification. In the words of the Apostle, the individual is "crucified with Christ," nevertheless he lives, yet not he, but Christ lives in him. The Lord's Supper becomes a symbol of this incorporation in the act of worship. As Freud himself says:⁴

It is not without a deep reason that the similarity between the community and a family is invoked (in the Christian religion) and that believers call themselves brothers in Christ, that is, brothers through the love that Christ has for them.

Here is a positive evaluation on the part of Freud as to what the essence of the Christian religion should mean in a community, and the heart of the idea he puts forth is that the strength of the individual's identification with Christ is socialized in terms of the common group experience of worship and love.⁵

Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feels himself united with all other Christians by the tie of identification. But the church requires more of him. He has also to identify himself with Christ and love all other Christians as Christ loved them.

This normative view of the social function of religion leads to a more specifically sociological conception of identification in society, especially as to the role of religious leadership in molding the character

4. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, pp. 42f.

5. Ibid., p. 111.

of society. Concerning this is the following observation by Freud:⁶

It is only by the influence of individuals who can set an example, whom the masses can recognize as their leaders, that they (the masses) can be induced to submit to the labours and renunciations on which the existence of culture depends. All is well if these leaders are people of superior insight into what constitutes the necessities of life, people who have attained unto the height of mastering their own instinctual wishes.

This is seen in its negative light in the suggestion made by Lawrence K. Frank when he says that⁷

Culture disintegration . . . and the seeming perversity of individuals . . . are to be viewed as arising from the frantic efforts of individuals, lacking any sure direction and sanctions or guiding conception of life, to find some way of protecting themselves or of merely existing on any terms they can manage in a society being remade by technology. Having no strong loyalties and no consistent values or realizable ideals to cherish, the individual's conduct is naturally conflicting, confused, neurotic, and antisocial, if that term has any meaning in the absence of an established community purpose and ideal. The more skilful contrive to profit from their own lack of scruples, while others evade or break the laws, become mentally disordered or diseased, or otherwise violate the older codes of conduct, damaging themselves and those whose lives they touch. No one is happy, it is apparent; the successful are driven as relentlessly as the failures by their sense of guilt, their compulsions, and their frustrations.

Freud would concur in this diagnosis:⁸ "The danger exists that in order not to lose their (the leaders) influence they will yield to the masses more than the masses will yield to them." This is the process of the

6. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, pp. 12-13.

7. Lawrence K. Frank, "Society as the Patient," The American Journal of Sociology, 42:3:339-40, November, 1936.

8. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, pp. 12-13.

blind leading the blind and both falling in the ditch.

The ethical imperative that arises from these ideas is that the masses are looking for the only real sort of exegesis of social and religious ideals there is: an incarnation that speaks not as the scribes, but as one having authority. Only an incarnation of the otherwise abstract words will appeal to the depths of the spirits of men. Then deep calleth unto deep and life is regenerated at its source.

Likewise, this dynamic of identification reflects the source of the sense of guilt. Freud suggests that the sense of guilt originates in the adjustive process of character development. All guilt is originally conscious, but the most important feelings of guilt become unconscious. Guilt serves the same purpose in the mental life that pain does in the physical body when that guilt is conscious. It is primarily a de-socializing experience and points toward an alienation of the individual from his environment. His God is the supreme expression of reality to him. And when guilt is conscious, it is healthy, non-compulsive, and leads to voluntary repentance rather than to irrational behavior catapulted from the hidden areas of the psychic life.

But the most important feelings of guilt remain unconscious. In their hiddenness they canker and corrode the person at the very dynamos of his energy. As Soren Kierkegaard says:⁹

This is one expression the more of the dreadfulness of this most dreadful sickness and misery, namely, its hiddenness — not only that he who suffers from it may wish to hide it and may be able to

9. Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 41.

do so, to the effect that it can so dwell in a man that no one, no one whatever discovers it; no, rather that it can be so hidden in a man that he himself does not know it!

Freud gives an aetiological picture of the course of the development of such despair and agrees with Kierkegaard that the conscious guilts ✓ are nothing in comparison with this unconscious guilt; these are genuinely destructive.

And Kierkegaard and Freud both agree in saying that to try to ✓ "talk" or "preach" or "exhort" these people out of their symptoms is like giving a hungry man a menu or passing out recipes during a famine. As Freud suggests, it not only does not feed the man, but merely in- / creases his symptoms. The guilt was built up through an identification, and the only way it can be removed is through a dynamic identification with a living person. This is to say, that the hail-stones of crystal- lized theological dogma can bounce off the tops of such people's minds and never find the depths of the spirit that are musty from having been closed off. The mere inscription of intellectual formulations into people's conscious thinking fails to enter the vast unconscious areas of the emotion. It is through a fundamental identification of people with minister and people with people in a face-to-face experience with ✓ God that people are changed, guilts removed, and power released for cre- ative work whereas it has been burned up in inner conflicts.

B. Sublimation is a second adjustive dynamism which Freud isolated and described. He defines it thus: "Sublimation is a process that con- cerns the object-libido in the instinct's directing itself towards an

aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual gratification; in this process the accent falls upon the deflection from the sexual aim."¹⁰ Here the relationship of the fundamentally biological impulse to its goal is brought to light. The distinction between natural and artificial aims is made clear. The natural aim would be immediate satisfaction; the artificial aim would be a delayed and differentiated satisfaction. Lester F. Ward gives a suggestive interpretation of the fundamental difference in the aim set forth here when he says that¹¹

The dynamics of society is, in the main, the antithesis of the dynamics of animal life. The psychic element . . . supplants nature by art. If we call the biological processes natural, we must call the social processes artificial.

This is the process which estimates social aims above essentially selfish aims. It is the frank recognition on the part of the individual that he was not born of himself and that he cannot live unto himself, but that society is his best chance of genuine satisfaction.

The process of sublimation is never absolute, but only partial in that there must be some direct contact of the impulse with reality. The mechanism of sublimation is largely an unconscious process in which the ego helps the id by draining off some of the energy and lowering id tensions. The ego is aiding the id, but it is also serving its own interests. The most prevalent area of sublimation is in the vocational

10. Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism, An Introduction," (1914), Collected Papers, p. 51.

11. Lester F. Ward, Psychic Factors of Civilization, (New York: Ginn and Company, 1906), p. 135.

and social spheres of the individual's experience. For example, an individual with strong polygamous impulses becomes an executive or teacher in a girls' school and at the same time has a fairly healthy home life. A person with strong homoerotic impulses will transmute his impulse and phantasies into artistic creations. There is usually a symbolic relationship between the sort of vocational adjustment an individual makes and his specifically genital sexual adjustment that can be called a sublimation. Often there is a very thin veil between the symbol and the reality. But several facts need to be pointed out concerning sublimation:

1. Much that is called sublimation is not rightly so-called. It is a submersion and a rejection of the impulse. The sublimating agency then becomes a compulsion with all the ear-marks of a repression. This is easily seen in a mental hospital where there are patients with artistic aptitudes bordering on genius, but whose direct expression of their impulses have been completely sealed off into the unconscious. Their degree of conscious acceptance and insight into the motive power of their compulsions is almost nil. These individuals never did succeed in facing up to the thing which was making the sublimation necessary.

2. The capacity for sublimation varies from individual to individual and may be determined by a close study of the pertinent facts of the infantile development of the person in question. Environmental adjustment can often do much to restore the balance of persons who are comparatively weak in their capacity for sublimation.

3. Religious asceticism has made much of sublimation in the past

few decades since the influence of Freud has trickled into the tributaries of religious psychology. This has too often been a way of palliating the tremendous energies of the sexual lives of adolescent college students whose sexual needs are being delayed satisfaction because of a highly competitive professional-minded culture. In doing so, a great deal of pious sentimentality has passed for "sublimation." It results in a splitting of the ideational and emotional lives of young people who set the idea of love against the feelings of sex and find difficulty in a frank acceptance of themselves as sexual beings. Of course, there are developmental trends in the individuals' lives that cause them to reach out and embrace such teaching. Otherwise they would sense the unreality of such teaching and be comparatively unharmed by it.

4. The best opportunity that religious leaders have in taking advantage of this fact of sublimation is not in the popular exhortations about "sublimation" in the sentimental sense of the word. Rather it lies in a frank facing of sexual problems in the dynamic relationship of counseling, coupled with an intelligent plan for hastening the time of the economic possibility of marriage in students' lives. The artificial demands of culture can be carried to such an extreme that it is no longer artificial, but the culture levies unnatural tolls on young nervous systems.

C. A third adjustive dynamism of great importance is the transference of affect. It has been seen how a charge of emotion is attached to a parent during the infantile development of the individual. The transference of affect signifies that these feelings are persistent and

tend to shift to other persons as substitutes in the adult life of the individual. Erotic or destructive tendencies can be unconsciously transferred almost in toto to another individual. Freud himself uses this term to apply exclusively to the therapeutic situation between the physician and patient. It is common in the minister-parishioner relationship also to such a degree that it merits separate treatment here as well as in the discussion of the therapeutic method of Freud.

The most common appearance of transference in the religious life of the patient is in the process of bereavement. In his paper on Mourning and Melancholia, Freud noted that bereavement is the "reaction to the loss of a loved person or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one"12 Then he observed that the normal recovery from mourning is effected by a gradual transference of affect to another love-object. Of course, aggressions can be transferred in this process too, and transference may be characterized by a return of whatever love the individual may have had for the deceased to the individual's own ego. In this case he transfers his aggressions to another person in his environment. This is a common phenomenon in the pastoral ministry when a minister observes that he has become the object of irrational aggression on the part of a person who has been bereaved at the loss of a very religious parent. Likewise, it is seen in the transference of erotic impulses of a young widow from her deceased husband

12. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," (1917), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 152.

to the minister.

But apart from the experience of the bereaved, transference is seen in the ordinary course of events. In the pastoral ministry, casual observation shows that the individual transfers feelings from his parental relationship over to authority-persons such as his employer, his pastor, his wife, and his God. If he had exaggerated feelings of dependence, aggression, or genital sexuality toward his parents, the same constellation of emotions tend to repeat themselves. As Freud says;¹³

As a child grows up, the office of the father is carried on by masters and others in authority; the power of their injunctions and prohibitions remains vested in the ego-ideal and continues, in the form of conscience to exercise the censorship of morals. . . . Social feelings rest on the foundation of identifications with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in common with them.

The poignant plight of many individuals in bondage to vestigial infantilisms is seen in the lives of people¹⁴

who all their lives, repeat, to their own detriment, the same reactions without any correction, or who seem to be dogged by relentless ill-fortune, though a closer investigation shows that they are unwittingly bringing this ill-fortune upon themselves.

Freud describes this sort of person as a daemonic character, and explains that the transference of affect has become a repetition-compulsion.

The importance of transference for religious thought and practice is two-fold: (1) It reveals that the dynamic source of energy for the individual's religious and social behavior and belief has its headwaters in the parent-child relationship; this increases the psychological

13. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, p. 49.

146. 14. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p.

significance of the New Testament teaching concerning the Fatherhood of God as being an effective symbol of ultimate reality because it is so integrally related to the individual's experience of temporal reality. In this respect, as J. R. Mosely¹⁵ once suggested, "the Spirit of God always takes the form of the vessel it fills." (2) It reveals a great deal about the pastoral ministry and can be effectively used or sadly misused by a minister as he relates himself to his people. The Catholics have used the conception of the priest as "Father" to the point of distortion; but most Protestants have reacted against the fundamental truth that the minister is, in the unconscious reactions of his people, a surrogate for the earthly parent and should use his insight and his role to develop a maturity in his people. He should, therefore, strive that his people may no longer call any man father, but walk as emotionally mature individuals who honor but do not worship any father but God.

D. The master dynamism of human personality is repression. This term has become a household word, a part of the vernacular. Consequently, it needs clear definition. The most succinct definition given by Freud is this: "The essence of repression lies simply in the function of re-jecting and keeping something out of consciousness."¹⁵ This implies that repression itself is an unconscious process, and that it is, as Freud says, "something very different from a condemning judgement." It is primarily a function of the super-ego, and not a conscious, volun-

15. Sigmund Freud, "Repression," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 86.

tary choosing of objects of thought. Again, repression is primarily the prevention of an idea or an impulse to act a certain way from becoming conscious, and not a conscious restraint of an act itself.

Freud dissects the process of repression into three phases "which are easily distinguishable from one another conceptually",¹⁶

(1) The first phase consists in fixation, which is the precursor and necessary condition of every condition of repression. Fixation can be described in this way. One instinct or instinctual component fails to accompany the rest along the anticipated normal path of development, and, in consequence of this inhibition in its development, it is left behind at a more infantile stage . . . These . . . fixations constitute the basis for the disposition to subsequent illness, and . . . they constitute the basis for the outcome of the third phase of repression.

(2) The second phase of repression is that of repression proper. . . . It gives an impression of being an essentially active process, while fixation appears to be a passive lagging behind.

(3) The third phase, and the most important as regards pathological phenomena, is that of miscarriage of repression, of irruption, of return of the repressed. This irruption takes its start from the point of fixation, and it involves a regression of the libidinal development to that point.

Regarding this last phase, Freud says that the irruption results in a symptom-formation which is usually in the form of the infantile stage at which a traumatic fixation occurred. He continues in his article on repression by pointing out that repression is the central mechanism of the mind, and that the failure of the repression is marked by the neurotic adoption of any of a series of mechanisms of secondary defense, which are characterized by their own train of symptoms. These secondary de-

16. Sigmund Freud, "A Case of Paranoia (Judge Schreber)," Collected Papers, Vol. III, pp. 453ff.

fenses will be discussed in order. Repression, as long as it succeeds, may justly be called a method of adjustment, for it is active in the lives of every person to some degree. But when it fails, it calls into play a whole series of defensive tactics. These mechanisms hold the weakening ego-line of the individual's self-esteem in the face of a frustrating environment. Meanwhile the libidinal forces of energy beat a hasty retreat to the old camping-ground where things were once childishly pleasant. The course of this emotional process is described in the periods of the development of an obsessional neurosis:

1. There is the period of childish perversity when the experience was pleasurable and accepted, a period which is closed by the onset of sexual maturity, often prematurely.

2. This is followed by the period of a primary repression making itself known in a primary defense symptom such as feelings of over-conscientiousness, shame and self-consciousness, inferiority.

3. This is followed by a period of apparent health, or better, a successful defense against the repressed memory.

4. The failure of the repression comes next upon the return of the repressed memories as these call into play the defense mechanisms.

5. These defense mechanisms carry with them symptoms which may be characterized as a compromise-formation between the desires of the instinctual life and the inhibitions of the conscience.¹⁷

17. Sigmund Freud, "Further Remarks on the Defence Neuro-Psychoses," (1896), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 162.

A cursory glance at this process of repression readily reveals that repression is the fundamental postulate of Freud's teaching. Everything else is an elaboration of this phenomenon, along with all its attendant circumstances. The significance of this fact for religion needs clear statement.

The ethical aspects of repression are far-reaching. It has been observed that repression is "something different from a condemning judgment." Much loose talk has described repression as being at the root of every ethical consideration, and that there is no such thing as rationality in moral behavior. Such surmising cuts the fact of discriminatory intelligence, not only out of the realm of ethics, but implies that there is no such thing as the capacity for discrimination in any realm — psychoanalysis included. Consequently, much must be made of Freud's distinguishing repression from a "condemning judgment." J. A. Hadfield has made much of this distinction.¹⁸

When the complexes are recognized and are consciously inhibited from expression in conduct, we call it restraint; . . . when the process of inhibition is unconscious, we call it repression.

Hocking draws this same distinction between compulsive obedience and voluntary self-control.¹⁹

In the same work referred to above, Hadfield draws a parallel distinction between sin and moral disease. The man who deliberately

18. J. A. Hadfield, Psychology and Morals: An Analysis of Character, (New York: R. H. McBride and Co., 1925), p. 32.

19. W. E. Hocking, Human Nature and Its Remaking, p. 37.

does a thing is said to be a sinner, and the man who does the same thing not having rational and responsible control of himself is said to be morally diseased.²⁰ The difference lies in the element of compulsion involved. The noted English physician made this differentiation because he observed that the "sinner" is ordinarily otherwise healthy, whereas the morally diseased is otherwise incapacitated and in need of a doctor. Dr. Hadfield's analysis lacks depth in that it overlooks the integral relationship between conscious and unconscious motivation, but it is valuable in practical, everyday dealings with people, especially in the minister's evangelistic and administrative program.

A second view of repression involves the theological importance of this phenomenon. Repentance has too often been preached as a condemnation of the self, rather than a conscious, voluntary acceptance of the self, based on understanding and insight. Seen in the light of repression, the process of repentance begins with an experience of worship in which the person relaxes and, through self-searching, gains insight into himself. It continues as the person accepts himself in the light of the new insight he has received. The process verges upon the experience of forgiveness as the person realizes that God also accepts him as he is. The middle wall of partition which alienates a person from himself is repression, and it is broken down through the process of self-insight and self-acceptance.

Dr. Karl Menninger evaluates prayer in the light of the process

20. J. A. Hadfield, Psychology and Morals, pp. 55ff.

just mentioned when he says that it can be a healthy psychotherapeutic experience because it enables "strong, practicing believers to verbalize certain conscious introspective reflections and half-conscious wishes under circumstances of intimacy and faith which rarely prevail in interpersonal relationships."²¹

Repentance, then, is an experience of self-knowledge and self-acceptance. Acceptance does not mean self-condonement, either, just as repentance does not mean self-condemnation. Repentance is a mental metamorphosis in which a person accepts the realities of his inner self as true and sees himself in a new realization of his relationship to the Father. He sees himself and God in a new light.²² It is a transformation of the self by a renewing of the mind. (Romans 12:1ff.)

This leads naturally to the fact that repression is the psychological mechanism which distinguishes perfectionism from consecration in the experience that the theologians call sanctification. The perfectionist thinks of repentance in terms of the denial of his impulses in the sense that he refuses to admit that he has them. This is precisely what is meant by saying that he cannot accept himself as he is. The perfectionist depends upon the refusal to accept and the inner blindness of repression to make him "sanctified." His religion becomes a compulsion, and his life a taut, unhappy, strained one. Conversely, the person who

21. Karl Menninger, Love Against Hate, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 201 n.

22. William D. Chamberlain, The Meaning of Repentance, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 37.

does not rely upon the compulsion of repression for his "santification" is the one who accepts all his life energies as talents and dedicates them to constructive goodness rather than a proud puritanism. As Liebmann says:²³

A splendid freedom waits us when we realize that we need not feel like moral lepers or emotional pariahs because we have some aggressive hostile feelings and thoughts toward ourselves and others. When we acknowledge these feelings we no longer have to pretend to be that which we are not. It is enough to be what we are! We discover that rigid pride is actually the supreme foe of inner victory, while flexible humility, the kind of humility that appears when we do not demand the impossible of ourselves is the great ally of psychic peace.

He concludes that one of the commandments of a new morality based upon insight and understanding is: "Thou shalt not be afraid of thy hidden impulses."

The end result of such fear and such repression, both from a psychological and a religious point of view, is waste, waste of human resources. The "higher goodness" consists of a wise stewardship of our basic drives. A foolish stewardship takes these impulses and buries them in the vast field of the unconscious recesses of the heart even as did Plotinus when he refused to admit that he had a body. But the Christian is "strengthened with power" through Christ's Spirit in "the inward man," and the eyes of his understanding become the conscious control mechanism for the outward, frank, joyous, purposeful expression of these powers of life -- the very powers which under the tyrannous hand of repression

23. Joshua Loth Liebmann, Peace of Mind, (New York: Simon Schuster, 1946), p. 54.

had been spilling over the dam of a darkened conscience in the form of anxiety, nervousness, and physical illness.

II. THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE

Different defense mechanisms come into play upon the return of the repressed. These may be described as the last lines of defense that a person throws up (more or less unconsciously) before the ego structure collapses; e.g., his capacity to deal effectively with reality in the presence of his instinctual needs fails.

A. The first method that Freud emphasizes is the reaction-formation. Freud calls this a "lower form of sublimation."²⁴ The process of the reaction formation is that the psychic forces of sex and aggression awaken "psychic counter-forces (feelings of reaction) which build up . . . psychical dams of disgust, shame and morality."²⁵ In his paper on "The Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud does not specifically call it a reaction-formation, but he does note that this process is a "reversal of an instinct into its opposite." The most common single instance is the reversal of the instinct of love into hate, or vice versa. The polarities of personality are called into play here: if one side of the polarity is completely repressed, the failure of the repression is

24. Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, p. 625.

25. Ibid., p. 584.

seen in the over-compensation of its opposite. The term over-compensation, used by other psychologists, is apparently synonymous with the term "reaction-formation." Freud points to the illustrations of the mother who has a profound sense of rejection for her child reacts against this with an over-protectiveness,²⁶ and the abundant evidence of the compulsive obsessions of psychoneurotics: the intense hand-washing compulsions signify a reaction-formation against an unconscious sense of guilt; the compulsions of the anal sort, such as extreme care in cleanliness, orderliness, and stinginess represent a reaction-formation against the expulsion of great quantities of aggressions, etc; the Don Juan is severely reacting against his sneaking feelings that he is not so masculine after all.

The religious significance of this mechanism is apparent but needs stress. Whereas sublimation is a higher form of this same tendency, it can be differentiated in that sublimation aims at the deflection of the impulse; the reaction-formation aims at the complete negation of the impulse and involves complete rather than partial repression. Thus "it is necessary to separate sublimation from reaction-formation."²⁷ To state this in religious or theological terms, it is the difference between a doctrine of sanctification which emphasizes perfectionism and purism, and one which lays claim and acceptance to every impulse as real

26. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety, p. 47.

27. Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, p. 584.

and emphasizes deflection and consecration of aim and impulse in both the direct and indirect expressions. This is the difference between Greek asceticism and the Hebrew religion that viewed the wholesome expression of all the energies of life as the direct will of God. The Hebrews had much to say about the Lord who satisfies the desires. They also built a culture which was accommodated to the emotional needs of the people. They did not move so far away from these in the direction of artificiality that their whole cultural life became a reaction-formation against their natural lives.

In terms of the insights of the New Testament, the reaction-formation is seen again in the form of Pharisaism which was a cultural compulsive obsession. Jesus stated the mechanism well when he said that the Pharisees "make clean the outside of the cup and of the platter, but within are full of extortion and excess."²⁸ Likewise, the compulsiveness of the reforming tendency of many evangelists is seen as a reaction-formation, too,²⁹ "ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him two-fold more a child of hell than yourselves." The classic example of this reaction-formation is seen in the story of Somerset Maugham entitled Rain, in which a missionary is dead-set upon the conversion of a prostitute, but finally is converted to her way of life. Too much religious work is compelled by completely repressed impulses of acquisitiveness, aggression, and sexuality. As ✓

28. Matt. 23:25.

29. Matt. 23:15.

Paul Scherer says:³⁰

Such outward purity as some folk achieve on one side of their lives, ministers among them, is too often matched by an impurity on some other side not so manifest, perhaps by acidity of disposition, by self-consciousness, by spiritual pride, by jealousy, by cruel sadistic temper. There are those who make up for secret immoralities of thought by the most meticulous habits of physical cleanness! There are those who find in hyperorthodoxy an escape from the relentless ethical demands of this troublesome Christ. Whatever else the mind is, it is a highly formidable piece of compensating machinery. All moralists in the pulpit and out of it should make a diligent note of that.

No more effective conclusion to the significance of this psychological mechanism can be drawn than to say with H. C. Miller that³¹

The moralist of yesterday dealt with the ethical factor of insincerity; the analytical psychologist of today deals with the psychological factor of repression. These two points of view must be combined in the religious investigator of tomorrow.

And if the reaction-formation is a lower form of sublimation, not too far removed from it, then compulsive neuroses are a lower form of religion and not too far removed from it; in fact the lower form of religion can often be mistaken for the higher form.

B. Whereas the reaction-formation is the mechanism of the compulsive character, projection is the mechanism of the deluded person. This process of projection, says Freud, is the means whereby³²

30. Paul Scherer, For We Have This Treasure, (New York: Harpers, 1944), p. 36.

31. H. C. Miller, The New Psychology and the Preacher, (London: Jarrolds, 1924), p. 20.

32. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, Tr. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 856.

unknown hostility, of which we are ignorant and of which we do not wish to know, is projected from our inner perception into the outer world and is thereby detached from our own person and attributed to another.

This is the externalization of an impulse in order to protect the ego from pain. As Freud says, "an internal perception is suppressed, and, instead, its content, after undergoing a certain degree of distortion, enters consciousness in the form of an external perception."³³

Especially is this thrusting forth of a feeling into the environment a characteristic mechanism in paranoid behaviour-symptoms and delusional ideas. Here, according to Freud, the delusions of persecution consist of a transformation of affect. "What should have been felt internally as love is perceived externally as hate."³³

Projection appears not only in paranoia, but in all normal people's psychological condition, also. "In fact," says Freud, "it has a regular share assigned to it in our attitude toward the external world."³⁴ This is apparent in three sorts of phenomena occurring regularly in religious experience:

1. Moralistic judgments often are predominated by projection in the psychological make-up of the person doing the judging. Judgment has its roots in personal bias beginning in the unconscious repressions of the critic. This seems to be the import of Jesus' words: "Judge not, that ye be not judged, for with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."³⁵

33. Sigmund Freud, "A Case of Paranoia," (1911) Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 452.

34. Ibid.

35. Matthew 7:1

This is characteristic of some preaching. The preacher tends to read his own problems into the lives of other people and seek a solution of them there by condemning them, scolding them, or becoming unduly solicitous over them. Preaching by nature is autobiographical, and the subjects the preacher chooses reflects the nature of his own problems. Likewise, much theological discussion revolves around a projecting of personal problems into the chess-men of abstract ideas. Theological symbols become diagnostic cues for the person who is equipped with both psychological insight and an historical perspective of theology.

This points the pastor toward two valuable tools, then: first, a way of getting behind the symptoms of the hyper-critical attitude of many of his people, rather than trying to argue with them about the relative merits of community customs. Often it will be seen that a person becomes most antagonistic toward another when he feels himself on the verge of expressing strong feelings of affection toward him. And often these feelings of resentment are a stop-gap for deep positive impulses that one church member has toward another and against which he is struggling. And then, in the second place, Freud's insight into the mechanism of projection, if applied to the pastor himself, will help him to be more objective in his pastoral and pulpit work. By self-analysis he can avoid the error of adding his own problems to those of his people in his sermons and his counseling. He will preach and counsel in terms of the great historical facts and objectives of religious experience rather than in terms of the subjective whims of each passing week. He will plan his preaching rather than follow his own moods, and he will develop insights and techniques that will encourage autonomous action in

each person with whom he counsels rather than say: "That reminds me of the time I had that problem; let me tell you about it."

Projection is seen again, not only in the bizarre experience of mental patients, but also in some of the more extreme experiences of religious people as they strive to avoid personal responsibility for their own impulses. Many of them project their impulses onto a cosmic screen and say that they are "the devil," and that they are possessed by the devil, or that a demon "entered them," and get feelings of persecution about some theological entity who is "plotting against" them. The skillful pastor will not argue or refute their feeling. The feeling is real to the needy person, and therefore the person is only confused by the pastor who mistakes the counseling therapy for a time for theological word-juggling. Rather the skillful pastor will evaluate the experience of the person as being real to him; he will carefully discover the relation of the symbols to the reality of the thing-in-itself that is bothering the person.

3. The mechanism of projection as seen in mental patients, especially paranoid or paranoiac patients, shows with vividness how far out of touch with reality theological concepts can become. Just as morality has its caricatures in the compulsive and obsessional neurotics and psychotics, even so theology has its caricatures in the deluded patient. Freud gives an elaborate description of the theology of Judge Schreber in the celebrated case history. Here is an excellent example of the extent to which the sense of need for moral change can become "past feeling," as Paul says, and completely de-sensitized by the mechanism of projection.

C. Conversion is an important mechanism of defense. This process consists in the "converting of abnormal sums" of emotional feeling into symbolic "somatic symptoms."³⁶ This is seen especially in the physical symptoms which conversion hysteria patients exhibit. As Freud describes this condition,³⁷

The paralysed organ of the abolished function is engaged in subconscious association endowed with great affective value, . . . and the arm becomes free as soon as this affective value is removed. The concept 'arm' exists in the physical substratum; but it is not accessible to conscious associations...

Illustrations of this phenomenon appear often in a general hospital.

Patients struggling against deep unconscious homosexual impulses and tendencies to identify with the alcoholism of a much hated parent convert the psychological problem into a physical symptom and develop a spastic throat, not being able to swallow.

Insight into the mechanism of conversion is of great importance to the pastor in his ministry to the sick, for he finds that the unconscious wish to fall ill plays a dominant role in some of the patients he visits. He is likely to take the patient's word at face value and commend and praise behavior in his parishioner without knowing the true motivation behind the behavior. The best policy to observe is caution: praise and eulogy should be as carefully handled as criticism and rebuke. It is far more important to know whom one is praising than it is to lay blanket praise on a certain bit of behavior regardless of whom the behaving person

36. Sigmund Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, Tr. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 934.

37. Sigmund Freud, "Organic and Hysterical Paralysis," (1893) Collected Papers, Vol. I, pp. 56-7.

may be.

D. Displacement is the ^{4th} third main mechanism of defense that Freud emphasized. Here Freud says that a painful affect frees itself from the unbearable idea and "attaches itself to other ideas which are not in themselves unbearable, but which through 'false connection' grow to be obsessions."³⁸ For instance, many otherwise unacceptable impulses are displaced into wit and humor.³⁹ Sexuality is socialized into obscene wit; invectives are made possible through wit; rebellion against authority is effected through wit; needs for self-depreciation are wittily accomplished; and even blasphemy is made amusing through wit.

Dreams are the most common illustrations of displacement. They are repressed wishes the representative acts of which are disguised through the process of displacing the impulse into a symbol. Freud finds in the analysis and interpretation of these symbols the "royal road to the Unconscious."

From a religious point of view, the most important sort of displacement is the displacement of guilt. Displacement seems to be at the center of the psychology of the substitutionary ideas about the atonement. It is clearly seen in Leviticus 16:21-22.

And Aaron shall lay both hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand

38. Sigmund Freud, "The Defence Neuro-Psychoses," (1894) Collected Papers, Vol. I, pp. 65-66.

39. Sigmund Freud, Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, Tr. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 934.

of a man that is in readiness into the wilderness:
and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities
into a solitary land: and he shall let go the goat in
the wilderness.

There is none of the identification of a person with an ideal, it seems, in the displacing of guilt to another person, but more of the building of a system of defenses against real insight into the causes of the guilt and the adjustment of life with life, through a forgiving and reconciling personal relationship of understanding love.

But in the process of displacement the attention of the individual can be narrowed down even more to a single object which may become a fetish for the protection of the individual from the idea which is so unbearable. The author has seen more than once patients in a hospital who frantically read their Bible day by day saying that as long as they were reading it they had peace of mind. The Bible in contemporary Protestantism has become for many Protestants what the scape-goat was to the Jews and what the icons and relics have been to the Catholics: a displacement substitute for the ding-an-sich of insight and repentance.

This is not an exhaustive but a suggestive discussion of Freud's findings concerning the dynamics of personality. Nevertheless, it is readily seen that the "ways of the human heart" are many and deceptive. Likewise, these dynamisms are clearly related to the ethical teachings of the New Testament.

CHAPTER VI

THE CLINICAL METHOD OF FREUD

A fairly clear conception of the results of analytical investigation has been achieved. Two questions need clarification in this chapter. First, what was his method of therapy of the disorders that he described? Second, how did Freud go about learning these facts about human nature? These are fundamental questions that will be answered in the description of the clinical method of Freud.

The starting point of any investigator is important. Where he starts has a great deal to do with the results he gets. Freud started with sick people. He came to his task after having discovered the inadequacies of neuro-anatomy and neuro-therapy in the attempted solution of the problems of the mentally ill. But before he ever touched the problems of the mentally ill, he discovered that even physical illness could not be dealt with adequately without a psychological approach to the practice of medicine. Freud says that his sort of therapy¹

was created through and for the treatment of patients permanently unfitted for life, and its great triumph has been that by its measures a satisfactorily large number of these have been rendered permanently fit for existence. In the face of such an achievement, all the effort expended seems trivial.

I. THE THERAPEUTIC METHOD

In the years 1893-1896, Freud worked in collaboration with Breuer;

1. Sigmund Freud, "On Psychotherapy," (1904) Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 257.

and the principle method they used was hypnosis. By a catharsis of emotional energies centered around a traumatic experience, the patient was able to abreact the symptom through the physician's uses of hypnosis.

In 1904, however, Freud wrote:²

Now I have not used hypnosis for the last eight years (except for a few special experiments).... There is actually the greatest possible antithesis between suggestive and analytic technique - - -

Freud says in the same context that the reasons why he gave up suggestive therapy are that the results of hypnotic treatment are not powerful and enduring enough to effect permanent cures, and that the hypnotic treatment does not recognize the severe emotional resistances which make the patient cling to the disease. This last point also suggests that hypnotic therapy does not take sufficient cognizance of the physician-patient relationship. But probably the most important reason for giving up hypnosis was that Freud knew that it dealt only with the symptom and not the deep-rooted cause of the illness.

Thus Freud made the transition from hypnotic to analytic therapy. This transition marked the birth of the psychoanalytic method. Hypnosis and psychoanalysis are directly related, however, in that both of them are based upon the principle of relaxation. Freud suggests that this is an historical relationship:³

I adhere firmly to the plan of requiring the patient to recline upon the sofa, while one sits behind him out of

2. Sigmund Freud, "On Psychotherapy," p. 253.

3. Sigmund Freud, "On Beginning the Treatment," (1912) Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 355.

sight. This arrangement has a historic meaning; it is the last vestige of the hypnotic method out of which psychoanalysis was evolved.

The main reasons for the use of such a technique, according to Freud, are:

1. It relieves the physician of the tension of having someone gazing at him for eight hours a day.
2. It reduces to a minimum the opportunity for the patient to be affected by the bodily and facial expressions of the physician.
3. It enables the physician to make the best observations and use of the patient's transference of affect.

Freud emphasizes, in the second place, that a "fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" must be observed:⁴

In any case, the patient must be left to talk and the choice of subject left to him. One says to him, therefore, 'Before I can say anything to you, I must know a great deal about you; please tell me what you know about yourself.'

....the fundamental rule of psychoanalytic technique ...the patient must observe. This must be imparted to him at the very beginning: 'One thing more, before you begin. Your talk with me must differ in one respect from ordinary conversation. Whereas usually you rightly try to keep the threads of your story together and to exclude all intruding associations and side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the point, here you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various ideas will occur to you which you feel inclined to put aside with certain criticisms and objections. You will here be tempted to say to yourself: "This or that has no connection here, or it is quite unimportant, or it is nonsensical, so it cannot be necessary to mention it." Never give in to these objections, but mention it even if you feel a disinclination against it, or indeed just because of this. Later on you will perceive and

4. Sigmund Freud, "On Beginning the Treatment," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. II, pp. 355-6.

learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one you have to follow. Say whatever goes through your mind. Act as if you were sitting at the window of a railway train and describing to someone behind you the changing views you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised absolute honesty, and never leave anything unsaid because for any reason it is unpleasant to say it.

In an earlier article, Freud suggests the following principles for the physician to follow in his therapeutic approach to the patient:

1. Listen with your whole being to all that the patient says in a sort of "evenly-hovering" state of attention. Follow the principle of hearing everything in succession and not trying to isolate and hear one thing at a time and in particular.

2. Do not take notes during an interview; it isolates your attention from the stream of the conversation while you write.

3. Refrain from scientific and theoretical formulations while the treatment is proceeding.

4. Set aside the ambition to achieve the novel which will impress and convince others of the value of what you are doing. Have something of the objectivity of the surgeon.

5. Beware of sharing your own personal experiences with the patient, for this will produce involvements of emotions, emotions that will be difficult to handle later.

6. Beware of your own resistances and blind spots which will prevent you from seeing in the patient that which is painful to you.

7. When pointing out "new aims for the impulses that have been set free" from repression through the process of making that which is unconscious conscious, always take into consideration the capacity of the patient for sublimation.

All these suggestions to the physician point toward one conclusion, according to Freud:⁵

They all aim at creating for the physician a complement to the 'fundamental rule of psycho-analysis' for the patient. Just as the patient must relate all that self-revelation can detect, and must restrain all the logical and affective objections which would urge him to select, so the physician must put himself in a position to use all that is told him for the purposes of interpretation and recognition of what is hidden in the unconscious, without substituting a censorship of his own for the selection which the patient foregoes.

The italicized words of Freud clearly describe the sort of person who is qualified to use this method; they imply that the physician cannot give health that he does not have.⁶

It does not suffice that the physician should be of approximate normality himself; it is a justifiable requisition that he should further submit himself to psychoanalytic purification and become aware of these complexes in himself which would be apt to affect his comprehension of the patient's disclosures. There can be no reasonable doubt about the disqualifying effect of such personal defects; every unresolved repression in the physician constitutes...a 'blind spot' in his capacity for analytic perception.

In the process of psychotherapy, Freud says that there are two main phases. The first phase is that in which the patient gets the story of his disorder, his life, and his problems out before the physician. This is largely preparatory and consists of a good deal of telling on the part of the patient and a good deal of listening on the part of the

5. Sigmund Freud, "Recommendations on Treatment," (1912), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 328. (The preceding points are a summary of this whole article; the italics in the exact quotation are the author's).

6. Ibid., pp. 328-9.

physician. The second phase consists of the formation of an affective relationship between the patient and the physician in which the physician uses the emotional conditions of this transference to bring insight and release to the patient's embondaged feelings. ⁷

The analysis divides itself into two clearly distinguishable stages: in the first the physician procures from the patient the necessary information, makes him familiar with the premises and postulates of psychoanalysis, and unfolds to him the reconstruction of the genesis of his disorder as deduced from the material brought up in the analysis. In the second stage, the patient lays hold of the material put before him, works on it, recollects what he can of the repressed memories, and behaves as if he were living the rest over again.

This leads to two summary remarks by Freud as to the definition of the therapeutic task. In one article, written in 1904, he says that "psychoanalytic treatment may in general be conceived of as...a re-education in overcoming internal resistances."⁸ In another, written in 1919, he amplifies the definition by saying that "our therapeutic task consists of two things: making conscious the repressed material and uncovering the resistances."⁹

The physician's discovering and dealing with the resistances of the patient is important, and the physician's failure can lead to

7. Sigmund Freud, "A Case of Homosexuality in a Woman," (1920), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 208.

8. Sigmund Freud, "On Psychotherapy," (1904), Collected Papers, Volume I, p. 262.

9. Sigmund Freud, "The Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy," (1919), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 262.

serious errors. The most common of these errors Freud suggests,¹⁰

The idea that a neurotic is suffering from a sort of ignorance, and that if one removes the ignorance by telling him the facts about the causal connection of his illness with his life, about his experiences in childhood, and so on, he must recover, is an idea that has long been superseded, and one derived from superficial appearances. The pathological factor is not his ignorance itself, but the root of this ignorance is in his inner resistances; it was they that first called this ignorance into being, and they still maintain it now. In combating these resistances lies the task of therapy....

This fact epitomizes the contribution of Freud. The process of repression is a dynamic, unconscious process of internal resistance that keeps the patient in bondage to that which he knows not what, which he has no wish to know, and will put up every defence against knowing. With definitive clarity, Freud says:¹⁰

If knowledge (that is mere intellectual information) about this unconscious were as important for the patient as the inexperienced imagine, it would be sufficient for him to read books or go to lectures. Such measures, however, have as little effect on the symptoms of disease as distributing menu cards in time of famine. The analogy goes even further than its obvious application, too; for describing his unconscious to the patient is regularly followed by an intensification of the conflict in him and the exacerbation of his symptoms.

The relation of verbal telling to the process of insight and emotional control is further clarified by Freud in his discussion of the unconscious.¹¹

If we communicate to the patient some idea which he

10. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on a 'Wild Psychoanalysis,'" (1910), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 301.

11. Sigmund Freud, "The Unconscious," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 135.

has at one time repressed, but which we have discovered in him, our telling him makes at first no change in his mental condition. Above all, it does not remove the repression nor undo its effects, as might be expected, from the previously unconscious idea has now become conscious. On the contrary, all that we shall receive at first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea. At this point, however, the patient in actual fact has the idea in two forms in two separate localities in his mental apparatus: first, he has the conscious memory of the auditory impression of the idea conveyed in what we told him, and secondly, and side by side with this, he has...the unconscious memory of his actual experience existing in him in its earlier form. Now in reality there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after overcoming the resistances, has united with the memory traces. On superficial consideration this would seem to show that conscious and unconscious ideas are different and topographically separated records of the same content. But a moment's reflect shows that the identity of the information given to the patient with his own repressed memory is only apparent. To have listened to something and to have experienced something are psychologically two different things, even though the content be the same.

This is a distinction between self-knowledge and self-acceptance that has far-reaching epistemological and theological significance as well as therapeutic and pastoral significance.

The editors of the American Medical Journal evaluate the importance of the method Freud used by saying that¹²

The aim of psychoanalysis, as Freud conceived it, was not to tell people unpleasant things about themselves, but to cure the patients by giving the integrative powers of their rational and conscious personalities an opportunity to deal with those psychological forces which were excluded from their conscious mind.

12. Editorial, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 113:1494, October 14, 1939.

II. THE FACTOR OF TRANSFERENCE

The principle by which Freud finally laid hold of the resistance which prevented the patient from getting well was the proper use of the transference. The success or failure of the therapy lay in the handling of the transference. In the beginning, Freud laid stress on catharsis, first by hypnosis and then by the mere "talk" cure. In the later phases of the development of his therapy, he emphasized the significance of the role of the physician in the patient's life. Transferences of affect from the patient's inner psychic life to the person of the physician received most attention. He saw this as the crucial factor in the analytical situation. In the context of the analysis, the factor of transference is seen most vividly:

Transferences...are new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the process of analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another way; a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the physician at the present moment.¹³

Freud would say that this process invariably occurs in a sustained physician-patient relationship, and that the careful handling of this delicate intertwining of emotions is the therapy of the patient. Here the transferences are "turned to account for the purposes of the analysis by being made conscious, and in this way the transference is constantly being destroyed!"¹³

13. Sigmund Freud, "Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," (1905), Collected Papers, Vol. X, p. 139.

The dynamic personal relationship between the physician and patient, then, provides both the obstacle and the avenue to the cure, according to the way in which it is handled. It is through this process that the patient comes not only to know himself, but to accept himself.¹⁴

Transference cannot be evaded, since use is made of it in setting up all the obstacles that make the material inaccessible to treatment, and since it is only after the transference has been resolved that a patient arrives at a sense of conviction of the validity of the connections which have been constructed...

From this point of view, then, psychoanalysis, and indeed all good psychotherapy, is the process of causing the patient to see old, unsolved, emotionally immature and damaging situations in a new light. As Freud describes the process:¹⁵

The neurotic human being brings his mind to us racked and rent by resistances; whilst we are working at analysis of it and at removing the resistances, this mind of his begins to grow together; that great unity which we call his ego fuses into one all the instinctual trends which before had been split off and barred away from it.

The aim of the treatment is a singleness of mind and unity of self. The double-minded man is unstable in all his ways, and stability of life consists of singleness of aim.¹⁶

14. Ibid., p. 140.

15. Sigmund Freud, "The Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy," (1919), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 395.

16. This concept is integral to the teaching of S. Kierkegaard, who, in his work, Purity of Heart, says that purity of heart consists in "willing one thing." His prayer for singleness of aim suggests much of the same idea that Socrates' prayer does: "Give me beauty in the inward soul, and may the outward man and the inward man be at one." It is essentially a prayer for an exact correspondence of the appearance with the reality of the self.

Freud's critics said that he analyzed behavior and neglected the synthesizing personality. They urged him to make conscious attempts to "put the person back together." To this Freud replied:¹⁷

The psychosynthesis is...achieved during analytic treatment without our intervention and inevitably. We have created the conditions for it by dissolving the symptom into its elements and by removing the resistances. There is no truth in the idea that when the patient's mind is dissolved into its elements it then quietly waits until somebody puts it back together again.

III. THE LIMITATIONS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THERAPY

Freud was not so careless as to suggest his method of therapy and technique of investigation as a panacea for all human ills. He frankly recognized its limitations. The first question that needs to be answered, however, refers to the positive side of the problem: What circumstances warrant the use of psychotherapy, and what are some of the misapprehensions concerning psychotherapy? In his article "On Psychotherapy," written in 1904, Freud answers these questions clearly. He says that psychotherapy is no new way of healing at all but has been used in an everyday fashion throughout the history of medicine. It is not a choice as to whether the physician is going to use or refuse to use psychotherapy, because he cannot avoid its use. The choice rather is between the wise or unwise use of psychotherapy.

Freud continues by saying that some of the most common errors in the use of psychotherapy are as follows:

17. Sigmund Freud, "The Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy," (1919), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 395.

1. That psychotherapy is the use of hypnosis.
2. That it is an easy technique.
3. That it cannot be used effectively except for long periods of time.
4. That psychotherapy recommends that health can be won through sexual license. Regarding this last suggestion, Freud makes three observations in different places in his writings:

a. There is very little room in the memory of the multitude; it really only retains an undigested kernel of any proposition and fabricates an extreme version which is easy to remember. It may be so that this has happened with many physicians, too, so that they vaguely apprehend the content of my doctrine to be that I regard sexual privation as the ultimate cause of the neuroses. ... This being so, would it not be simpler to aim directly at recovery by recommending the satisfaction of sexual needs as a therapeutic measure, instead of taking the circuitious path of mental treatment?¹⁸

b. Conflict is not resolved by helping one side to win the victory over the other. It is true that in neurotics asceticism has gained the day; the result of which is that the repressed sexual impulses have found a vent for themselves in the symptoms. If we were to make victory possible merely to the sensual side instead, the disregarded forces repressing sexuality would have to indemnify themselves by symptoms.... People who can be so easily influenced by a physician would have found their own way to that solution without this influence.¹⁹

c. You must not be led away by my eagerness to

18. Sigmund Freud, "On Psychotherapy," (1904), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 263.

19. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, (*Italics author's*), pp. 375-6.

defend myself against the accusation that in analytic treatment neurotics are encouraged to "live a free life," and conclude from it that we influence them in favor of conventional morality. That is at least as far removed from our purposes as the other... We can demonstrate with ease that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its behavior is neither dictated by honesty nor instituted by wisdom.²⁰

Neither the sexual libertine nor the pious defender of a legalistic faith finds any comfort here.

The positive uses of psychotherapy, however, need to be emphasized. Freud says that²¹

The ideal situation for analysis is when someone who is otherwise the master of himself is suffering from an inner conflict which he is unable to resolve alone, so that he brings his trouble to the analyst and asks for his help.

He describes the following as conditions which indicate the advisability or inadvisability of the use of psychotherapy:

A. Conditions in which psychotherapy is indicated:

1. The person must have a reasonable degree of education and a fairly reliable character.
2. A normal ego-activity must be apparent, and there can be no effective use of psychotherapy where the ego is more or less paralyzed.
3. A person should have most of his life before him.

B. Conditions which do not indicate psychotherapy:

1. Where there are dangerous symptoms, such as suicidal tendencies, for instance.

20. Ibid., p. 376-7.

21. Sigmund Freud, "A Case of Homosexuality in a Woman," (1920), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 205.

2. Where the person is extremely young or very old.
3. Where the person is feeble-minded or illiterate.
4. Where the person is overcome by hysterical confusion, interpolated mania or melancholia.
5. Where the person has a neuropathic degeneration.

Freud recognizes the above limitations in his article written in 1898.²²

It is with mellow wisdom that he makes the following over-all observation about the advisability of taking a patient for treatment:²³

In spite of every theoretical interest and endeavor to be of assistance as a physician, I keep the fact in mind that there must be some limits set to the extent to which psychological influence may be used, and I respect as one of these limits the patient's own will and understanding.

IV.. THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST

The problem of the layman's use of psychoanalysis was raised in the day and generation of Freud himself. It was questioned as to whether the layman should be allowed to use the technique. Freud pointed out that a person could have his degree from a medical school and still not have the slightest insight into the psychology of his patient and be unqualified as a psychotherapist. He drew his convictions into a succinct statement:²⁴

..... I strongly emphasize my demand that nobody should

22. Sigmund Freud, "Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses," (1898), Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 245.

23. Sigmund Freud, "The Analysis of a Case of Hysteria," (1905), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 132.

24. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Lay-Analyses, (New York: Brentano, 1927), p. 150.

be permitted to practise psychoanalysis, unless he has obtained the privilege on the basis of thorough training. Whether such a person is a qualified physician or not does not seem important to me.

In direct line with the conclusion just stated, Freud says:²⁵

In the spring of 1910 we founded the International Psychoanalytic Association in which the members admit their participation by allowing the publication of their names, in order to repudiate responsibility to those who do not belong to us and yet call their methods psychoanalysis.

There can be no doubt as to the conviction of Freud himself on the matter of the qualifications of a psychotherapist.

V. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Freud was concerned that his contribution find a secure place in the history of medicine and be a constructive force in society.²⁶

The 'advantage through illness' provided by the neuroses is indeed on the whole and in the end detrimental to the individual as well as to society. The distress that our work will cause will but affect a few. The change to a more honest and honorable attitude in the world in general will not be bought too dearly by these sacrifices.

This is as far as his own sense of rejection by the "few" was concerned.

But Freud has a greater dream than this:²⁶

But above all, all the energies which are consumed today in the production of neurotic symptoms, to serve the purpose of a world of phantasy out of touch with reality, will, even if they cannot at once be put to uses in life, help to strengthen the outcry for those changes in our civilization from which alone we can hope for better things for our descendents.

25. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on a Wild Psychoanalysis," (1910), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 303.

26. Sigmund Freud, "The Future of Psychoanalytic Therapy," (1910), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 295.

His aspiration for his work is to produce²⁷

That enlightenment of the many from which we expect to gain the authority of the community in general and thus to achieve the most far-reaching prophylaxis against neurotic disorders.

The conclusion to this matter seems to be that Freud began with the individual and saw that not only the individual but society needed transformation and reconstruction. The social sources of neurotic disorder left their mark on the individual, and Freud saw that the prophylaxis against neurotic disorders would necessitate a series of changes in society and the direction of the process of civilization. In his books on social theory and practice, Civilization and Its Discontents, The Future of ~~the~~ Illusion, Totem and Taboo, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud discusses his ideas about the nature of society.

VI. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCEDURE AS A METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

Not only is Freud's method a therapeutic procedure; it is also an instrument for scientific investigation. Freud may be said to have established firmly the validity of the clinical method of the study of human behavior in all its manifestations as over against the theoretical and philosophical approach to the problems of human nature. Wundt had pioneered in this method, but he had restricted his area of research to the conscious, rational processes of mind. He did not touch the wider area of irrational, compulsive processes of mind. Freud chose the whole field as his domain. In doing so, he turned his back on mere philosophical

27. Ibid., p. 296.

assertions and began to apply his instrument of research which he called psychoanalysis. He says:²⁸

As a rule...theoretical controversy is unfruitful. No sooner has one begun to depart from the material upon which one ought to be relying, than one runs the risk of becoming intoxicated with one's own assertions, and, in the end, of representing opinions which any observation would have contradicted. For this reason, it seems to me to be incomparably more useful to combat dissentient interpretations by testing them upon particular cases.

Naturally this process is the most difficult one, says Freud:²⁹

Each case requires years of labour. So that advances in these spheres of knowledge must necessarily be slow.

This difficulty leads to a certain temptation:²⁹

To content oneself with scratching the mental surface of a number of people and replacing what is left undone by speculation -- the latter being placed under the patronage of some school or other of philosophy.

Freud was forced to disagree with Dr. J. J. Putnam when it came to putting the clinical method of psychoanalysis into the service of this or that school of philosophy, and said:³⁰

We cannot accept his proposal...that psychoanalysis should place itself in the service of a particular philosophical outlook...in order to ennoble the patient. I would say that after all this is only tyranny, even though disguised by the most honourable motives.

There is one allegiance, however, to which Freud does pay homage,

28. Sigmund Freud, "An Infantile Neurosis," (1918), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 520.

29. Ibid., pp. 586-7.

30. Sigmund Freud, "The Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy," (1919), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 399.

although he does not systematize it into a philosophy,³¹

The psychoanalytic treatment is founded on truthfulness.... it is dangerous to depart from this foundation. When a man's life has become bound up with analytic technique, he finds himself altogether at a loss for the lies and guile which are otherwise so indispensable to a physician, and if for once with the best intentions he attempts to use them he is likely to betray himself. Since we demand truthfulness from our patients, we jeopardize our whole authority if we let ourselves be caught by them in a departure from truth.

Another ethical principle on which the method of investigation is based is evident in this remark:³²

The analyst is debarred absolutely from giving way (to overtures of sexual affection from female patients). However highly he may prize love, he must prize even more highly the opportunity to help his patient over a decisive moment in her life. She has to learn from him to overcome the pleasure-principle, to give up a gratification which lies to hand but is not sanctioned by the world she lives in, in favor of a distant and perhaps altogether doubtful one, which is, however, socially and psychologically unimpeachable.

In conclusion, Freud recommended his method of investigation above the subject matter with which he dealt and the conclusions which he himself reached.³³

As a science psychoanalysis is characterized by the methods with which it works, not by the subject matter with which it deals. These methods can be applied without violating their essential nature to the history of civilization, to the science of religion, and to mythology as well as to the study of the neuroses.

31. Sigmund Freud, "Observations on Transference-Love," (1915), Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 383.

32. Ibid., p. 390. (Italics author's).

33. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 388.

CHAPTER VII

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CLINICAL METHOD OF FREUD

The clinical method of Freud has value and limitation when it is seen from the vantage point of its importance to the Christian minister and to the practice of the Christian faith in general.

The implications of Freud's clinical method for a religious theory of knowledge are outstanding. For instance, Freud saw the important correlation between relaxation and the knowing process from the beginning of his investigations. His use first of hypnosis and then of analysis under more or less relaxed conditions shows conclusively that tension and insight are antithetical; relaxation and repression likewise are opposed. The marginal translation of Psalm 46:10 permits such a translation as "Let be and know that I am God." The Hebrew reflects the idea of relaxation. "Relax and know that I am God." Much Scriptural exhortation centers around the need for "resting" and "waiting patiently" and not "fretting". Stating the principle theologically, it seems that there is a cause-effect relationship between relaxation and contemplation on the one hand, and revelation and insight on the other hand.

Again, Freud points out the integral relationship between experience and knowledge. He says that "to have listened to something and to have experienced something are psychologically two different things, though the content is the same."¹ This is the distinction between oral

1. See footnote 11, preceding chapter.

transmission and personal apprehension, intellectual and emotional insight, mere information and genuine understanding. This difference reflects itself again in the Hebrew language. The Hebrews ordinarily used the word נִסַּח to indicate the mere telling of something to a person. They used the word $\text{יָטַע$ in the Hiphil causative stem to indicate the experience of causing the person to know. This distinction points toward a vulnerable spot in the theological indoctrination and evangelistic efforts of evangelical religious groups. Too often these symbols have been rained upon the tops of the minds of people without ever getting into the attitudes and behavior-patterns of the experience.² This points toward the need for re-thinking of the nature of the preaching and teaching experience in the light of causing people to know by experience rather than to have merely heard by ear. Such was the experience of the Samaritans when they reported back to the woman of Samaria who had told them about Jesus. In John 4:42 they say: "It is no longer because of your words that we believe, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the Savior of the world."

This sort of knowing suggests a third factor in Freud's psychotherapy. The main medium of causing the patient to know himself was the inter-personal relationship existing between the patient and the physician. This Freud called the transference. It was through this personal relationship that the patient came to a sense of conviction of the vital connections (to use Freud's phrase). Thus the knowledge comes to have obligating power over his life. Here Freud emphasizes that if

2. J. G. Mackenzie, Psychology, Psychotherapy, and Evangelicalism, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 23.

there are any renunciations to be made, the patient has to learn from the physician as the example how to make these renunciations. This is of supreme importance in the communication of health. The physician cannot communicate health that he does not have. In the language of the religious ministry, this means that the minister must have experienced reconciliation before he can communicate the ministry of reconciliation. The principle of incarnation works on every level, from the lowest to the highest. Vestiges of it are seen in the psychotherapeutic situation which Freud described. Conviction grows out of personal, face-to-face relationships, and knowledge of the most effective sort is that which one person has of another. It is not mere sense perception, although it involves all these languages of the senses. There is a gestalt, a totality of impression, that "lies too deep for sense or sound." This is the sort of knowledge that arises when "deep calleth unto deep."

Not only is Freud's psychotherapeutic method important for a theory of religious knowledge, but it has marked considerations that concern the student of ethics. Freud said that when analysis was adequate and the transference-relationship had been used properly, there was no need for the analyst to prescribe goals or "ideals" for the patient. In the first place, Freud evidently had a good deal of confidence in the competency of a free mind to choose its own course. Consequently, he majored on "giving the patient's integrative, rational powers an opportunity to deal with the hitherto unacceptable impulses." In this he may be followed and imitated. One of the fundamental concepts of the Christian faith is that of the competency of the individual before God, but very little confidence is placed in the competency of the indi-

vidual parishioner when it comes to making his own decisions with reference to his life. Consequently, authority and coercion are used in the realm of morals especially. As a result, his ethical experience is compulsive and immature rather than intelligent and mature.

The other side of this issue, however, must be stated. Freud overlooked the necessity for group ideals and for available ethical resources within the patient's reach from which he might choose. Freud and his followers (especially Brill) make dogmatic remarks about the person's incapacity to know himself without the help of a psychoanalyst.³

No person can bring to light anything from his unconscious unless he is made to recall it by hypnosis, or unless it is interpreted for him by psychoanalysis. ✓

This remark from A. A. Brill reflects an exaggerated sense of importance. The assumption is that a person is doomed except he be privileged to be psychoanalyzed. Other disciplines for self-knowledge such as the experience of prayer, the sharing of experience in family and social relationships, the comparison of the individual with other people with whom he identifies --- all these are set aside as naught and the wisdom of the race is supposed to have started with the discovery of psychoanalysis. The absurdity of such a dogmatic generalization is its own refutation.

But in contradistinction to this dismal helplessness of human beings without the analyst in the discovery of the deep sources of their problems is the equally exaggerated optimism about the capacity of their patients to know what is good for them. The well-trained minister who has had experience in guiding the lives of people knows that it is bad

3. A. A. Brill, Introduction to the Basic Writings of Freud, p. 13. (Italics author's).

religion and bad ethics to make his people's decisions for them in the realm of religious and ethical belief and practice. But he knows also that just as people need help in the analysis of their inner lives, they need available social and ethical resources from which to draw their ideals. The environment often needs adjusting, as any good social worker will affirm. Psychoanalysis itself attests that integration of personality around a real love-object is the sureway to psychic reorganization. As Chamberlain says,⁴

'In religion as well as in astronomy everything depends upon what you make the center.' Ptolemaic astronomy made the earth the center of the universe; consequently all its conclusions were wrong. Unregenerate man makes his own desires and aspirations the center of his spiritual universe; so his conclusions are often just the opposite of the man who makes God the center of his aspirations... Christian repentance includes the discovery of a new center for life...

The Christian minister sees very clearly the necessity of portraying the character and spirit of Christ in his counseling relationships with his people. But he sees more clearly the easy possibility of substituting himself for Christ and thus obscuring the supremacy of Christ as a unifying ethical loyalty available to his parishioner. He feels that his parishioner needs not only help in self-analysis, but help in discovering social and religious loyalties that will sustain his gains in direct proportion to his faith in and loyalty to these ideals.

Nevertheless, Freud makes another observation concerning the pointing out of new aims for the patient that every Christian worker should bear in mind as he recommends ideals to the person with whom he

4. Chamberlain, The Meaning of Repentance, p. 59.

counsels. Freud says that in pointing out new aims, the therapist should take into consideration the capacity of the person to carry out those aims. In another place, Freud says that "ethics must be regarded as a therapeutic effort," but he criticises ethics in that "it does not trouble enough about the mental constitution of human beings; it enjoins a command and never asks whether or not it is possible for them to obey it."⁵ The limitations of human nature in general are often overlooked in the establishment of ethical ideals in religion, and in the practice of religious instruction and counseling. And, as Freud suggests, the handicaps of individuals — culturally, constitutionally, and emotionally — are left out of the picture. With men some things are impossible.

The relation between the psychoanalytic therapy and the confessional ministry of the priest, pastor and rabbi has received some attention. Some writers tend to equate the two. Freud points out the distinctive difference:⁶

In the confessional, the sinner tells what he knows,
but in Analysis, the Neurotic is expected to reveal
much more.

Zilboorg clarifies this by saying that the confessional deals only with conscious guilts, whereas the analysis deals with both conscious and unconscious guilts.⁷

This, however, is much too academic a distinction for the well-trained minister to accept as final, because the integral relationship

5. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 138 ff.

6. Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Lay Analyses, pp. 40-1

7. Gregory Zilboorg, Mind, Medicine and Man, pp. 328 ff.

between conscious and unconscious guilts makes it impossible for them to be so easily categorized. Freud and Zilboorg must not be easily discounted by ministers, either. They show the necessity for an increased insight into human nature and the development of skill in personal counseling on the part of the minister in order that he may be able to detect and deal adequately with causes and not mere symptoms in his religious ministry. It is at this point that the psychotherapeutic method of Freud and the later revisions of men such as Jung, Adler, and Rank have the greatest pertinence to the practice of the Christian ministry.

In this connection, Freud made his primary contribution to the Christian religion. He used the clinical approach to human problems, as over against the academic, theoretical approach. This general method, Freud says, can be equally as effective in the study of religion as it can in the study of medicine.⁸ As applied to religion, then, what are the characteristics of the clinical method?

1. The clinical method of the study of religion begins, not with a theory, but with the face-to-face relationship of the student of religion with a person who is consciously in need of his help. It begins, not with a book about people, but with the "living human documents of personal experience," to use the phrase of Dr. A. T. Boisen. All conclusions are based on first-hand, inductive observation, and not on a priori judgements. Books, theories, and doctrines are used as references in the study of the experience of the individual or group under obser-

8. Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, p. 338.

vation.

2. The clinical method of the study of religion involves the use of all of the tested psychotherapeutic means of distinguishing between real and professed motives of people. It is based upon the assumption that every virtue has its counterfeit in everyday life and its caricature in psychopathology. The student of religion learns to listen more than to exhort. He majors on the development of insight rather than the transmission of doctrine, the growth of the soul rather than conforming the soul to a pattern. He emphasizes the inseparableness of religion and life, vital faith and healthy usefulness.

3. The clinical method of the study of religion is based upon the student's refusal to make a "thing" (to reify) any one system of psychology, theology, philosophy, or ecclesiology. He is faithful to vital experience in a personal everyday existence of people with people and people with God.

4. The clinical method of the study of religion is objective in that it insists upon evidence for each conclusion, but it is subjective in that it lays stress upon the minister as a man of God, a representative of all that religion means to the individual under consideration, and as minister of reconciliation to whom people turn as an interpreter of God.

5. The clinical method of the study of religion is not restricted to materials and facts that arise from within the church, or the Bible, or the creed, but draws upon the materials and facts that scientists have discovered. Much emphasis is laid upon clinical cooperation with the people of other professions, such as medicine, sociology, and

psychiatry. The student of religion does not accept the a priori dicta of people of these professions, just as he does not accept them from people of his own profession, but subjects these data to testing and observation under more or less controlled conditions. The student welcomes truth wherever manifestations of truth may be found, and proceeds upon the assumption that truth is coherent when different symbols used to describe it are properly understood.

6. The Christian student of religion bases his use of the clinical method on the firm ethical foundation of the worth and sacredness of the individual human life. Each person to him is "one for whom Christ died," and his reason for working with people is his concern for them and his dedication of himself as an "instrument of righteousness" in the all-inclusive redemptive ministry of Christ. His motive is not that of mere childish curiosity, although he does have a mature intellectual hunger for knowledge; it is not the motive of a childish sense of omnipotence, although he does feel a sense of calm confidence in seeing people's lives change; it is not a desire to substitute human efficacy for divine power, although he does see the slovenly results that come from careless references to divine power. His motive is that of being a "laborer together with God."

Freud did much to initiate the scientific study of human experience in all areas of study. Other competent investigators developed it in their respective fields of research. The result has been that previously isolated disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, anthropology, and religion are moving closer together. The pioneer in the clinical study of religion who has done most to

develop this sort of discipline is Anton T. Boisen. His book The Exploration of the Inner World⁹ is a classical example of the application of this method. He has recently published a handbook for guidance to pastors in the application of the method to pastoral practice.¹⁰ He has spent the majority of his life in the clinical training of theological students, and may be said to be the founder of this movement which is gradually becoming a recognized part of theological education. His student, Carroll A. Wise, has made a contribution in his own right in the field in his work, Religion in Illness and Health.¹¹ Dr. H. Flanders Dunbar, formerly a student of Dr. Boisen, has been one of the pioneers in the field of psychosomatic medicine, a meeting ground of medicine, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, sociology, and religion.

Freud has laid new emphasis upon the importance of an individual life. He was not content with "scratching the mental surface" of a great many people, but sought to deal adequately with one person at a time. He saw this as the most effective way of discovering principles and procedures that could ultimately redound to the advantage of the masses.

But this raises the question as to the limitations of his

9. Anton T. Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World, (Chicago: Willett and Clark, Co., 1936); "The Problem of Sin and Salvation in the Light of Psychopathology," The Journal of Religion, 22:288-301, July, 1942; "Religion and Personality Adjustments," Psychiatry, 5:209-218, May, 1942.

10. Anton T. Boisen, Problems in Religion and Life, (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1946).

11. Carroll A. Wise, Religion in Illness and Health, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942).

clinical method. Freud did not consider his clinical method a panacea for all the world's ills. He frankly recognized its limitations. Some of his over-zealous followers may have left this impression, but it is not inherent in his teaching. Psychotherapy, which may be said to stem from Freud's work, is of principal concern to the religious worker, because it is most nearly akin to pastoral counseling. But the competent psychiatrist recognizes it as one of the many different types of therapy available for distressed persons. The indications for its use are clearly stated by Freud himself in the preceding chapter. Likewise, the minister should make note that personal counseling, which should include the fundamentals of a sound psychotherapy, is not a panacea for his parishioners' problems. Other procedures must be used also: preaching, teaching, opportunities for public confession of sin and faith, group activity, social re-construction, medical cooperation, and institutional resources should be corollary to all counseling therapy. A cross-fertilization of insights from all of these endeavors to help people will assure the success of an integrated, well-balanced ministry. But above all, the minister's sovereign responsibility in all these functions is to portray Christ in such a way that he pervades the people's daily experiences.

PART III

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE AND THOUGHT OF FREUD

CHAPTER I

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF FREUD

Freud says that he was born and remained a Jew. He makes few references to his own personal feeling about organized religion. A veiled criticism of the Catholic Church is seen in this rather lengthy parable:¹

Freud opened his remarks (says Sachs) by reminding us of a well-known picture in Austria, by Moriz Von Schwind, representing an episode from the legend of St. Wolfgang. It shows the devil who has made a contract with the Saint to provide the stones with which a church was to be built (The devil, in the end of course, is cheated of his reward by the Saint) pushing a great load of rocks on a wheelbarrow up hill, while the Saint is seen in the background in his bishop's vestments, praying in dignified repose. "Mine," said Freud, "was the devil's lot. I had to get the stones out of the quarry as best I could and was glad when I succeeded in arranging them willy-nilly so that they formed something like a building. I had to do the rough work in a rough way. Now it is your turn and you may sit down in peaceful meditation and so design the plan for a harmonious edifice: a thing that I never had the chance to do."

The biting sarcasm and the undercurrent of pathos in this parable point to the fact that Freud's religious views have a cultural explanation. Any reference to Freud's idea of religion must take into account his cultural milieu of Roman Catholic domination of the intellectual and social life of Vienna. It was these Christians that knocked his father off the street; it was these Christians that deprived Freud of an equal opportunity in his university days; it was these Christians who rejected Freud from the beginning of his life. The result was that the pattern

1. Sachs, Freud: Master and Friend, pp. 169-170.

of rejection which Freud had carried with him from childhood became effective also in the rejection of religion, per se, in the sense of an organized body of theology and ecclesiastical practices.

But the question remains: Was there a spiritual quality to the life of Freud apart from his paying allegiance to this or that theology and church?

The first spiritual characteristic that stands out in the character of Freud is the unification of his life around one central purpose. He says that he had to work "with the tenacity and single-mindedness of Hannibal." In another connection he says:²

This is the only way to make important discoveries: have one's ideas focused exclusively on one central interest.

The sense of mission, a vocational urgency, is reflected in these words. There is no theological orientation, to be sure, but there is something of the stirring of an absolute ethical conviction. Reik says Freud once said to him that "character is determined essentially by the prevalence of one instinctual impulse over others. . . . we are indebted for our greatest cultural achievements to great personalities, those with powerful impulses who had the gift of curbing them and turning them to serve higher ends."³

This central purpose in life was augmented by Freud's sincerity and truthfulness. He faced his own psychic processes with a remarkable honesty. His frank biographical references in his works The Interpre-

2. Ibid., p. 71.

3. Theodor Reik, From Thirty Years With Freud, Tr. by Richard Winston (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), pp. 8-9.

tation of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life are sufficient index to the truth of this statement. He says in one place that he is not concerned with the reasons why he would want to keep certain facts to himself in that he would not tell other people, but with the reasons why he has such a powerful inner censorship by which means he keeps certain insights from himself. He is grappling with the essence of internal honesty and dishonesty.⁴

In keeping with this fidelity to truthfulness, Freud had little patience with insincerity. (He noted shallowness in much moralism. On one occasion he walked out of a meeting where a professor was giving a factually groundless homily on "sexual abstinence."⁵) Freud requested Reik to speak at the funeral of Abraham, the analyst. Reik spoke on Abraham's faults as well as his good points. On the way home, Freud said to Reik: "That is just the way I would have done it, Reik.... Trust others to remain hypocrites even before the coffin."⁶ Pryn's Hopkins says of Freud that "truthfulness, regardless of whatever injury to himself, may well be the man's greatest quality."⁷

(But another ethical value has a high place in the life and teachings of the man Freud: love is supreme with him;⁸

4. Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 273.

5. Hans Sachs, Freud: Master and Friend, p. 99.

6. Theodor Reik, From Thirty Years With Freud, p. 6.

7. Pryn's Hopkins, "Sigmund Freud," Character and Personality, 7:2:169, December, 1939.

8. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Tr. Joan Riviere, (Longon: Hogarth Press, 1930), pp. 36-38. (Italics author's).

How would it be possible to forget this way of all ways of practicing the art of life! It is conspicuous for its remarkable capacity to combine characteristic features. Needless to say, it, too, strives to bring about an independence of fate...and with this object it looks for satisfaction within the mind, and uses the capacity for displacing libido which we mentioned before, but it does not turn away from the outer world; on the contrary, it takes firm hold of its object and obtains happiness from an emotional relationship to them. Nor is it content to strive for avoidance of pain -- that goal of weary resignation; rather it passes that heedlessly by and holds fast to the deep-rooted, passionate striving for a positive fulfilment of happiness. Perhaps it comes nearer to this goal than any other method. I am speaking, of course, of that way of life which makes love the center of all things and anticipates all happiness from loving and being loved. This attitude is familiar enough to all of us; one of the forms in which love manifests itself, sexual love, gives us our most intense experience of an overwhelming pleasurable striving after happiness. That is more natural than that we should persist in seeking happiness along the path by which we first encountered it? The weak side of this way of living is clearly evident; and were it not for this, no human would ever have thought of abandoning this path to happiness in favour of any other. We are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love; never so forlornly unhappy as when we have lost our love object or its love.

These two great ethical principles --- truth and love ---

stood apart from each other in the moral experience of Freud. He did not achieve the ideal of "speaking the truth in love" which characterized the ethical perception of Paul. This ^{is} understandable in that Freud received very little of appreciation for truth or expressions of love from his environment. To his death he was the object of scorn by scientists -- the searchers after truth -- and persecution by religious zealots -- the professors of love. His earlier writings reflect patient scholarship and a calmness of spirit. But his later writings are filled with invective and satire. This was his answer to the reception that he received at the hands of science and religion.

Nevertheless, the ways of religion captured Freud's concern throughout his life. He spent his childhood pondering the mysteries of a religious explanation of the world and trying to handle his strong aggressions. He grew up under religious influence. The Biblical story was active in his vocational choice. He spent his old age elaborating two great experiences -- aggression and religion -- into this theory of the "death instinct" and his religious theory of illusionism. Here the two problems of his infancy coalesce into a unified weltenschaung.

II. THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF FREUD

A summary of Freud's religious writing reflects his growing concern about religion. In 1907 he wrote an article in which he showed the psychological similarity between the obsessive acts of neurotics on the one hand and the ceremonial rituals of formalized religious groups on the other.¹ In 1912 he wrote his work on primitive religion which he called Totem and Taboo. Here he universalized his concept of the Oedipus situation and explained religion and morals as growing out of an original sin of the sons of the herd having slain the patriarch of the herd. The religion and morals of the race, then, arose in much the same way as the super-ego arises in the individual. In his work, Freud drew on the resources of other men. He used the researches of Frazer in The Golden Bough, Robertson Smith's The Religion of the Semites, and drew heavily upon Darwin's concept of the horde-father.² In reality, Freud is grappling with the idea of original sin, or "ancient guilt," in this work. He says that the race killed the primal father and then experience guilt unbearable which was removed in the process of the deification of the father. He interprets the Christian doctrine of redemption in the following way:³

1. Sigmund Freud, "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices," (1907), Collected Papers, Vol. II, pp. 25-35.

2. Pryn's Hopkins, "Sigmund Freud," Character and Personality, 7:2:169, December, 1939.

3. Sigmund Freud, Reflections on War and Death, pp. 50-51.

If the Son of God had to sacrifice his life to absolve mankind from original sin, then, according to the law of retaliation, the return of like for like, this sin must have been an act of killing, a murder. Nothing else could call for the sacrifice of a life in expiation.

The world, as a further elaboration of this suggestion would justify, originally had, as every individual man of the race has, a deep ambivalent, contradictory feeling of love-and-hate toward God. The state of sin is characterized by the predominance of the rebelliousness of the race. God, in Christ, in a loving, permissive relation to man in the incarnation, allows the full vent of man's wrath to be spent on him in the crucifixion. When wrath had done its full work, the permissive love of Christ turned the wrath of man into shame, guilt and contrition. Then the individual suddenly accepts himself as a sinner alongside the fact that God in Christ as a Redeemer on a cross accepts him as a sinner. Then such grace stimulates him to the expression of the other side of his love-hate ambivalence in an experience of identification, love and fellowship. Thus it is that the so-called Oedipus situation is resolved successfully in a religious experience of conversion.

Then, again in 1915 Freud, driven to deeper levels of pessimism because of the ravages of the World War I, wrote a paper on Reflections on War and Death. Here he observed:⁴

Our unconscious...does not believe in its own death; it acts as though it were immortal.... The idea of death finds absolutely no acceptance in our impulses....

He concluded that it would be better for us to be more realistic in the accepting of the fact of death. "To bear life remains, after all, the

4. Ibid., p. 62.

first duty of the living."⁵ It was not long after this that Freud enunciated his firm belief in the existence of a death impulse, a self-destructive instinct alongside the life impulse. Rank accurately observes that it seems to him⁶

noteworthy...that Freud discovered the aggressive impulse so late....(and)that in his lifelong analytic practice it came to him only by the circuitous route of a consideration of culture, and not through the individual himself.

Freud's formulation concerning the death impulse was more of a personal confession than a scientific discovery. He did not arrive at it through clinical experience, but through personal experience, and that very late. He says:⁷

The time comes when everyone of us has to abandon the illusory anticipations with which in our youth we regarded our fellow-men, and when we realize how much hardship and suffering we have been caused in life through their ill-will.

When close examination is made of Freud's autobiography, one finds on the one hand a very sensitive person who feels keenly the "misery of poverty," and the "indifference and arrogance of those who have possessions:"⁸ then on the other hand, one finds a very aggressive, strong-willed person who challenges his own professional equals, the status quo of religion, and the accepted standards of morality. The question as to how Freud remained so long in the dark as to the

5. Ibid., p. 71

6. Paula, Will Therapy, p. 115.

7. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 87.

8. Ibid., p. 88.

aggressive impulse is to the point; not only did he remain in the dark, but he rejected Adler upon his suggestion of it. He apparently had a personal blind-spot that kept him from seeing this. But it refreshes one to see this confession in a man of his age; he felt no necessity of "saving face" when he finally did see it. He left it to his successors to work out in clinical detail. Menninger has done much research along this line.⁹

Freud wrote a cluster of minor religious works in the years 1917 to 1930. In 1917 he wrote a preface to Reik's Problems of Religious Psychology. In 1922 he toyed with the idea of mental telepathy in his paper on Dreams and Telepathy. Likewise, he wrote a short paper on A Demoniac Possession in the Seventeenth Century in which he recognized the psychological validity of the theory of demon possession of ancient times, and suggested that this was a process of externalization of internal conflicts.¹⁰

The most succinct statement of Freud's religious views, however, is his book The Future of an Illusion, published in 1930. This book exploded on the attentions of religious thinkers. The view of illusionism set forth in this work attracted the attention of religious thinkers in such a way as to obscure the technical discoveries of which so much is made in this treatise. Full, thorough, and adequate criticisms of this view have been made by competent philosophers of religion. A separate

9. Karl Menninger, Man Against Himself, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Co., 1938),

10. Collected Papers, Vol. IV.

thesis could be written on this theory of illusionism, which is not peculiar to or original with Freud. Freud is more of an echo here than he is a voice. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) anticipated him by half a century with the theory.¹¹

The procedure at this point, however, will be to take Freud's own statement and criticism of his theory as a framework and criticise his contribution here in the light of his personal and scientific experience with a view to understanding why he said what he did rather than condemning him for what he believed.

In the first place, The Future of An Illusion is more of a sociology of religion than it is a psychology or philosophy of religion. It is an analysis of Western culture. Freud says that "every culture is based on compulsory labor and instinctual renunciation."¹² External compulsion is necessary to culture as a means of social control.¹³ It is in this context that Freud sets forth on a discussion of religion as a means of social control. He says that the business of religion in this respect is to exorcise the terrors of nature, reconcile men to the cruelty of fate, and "make amends for the sufferings and privations that the communal life of culture has imposed upon man."¹⁴ Religion, in the last sense, becomes a series of over-compensatory devices which allay men's frustrations in the real world.

11. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, Tr. by Marian Evans, Second Edition, (London, 1861).

12. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 16.

13. Ibid., pp. 20-21.

14. Ibid., p. 30.

In the second place, this social theory paves the way for Freud to universalize his theory of the Oedipus situation and say that society does to group what parent-child relationship does to the individual. He concludes that religion and religious doctrines are the projected wishes of the frustrated child -- either individually or collectively -- and as such are illusions. The conditions that otherwise would produce a neurosis in the individual are socialized and the individual neurosis is exchanged for a collective neurosis in the form of religion.¹⁵ Freud says that the term "illusion" does not necessarily imply that the wishes are groundless, or that the beliefs are "errors" in the sense that the beliefs are true or false. It simply means that they are wishes; the "evidence is not seen." What he means by "illusion" is what the average religious person means when he says he has faith. This is a comparison between the old moot philosophical question among the theologians as to the relation between faith and reason. It simmers away at the end of Freud's discussion as to the relative excellence of faith in science and faith in God. Freud concludes that so much trouble is stirred up by the introduction of God into the psychic and social scheme of things that "it would be an indubitable advantage to leave God out of the question altogether, and to admit honestly the purely human origin of all cultural laws and institutions."¹⁶ Supplant the idea with an enlightened self-interest, he suggests.

The only hope of the world, according to Freud, is the search for

15. Ibid., pp. 75-78.

16. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

truth by scientific methods. He asks for the avoidance of all "symbolic disguisings of the truth." He avers that the "voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it succeeds."¹⁷ As Arnold W. Green puts it,¹⁸

The primary social value Sigmund Freud sought to propagate was respect for science, in and of itself, apart from any other therapeutic consideration.

It is in order now to look at the criticisms that Freud made of his own theory as it has been outlined above, and to see whether or not he has any positive suggestions to make.

In his Autobiography, Freud criticizes his religious theory by saying that he expressed "an essentially negative evaluation of religion."¹⁹ In this sense of giving a negative description of religion, Freud's feeling that religion is the product of wishful thinking may be accepted as an accurate estimate of much that is current in popular religion. What hurts about his estimate is that it is too often true. As Paul said of the Romans, so it can be said of the chaos of religious cults and divergent religious denominations abounding on every hand in contemporary life, that they have "exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator."²⁰

But in a more positive sense than this, the negative evaluation

17. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

18. Arnold W. Green, "Social Values and Psychotherapy," Journal of Personality, Vol. XIV, March, 1946, No. 3, P. 201. (pp. 199-226).

19. Sigmund Freud, Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

20. Romans 1:24.

of Freud is true. As Charles Holman says,²¹

In a very real sense, religious ideas are projections on a cosmic scale of biological needs... The conception ... argues its validity rather than otherwise. Our world is such that it meets and responds to the demands of life.

God is a God who "satisfieth our desires with good things...." If the hungers for food, sex, self-identity, and companionship find realistic responses in the universe, it is not unimaginable that the hunger for the certainty of the reality of God meets an objective reply from Him.

But Freud realized the weakness of his religious nihilism in that it is essentially negative. In another work, not so well known, written in the midst of his clinical research, Freud gives his positive evaluation of the function of religion in the psychic life of the individual.²²

It puts a restraint upon sexual tendencies by affording them a sublimation and a safe mooring; it lowers the importance of family relationships, and thus protects (the individual) from the threat of isolation by giving (him) access to the great community of mankind. The untamed and fear-ridden (child) becomes social, well-behaved, and amenable to education.

Such religious experience is personal, heart-felt, and related to life. The value that Freud has given to religion both in his negations and affirmations is to demonstrate that just because an emotional or intellectual phenomenon is called "religion" does not testify to its worth. What Freud overlooked is the simple fact that religion cannot be separated from the person who is religious, and that the neurotics he studied

21. Charles Holman, "When the Clergyman and the Psychiatrist Meet," The Journal of Religion, 16:4:438-40, October, 1936.

22. Sigmund Freud, "An Infantile Neurosis," (1918), Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 507.

were naturally neurotic in their religious experience, too. They were neurotic in all their interpersonal relationships, and God was no exception to their neurosis.

In the second place, Freud criticised his formulations concerning religion in the following way:²³

In my Future of an Illusion I was concerned much less with the deepest sources of religious feeling than with what the ordinary man understands by his religion...The whole thing is so patently infantile, so incongruous with reality, that to one whose attitude to humanity is friendly it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life.

There is no devoted minister who Sunday by Sunday talks with his people but that has felt this same emotion. The religion of the masses is appalling, rarely getting beyond the festivities of the seasons: Christmas, Easter, Thanksgiving, and the summer revival. And whether it is pleasant or not, the minister has to admit that many of his parishioners will never be any different. But he does not despair, as did Freud. For it is precisely "the deepest sources of religious feeling" with which the participating Christian is concerned.

The religion that Freud talks about is folk-religion, and, as Fosdick has said, "what the Freudians call 'religion' Jesus called sin."²⁴ It is the same sort of thing that Paul observed at Athens and it is the same sort of thing that set the populace into motion to crucify Jesus. The Christian who has his mind steeped in the message of

23. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, op. cit., p. 23.

24. H. E. Fosdick, As I See Religion, (London: The Student Christian Movement Press, 1932), p. 117. (189 pages).

the New Testament and who is a careful student of the historical revelation of God in Christ has no plea to make for the religion of "ordinary man," and his sensitive spirit is struck with the same sense of its inadequacies as was the spirit of Freud. He knows that it was out of such degeneracy that the Christian faith sprang. Josiah Moses demonstrates effectively the fact that just such "religion" as Freud denounces was the cause of the rise of the Christian movement. He says, after a careful analysis of "popular religion,"²⁵

What we have here given will suffice to show how deep in the mire of bibliolatry, traditionalism and formalism that people, who more than any other had a peculiar genius for religion, had sunk. The religion of the living heart was gradually superseded by the religion of the dead letter; the essentials were either forgotten or dispensed, while the trivialities and accessories, fringes and phylacteries were paid all the due reverence due Jehovah himself.

It is to this complete degeneration, however, that Christianity very likely owes its birth.

In this sense, as Kierkegaard insisted, Christian experience is not a religion but a faith, and the opposite of sin is not virtue but living faith. In line with these thoughts, it must be borne in mind that when Freud referred to "religion" he was thinking of the situation-that-was in his cultural milieu of Roman Catholicism and Jewish orthodoxy and legalism. The writings of Freud show a remarkable ignorance of the contents of the New Testament, and the sources of his information about the Christian faith were meager. The tension between Roman Catholicism and the Jews had such personal pain for Freud that he dreamed of the death of the Pope often. His Jewish faith meant practically nothing to

²⁵. Josiah Moses, The Pathological Aspects of Religion, (Worcester. Mass.: Clark University Press, 1906), p. 168. (viii, 264 pp.).

him, and he had to turn to humanism for a spiritual maintenance.

The third observation Freud makes as to his religious teaching is that his views are more or less personal ones, and that he adopted them in disagreement with many of his fellow-workers.²⁶ The most apparent thing about Freud's teachings on religion is the element of personal bias in them. He did not use his clinical method in arriving at them, but made a leap of surmise with such compulsiveness that one looks for the element of "wish-fulfilment" in them. The biography of Freud throws some revealing light upon his motivation for such blatant extremes of rebellion against authority. In connection with this, Freud gives a clue as to the direction that a criticism of his personal bias about religion should take.²⁷

The defenders of religion will with equal right avail themselves of psychoanalysis in order to appreciate the full affective significance of religious doctrines.

In order to appreciate the "full affective significance of Freud's own religious doctrines," the methods of interpretation and technical discoveries he himself made are of greatest value.

Freud's life shows the reason for his compulsive rebellion against religious faith. As has already been seen, his cultural pattern had something to do with it. But his personal relationship to his father affected it all the more. Open rebellion against his father's inadequacy characterized his whole life pattern. The element of personal bias against authority of any kind, and a strong will to power in becoming the authority himself colored all of his life, vocational, as well as

26. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, pp. 64-65.

27. Ibid., p. 65.

religious. He repressed all his needs for a reasonable amount of authority in his social and interpersonal relationships, becoming an iconoclast of the first rank.

But there was a return of the repressed in that he became the "father-figure" of the psychoanalytic movement. Correspondingly, the psychoanalytic movement took on all the characteristics of a personally founded religious cult. Cultic formation is an enlightening study in social psychology, and the process described by investigators such as Richard Niebuhr and Liston Pope²⁹ is evident in the history of the psychoanalytic movement.³⁰ There are five phases in the progress of a religious cult. The first phase is that of a discovery of a set of facts through experience which becomes the basis for a gospel. Such was the case in Freud's discovery of the facts of repression, the unconscious, and all the other facts that have been listed in his contribution. The second phase is that in which the founder of the movement gathers disciples about him, teaching them in a training relationship. This apparent in Freud's relationship to the Vienna School. The third phase is the establishment of a "way of life" or an ethic that involves the personal lives and devotion of the followers. This is seen in the personal ties of devotion that bound the students of Freud to him. These men, as has been seen, did not resort to traditional religion in time of grief, even,

29. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929).

Liston Pope, Millhands and Preachers, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942).

30. Sigmund Freud, The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, (New York: Modern Library Series, 1938), pp. 933 ff.

but "preached" the funerals of their own clan. Almost all of them had a religious specialty. Freud stimulated Jung's studies of primitives and neurotics, Pfister's studies of Zinzendorff, Hitschmann^g and Von Winterstein on philosophic systems, Richlin, Abraham and Rank on myths, Jones and Storfer on folklore, Reik on ritual, Money-Kyrle on sacrifice, and many others on other subjects. Reik published his Problems of Religious Psychology, and almost every successor of Freud has felt the necessity to make some discussion of religion. The significant fact about all this is that with each of them the fact of religious experience is inevitable.

The fourth phase of cultic development is the formulation of a creed, in which the lines of orthodoxy are drawn and efforts are made to determine who is of the fold and who is not. The work of the International Psychoanalytic Congress is analagous to this.

The establishment of the creed leads to the final phase of which schism and heresy arise. The history of psychoanalysis is replete with the heresies of a few strong personalities such as Jung, Adler, Rank and others. The terms "orthodox" and "heterodox" are used in the literature without too much consciousness of the specifically religious taint that these words have acquired.

Freud is the common denominator of all these phases of the development of the history of psychoanalysis, and he stands out as the "father of the horde." His work was his religion.

CHAPTER II

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREUD

A. THE EXTENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREUD

The significance of Sigmund Freud is not restricted to any one field of study, but rather extends to many areas of modern culture. Authorities in different realms of knowledge vary widely in their opinions as to the positive worth of Freud's contribution to knowledge, but none of them deny his importance. They agree in their estimates of the extensivity and intensity of Freud's significance, whether they be his enemies or friends. The objective of this section of this chapter is to determine the extent of, not the value of, Freud's significance.

The editor of The Catholic World, though vindictively rejecting Freud's contribution, says that he is "the most influential thinker of our time, next to Einstein."¹ Ernest W. Burgess, one of the leading American sociologists, makes this generalization:²

There can be no doubt that the present period of specialization and of significant discoveries by research of isolated disciplines is drawing to a close. An era of the synthesis of the contributions and of the methods of the basic life sciences — biology, cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology — is beginning. In the integration of knowledge in preparation for further research the work of Sigmund Freud will have first place.

1. J. M. Gillis, Editor, "The Influence of Sigmund Freud," The Catholic World, 132:224, November, 1930.

2. Ernest W. Burgess, "The Influence of Sigmund Freud Upon Sociology in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, 45:374, November, 1939.

These are generalizations, however, and the significance of Freud must be defined more specifically in terms of the "isolated disciplines" of which Burgess speaks, for it still goes without saying that this is an age of specialization and isolated disciplines. The first field to which reference should be made is that of medicine, inasmuch as Freud himself was a medical doctor. The editor of the British Medical Journal ascribes to Freud a particular historical significance when he says that:³

At the time when Freud began, unaided to build up the technique of psychoanalysis, the sciences of psychology and medicine were pursuing divergent paths; while psychiatry, which might have bridged the gap between the two disciplines, tended to maintain a state of isolation. It was not the least of Freud's achievements that he...brought all three together and laid a sound foundation for branch of diagnostic and therapeutic medicine called clinical psychology.

The editors of the Journal of the American Medical Association speak more specifically than do the British when they suggest the significance of Freud for the future of medical practice.⁴

The effects of emotional factors on physiologic processes are being studied by adequate methods. Such generalizations as worry, fear, and overwork as causes of physical disturbances are being replaced by precise descriptions of the emotional factors. By this pathway, Freud's influence will be most felt on general medicine in the future.

The system of therapy that Freud established was a psychological approach to medical problems. It began as an effort to help sick people

3. Editorial, British Medical Journal, :693, Sept. 30, 1939.

4. Editorial, Journal of the American Medical Association, 113:1494-5, Oct. 14, 1939.

get well. This beginning has grown and expanded under the general title of psychotherapy. Karen Horney, a medical doctor and a psychotherapist, makes this evaluation of the significance of Freud:

Nothing of importance in the field of psychology and psychotherapy has been done since Freud's fundamental findings without those findings being used as a directive for observation and thinking; when they have been discarded, the value of new findings has been decreased.⁵

Since Freud established a psychological approach to medical problems, his contributions have gradually worked into a distinctive psychology, and his significance in the field of psychology needs clarification. Garner Murphy, a careful historian of psychology, says of Freud:

Freud's work has outlined an approach to psychology radically different from that of any psychological system either ancient or modern. For, despite the constant recourse to theory, the system differs fundamentally from earlier speculative systems in that it has arisen from and constantly returned to the practical problems of personalities struggling for an adjustment to the world.⁶

Although medical psychology is the native habitat of psychoanalysis, and although Freud concentrated his attention on the task of the therapy of mentally sick people, his findings concerning the nature and destiny of man have profoundly affected fields other than these isolated disciplines. Therefore, an evaluation of Freud's significance in such areas as sociology, philosophy and religion in general must be made.

The editors of the American Journal of Sociology considered Freud

5. Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, (W. W. Norton Company, 1939), p. 18.

6. Gardner Murphy, An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, (New York: Harcourt Brace, Co., 1933), pp. 327-8.

so significant in their work that they devoted the entire issue of November, 1939 to a description of his significance for American sociology. Ernest W. Burgess, the chief editor, suggests that Freud has meaning for American sociology in three distinct ways: First, his findings have infiltrated the text-books of sociology, the first such text-book being published in 1927 under the title of An Introduction to the Science of Sociology, by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess. Second, his techniques of classification in the analysis of social behavior were being used in 1927 by such well-known sociologists as Groves, Ogburn, Miller, Peters, Wolfe, Sorokin, Burgess, Rice and Becker. In recent years the ranks of these men have been increased by such men as Cottrell, Dollard, Folsom, Waller, and Young. And finally, Freud has given three indispensable concepts to sociology: (1) the concept of the role of the unconscious factors in human behavior, (2) the emphasis upon the role of wish fulfillment in the life of the person, (3) and the analysis of the formation of dynamic traits and trends in the individual personality development independent of the environment. This last concept has served as a balancing influence upon sociologists who tend to think that the individual is a puppet of his culture.⁷

The speculative philosophers in general have paid little attention to Freud. Alfred North Whitehead, one of the outstanding speculative philosophers of America, has written a book called Science and the Modern World and does not mention Freud or his work. Bewkes and his associates conclude that "the implications of psychoanalytic theory for philosophy

7. E. W. Burgess, op. cit., pp. 365, 372-3.

have not as yet received much attention."⁸ These philosophers, however, do define the significance of Freud:

Regardless of what we may come to believe about the final truth contained in his theories, or of the value of psychoanalysis, we shall have to recognize in Freud one of the makers of the modern mind. Should we list men who have profoundly influenced contemporary thought, we should include Freud along with Darwin and Einstein. The psychology of the unconscious takes its place beside the theory of evolution and the theory of relativity as influences that have revolutionized thought in the last seventy five years.

The philosophers who do deal with Freud show ambivalent feelings about his significance in a marked sort of way. W. Beran Wolfe describes Freud's work as an "egregious failure" and at the same time says that Freud himself is one of the "great pioneers of human thought, and psychoanalysis, his brain child, is one of the most significant epistemologies of modern times."⁹ This pronounced ambivalence is refined into a careful appreciation and subsequent re-interpretation of ideas in the work of such a writer as William Ernest Hocking. Hocking suggests that "Freud's importance...lies in his showing the very mechanism of the process by which the ignoring of Nature is punished."¹⁰ Then he goes on to criticize the different details of Freudian theory in a sympathetic but cautious sort of way.

A variety of opinion swarms about Freud from the field of religion,

8. E. G. Bewkes, et. al, Reason, Experience, and Faith: A Survey in Philosophy and Religion, (New York: Harper, 1940), p. 590.

9. W. Beran Wolfe, "The Twilight of Psychoanalysis," The American Mercury, 25:386, August, 1935.

10. William Ernest Hocking, Human Nature and its Remaking, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918), pp. 25, 36f, 98ff, 340, 380, 444.

as such. At three points in religious thought and action Freud has been especially significant. The first point has been in the area of pastoral psychology. Psychologists of religion and pastoral counselors have been quick to perceive the significance of Freud. Rollo May describes him as "a watershed in man's endeavor to understand himself."¹¹ And Karl Ruf Stolz, the late dean of Hartford School of Religious Education who did much to integrate the work of Freud into the practice of pastoral care, suggests that Freud, through his demonstrable discoveries, "staged a creative revolution in education and religion."¹² Carroll A. Wise, twelve years a chaplain in a mental hospital, has done a careful work of interpreting the work of Freud in the light of religious experience.¹³ He adapts the findings of Freud to the central truths of religion wherever adaption can be effected, and turns to other psychologists where adjustment cannot be made. Likewise, a similar purpose was wrought out by Joshua Loth Liebmann, a Jewish rabbi, in his book Peace of Mind. He gives Freud, a fellow Jew, a religious significance when he says that "Sigmund Freud had a spiritual purpose, even though he may not have been aware of it."¹⁴

The second point at which the significance of Freud for religion has been defined has been in the philosophy of religion. Naturally

11. Rollo May, The Art of Counseling: How to Gain and Give Mental Health, (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1939), p. 145.

12. Karl Ruf Stolz, The Psychology of Religious Living, (Nashville: Abingdom Cokesbury Press, 1937), p. 163.

13. Carroll A. Wise, Religion in Illness and Health.

14. Joshua Loth Liebmann, Peace of Mind, p. 19.

the philosophers of religion would confine themselves to a criticism of Freud's theory of illusionism and of his emphasis upon emotion as opposed to intellect in religious knowledge. The fact, however, that such eminent philosophers of religion as D. C. Macintosh,¹⁵ Harris Franklin Rall,¹⁶ Edwin A. Burt, ¹⁷ A. H. Dakin,¹⁸ and D. Elton Trueblood,¹⁹ and C. A. Bennett²⁰ feel the necessity to answer in rather lengthy discussions the problems that Freud raised is evidence as to the significance of the uneasiness that he has created in the philosophy of religion. E. A. Burt suggests that the area of Freud's influence on religion is in the modification of religious anthropologies when he says:²¹

At present the development of psychological science along Freudian and behaviouristic lines is posing a ...major issue — whether or not the theologians will accept the concept of man which the most exact and realistic analysis offers.

Dr. Trueblood summarizes the most wholesome attitude the author of this

15. D. C. Macintosh, The Problem of Religious Knowledge (New York: Harper, 1940), pp. 60-78.

16. Harris Franklin Rall, Christianity: An Inquiry into its Nature and Truth, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 277-8.

17. Edwin A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), pp. 370ff.

18. A. H. Dakin, Man the Measure, (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1939), pp. 129-150.

19. D. Elton Trueblood, The Logic of Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p.248 ff.

20. C. A. Bennett, The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 95-110.

21. Burt, op. cit., p. 302.

thesis could find among philosophers of religion when he says that "Freud's followers are growing numerically so far as mental hygiene is concerned, but they are becoming fewer so far as his religious theories are concerned."²²

As one turns to the theologians of today, one finds the leaders in this field making sweeping generalizations as to Freud's significance and giving searching analyses of his teachings concerning man. Dr. John Baillie associates Freud and Marx as "the two modern prophets who have probably affected the mind of our time more profoundly than others.... I hope I have learned something from each of them which has been of help to me in my own confession of sin."²³ Dr. Emil Brunner suggests that the system of Freud is the "most fruitful psychology" and has won "revolutionary significance for psychology in general" because it is nearest the presuppositions of unscientific everyday psychology."²⁴ Reinhold Niebuhr, in the midst of a detailed discussion of human nature in which he makes repeated references to the work of Freud, says that "romantic pessimism culminates in Freud" and describes his work as "symbolic of the despair which modern man faces when his optimistic illusions are dispelled; for under the perpetual smile of modernity there is a grimace of disillusion and cynicism."²⁵

22. Trueblood, op. cit., p. 251.

23. John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), pp. 11-12.

24. Emil Brunner, God and Man: Four Essays on the Nature of Personality, Tr. by David Cairns, (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1936), pp. 146-148.

25. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), Vol. I, Human Nature, p. 121.

The authorities in these different fields have not spoken out of the heat of emotion, but upon careful consideration. Their estimates of the extent of Freud's significance suggest that he is polymorphously significant to modern thought. Two main conclusions may be drawn from their estimates:

First, the secular fields of medicine, psychology, and sociology have laid hold of the essence of his contribution and have made it a part of the structure of their approach to human need. They have been careful and accurate in their criticisms of Freud, meeting him on his own ground and testing his findings in the ignorance, social pathology, and disease. In so doing, they have taken over many of the functions of traditional religion. This "taking over" is secularization -- the secularization of education, counseling, social welfare, and healing. And these have formerly been the functions of the churches. It may be said with the editors of the American Journal of Sociology that Freud "was undoubtedly one of the great secularizing influences of our time."²⁶ And even as Prometheus stole fire from heaven, so did Freud set into motion forces which have secularized much of the distinctly religious ministris of generations before him.

Second, the significance of Freud for the secular sciences has been and is being worked out assiduously by the authorities in these fields, as can be seen reflected in the careful statements that they make concerning him. Much attention has been paid to Freud's religious

26. Ernest Burgess, "Sigmund Freud: 1856-1939.", The American Journal of Sociology, 45:453, November, 1939.

theories by religious thinkers. But Freud himself admits that these views are not even taken seriously by his own followers. The positive contributions of Freud in the field of psychotherapy, however, have far-reaching implications for the Christian faith. It has been to these implications that this treatise has been devoted. On the basis of the preceding investigation, a concluding statement of the value of the significance of Freud for the Christian faith is in order.

B. AN EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREUD
FOR THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

In the light of the factual study of primary sources concerning the work of Sigmund Freud, positive and negative conclusions may be drawn as follows.

1. The values that Freud has to offer:

The most important thing about Freud for the thinking Christian is not the labyrinthian catacombs of psychoanalytic theory, but Freud himself. As Llewellyn Jones has said, "Freud has given every idealist one of the world's great examples of life-long devotion..."²⁷ The outstanding contribution that Freud has to make to Christian faith lies in the field of Christian ethics. He had made the instruments available and set into motion the forces which will make it possible for Christians to make, ~~insofar as is humanly possible,~~ ethics a factually grounded and morally sincere science. This has not been and is not now characteristic of popular Christian morality. Patrick Mullahy argues well in this appeal.²⁸

Until man learns to use intelligence in social problems with as much care as he does in non-human spheres, Western culture seems destined to remain, as now, a hodge-podge of irrelevant, contradictory, and frequently vicious ethical norms.

In this search for a dependable ethic, a greater cooperation between the

27. Llewellyn Jones, "Sigmund Freud at Eighty," The Christian Century, 53:21:735, May 20, 1936.

28. Patrick Mullahy, "Values, Scientific Method, and Psychoanalysis," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 6:2:146, May, 1943.

hitherto isolated disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, medicine, and religion has been precipitated by the work of Freud. Freud has been a common friend and foe of men who are working in these fields. As a result the questions he raised and the methods he used have shown these disciplines how closely related to each other they really are. Such cooperation will hasten the advent of a "more adequate psychology of moral experience which shall exhibit the scientific basis for the insights which already exist in proverbial philosophy."²⁹

In the second place, Freud offers to the Christian thinker implements and insights in the development of a Christian anthropology. Christians are often more concerned about what man ought to be than they are about the facts about what man is. Freud meets the Christian in his estimate of man in the following ways:

He admits man's defects, but has firm convictions as to man's possibilities. He is honest in his estimate of man without being pessimistic, and hopeful about man without being optimistic.

He reveals that man is not a single self, but a plurality of selves. But this does not forbid the integration of these selves into a unity, but compels the effort.

He furnishes the perspective of long-term rather than short-term values as the ground for the relatedness of people with each other.

He reveals with clarity the need of every person for a strong and adequate person with whom he can identify as an ideal, as someone to follow. These ideals constitute the true measure of life.

29. W. G. Everett, Moral Values, A Study of the Principles of Conduct. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1818), p. 319.

He shows the validity of the emotional life and places himself on the side of the stewardship rather than the repression of the emotions.

And finally, he shows that society and the individual are inseparable and exist for each other. The community of mankind has a solidarity in both its pathology and its health.³⁰

In the third place, Freud has been a revolutionary in the field of the psychology of religion. Before him psychologists of religion directed all their attention to the conscious motives of people in their religious experience. They took their subjects' words at face value. Freud developed a theory of personality and a technique of investigation that has necessitated a reconstruction in the field of the psychology of religion. This reconstruction has taken a clinical bent and has lasting implications for the nature and function of theological education and Christian nurture. The importance of psychotherapy for the minister's pastoral practice may be said to be the end result of this clinical emphasis. The psychology of religion is no longer an arm-chair function, but a systematic attempt to integrate all the resources of theology, psychology, sociology, and Biblical and ecclesiastical authority in the single task of ministering to those who do "have need of a physician" of the soul.

Again, Freud has much to offer the Christian faith in his interpretations of family life and sexual morality. This is the point where he has been least understood and most misinterpreted. The view of the sexual

30. Joseph Martin Dawson in a review of Liebmann's Peace of Mind, (Christian Century, 43:1248, October 16, 1946), incorporates many of these ideas in his evaluations of this book.

life of man that he gives is in accord with the facts on most important points, and has much in common with the Biblical psychology. But it is difficult for most religious people to think as straight about sex as did the writers of the Old and New Testaments and as did Freud. The end result, however, of Freud's teachings about the psychic factors in sexual experience is that the value of the child and the importance of the husband-wife relationship has been elevated. This affords a symptomatology for Christian workers. The present practice in evaluating a person's relation to God is to look at his attendance at church, his tithing, his "respectability" in the light of community morals, and his doctrinal orthodoxy. But the most direct way of evaluating that divine-human relationship is to pay attention to the person's competency as a marital partner and as a parent. For society has yet to produce a more crucial test of human character than the monogamous marriage. All other criteria of spiritual excellence are inferior to this one.

Probably the most significant point of understanding between Freud and the Christian faith is that of the sense of guilt and the need for atonement and forgiveness. Freud soon found that the sense of guilt was the determining factor in neurosis. Contrary to popular opinion, Freud did not say that sex is the cause of all mental disturbance; rather it was the feeling of guilt about sexual desire that lay at the root of the disorder. Likewise, guilt over aggressive impulses distorted the life of people. This was the effective barrier to the recovery of his patients. The dark picture of human nature that Freud gives is one clouded by the sense of sin and guilt. The only light shining in it is the light given by the incarnation of forgiveness and permissive love

and understanding on the part of the physician. The therapy is the interpersonal relationship between the physician and the patient.

2. The Points of Divergence between Freud and the Christian Faith.

The last suggestion as to the role of the physician in the removal of guilt in the life of the patient is the point of greatest difference between Freud and the Christian faith. In the psychoanalytic patient-physician relationship, the whole therapy is made to rest upon the health of the analyst. And the central weakness of Freud's theory is that neither the physician nor the patient has any guarantee of the quality of the physician's motives. In Freud's case, he himself had much to say about the need for self-renunciation on the part of the physician in order that he might help the patient. But the physician is the final court of appeal. It stands on evidence already presented that psychoanalysis is a method, and has no inherent guarantee of the ethical nature of the analyst. This is a question as old as the Christian church itself, because since the time of the Donatists it has been argued as to whether the efficacy of the sacraments (or the methods) of the church depended upon the sacrament itself, the faith of the believer, or the moral excellence of the minister who administered the sacrament. The answer has always been that none of them are of avail apart from a personal ethical relationship to God. Here, like any other humanism, psychoanalysis breaks down.

In the second place, Freud diverges from Christian faith in that he, like too many interpreters of the Christian faith, does not work out the positive, social implications of his theory. His work is highly individualistic, and his efforts toward a social theory break down when

he tries to universalize such concepts as he developed in the therapy of individuals. Later investigators have taken the social implications of his work and developed them. But Freud himself made the mistake of psychoanalyzing society. Franz Alexander observes that such errors grow out of assuming that society is an individual, a group psyche, or collective mind.³¹ The most evident illustration of the fact that Freud did not work out the social implications of his theory is in his criticism of sexual morality and marital practice. In the main, Freud was right in his criticism of the sexual morality of his day, but he did not give a positive reconstruction on the basis of his criticisms. It remained for his followers to develop these implications into a well-defined body of facts and therapeutic practices with relation to marriage and the family. Freud, however, had not as much opportunity for doing this as he would have liked, and he left the "construction of the edifice" from the stone he quarried to his followers.

In the third place, Freud diverges from the Christian faith and from his own better self when he discusses religion. He is too moralistic and compulsive in his attitude toward religion. The main criticism that can be levelled at him is that he forsakes his clinical method. He has a reasonable degree of objectivity until he comes to the discussion of religion; then he becomes moralistic, dogmatic, and overlooks facts. Forsaking his clinical method, he argued like a medieval scholastic. His personal wish-fantasies

31. Franz Alexander, "Psychoanalysis and Social Disorganization," The American Journal of Sociology, 43:6:787-788.

overcame him, and he began carping at the world for being what it is rather than trying to understand it.

Finally, Freud had his illusion, too. He concluded the work The Future of ~~the~~ Illusion by saying that science is no illusion. Had he lived to see the end result of atomic research and the illusoriness of the world's security because of the work of science, he would have had to revise his opinion. The god of science may be the high god of a man like Freud, but it too has clay feet.

But from birth to death, Freud was touched with compassion for the individual in the human situation. Whether one is a psychologist, a theologian, or a linguist, when he confronts the plight of human beings in need, a working psychology becomes a necessity. In the construction of such a working psychology, Freud unearthed the most dependable materials. He himself hoped that these materials would be used in the construction of a realistic psychology of religion. As Hamilton says, "out of the thesis of the sterile academic psychology of the nineteenth century, Freud brought the antithesis of psychoanalysis with its dark negations. But he thereby provoked the synthesis of the future."³²

32. Robert Hamilton, "Freud: Architect of Negation," Contemporary Review, 962:104, February, 1946.

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