



ENDLESS RETRIBUTION

A decorative banner with the text "ENDLESS RETRIBUTION" written in a bold, serif font. The banner is tilted diagonally and features ornate scrollwork and flourishes around the text. The banner is set against a background of a double-line border.



ENDLESS RETRIBUTION:

A REFUTATION OF UNIVERSALISM

BY W. F. PAXTON.

PRICE FIFTEEN CENTS.

DALLAS:
TEXAS BAPTIST PUBLISHING HOUSE,
1878.

SOUTHERN BAPTIST
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
1880

PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

The name of Elder W. E. Paxton, so well known in the South as a logical reasoner and a successful defender of "the faith once delivered to the saints," should itself secure the attention of the reader to the following pages. His candor, fairness and perspicuity, as a writer, merit the admiration of all who disagree, as well as those whose views are in harmony with his.

The subject on which this little volume treats is of vital importance, and timely, as it is now exciting the attention of leading theologians in Europe and America. Never has there been such a demand for the talent of our best minds in the discussion of the doctrine of endless punishment. The multitudes are interested; and this work is thrown out that they may have in convenient and permanent form a concise statement of the teaching of the Word of God, and the deductions of sound reasoning on this subject. We commend it to Christians of every name, and to all who feel interested in the grave question, "Is there an endless hell for all who die in their sins?"

R. C. BUCKNER.

APRIL 6th, 1878.

ENDLESS RETRIBUTION.

There are two classes of Universalists, those who maintain that sin is punished in this life only, and those who admit the punishment of the wicked after death, but deny that the punishment is endless. A successful answer to the latter class will necessarily silence the former.

I will first present some reasons in favor of the commonly received doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked, and then consider some of the objections urged by Universalists to the doctrine.

FIRST.—THE GENERAL VERDICT.

It is a material fact in the discussion of this subject that the general judgment of mankind is against Universalism, and this is an argument against its truth.

1. The voice of the multitude is to be dis-

236.2

P289e

trusted when its decision runs parallel with its inclination and interest; for men are inclined to favor themselves by their conclusions. But if they decide against their interest and desires, it is a strong presumption in favor of the truth of the conclusions thus formed. Now, men would be glad to be assured that they will not suffer hereafter for the deeds done in the body. But, notwithstanding this natural inclination, and in spite of it, the greater part of mankind in all ages have arrived at a different conclusion. They have ascended the stream against the current. No nation, however barbarous, but has had some notion of a fixed state of future rewards and punishments, that the present life is one of probation, and that after death the good enter a state of fixed happiness and the wicked one of perpetual misery.

The introduction of Christianity, instead of lessening this conviction, has strengthened it; for, wherever the Bible has gone this idea has become more and more distinct, and its horrible import attended with greater definiteness.

Now, this generally prevailing conviction in all countries and among all classes of people can be accounted for only upon two suppositions. Either it was a direct revelation of God in the purer days of man's primi-

tive state, still preserved by tradition, or else the necessity for the existence of such a state of future rewards and punishments was so apparent as to force the conclusion upon the mind, even contrary to its natural desire. Hence it is the general judgment of mankind drawn from natural and revealed religion, that their wicked actions will meet with a just retribution hereafter.

2. Dr. Hartley, an able and zealous defender of universal salvation, acknowledges that the eternity of future punishment seems to have been a general tradition, previous to the appearance of Christianity, among both Jews and pagans, and has been the doctrine of the Christian world ever since, some very few persons excepted. Now, if the Scriptures were written for the express purpose of making known universal salvation, it is remarkable that they should have so signally failed to accomplish the end for which they were designed. Had it been a doctrine unpalatable to the natural mind of sinful men, it would not be surprising that, in so many years, it has gained so few adherents. But, being agreeable to men's wishes, it is certainly remarkable that the great mass of the readers of the Bible have come to a conclusion so adverse to what Universalists say is the proper intention of its

4 ENDLESS RETRIBUTION.

teachings. If Universalism be true, the writers of the Bible have done their work very bunglingly—so much so as to lead the great mass of those who read it to a conclusion the opposite of the truth. *Credat Judæus Apella!*

SECOND.—THE TEACHINGS OF THE SCRIPTURES.

The most cursory examination of the Scriptures will convince any one that the general judgment founded upon their teachings is the correct one. If the Bible does not teach the endless punishment of the wicked, it teaches nothing so definite that it may not be disputed.

1. The Scriptures uniformly associate faith with salvation. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved;" and it is expressly declared, "He that believeth not shall be damned." Salvation and damnation are always opposed to each other. "He that believeth on the Son hath eternal life." "He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed on the only begotten Son of God." Now, it is evident that this condemnation remains upon every sinner until he believes upon the Lord Jesus Christ, and that faith is not simply a forced assent of the mind to the truth of the gospel, for "the devils believe and tremble." "But with the heart man believeth unto

righteousness." Now, do the Scriptures teach that all men will ultimately, either in this life or the next, embrace Christ with that loving faith that secures the favor of God and the salvation of the soul?

2. If the Savior meant to teach this doctrine, he certainly lost a favorable opportunity when his disciples, who had evidently been discussing the extent of salvation, said to him: "Lord, are there few that be saved?" If he had meant to teach Universalism, the natural answer would have been: "All men will ultimately be saved." Up to this point his disciples had certainly not understood him to teach universal salvation, and his answer is either an evasion of the question or it teaches the salvation of a limited number: "Straight is the gate and narrow is the way, and few there be that find it."

3. If it should be said that the wicked will all ultimately be subdued by the chastisements of God, and, accepting Christ, be reconciled to the Father and admitted into happiness, it becomes the Universalist to show the express declaration of Scripture to that effect. He must show that the offer of salvation is made in the life to come, and that all will accept it. In the absence of any

6 ENDLESS RETRIBUTION.

such scriptural proof, we may appeal in vain to reason.

(1.) If we observe the effect of punishment here, we do not find that it uniformly produces reformation. On the contrary, many criminals become hardened by repeated punishment; and the Scriptures furnish many examples of men hardened by the punishments of God.

(2.) If men do not repent under the preaching of the Gospel here, but die impenitent, despite the good influences that are brought upon them, the probability, to say the least of it, is that they will never repent. The Scriptures represent that there will be a separation between the good and the bad after death, and it is said that His spirit shall not always strive with man. Now, when the influence of virtuous example and the strivings of God's Spirit are withdrawn, what probability is there that he will ever repent?

(3.) We observe that the natural tendency of sin in the present life is to grow worse and worse. When the sinner enters the world to come his character is unaffected by death, and he is still a sinner. The good influences that affect men in this life being withdrawn, and the sinner left to the operations of his own depraved desires, stimulated by bad associations, he will become worse and worse.

And if it were possible for him in a given time to atone for the sins of the present life, how long will it take him to atone for the accumulated sins of the life to come? He continues to sin, and, as the punishment could never anticipate the sin, it follows that he would always be in arrears and the fearful account could never be liquidated.

(4.) We are taught that no man cometh unto Christ except the Father draw him. This is true here; but Christ is represented at the judgment day as repelling the wicked: "Depart from me, ye workers of iniquity, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels"; "the wicked shall be driven away in his wickedness." But is it alleged that God still pursues him, to draw him back to Himself?

4. The Scriptures expressly say: "These (the wicked) shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Here the duration of the punishment of the wicked is coeval with the rewards of the righteous. The same word is used in reference to each. If the punishment of the wicked may cease, so may the enjoyments of the righteous. Again, it is said of the wicked: "They shall be punished with everlasting destruction."

5. Such examples as the last I have quoted

might be largely increased, but as the force of all these passages depends upon the signification of *aioonios*, translated "eternal" and "everlasting," I will examine its force. It is etymologically derived from two other words—*ai*, signifying "always," and the participle, *oon*, "being." It expresses continuous being. It is sometimes applied to periods of time, but there is always, in such cases, something in the context to limit the signification. There is no idea of termination in the word itself. The periodicity must be derived from the context. Without some limitation outside of the word itself, it expresses continuous being. *Aioonios* occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times; forty-four times it is applied to life, and indicates the happy state of the Christian and its continuousness; seven times it is employed to describe the state of the wicked after death. It is once applied to the habitations of the righteous; once to the house not made with hands. It is applied to God (Rom. 12:26); to Holy Spirit (Heb. 9:15); to salvation (Heb. 5:9); redemption (Heb. 9:12). There are only two instances of its limited use, and then it is used with *chronos* (time). The participle *aioon* occurs in the New Testament in one hundred and three passages. It is by this term that the

priesthood of Christ is described. It is applied to God; to His glory; to the continuance of God's being; to Christ and His reign. It is admitted that it is in some cases evidently applied to limit periods of time, but in such cases the context shows the limitation. The word itself does not do it. The Greeks, in whose language the New Testament was written, used these words to convey their idea of eternal duration.

But I pass to notice some of the objections of Universalists to the doctrine of the endless punishment of those who die impenitent.

FIRST.—THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD.

It is urged that this doctrine is irreconcilable with the benevolence of God, who is a God of love and cannot inflict eternal misery upon his creatures.

1. If it should be conceded that the benevolence of God will not allow him to be an active agent in the production of misery, it cannot, hence, be inferred that his benevolence compels him to prevent it. Whatever be the nature of his love it is not inconsistent with it to permit the existence of sin and misery. To say that his love requires him to prevent unhappiness and suffering is to charge him with a want of faithfulness to his own nature in permitting all the wretch-

edness in the world and which has been in the world ever since the fall of man—affecting the good as well as the bad. Or, if he is not chargeable with unfaithfulness, at least, with a want of power to carry out the benevolent purposes of his own nature. It is not sufficient to say that he has provided the means to recover men from the misery into which sin has plunged them. If one assumes that his nature requires him to prevent wretchedness, it follows that it has always obliged him to do so. In that event he was remiss in permitting the introduction of sin, and consequent unhappiness, into the world, as he certainly could have prevented it if his nature required his benevolence to over-ride every other consideration. But as he did permit the introduction of sin and its continuance, even until the present time, with all the misery it entails upon his creatures, we must conclude that this state of things is consistent with his benevolence. Moreover, if its existence, during the present life, is not inconsistent with the love of his creatures, its perpetual existence could not do any violence to his character.

If nothing in the nature of God can compel him to prevent that misery which his creatures have brought upon themselves, who shall say that he may not, consistently with

that nature, leave them to the natural consequence of their actions forever? As all men are sinners, and consequently wretched, they must necessarily continue so until God does something to relieve them. But we have seen that God is under no compulsion to do this. All that his love prompts him to do he will certainly do, and to ascertain what he will do we must look to what he proposes to do; rather than infer what he ought to do from our knowledge of his nature.

Dr. Andrews, a leading Universalist writer, asks: "How can it be believed that God, who is all love, could be satisfied at beholding a wide-spread and deeply malignant influence to prevail in his universe, which, by its very existence, aims a fatal blow at his own most holy nature?" And yet, for nearly six thousand years, he *has* permitted this very influence to prevail in his dominions. "Facts are stubborn things," and are often sadly in the way of our speculations. Had the Universalist stood by the Creator when man was made reasoning as he now reasons, he would have concluded that God, who is infinitely wise and good, could not give him a nature susceptible of sin and unhappiness, but that he would fix him in an unalterable condition of purity and happiness. Had he stood by the tempter in the

garden of Eden, he would have endorsed the declaration of the father of lies, when he said, "Thou shalt not surely die." He would have argued: "Surely, God is too good to punish his creature for so small an offense as eating a harmless apple. He has made the fruit fair to look upon and pleasant to taste, and he has given man an appetite for just such fruit as this, and surely he will not punish him for doing what he has given him an inclination to do." But God did punish man, for all that, and—small as the offense might seem to the erring reason of man—it involved the whole human family in misery and death; not only those who partook of the fruit themselves, but all their posterity to the remotest generations became subject to the penalty. If such reason has been at fault in the past, may we not distrust its deductions as to the future drawn from the same premises.

2. But is God merely passive in the work of retribution for sin? Does he not inflict pain upon his creatures as a punishment for their sins? This, Universalists themselves admit. Then it is not inconsistent with God's benevolence to inflict pain and suffering. The extent and duration of that punishment cannot be determined from the nature of God, but from what he has revealed upon the subject. If we make the infinite benevolence

of God the basis of our reasoning we might conclude that God would not, under any circumstances, inflict misery, but would take some more direct and less disagreeable way to correct the faults of men. To apply a favorite illustration with Universalists; what parent would inflict pain upon his child at all, if he had power to change his heart and make him do better without it? And yet, this reasoning is as legitimate as any of the inferences of Universalism, drawn from the nature of God. If the Universalist should tell me that this reasoning is opposed to the acts and declarations of God, I might answer that in the Scripture God is often said to do what he only permits and thus by the same process of reasoning by which Universalists evade the eternal punishment of the wicked, I might as reasonably conclude that God's benevolence would not permit him to punish at all.

I merely adduce this to show that our conclusions, based upon our knowledge of the character of God, are not to be depended upon, and that we can infer nothing from this source as to God's actions in the future.

3. But the fact that God is love should be a source of uneasiness instead of security, to the sinner. God loves—but from his very nature he can only love the pure, the holy,

the good. He cannot love sin. He may compassionate the poor victim himself but he cannot love his ways. He must love his government and laws, and therefore, he cannot tolerate their violation. That love can bode no good to the finally impenitent. It may prompt him to offer terms of reconciliation, but if men persist in rejecting the terms to the last, his love does not require the sacrifice of his government.

4. Universalism proceeds upon the assumed hypothesis that God's character of love is inconsistent with infinite hatred. The same author, from whom I have quoted above, says: "An impure stream cannot flow from a pure fountain. A good tree will not bear evil fruit. No man gathers grapes from thorns—nor figs from thistles. Neither can infinite hatred, wrath and cruelty, ever be the legitimate fruits which result from unlimited love." If God's infinite love excludes infinite anger, much more does it exclude limited anger, for the less is included in the greater. If he may, without any violence to his attribute of love, be angry with the impenitent for one moment, he may be angry with him so long as that impenitence continues. If he is continuously rebellious, he may be the object of God's perpetual hatred. That God is capable of anger or

wrath is abundantly evident from numerous passages of scripture. Moses says (Deut. 1:37) that the Lord was angry with him on account of the Israelites. To the children of Israel, he says: "Also, in Horeb, ye provoked the Lord to wrath so that the Lord was angry with you, to have destroyed you," (Deut. ix:8). "And the Lord was very wroth with Aaron," (Deut. ix:20). "And the Lord was angry with Solomon," (1 Kings xi:9). "The Lord was angry with Israel," (2 Kings xvii:18). "God is angry with the wicked every day." (Psalms vii:11). "Thou shalt make them a fiery oven in the time of thine anger; the Lord shall swallow them up in his wrath, and the fire shall devour them." (Psalms xvi:9). "The day of the Lord cometh with fierce anger." (Isaiah 13:9). "The Lord will come to render his anger with fury." (Isaiah 66:15). "Who can abide the fierceness of his anger?" (Nehemiah i:6).

A thousand passages to the same effect might be quoted, but these show, whatever we might be disposed to infer from the nature of God, he is capable of wrath and fierce anger, and that this anger is manifested in the most fearful manner towards the ungodly.

5. If it should be said that God consents that the objects of his love shall be misera-

ble on account of the eventual good to be derived from that misery, it might very aptly be asked what benefit can it be to any man to fall into sin and suffer the punishment for it? If God's infinite benovolence requires him to save all men from endless misery, it equally requires him to save them from present misery, by giving them at once a character incapable of sin and unhappiness. One conclusion is just as legitimate as the other.

SECOND.—THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

The argument drawn from the goodness of God is but the last put into a different form and is liable to the same objection:

1. The demands of infinite goodness are fully met when God has provided the means of escape from endless misery. If man willfully rejects the terms of salvation, certainly, God's goodness is not chargeable with the results.

2. But says the Universalist: "The salvation of all men is consistent with the goodness of God." If this proposition were admitted the salvation of all men does not follow. I suppose it will be admitted that it was perfectly consistent with God's goodness for man to continue in his primitive state of innocence; but yet he did not. With the same propriety we might say that it was con-

sistent with His goodness to have fixed our first parents in a state of unalterable purity and happiness—but in the exercise of His goodness He acted otherwise. When the Universalist explains how God could permit man to fall, he will, at the same time, give a reason why God can permit the sinner who has refused the overtures of mercy to suffer endless misery.

3. But is it consistent with the goodness of God to save all men? We can only know what is consistent with His character by what he expressly declares or from his acknowledged acts. We cannot infer anything from His acts in this particular, for they are yet to come. If he has made any express declaration upon this subject it becomes Universalists to produce it, and not depend upon uncertain deductions from an imperfect knowledge of His attributes. Paul tells us that God may be just and yet the justifier of him that believeth. But this affirmation is pregnant with the negative that he can not be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth not in his Son. That which is not consistent with His justice cannot be consistent with His goodness.

THIRD.—GOD'S WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE.

It is urged that an All-wise and All-know-

ing God would not have brought into existence so many millions of human beings the greater part of whom He knew would land in eternal misery, for His omniscience could have marked out a plan of operation which would take in all the circumstances and events of futurity and guard effectually against all accident or defeat. The fallacy of the conclusion may be seen if we apply this reasoning to the known fact of man's fall. In the creation the wisdom and knowledge of God could have just as certainly foreseen and effectually guarded against the fall and consequent misery of mankind. But the patent fact stares us in the face that He did not do so. Can we therefore charge Him with a want of wisdom or foreknowledge?

I hold it to be a correct principle of logic that the premise and conclusion of a logical proposition bear such relations to each other that you may reason from the conclusion to the premise and in two similar propositions the premise of the one and the conclusion of the other. My idea may be expressed syllogistically thus:

God does all things consistently with His wisdom and foreknowledge:

He foreknew, and might have prevented, the fall and the consequent misery of man and yet permitted it:

Therefore the fall of man and his subsequent misery are consistent with the wisdom and foreknowledge of God.

Again:

God does all things consistently with His wisdom and foreknowledge:

He foreknew that some would be eternally miserable and permits it.

Therefore the endless misery of some men is consistent with the foreknowledge and wisdom of God.

Now if in the first case, with the admitted fact of man's fall as the minor premise the conclusion is correct, it must be equally so in the second on the supposition that endless misery will befall a part of mankind. But if the argument of the Universalist is worth anything the endless misery of any part of the human family is inconsistent with the wisdom and foreknowledge of God. But I have shown that this cannot be true from the premises.

FOURTH.—GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE.

The Universalist says that God has power to prevent the endless misery of men, and as He cannot but desire to do so, He certainly will. Certainly I will not deny that God can and will accomplish all He intends to accom-

plish, but the fact that God has power to save all does not argue that He will save all. It cannot be denied that He had power to prevent Adam's fall, but He did not do it. Nor is there any greater reason founded upon the boundless power of God to suppose that any will be saved.

FIFTH.—GOD'S IMMUTABILITY.

The argument drawn from God's immutability assumes that God in the creation designed man to be happy, and, as He is unchangeable, He will not allow the ultimate misery of any.

The fact that God is immutable is certainly a strong reason to suppose that God will accomplish whatever he has designed in regard to man, but it is no proof what that design is. We can only look to the declaration of His purposes on this subject. As far as He has revealed His purposes that far we may confidently expect their accomplishment. So that the whole question turns upon what He declares that He will do rather than upon inferences from what we may conceive Him to be, particularly when that event in the world's history to which I have so often referred, stands ready to contradict the conclusion, for the fall and consequent misery of men is just as much at variance with the premises of the Universalist as the ulti-

mate and endless misery of the impenitent.

SIXTH.—GOD'S JUSTICE.

The Universalist says that the endless punishment of the wicked is inconsistent with God's justice.

If, as Dr. Andrews, the author from whom I have several times quoted, says, the object of God's justice is to remove everything which is opposed to the rectitude of the divine nature; to preserve the law from violation and to restore it when broken, then it has so far most signally failed of its purpose. It has not preserved the law from violation. For nearly six thousand years sin, which is the violation of law, has opposed itself to the rectitude of the divine nature. All that time God has disapproved it and most signally manifested His disapproval by punishing it; and yet men sin as greedily as at the beginning. How the broken law is to be restored—how an act which is done is to be undone, is yet to be revealed by the prophets of this new school. Mr. Andrews seems to misunderstand the whole nature of justice. Justinian defines justice to be the fixed purpose to give each one his own. It has no other object in God's government than to mete out to each exactly what is due to his actions. Its perfection consists in the exactitude with which it gives to each his own. When it has

done this its office is done. The nature of the penalty cannot affect the justice of God. If He has ordained the eternal punishment of the finally impenitent, justice consists in inflicting that penalty. If God has decreed the eternal happiness of the righteous, justice consists in bestowing it upon them. It is said that on the supposition of the endless misery of the wicked, God's justice could never be satisfied. God's justice is always satisfied when men are receiving their just deserts. It is a singular assertion that the endless punishment of the wicked would destroy the justice of God. This cannot be if endless punishment be deserved. Why should endless punishment destroy justice any more than endless rewards, if both are equally deserved? But if God's justice consists, as Dr. Andrews says, in removing everything that opposes itself to the rectitude of the divine nature, whenever that event is accomplished, as it must be if the whole of the wicked are redeemed, then His justice ceases.

SEVENTH.—GOD'S HOLINESS,

“God's holiness,” says the Universalist, “will secure universal holiness. This perfection cannot be content always to look upon sin and unholiness, but must operate

to the removal, finally, of everything which is radically opposed to its own nature."

To make this proposition worth anything to Universalists, it should first be proved that whatever is radically opposed to God's holiness cannot exist cœtaneously with it. But this is opposed to facts. Sin has existed for thousands of years side by side with the holiness of God. Why has that Being of perfect holiness suffered such a hateful thing as sin to exist so long in His presence when He has had the power to remove it? Has His holiness been circumscribed during the last six thousand years? If its existence for a day is not inconsistent with His perfections, how can its eternity be? God is not held in by days and years, but in His sight one day is as a thousand years and a thousand years as one day. If His holiness can permit sin to exist at all and to continue a day, it can permit its perpetual existence. Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should perpetually vindicate His holiness by perpetually punishing its opposite.

EIGHTH.—THE GLORY OF JEHOVAH.

It is asserted that the salvation of all men is consistent with the glory of God.

1. It does not follow hence that God does everything that is consistent with His attri-

butes. So far as we can determine by reason it would have been consistent with His glory to prevent the existence of sin altogether ; but He did not do so. It by no means follows that God will do what He may do.

2. The punishment of the wicked no more than the reward of the righteous, is necessary to the glory of God. But who shall say that the glory of God may not be shown in the punishment of the wicked? Whatever manifests His hatred of sin glorifies that attribute of His nature. The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh: "Even for this very purpose have I raised thee up that I might show my power in thee and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth."—Rom. ix:17. Pharaoh did not willingly glorify God, and yet God was glorified in Him. If it was not inconsistent with the divine character to punish Pharaoh for His glory neither can it be inconsistent with His glory to exhibit His power perpetually to vindicate the honor of His government.

NINTH.—THE IMPARTIALITY OF GOD'S BENEVOLENCE.

It is said that universal benevolence is in accordance with the impartiality of God's benevolence as displayed throughout His works.

1. God has surrounded us all equally with the means of happiness. But are all equally happy, even in this life? The industrious and frugal become rich, the idle and the prodigal come to want. The impartiality of God consists in rendering to every man according to his deeds; "to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; but unto them who are contentious, and obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." God, it is true, has placed the blessings of life within the reach of all; but they must be appropriated to be of any avail to us. Our tables may be loaded with the most nutritious food, but unless we eat it we must perish. The sunshine is provided for all, but if a man choose darkness rather than light and confine himself in a dungeon by day and come forth to prowl at night, he is in no way benefited by the light. So God has impartially provided His grace for all. "By the grace of God, Jesus Christ tasted death for every man." And, "He that believeth upon him shall not perish but have everlasting life." But, "He that believeth not shall be damned." If a man refuses the terms upon which he may be happy, and makes himself eternally miserable, cer-

tainly God cannot be charged with partiality when He made the liberal offer: "Whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely."

2. But if men may be miserable as the result of their sinful life in this world, without any compromise of God's impartiality, why may they not be so always?

3. Because God has impartially provided the means of grace and salvation for all, no more proves that all will avail themselves of the rich provisions of His mercy than the fact that He has provided the means of temporal happiness, proves that all men will properly use those means and render themselves happy.

TENTH.—THE NATURE OF MAN.

Man is endowed with faculties capable of infinite expansion and endless progression and is evidently fitted for a noble end and lofty destiny.

1. If man had continued as God made him, pure and holy, then there might be some reason to conclude that his nature would be a ground to hope for his ultimate happiness. But man became a sinner. Whatever noble powers remain to him they have been perverted and abused, and become the instruments of unrighteousness. He is "conceived

in sin and brought forth in iniquity." "God saw that the wickedness of man was very great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."—Gen. vi:5. His heart became estranged from God. So hostile is his natural disposition to God that it is necessary to be regenerated before he can become reconciled. So far, therefore, from his nature furnishing any ground to hope for his ultimate restoration to holiness and happiness, it is the very obstacle in the way.

3. Dr. Andrews in his work asks, "Why, then, is it thought that a being of so exalted a rank as man in the scale of existence should not answer the purpose of his formation? It cannot be that the most noble of God's workmanship should so utterly disappoint His intentions when all else fulfilled the same."

And yet, so far in the history of the race, man has not been either holy or happy. Did God intend the race should sin and be unhappy through a long period? If God's intentions are frustrated by an eternity of misery and sin on the part of the unrepentant, they must also have been frustrated by a life of wickedness on the part of the sinner. So the difficulty arising from this source applies as well to Universalism as to orthodoxy.

ELEVENTH.—THE NATURE AND DESIGN OF PUNISHMENT.

Universalists teach that “the true object of punishment is the correction of the evil doer.”

1. The object of punishment is three-fold: (1). The protection of society against the unbridled passions of the transgressor. This is the prime object of punishment and subsidiary to this (2) the reformation of the offender in order that society may no longer be troubled with him; and (3) to deter others by the example.

(1). Government owes to the good and obedient of its subjects, protection. No government, civil or moral, could exist without adequate penalties duly enforced. The bad can only be restrained by punishment. The lawless must be separated from the good and confined where there is no opportunity to do injury. The just ends of all government is the protection and happiness of its obedient subjects. Whenever the bad are permitted to go at large, unpunished, to spread ruin and wretchedness abroad, government has failed in its object. Hence so long as there are any bad it is necessary to continue the punishment. But as death does not change the moral character, there will be bad men in


the world to come, and hence it will be necessary to continue their punishment.

(2). With the desire to reform the object of punishment for the good of society is also mingled the benevolent desire to make him a better man for his own sake. But if this were the sole design of punishment it would often fail of its object. Men who progress far in crime are seldom reformed by punishment. They come from their sufferings more vindictive against society and increase the enormity of their crimes. It often happens that impenitent men become worse and worse under the afflictions which God sends upon them. This is the general course of the finally impenitent. A memorable example is to be found in the history of Pharaoh. Each succeeding plague only made him the more rebellious. But the tragical end of Pharaoh furnishes proof that his reformation was not the end of the fearful drama in which he perished with all his host. He had already proved to be incorrigible. His last punishment cut off his life and defeated his reformation. So with the Antideluvians; so with the Sodomites, and a hundred other examples that might be adduced. It is a singular way to reform a man to hang him by the neck until he is dead—dead—dead!

(3). Can it be denied that the execution of

the law by the punishment of offenders has its effect to restrain men? That it does not always do so no more proves that it is no part of the design of punishment, than the fact that punishment often fails to reform the offender proves that punishment did not design the good of the offender.

But, says the Universalist, the punishment is out of sight and therefore cannot exercise this salutary influence upon men in this world. How many men ever witnessed the execution of a criminal? I have lived over half a century and practiced law fifteen years of my life and yet I never witnessed such a scene. Yet thousands are restrained by the general understanding that men are punished for crime. And the belief that men will be punished hereafter, to say nothing of the grounds of that belief, has its effect to restrain men. It is because men lose sight of this fact that they are not always restrained by it.



**TEXAS BAPTIST
PUBLISHING HOUSE.**

This House is furnished with the latest improved Machinery and an extensive variety and new styles of Type, Printers' Material, &c. The quality and style of work turned out regularly entitle this establishment to the character of a

LEADING JOB AND BOOK PUBLISHING HOUSE.

Estimates furnished on application. St. Louis prices duplicated. Orders from abroad solicited and promptly attended to.

Address,

R. C. BUCKNER,
DALLAS, TEXAS.