

A Sketch of the Logos Doctrine from
Heraclitus to Philo, with special reference
to its relation to the Logos Doctrine
of the New Testament.

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Introduction

In undertaking the investigation of this intricate doctrine, I was conscious that, with the limited time and resources at my disposal, I could hope to add little to what had already been said on the subject. As the investigation proceeded I was more and more impressed with the vastness of the undertaking; and was in doubt more than once whether to advance or withdraw; being persuaded however that my enquiries would at least be of great help to myself, even though they should result in the addition of little that was new to others, I continued the investigation with the results set forth in the following pages.

Before entering upon the discussion however, it will be necessary to preface a few remarks by way of general explanation.

1. The development of the Logos doctrine will here be discussed from the standpoint of the Greek philosophy. The influence of the Old Testament in the development of this doctrine has, in my judgment, been too much insisted upon. The word of Jehovah in the Old Testament was not a person; nor is it very clear

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that it was even used as a poetical personification. None of the passages adduced in support of this notion, which have come under my observation, bear out the interpretation. In all of them, the phrase, "the word of Jehovah," seems to be a set formula to introduce or express Jehovah's message to men. It is not probable that Philo was influenced in his doctrine by this phrase of the Old Testament, although the Septuagint translation, λόγος κυρίου, gives a tinge of plausibility to the assumption. In Philo's Logos the Stoic idea of reason is always prominent. The other meaning of logos, namely speech, if present at all, is always kept in the background. Philo has a great deal to say about the wisdom of God; this idea was, no doubt, derived from the Septuagint (cf. Prov. and Eccles.); but in his conception, it assumed the more specific notion of reason, and seems to be identified sometimes with the Logos, which, as we shall hereafter see, was in the main, the Stoic Reason. It is more probable that the author of the Fourth Gospel was influenced by the Old Testament

ideas and phraseology, than that Phila-
was so influenced, as will hereafter
appear. It is often difficult to deter-
mine how far one Scripture writer
was influenced by another, especially,
when we consider that they all wrote
under the inspiration of God: but to
connect John 1:1-6 with the first
chapter of Genesis is, I think, to
base a great deal on a slight super-
ficial resemblance.

2. I am aware that the phrase,
word of the Lord, as a circumlocution
for the name of God, is to be found
in the Pargman translations of the Old
Testament; but these belong to so late
a date that this circumstance cannot
be allowed much weight, as we have
little to assist us in determining, on
the one hand, how far this represents
a previous tendency among the Jews, if
it represents it at all, and, on the
other hand, how far it was due to Greek
influence.

3. The development of the Logos will
here be discussed, therefore, from the stand-
point of the Greek philosophy; and the
endeavor will be made to show in
what respect the apostle John and the

apostle Paul were influenced in their Logos doctrine, and the doctrine of the person of Christ in general, by the previous Logos doctrine which reached its highest development in Philo, the Alexandrian Jew.

4. The differences between the doctrine of Paul and that of Philo are not pointed out in detail; partly for want of time, but chiefly, because the main object here, is to show that Paul's theology rested on Trinitarian Monotheism, and emphasized the incarnation of Christ; and consequently must be viewed as a revelation and not as an historical development, ^{and} therefore cannot be considered a link between Philo and the Fourth Gospel, where the Christian Logos, properly so called, for the first time, appears.

5. In this paper, the treatment of the subject must necessarily be brief; consequently, in attempting to present so vast and many sided a subject in so narrow a compass, it will not be possible to enter into elaborate processes of reasoning, in all cases in which it might be thought

desirable; in many cases, therefore, without attempting this, I shall present the conclusions reached, indicating, in brief, the line of reasoning pursued.

6. It is proper, in this connection, to acknowledge my indebtedness to Jella, Windelband, Drummond and Damer for some suggestions, and in addition to these, to Profs. Doy and Royce of Howard, Butler, Überweg and Diogenes Laertius for many valuable references to the original sources, which often led me, however, to conclusions widely differing from those in support of which these passages were adduced.

+ Chapter I.

Meaning of the term.

The meanings of the term *Logos* fall under two main divisions.

1. That of the inward thought.
2. That of the outward expression of thought in speech.

Under the first division we may include such meanings as reason; account, consideration and esteem; true relation, proportion and analogy, etc.

Under the second division may be included the following: word, proposition

speech or language, tale or story, prose composition (ὁμιλία), learning in general, line ῥῆμα The thing spoken of, a principle, a definition, etc.

These two general meanings of logos, thought and speech, have been in use from the earliest period of the historic language down to the present time. For the Classic usage compare Liddell and Scott, for the New Testament, Thayer and Creever, for the Patristic literature, Sophocles, and for modern usage, the lexicons of Modern Greek.

With Heraclitus in the fifth century B.C. the Logos began to take on a metaphysical meaning; this was adopted and extended by the Stoics, and was further enlarged by the Jewish Alexandrian philosophers, especially Philo. Then came the Christian Logos which is thought by many to be a further development of Philo's doctrine. In the following centuries the logos doctrine assumed a variety of forms most of which were in some way connected with the person of Christ. The Stoic, Philonian and Christian logos were blended in various

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combination. In some systems the Stoic, in some the Philonian, in others the Christian logos was foremost and thus became the determining force in shaping the respective systems. With this period however the present discussion has nothing to do. It is our business to investigate the pre-Christian Logos and to consider the relation of this doctrine as developed by Philo to the logos doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.

Chapter II.

Heraclitus and the Stoics.

The first school of philosophers in antiquity who held a logos doctrine in the technical sense of that term was the school of the Stoics. Although Plato preceded them in point of time, I will consider them first, partly because Plato did not use the word logos in this technical sense, but chiefly because of the intimate connection of the Stoics with Heraclitus of Ephesus, with whom the logos doctrine had its origin.

Some critics are disposed to minimize, or even to eliminate the dependence of the Stoics on Heraclitus and to assign to them much greater independence of thought than the consideration of the facts justifies. A careful examination of the Stoic system reveals their eclecticism. A comparison of some of their dogmas with the theories of preceding investigators discloses marked similarity in many points.

The Stoics derived their physics in large measure from Heraclitus and Empedocles, probably through the Platonic school, as Zeno studied several years in this school: now Plato borrowed not only from the Pythagoreans, but from Empedocles also, and probably from Heraclitus. Their scheme of morality the Stoics derived in the main from the Cynics; the logos from Heraclitus, fire-atoms and the doctrine of inevitable necessity from Democritus and Epicurus, and the immutability of the deity in the world from Aristotle; in the world-

structure, and in physics generally, they adhered more closely to the Platonic physics as developed by Aristotle. These are a few of the points of similarity.

All these resemblances cannot be set aside as accidental, when we consider that the Greek philosophers were conversant not only with the writings of their contemporaries, but with those also of preceding generations: and especially, when we remember that Zeno studied under several teachers of different schools, that he might, as Paley observed, start a new school of his own.

It must be admitted then, I think, that the Stoics, in all probability, got their logos doctrine, in the germ at least, from Heraclitus.

Before proceeding, however, to examine their views, let us briefly consider the doctrine of Heraclitus.

I 1. The doctrine of Heraclitus, who flourished in the first half of the fifth century B.C.

With Heraclitus, the logos doctrine was intimately connected with the

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cosmic processes; (With him) The
ultimate ground of all things was
an ever-living fire^(sum). By this, he
did not mean that fire which is
ever consuming while itself survives,
but rather the opposite. It was
rather a warmth than fire, as
we understand it, an ever-acting,
ever-generating principle. This alone
is permanent in the universe:
nothing else really is, but^{is} always
becoming; This Ever-living Fire
corresponds with the Becoming.

All sensible things are in eternal
flux, one thing ever passing into
another. It is through this fire
principle, that this ceaseless change
is effected. This transformation
takes place in accordance with
definite relations, and in unchan-
ging succession: this he calls
εἰσαρπυμένη, δίκη, λόγος, viz.,
This rational order in the succession
of things and events. To him there
was clear evidence of rational order
everywhere in the universe; but this
rational order is dominated by an
invariable necessity. The ceaseless

transformation of the universe is under the guidance of reason, but that reason itself, is under necessary, unchanging law. This uniformity of nature under law is the Logos of the world. Such, in brief, is the logos doctrine of Heraclitus, who, as far as I have been able to find out, was the first to use logos in this metaphysical sense.

The doctrine may have had an earlier origin; it may have come from the coloring of Greek thought by the mystical speculations of the East. The fine philosophy of the Greeks was, probably, to a large extent the result of Persian influence. The Greeks of that period, we know, had constant intercourse with Persia. From Diogenes Laertius we learn that Heraclitus had correspondence even with the King of Persia; and the same writer tells us that Democritus learned theology and astronomy from the Persian Magi; we are bound, however, to make such suggestions with extreme caution, as the writings of these philosophers have come down to us in fragments only. Heraclitus then, as far as as-

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certainable, was the author of the logos doctrine.

II. The Stoic doctrine.

1. With the Stoics the doctrine of the logos was closely connected with their theory of the origin of the world, the orderly, unvarying succession of things under law, and the design, orderly arrangement and adaptation of means to ends, everywhere discernible in the world.

Stoicism was, in part, a reaction from the idealism of Plato, although the Stoic materialism in the end amounted to almost the same thing. The Stoics attempted to overcome the dualism of idea and phenomenon which lay at the basis of the Platonic - Aristotelian philosophy, and therefore combined the ultimate ground of matter and the efficient cause of things in a primitive being, which they, like Heraclitus, conceived to be fire; but owing to their materialism, for materiality was with them essential to reality, they did not succeed in getting rid of dualism in some form. They called that real,

which has the power of acting and being acted upon; hence, this primitive being, as they conceived it, divided into two parts, an active and a passive, force and matter; so that it amounted to nothing else than this, that the efficient cause acts eternally on matter which coexists with it from eternity in this primary being. The universe is the development and manifestation in determinate forms of this primitive being, by virtue of a law inherent in that being; the universe is a living whole. The fundamental position of the Stoics is then, as Hindelband well expresses it, that "The entire universe forms a single, unitary, living, connected whole; and all particular things are determinate forms assumed by a divine, primitive being which is in a state of eternal activity."

Here appears the immanence of the deity in the universe, which was taught by Aristotle, only the Stoics went further, and held to a conscious pantheism¹ (see notes at the end)

The primitive fire which was the source of all things, is also the mind ($\nu\omicron\nu\varsigma$), reason ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$), and soul ($\Psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) of the world. That which is the cause of consciousness and reason in man, must itself possess consciousness and reason. The Stoics did not attain to spiritual monotheism, for they could not conceive of God apart from material form, hence they held to a conscious pantheism. Reason is diffused throughout the universe as the soul of the world, and appears in man. The minds of men are but special manifestations of the universal mind, the reason ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$) of the world.

Generative or creative reason ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$) is the cause of all things. The germ from which all things are developed. Matter, under the guiding formative power of this $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, takes on definite forms, is endowed in some cases with vitality, and in some with rational souls. The $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ unfolds itself in definite forms as $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$ $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\iota$,

grains which become centres of development.

This creative reason is not different from primitive fire, but is the same being viewed under a different aspect. Different sets of phenomena present themselves to the mind, calling for explanation; and the divine primitive being whose generative activity must account for all things, is conceived of, now in one way, and now in another, according to the character of the phenomena to be explained. When this being is viewed in the abstract, as the author of all things, it is thought of as fire; when it is viewed as the author of rational souls and of things in general, in which design is plainly manifested, it is thought of as reason; when conceived as the author of orderly arrangement of things in the world, and of the unvarying succession of things and events according to an inevitable necessity, it is called providence ($\tau\acute{\iota}\pi\acute{o}\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$), and fate ($\epsilon\iota\sigma\text{-}\mu\alpha\pi\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\varsigma$). All these are one and the same being. Reason then is not a being intermediate between the material

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universe, and the great efficient cause of all things, but is that cause itself. In the Stoic conception there are but two, matter and force, and these two are one. I fail to find, then, in the Stoic philosophy, any such notion as mediating λόγος, which Philo seems to teach, and some attribute to the Stoics: The λόγος ὁπρῶτα κτιστῶν is God himself.

From the foregoing discussion it appears that while the Stoics adopted the term and the idea of Heraclitus, they developed it; their conception of the λόγος was broader and more comprehensive than that of the Ephesian philosopher, to whom they ^(the Stoics) were indebted for the germ of the doctrine.

2. It must be noticed here also the distinction of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός, which occurs so frequently in the Stoic writings; which was adopted by Philo into his philosophico-theological system, though in a different setting, and still later by Justin Martyr and other Christian writers, in their speculative treatment of the Christian doctrine of the λόγος.

It is not introduced here because the distinction was applied to the creative λόγος just discussed, but because of the use made of it in succeeding times, and that it might appear what position it really held in the Stoic philosophy whence later philosophers unquestionably borrowed it. This distinction with the Stoics belonged to the department of logic and was of course applied to the human λόγος. It was the relation of the thought to its expression which the Stoics made much of in their metaphysical discussions. The λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is the inward thought of the mind; the λόγος προφορικός is the outward expression of thought in words. These terms were never applied to the divine reason, but to the human λόγος. This distinction is probably to be connected with that of Aristotle: οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (Anal. Post. i. 10, 76). Compare also the following passage from Heraclitus, from whom the Stoics, in all probability borrowed it: Διὸς δὲ

not from
point to
after III and
Note 8 of
analysis

λόγος τούτων δ' οἱ φιλόσοφοι
τὸν μὲν ἐν-
διάθετον καλοῦσι, τὸν δὲ πρῶτον
λογικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐνδοκω-
σμῶν ἐστὶν ἐξάγγελος. ὁ δ' ὑπὸ
τῶν σπέρ-τους καθέστηκεν. φασὶ
δὲ τούτω χρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ θεῖον.
(Herodot. Alleg. Nou. c. 72).

Chapter III.

Doctrine of Plato.

Plato had no logos doctrine, properly
so-called. As has ~~been~~ already been
intimated, he did not employ the
term logos in the technical sense
of the doctrine which we are discuss-
ing. In his dialogues, the word logos
is sometimes used to designate the
faculty of reason in man; and
the ~~dicty~~ dicty is sometimes spoken of
as employing reason and reflection,
(for Plato believed the author of the
universe to be mind), but he is
never, I think, called the Reason (Λόγος
ος) of the world; this conception be-
longs to the Stoics. Plato, however,
had a theory, in many respects
akin to the logos doctrine of later
times. Philo was, no doubt, in-

planned by this theory, as he was by many other notions in the Platonic philosophy. In order to a clear understanding of the relation of the Platonic philosophy to the logos doctrine of later speculators, it will be necessary to present a brief sketch of Plato's theory of ideas, which lay at the basis of his whole philosophy, for it is in connection with this theory, that the doctrine in question was developed.

I 1. The Theory of Ideas.

There are difficulties in Plato's philosophy, apparent contradictions, and, sometimes, an illogical blending of incompatible notions, with consequent confusion of thought. These difficulties are variously resolved by different investigators. Every commentator and critic of Plato, (every one whose works I have been able to consult), has a different theory as to what Plato's doctrine of ideas really was. No attempt will here be made to present and discuss all these difficulties, with the hope of reducing Plato's theory of ideas to a

complete, harmonious system: The theory in its broad outlines, in its distinctive, characteristic features, can, I think, be definitely made out, and this will be sufficient for the present purpose.

1. Plato, following Heraclitus, believed that nothing in the sensible universe was permanent, but that all things were in eternal flux: he did not agree with the Ephesians, however, in holding that the process of change itself was the only permanent thing; but he maintained that behind sensible things there were real existences, which were, in some sense, *potteroi* (παρὰ δὲ ἴσχυρα) of sensible forms; these he called Ideas. He thus divided all conceivable existence into two parts; the *κοῖτος νοητός* (intelligible), and the *κοῖτος αἰσθητός* (perceptible); the world of ideas and the world of sense; the world of realities and the world of phenomena.

Ideas alone have real existence, phenomena are generated, are always "becoming", and never really are. Their existence is at best

a derived, participative existence.
 A casual reading of the Platonic dialogues, discloses the frequent use, in evident contrast of the terms εἶναι and γίνεσθαι. In passages, purely nominal, εἶναι and εἶναι seem to be used interchangeably; but in purely philosophical discussions, the terms εἶναι and γίνεσθαι appear employed with distinct meanings, in clear contrast, referring respectively to the world of ideas and the world of sense. Οὐσία (real being) is never predicated of sensible forms, but of ideas alone; on the other hand, γένεσις (generation) is predicated of phenomenal being only.

The following passage from the Timaeus is a good illustration of the point in question: Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ ... πρῶτον διαίρεινόν τινος ἴσως τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσας μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, αἰεὶ κατὰ τούτῳ ὄν, τὸ δὲ αἴθερ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγος δοξασθὲν γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ὄντως

δι οὐδέ ποτε ὄν. πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγ-
νόμενον ἐπ' αἰτίον τελευτᾷ ἔξ ἀνά-
γκης γίγνεσθαι. πάντ' ἄρ' ἀδύ-
νατον χωρὶς αἰτίου γένεσθαι οὐχ ἔστι.

Compare also Philebus §§ 12, 14,
and Theaetetus § 25.

Many other passages from the
Philebus, Theaetetus, Republic, Timaeus,
Politicus, Parmenides and other
dialogues might be quoted, but
these will suffice to show the usage
of the terms.

2. (1)

The ideas have real existence. Some
writers would maintain that the Ideas
of Plato are mere abstractions of
the human understanding, general-
izations from experience, obtained
by the faculty of the mind, by
which we abstract general con-
cepts from particular notions; but
this is not the case: the ideas are
separate, independent, real existences,
apprehended, not by abstraction, but
by pure reason. Plato recognizes
these faculties as distinct in the
human mind. Let us take one
example. In the closing chapters
of the sixth book of the Republic,

is the celebrated illustration known as the "twice-bisected line". Plato here divides existence into two; the intelligible, corresponding to the world of ideas, and the perceptible, corresponding to the world of sense.

He again divides the intelligible into two parts; the one, that of mixed ideas in which we proceed from hypotheses to principles, that is, by abstract reasoning; the other, that of pure ideas, apprehended by the pure reason ($\nu\omicron\delta\delta$), elsewhere $\delta\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\epsilon\nu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. This apprehension of the ideas by the pure reason, Plato calls true knowledge. The partial knowledge, gained by inductive reasoning, is helpful in freeing the soul from the bonds of sense, that it may behold the truth itself, in the pure ideas through the $\nu\omicron\delta\delta$.

The impressions gained through the senses, since they are impressions of phenomena, do not belong to knowledge, but to opinion; for real existence alone is knowable; that which does not exist is un-thinkable; phenomenal existence does not contribute to knowledge but

to opinion. The apprehension, then, of pure ideas, which are real existences through the *no \bar{u} s*, which is the highest faculty in man, is true knowledge. From Plato's theory of knowledge, then, it follows that the ideas have real existence; for Plato held that knowledge was attainable; but there could be no knowledge, since reality alone is knowable, unless the ideas have real existence, for to everything else, except ideas, reality is denied.

(2)

Others hold that the ideas of Plato were nothing else than the conceptions in the divine mind, according to which the *Deity* fashioned all things: but this would not be giving to ideas any real existence at all; for conceptions, even though they be divine conceptions, have no reality, but are only mental plans to which some reality may or may not correspond, as it may please the *Deity* himself; according to this view the sensible universe would be the product of direct creation, and as it is phenomenal, there would be nothing real but God. and yet Plato says

ideas have real existence.

Zeller argues well that the ideas must, in some sense, be efficient causes. In the mythical language of the *Timaeus* the $\Delta\eta\mu\iota\omicron\rho\tau\omicron\varsigma$ (Creator) is represented, after allotting to each star an intelligent soul or god, as directing these gods to form other things in like manner as he had formed them. Mythical language must not be strained too far, and yet, it must mean something. In the *Timaeus* Plato resorts to myth to set forth his physical system; but even here his characteristic ideas, as well as his characteristic modes of expression, appear everywhere. Instead of the Idea of the Good is the Creator; instead of the unlimited, a confused, formless matter; instead of the limit the world-soul; instead of the ideas, when they are not distinctly called ideas, gods; $\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\delta\iota\alpha$, $\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, $\varphi\alpha\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and other characteristic expressions abound. Now the gods are, beyond question, efficient causes and the gods in this myth fill the same place in Plato's system that is filled by the ideas, hence, the ideas must,

in some sense, be efficient causes; ideas then cannot be mere conceptions in the divine mind, for conceptions cannot effect anything, but as was before remarked, are nothing but plans to which no reality corresponds, and to which no reality can correspond, except such as flows from the divine will.

(3) Moreover, the ideas are eternal, and must consist, therefore, with the idea of the good, the highest of ideas ('idea' 'idea'), which Plato identifies with the creator of the world. Now, if the creator, as the idea of the good belongs to the ideal world, standing for them in some sense as their ideal unity, then the ideas must have real existence; otherwise, there would be no reality at all, no causation and consequently, no existence, either phenomenal or real. Holding this point to be established, I will now proceed to consider the connection between the intelligible and the perceptible, for which we have been preparing.

3. The ideas alone have reality; the things of sense are generated and so phenomenal. On the one hand is the world of ideas; on the other, the world of sensible forms,

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which have existence only in so far as they participate in the ideas; but how do they participate? It is an easy matter to say that there is a connection of participation between the phenomena and the ideas; but how is this connection to be explained? How are the phenomena and the ideas to be brought together? Plato saw this difficulty and endeavored to meet it. This relation appears in his writings under two different aspects. In the *Philebus*, it is seen in the relation which the limited ($\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$) sustains to the ideas and the unlimited ($\alpha\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$). In the *Timaeus*, it is seen in the world-soul,

As the theory of the world-soul is more closely connected with the logos doctrine of Plato, we shall give it here the more careful consideration. This theory Plato works out in connection with his physics. In describing the formation of the universe, he says that the *Δημιουργός* formed the perceptible universe after an eternal pattern, that is, the intelligible universe, or world of ideas. Again, he says the creator wished to form the world as nearly

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as possible resembling himself; Thus
apparently identifying the *Ἰδέων*
with the ideal world; but this cannot
be an absolute identification. The ideas,
with Plato, are real, independent ex-
istences; he seems to conceive of them
as a kind of hierarchy, at the head
of which stands the idea of the good
or *Ἰδέων*. By bringing together
the hints scattered through the Platon-
ic dialogues, one gets the impression
that the causal efficiency of the
ideas, as far as they have causal
efficiency, is derived from the idea
of the good or *Ἰδέων*, and yet,
the ideas have a real, independent, eter-
nal existence; The ideas are evidently
very closely related to the idea of the
good. While it cannot be maintained
that Plato identifies the *Ἰδέων*
with the ideal world, or views the
ideas merely as divine conceptions,
the *Ἰδέων*, has the idea of the
good, by virtue of the controlling and
directive, if not causal relation, ex-
isting between this idea and the other
ideas, stands for them as their ideal
or representative unity. This involves

some confusion of thought, but is, I think, logically deducible from Plato's teachings. Let us now return to consider the formation of the universe. The creator formed the world after an eternal pattern, that is, the world of ideas; and wishing to make it as nearly as possible to resemble the all-beautiful and all-perfect, he decided to endow it with intelligence since nothing is so beautiful as that which has intelligence; but intelligence cannot exist apart from soul; so having formed the soul by a mixture from that which ever exists according to succession, that is, ideas, and the non-existent, which is here conceived as confused, formless matter, he placed intelligence in soul, and the soul in the perceptible universe as its body. Of this soul, the human soul is a copy, which being endowed with intelligence, is placed in a body; thus man is, on a small scale, a copy of the universe.

This world-soul pervades the universe, and having in itself the nature both of the ideas and the phenomena,

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it forms a link between them which binds them together in indivisible union. Thus Plato in this mythical representation, presents, in the world-soul, a connecting link between the world and the creator, (the standpoint of the Timaeus), or in his more philosophic phrase, between phenomena and ideas. It would be interesting to follow out Plato's theory of ideas in all its intricate windings, and to examine the mediating principle under its more philosophic aspect, (the view of the Philebus), but there is no place for such inquiries in this brief sketch. As the theory of the world-soul bears a closer resemblance to the logos doctrine, and since it is this phase of Plato's doctrine that most strongly influenced Philo's mind, we shall bring our investigation of Plato's system to a close at this point, and pass from the domain of purely Greek, to that of the Jewish-Alexandrian speculation. (note & appendix)

Chapter IV

Philo

The Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy was an eclectic system; or rather, a strange combination of heterogeneous elements, brought together in an arbitrary way, from various sources. We find notions from the Stoics, the Academy and the Pythagoreans, blended, or rather mixed with ideas from the Hebrew scriptures. Philosophy was the highest expression of Greek thought, aspiration and conscience. The Hebrew mind found its highest expression in the religion of the Old Testament scriptures. The Jewish-Alexandrian speculators, foremost of whom was Philo, endeavored to show that the philosophy of the Greeks was borrowed from the Hebrew scriptures, and consequently, that the Greek philosophers were seeking the same end, though by a somewhat different way; they thus sought to combine the philosophy of the Greeks, and the religion of the Hebrews into one system. Philo's philosophic method was allegory. The law of Moses was the text requiring explanation, and from this, by allegory, he derived that composite philosophy which, as we have seen, was a confused blending of Greek abstract ideas and more concrete notions from the Hebrew scriptures, worked over in the peculiar mould of Philo's speculation. He had little of the historic sense. Historic incidents and personages were not treated by Philo as real, but were volatilized

into symbolic representations of divine truth. These incidents and personages represented abstract ideas or qualities; their true meaning was veiled under symbolic forms; it was the province of the philosopher by means of allegorical interpretation to unveil its meaning.

Some of the ideas borrowed by Philo from the Greek philosophy are as follows: from the Stoics, he drew the doctrine of universal reason, as law and order in the universe; from their logic also, the distinction of λόγος ἐνδεδάθετος and προφορικός, which he applied directly to the human logos, ^{and} in a few instances, by implication, at least, to the universal Logos; he was in some other respects too, influenced by their physics, and in large measure by their ethics; (he adopted, for instance, their maxim, "Live conformably to nature"). So Plato

he was indebted for the theory of ideas, which he altered in some respects, however, to suit the peculiarities of his system. He borrowed also the mediating principle expressed in the world-soul; not however, as the world-soul, but as universal reason, which served as a connecting link between matter and primary being, and between God and the rational principle in man.

He adopted Plato's division of the universe, and in general, the Platonic physics; especially did he retain the notion that the heavenly bodies were endowed with intelligent souls.

Plato's ethics also had its influence. Philo's extreme fondness for speculating about numbers, betrays a predilection for the Pythagorean fancies. From the Old Testament scriptures, he got his monotheism, his doctrine of angels &c.

With all these suggestions as preparatory hints, the thoughtful inquirer would naturally expect to find, in considering any of Philo's doctrines, difficulty in determining the precise meaning of many expressions, which are fraught with various meanings.

I This difficulty makes itself felt, for instance, in the study of the Logos doctrine. Of this doctrine, modern scholars hold widely divergent views, and yet, each finds abundant warrant for his view, he thinks, in the writings of Philo. I shall not attempt, therefore, to speak dogmatically, but to present what seems to me to be Philo's doctrine, after making due allowance for the composite character of his system, and his allegorical method of interpretation, which preclude the possibility of dogmatizing with consistency.

1. Before entering on the discussion of the Logos doctrine, it will be necessary to preface a few remarks on the "powers" which hold such an important place in Philo's philosophy; partly, because the Logos is one of the powers, and partly, because it is here that we see the relation of Philo's system to the ideal theory of Plato, as well as the different mode of viewing the ideas adopted by Philo.

He not only viewed the powers as ideal, and therefore as the eternal archetypes of rational forms, but also as the divine energies, which proceed forth from God to impress rational ideas on formless matter. Viewed under the first aspect, they correspond to the ideas of Plato conceived merely as the patterns of phenomena; under the other aspect, Philo emphasized the notion of causal efficiency of the ideas, which Plato in his mythical discourses, sometimes ascribed to them. That the powers are to be identified with the ideal, is evident from many passages; the following will serve as an example: "As, among you, seals, whenever wax or any similar material is applied to them, make innumerable impressions, not suffering the loss of any part, but remaining as they were, such you must suppose the powers around me to be, applying qualities to things without quality, and forms to the formless, while they experience no change or diminution in their eternal nature. But some among you call them very appropriately ideas, since they give ideal form to each thing, arranging the unarranged, and communicating determinate limits and definition and shape, to the indeterminate and indefinite and shapeless, and, in a word, altering the worse into the better." Monarch I. 6.

Philo's monotheism obliged him to form a conception of the ideas somewhat different from that of Plato. He viewed the ideas as the thoughts of God - as the

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multitudinous expressions of the divine reason, and collectively, as the intelligible kosmos, residing in the mind of God; for he speaks of God as "the immaterial place of the immaterial ideas." Cherubim 14

Under their dynamical aspect, the ideas or powers are identified with the attributes of God viewed as living energies. These powers "stretched" throughout the universe, hold together as well as produce the kosmos. That this identification was intended by Philo, is evident from the fact that actions sometimes ascribed to the powers, are in other passages, referred to God himself. The formation of the kosmos, for instance, which is sometimes referred to the creative power ($\delta\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\tau\iota\kappa\eta$), is sometimes referred to the self-existent God. These powers are sometimes spoken of in such a way as to lead one to think of them as persons: this is, however, personification merely, and not the attribution of real personality, for in Philo's conception, God cannot be viewed as an aggregation of persons, for he is one, nay, "the archetype of unity" itself. The Logos is in many places called an idea. In the allegorical interpretation of the cities of refuge, the Logos is spoken of as the highest of powers. The personality of the Logos will be considered in its proper place.

2. Logos is an indefinite term. All the meanings referred to in chapter I, are, I think, to be found in Philo's writings. Owing to his lack of precision and the vagueness of his

speculations, as well as his figurative style of expression, it is often difficult to determine whether he uses the term in one of the senses above referred to, or in its metaphysical sense. The metaphysical Logos, which we are considering, appears under several different forms; but in every case, is reducible, I think, in the last analysis, to the principle of rationality, the universal reason, which has its source and its highest expression in God.

- (1) "God", says Philo, "is the most generic of things, and the Logos is second" (Prof. 20), showing that he regarded Being more generic even than Reason, a notion which his conception of God rendered necessary: but he elsewhere says, (Leg. all. III. 61), that the Logos is the oldest and most generic of things which have come into being; from which it is clear that he did not wish to be understood as making the Logos co-extensive with God as God, but only as viewed in a certain definite relation, that is, his relation to the universe. The kosmos everywhere on its bosom bears marks of reason. Everything has the impress of a rational idea. These ideas are the thoughts of God, which collectively equal the thought of God impressed on matter, by virtue of which it becomes a kosmos. All these thoughts are logically subordinate to this universal thought and are included under it as the highest genus. This thought is the product or objective expression of the divine reason,

and exhausts it; such is Philo's conception. Pure rational forms, however, are but copies of immaterial ideas, which exist in the mind of God.

These immaterial ideas, together constitute the intelligible kosmos, which has for its place the divine Logos (De Op. Mundi 4+5) and as the idea of ideas; is identified with the Logos itself, as will appear from the following passage: "It is evident that the archetypal seal also, which we affirm to be the intelligible kosmos, would be the archetypal pattern, the idea of ideas, the Logos of God." (De Op. Mundi 6)

All the other ideas are thus included under the Logos as the highest idea. Philo himself calls it an idea. "God gave the soul a seal, an all beautiful gift, teaching that he shaped the substance of all things when it was unshaped, and stamped it when it was unstamped, and gave it form when it was without quality, and, having finished, he sealed the entire kosmos with an image and idea, his own Logos." Somn. II 6

Again, the Logos, as the intelligible kosmos, is the archetypal pattern of the perceptible, and is as such, the archetypal seal, which impressed on matter those rational ideas, which constitute it a kosmos.

Again, the Logos is viewed as the rational order of the universe, the universal law which holds all things together, and directs all things conformably to reason; in this sense, it is called the Logos of nature. Joseph. II. 6.

Again, the Logos is viewed as disposing the kosmos into order; in which sense, as the formative principle ($\delta\sigma\theta\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$), it must be considered as a divine faculty, the divine Reason ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$), or understanding ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) of God; for what is sometimes referred to the Logos as $\delta\sigma\theta\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, is at other times ascribed to the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. " $\tau\acute{o}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\sigma\theta\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$, $\delta\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\omicron}\lambda\omega\nu\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ ". Philo here makes the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ and the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, one and the same thing.

So we see that the Logos in all these phases, whether as equivalent of the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, or viewed as the intelligible kosmos, as the idea of ideas, as the archetypal pattern of the perceptible kosmos, as the archetypal seal, or as universal law, is the same divine reason in different relations; it is either the rational power itself, its ideal contents, or its objective expression in the perceptible kosmos.

- (2) We must now consider the analogy of the divine to the human logos; whether the distinction of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ and $\pi\rho\omicron\phi\omicron\rho\epsilon\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, in the human logos, is attributed by Philo to the divine; on this point there are opposing views. Philo does, in a few cases, apply this distinction of the Stoics, to the human logos; and, moreover, recognized a distinction of some kind in the divine Logos. In the *Life of Moses*, 13, he gives an allegorical exposition of the High Priest's vestments. In describing the breast-plate, which is called $\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\iota\omicron\nu$,

he speaks of it as two-fold, and from this is led to speak of the Logos, which he says is double, both in the universe and in the nature of man. To the universal as well as to the human logos two qualities appertain, viz., truth and declaration; the correspondence of these qualities to the distinctions in the human logos is obvious. In the universe, he says, the one is that of the immaterial and pattern ideas, that is, the intelligible kosmos; the other, that of visible things, which are imitations and copies of those ideas. This bears a close resemblance to the distinction in the human logos. It is probably true, as Drummond suggests, that Philo shrank from applying the terms ἐν δὲ ἄθροτος and προφορικὸς to the divine Logos, on account of his unwillingness to employ anthropomorphic language in describing the self-existent God. Nevertheless the distinction recognized by Philo in the universal Logos, is parallel to that in the human Logos. The intelligible kosmos, which equals the Logos, exists in the mind of God, and corresponds to the logos ἐν δὲ ἄθροτος in man; the Logos made objective in the universe, answers to the logos προφορικὸς in man. This finds confirmation in the fact that Philo in many passages, says that "the words of God are none other than his works". This is further confirmed by Migrat. Abr. 9, where the voice of God is spoken of as seen and

not heard. Philo gives an elaborate explanation, showing that the voice of God is not heard like the voice of man, but seen by the eye of the soul; that is, the reason of God made objective in the universe, must be recognized and interpreted by the reason in man. From what has been said, it is clear that Philo recognized a distinction of some kind in the divine Logos; and that this distinction, if not identical with that in the human Logos, does, to say the least, bear a strong analogy to that distinction.

(3) This distinction in the divine Logos, to my mind, helps to explain the mediating office of the Logos between God and the world.

In a certain passage (Quis Res. Div. Her. 42), he assigns to the Logos a mediating position between God and the universe; being neither ungenerated as God, nor generated as the world, the Logos is in the middle between the two extremes. From a passage before quoted, we saw that Philo considered God the most generic of things and the Logos second; that is, Reason is ranked logically under Being; as in some manner dependent on it. Reason in God must be eternal, and yet, viewed as thought, it must be, in a sense, produced, and thus logically subordinate to Being. It is not ungenerated as God, not being self-existent, neither is it generated as the universe. When this divine Reason (Λόγος) becomes objective in the universe,

it is still eternal Reason, and so, not generated as the Kosmos, which would cease to be a Kosmos, were the rational principle withdrawn.

The Logos thus becomes a mediating principle between God and the world. Being objective in the universe, it secures the permanence of the Kosmos. On the other hand, as eternal reason, it is immanent in God; and thus, by this mediation, the Kosmos is forever bound to its Creator. It is here

that Philo, in his Logos, combines the mediating world-soul of Plato, and the universal reason of the Stoics. The idea of mediation is derived from Plato, but the universal reason itself is the mediator, not a created soul. Note 3 See appendix

(4)

We now come to the question of the personality of the Logos. Grossman, Ritter, Lücke, Semisch, Dähne, Überweg and others are inclined to think that Philo gives to the Logos an independent hypostasis, but with Doerner, Drummond and others, I am inclined to think that this is a mistake, arising in part, no doubt, from failure to make due allowance for Philo's habit of personification, and in part, from a desire to make Philo's Logos doctrine approach as nearly as possible to that of the New Testament.

As far as I have been able to make examination, all the passages adduced in support of the personality of the Logos, can be satisfactorily explained, and many of them more satisfactorily explained

in other ways. The best method of procedure would be to examine in detail, all the passages in question, but the limits of this paper will not admit of such an examination: I will, therefore, present briefly, two or three arguments which to me appear conclusive, and consider one or two of the opposing arguments, and then proceed to consider the relation of Philo's doctrine to that of the New Testament - the Fourth Gospel in particular.

The identification of the Logos with the words of God, already referred to (I 2.11), goes to show that Philo did not attribute independent personality to the Logos; for rationality is essential to personality, and if the reason of God were removed and placed in another person, God would thereby be deprived of rationality, the essential quality of his personality, and he would be nothing but an impersonal aggregation of forces, incapable of directing the universe, which function would devolve on the Logos alone. This, however, is not Philo's conception of God; for, although he did not entirely escape from dualism, in his theory of the universe; he again and again asserts the transcendence and immeasurable superiority of God to all other things. God, he says, "availing himself of himself and of none other," created the world and directs it; (*De Op. mundi*) moreover he has filled all things, and has left nothing destitute of himself. "Πάντα γὰρ πεπλήρωκεν ὁ θεὸς, καὶ διὰ πάντων διεληλυθεν, καὶ κενὸν οὐδέν"

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οὐδὲ ἔργον ἀπολέλο-πεν ἑόντων." Again,
God encompasses and contains the universe (cf. De
Somn. I. 25- and Confus. Ling. 27 9c)

Again, the Logos is said to be the place of the ideas;
(De Op. Mundi 5-) but God is also called "the immaterial
place of the immaterial ideas". (Cherub 14) It fol-
lows, therefore, that the Logos is the reason immanent
in God, and hence, cannot have an independent
hypostasis.

The Logos, as the intelligible kosmos, is the sum of
all the ideas or thoughts of God. It is the product
of the divine reason, and so is the inward thought
of God. As such, it is the archetypal pattern of
the perceptible kosmos, that is, the model according
to which it was made. Again the Logos as
the archetypal seal, is the intelligible kosmos, or
thought of God, which God used to stamp rational
ideas on matter. But neither as archetypal
pattern, nor as archetypal seal, can it well be
thought that Philo attributed personality to the Logos

Some appeal to Philo's identification of angels
and logoi, and especially, to the designation
ἀρχάγγελος, which Philo, in a few cases, applies
to the Logos, as conclusive proof that the Logos is a
person. I cannot here enter into a detailed
refutation, but will present Dooner's counterargu-
ment, which, while not absolutely conclusive, breaks
the force of the opposing argument.

Supposing ἀρχάγγελος to be used in the same sense as the Old Testament angels referred to by Philo, yet these angels are so identified with ἰδέειν, συνάψεις λόγου, that their personality is often questionable.

Again, as the Logos is sometimes represented as the unity of the συνάψεις or ἄγγελος, instead of arguing that as the angels are personal, therefore the Logos also is personal, the opposite course of reasoning might with equal justice be adopted; namely, that the Logos is personal, and the angels are not personal, but the impersonal powers of which he is the unity, or, that the angels are personal, and the Logos which is their unity, is not personal.

Some lay stress on the fact that Philo sometimes applies to the Logos the epithets "son of God" and "Image of God," claiming that this necessarily involves the ascription of personality.

The Logos is sometimes called "the son of God," and "the elder son of God"; but the kosmos is also a son of God, his younger son, and time is the son of the kosmos, and the grandson of God (De Op. Mundi 6)

What warrant have we for concluding that Philo attributed personality to the elder and not to the younger son? The same reasoning is applicable also in the case of the image. The Logos is an image of God, and is, therefore, it is said, a person; but the kosmos is the image of the Logos, and according to this reasoning must also be a person. Moreover, the

number seven, as Drummond points out, is an image of God, but no one will attempt to show that the number seven is a person. We must remember that "by an image need be meant no more than an intellectual conception, possessing a property similar to that which distinguishes the object of which it is the image." This will be apparent to one who carefully examines Philo's "images"; so the Logos may be an image of God because it is or possesses rationality.

Aside from these considerations, however, an adequate explanation may be found in the fact that Philo not only habitually volatilizes historic persons into abstract ideas and qualities, but is also extremely fond of personifying abstract qualities; let us take a few examples.

The sciences and virtues are "daughters of right-reason" (Hicaut. 4). "God rains down his virgin and immortal graces," these graces are his "virgin daughters" (Post. Cain. 10). "God is the husband of the virtue-loving intelligence," and laughter is his "ideal son"; (Mutat. Nom. 23) and the Logos is "the cupbearer and toast-master of God".

It is interesting to notice the confusion that follows the bringing together of some of the figures which Philo uses in connection with the Logos and Wisdom. "God is the husband of Wisdom but Wisdom is the daughter of God, the mother of the Logos and the father of Intelligence".

These are clearly personifications, and such figures are to be met with on almost every page of Philo's writings. When, therefore, we find such epithets as "son of God" and "image of God" applied to the Logos, we should proceed with caution, and consider every possible explanation, before we charge Philo with any doctrine which would be inconsistent with his monotheism, which was to him the doctrine of doctrines.

Chapter V

The relation of Philo's doctrine to the Logos doctrine of the New Testament.

The Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy reached its highest development in Philo, who was contemporary with our Lord and his Apostles. How widely the influence of the Alexandrian philosophy extended during this period, cannot be determined; but some of the writings of the Gnostics of the latter half of the century, both in Asia Minor and in the East, show traces of the peculiar Alexandrian speculations, which lends probability to the conclusion that the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy at this time, had a broad and powerful influence. This conclusion is further strengthened by the consideration of the fact that Alexandria was in this period, one of the chief centres of culture and learning,

as it had one of the foremost schools of the world, which was attended by students from all parts of the Roman empire.

Some of the writings of the New Testament, for instance those of John, and especially those of Paul, including the epistle to the Hebrews (for I prefer the view which ascribes the authorship of this epistle to Paul), contain many expressions to be met with in Philo's writings, and many others which bear a strong resemblance to characteristic ideas of the Alexandrian Philosopher.

The following expressions are by Philo applied to the Logos, and by the New Testament writers to Christ; many of them it is true, in a quite different sense, yet it is a striking parallel.

Son of God (Heb. 4:14 John 1:18 &c), it is an instrument in creation (John 1:3, Eph 3:9, Col 1:16), is the "bond of the universe," (cf Col 1:17), image of God (2 Cor 4:4, Col 1:15), archangel (1 Thess 4:16), High Priest (Heb 4:14 &c) mediator (Heb 8:6, 9:15 &c 1 Tim 2:6), advocate (1 John 2:1), is symbolized by manna (John 6:49+50), as Sophia, is symbolized by the rock in the wilderness (1 Cor 10:4), is symbolized by Melchizedec (cf. Hebrews), is forgotten before the world which is the younger son (cf. Col 1:15-); in addition to these I will select two or three others not referring to the Logos.

God is invisible (John 1:18), fills the universe (Eph 1:23)

the angels are instrumental in giving the Law (Gal. 3:19, Heb 2:2); lastly, the figure of milk and strong meat (1 Cor 3:2, Heb 5:13 & 14).

These are some of the points of resemblance; there are others, but these are ^{the} clearest and most striking, and have for this reason been selected.

Now no candid, thoughtful inquirer, would be willing to venture the suggestion that all these coincidences of expression were purely accidental; they must be accounted for. The apostles may not have been acquainted with Philo's writings - it is possible, ^{but} not probable. Especially is it improbable that Paul, who was a philosopher and a scholar, and moreover, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, would neglect the writings of so prominent a Jewish philosopher as Philo; be that as it may; but whether the apostles were influenced in their style of expression by familiarity with Philo's works, or whether the phrases in question were the common property of the theological world, as some think, to my mind there is no material difference; these phrases were, at least, Alexandrian, for they are characteristic of Philo, and he, as we have before remarked, was the leading philosopher of this school, and consequently contributed largely to the formation of the theological terminology of this period.

The apostles, it is evident, did not hesitate to use phrases from the Alexandrian philosophy, which would the more clearly convey their doctrines to the minds of those to whom they wrote. These expressions, however had a richer, deeper and fuller meaning to the Christian mind, from their association with the person of the historic Christ. His real personal existence was not only vividly present to the Christian consciousness, but it was the basis of the Christian hope. That the apostles, however, borrowed any essential doctrine of the Alexandrian system, which is not also contained in the old Testament scriptures, is not at all clear. Some critics find in the Fourth Gospel the identification of Philo's Logos with the person of the historical ^{Jesus}

I. The theology of Paul.

Dr. Toy of Harvard (note 4. Appendix), thinks he proves, in his discussion of the Logos, in his work on Judaism and Christianity, that Philo attributes to the Logos a high degree of personality; he is unwilling to say that Philo accords to it, a complete independent hypostasis; this, he thinks, was finally accomplished by the author of the Fourth Gospel (note 5. Appendix), by identifying the Philonian Logos with Jesus of Nazareth. He shows the intertwining processes of development, which made this identification possible.

He assumes on the one hand, the acceptance, on

the part of many Christians, of the Greek philosophy as employed by Philo, to set forth Jewish monotheism and a growing tendency among these Christians to attempt to bring Philo's system into harmony with Christianity by identifying his Logos with the historic Jesus. On the other hand, he finds in the Pauline writings, a tendency to idealize the person of Jesus.

Paul, in his view, touches very lightly on the humanity of Jesus: Paul conceives of him from the very first as the glorified Christ, an exalted being intermediate between man and God.

In Hebrews, Ephesians and Colossians, this process of idealization is carried still farther, and the person of Jesus more philosophically conceived, is raised to the rank of a divine being, very closely related to God, but still subordinate to him.

Mr. Toy, to my mind, does not adequately conceive, if he does not altogether misconceive Paul's position.

Paul does fully recognize the humanity of Christ, and dwells on it as much, to say the least, as ought to be expected of one who was not a personal associate and disciple of the Lord during his bodily presence on earth, of one, moreover, who was not a biographer but a theologian.

He partakes of flesh and blood, is born of a woman (Heb 2:14 and Gal 4:4 of also Rom 1:3 and Heb.2:16), is in all points tempted as we are (Heb 2:18), before Pontius Pilate witnesses the good confession (1 Tim 6:13), suffers death (by crucifixion, and as an offering for sin,) is buried and rises from the dead (Heb 2:9, 1 Thes.2:16 Gal.1:4 Rom.6:3 to 6, 1 Tim. 2:6, 1 Cor 1:13+23, 5:7, 15:3+4 and many other passages). Some of these are from the epistles which are recognized by all to be Pauline.

Paul did teach that Christ was a mediator between God and man (Heb. 8:6, 9:15, 12:24 1 Tim 2:6 etc.); but this mediatorship was an office, of his own will, and by condescension assumed (Phil 2:6-8), and is to cease at the end of the world. (1 Cor 15:24-28)

Christ is not only man and the mediator between God and man, but he is God himself. In him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily (Col. 2:9 of also Col. 1:19 and Eph 1:23); it is through him that all things are created, and not as a being inferior to God, for through him and for him are all things (Col. 1:16 of also Heb. 2:10 where the same things is said of God the Father). He is the express image of God's person (ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΣ ΑΥΤΟΥ) (Heb 1:3), he is in the form of God and on an equality

with him (Phil. 2:6), and lastly, is called God (Titus 2:13 and Heb 1:8). Thus Paul recognizes the full humanity and the full divinity of Christ; moreover, he expressly declares an incarnation, a revelation of God in man (Phil 2:6-8).

Paul had a philosophic mind; a mind fitted to form a profounder conception of the incarnation than any other of the apostles, not excepting John himself; and the Holy Spirit made use of this wonderful mind to express in human thought and in human language, the deeper mysteries of God's nature, and of the doctrines of grace.

It is not strange that Paul should dwell more on the divine nature of Christ, for he did not receive the gospel from the other apostles, but was converted and received his commission by direct revelation (Gal 1:13). We know, furthermore, that after this, he was from time to time favored with special revelations. Somewhere between his conversion and his third visit to Jerusalem, he was caught up into the third heaven, and heard unspeakable words. ^{2 Cor 12:2-4} What knowledge he obtained on this occasion, we do not know; but to one who had attained such a clear knowledge of God as Paul had, there could be no uncertainty, no wavering as to the person of Jesus; Christ would be throughout the same. With this doctrine established, it readily appears in what-

sense the terms "power of God", "wisdom of God" and the like were applied by the apostle Paul to the Lord Jesus. We can see that Paul attaches a deeper significance to the terms "son of God" and "image of God" than does Philo, and wherein lies the difference of meaning. We can better understand also what ideas Paul really meant to convey by the use of these expressions. We cannot understand it all - the great mystery of the Trinity must forever remain beyond our comprehension. From what has been proved it is clear that, in the group of epistles generally ascribed to Paul, there is no idealizing of the person of Jesus. It is presented under different aspects, but there is never inconsistency. The aspect presented in any given passage, depends on the nature of the error there combated, or on the nature of the doctrine there under discussion, or otherwise accords with whatever purpose the apostle had in view in that place; there is throughout, as I think has been proved, a consistent doctrine of an incarnate God. If this be so, the doctrine of these epistles will not serve as a link between Philo and the Fourth Gospel, and the gap remains unfilled.

II

Relation ^{of Philo} to the Fourth Gospel

We have seen that the Logos of Philo borrowed a deceptive appearance of personality from his habit of personification, which we learned, he applied to almost everything; which he extended, moreover, to the divine reason as well as to the other powers or attributes of the divine nature. We observed further, that to attribute personality to these powers or attributes, would be to make the deity an aggregation of persons, and consequently to destroy the unipersonality of God, which was the cardinal principle of Philo's system. We saw further, that it follows from this, that the Logos of Philo was nothing but impersonal reason, or at best, the faculty of reason in God, which is essential to the divine personality; and that the Logos, therefore, could have no hypostasis apart from the personality of God. On the other hand, what is the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel?

The formal statement of the doctrine is to be found in the first eighteen verses of the first chapter; but it finds illustration and explanation in various passages throughout the book.

The first verse, in my view, contains a declaration of the coordination, and, in a sense, the identification of the Logos with God. If it be thought that by the Logos is here meant no more than impersonal reason, (which, I must say, could

not but entirely empty of meaning, the last clause of the verse), but if it be thought that the Logos is here no more than impersonal reason, let us compare verse 4, where it is said "in him was life." Now it could not be said of impersonal reason, that in him (it) was life.

Compare also verses 7 to 18, where the apostle expressly identifies the Logos with the person of Jesus.

This passage, without further argument, is conclusive proof, that the Logos in the apostle's conception, was a person. Still waiving

verse 1 as inconclusive, let us consider verse 3, where it is said that all things through him came into existence, thereby indicating that the Logos was prior to all generated being. It is true

that the Logos is called (verse 18) "only begotten son" (μονογενὴς υἱός) but the generation of the Logos

tain. More probably
is Deos

must be understood in a sense not involving a beginning: for the apostle (3rd) continues in the most specific way, to emphasize $\alpha\alpha$, by asserting that not even one thing which has come into existence, has come into existence apart from him, thus placing the Logos before all beings whatsoever which have had a beginning, thereby making him eternal. The generation, therefore, asserted of the Logos, cannot be generation of essential being, at least, in a sense which would involve a beginning;

unless we can say that the Logos had an eternal beginning (note 6 Appendix), which is a contradiction in terms. Compare in this connection, 5:17, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," and 8:58, "Before Abraham was, I am," which passages have great force in the light of the passages under discussion.

Again, the Logos, as we have seen, is called $\mu\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\eta\varsigma\ \upsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$; what force has the term "son" in the Fourth Gospel? We will let it explain itself.

In 5:18, we are told ^{that} the Jews sought to kill Jesus, because he called God his own Father, making himself equal with God ($\epsilon\gamma\omega\ \epsilon\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \pi\iota\omicron\lambda\omega\gamma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$). The last phrase may be understood, either of the notion of the Jews, or as the author's explanatory comment. If the former, it shows, at least, that the Jews understood the sonship claimed by Jesus, as involving divinity. That it was the belief of the author of the book also, is evident from verse 23, where Jesus claims equal honor with the Father, which he could not do unless he was God.

Let us proceed still farther. Jesus claims that he and the Father are one (14:9-11, 16:15-17:10 &c). Lastly, Jesus allows Thomas unrebuked, to address him as God (20:28)

These considerations remove the doubt from 1:1, which now stands forth as an express.

declaration of the full divinity, the full personality, and, as illustrated by verses 3, 14 & 18, the separate divine personality of the Logos.

The divinity of the Holy Spirit is not so clearly set forth in this Gospel, although his personality is every where apparent. The terms however in which he is described as proceeding from the Father, and as being the Paraclete who is to be in the church after the withdrawal from the earth of the bodily presence of the Son, afford strong presumption that the author of the Fourth Gospel, in harmony with the other New Testament writers, understood the Holy Spirit to be a divine person.

Some are fond of saying that the doctrine of the trinity was not definitely formulated till the fourth century; and that before that time, as far as it was held at all, it was an esoteric doctrine, held by a circle of Christians of a more philosophic turn of mind, and that it was the result of the Platonic influence.

And yet, one who carefully reads the Fourth Gospel, though he may not admit it even to himself, cannot but feel that the author means to teach that Jesus Christ, while in some respects different from the Father, is nevertheless God; and that the Holy Spirit, while different from the Father and the Son, is nevertheless divine.

Is this doctrine of God and the Logos like that of Philo?
Is this Logos doctrine the natural, logical development of the Alexandrian Logos? Let us compare them in detail.

We have seen that Philo's Logos is impersonal reason, but that the Logos of the Fourth Gospel is personal, and essentially divine. Now, Prof. Toy maintains that the absence of the article from θεός in the last clause of verse 7 shows a conception of the Logos like Philo's conception of the Logos as a God to the imperfect, which he presents in his exposition of Deut 32: 12 & 13, where, Prof. Toy thinks, he attributes divinity of a subordinate kind to the Logos. Whether this is Philo's conception or not, (and it is highly improbable ^{cf. p. 4} especially I. 2. (4) of this paper), it does not follow that the anarthrous θεός in our passage, has the same meaning. The absence of the article can be accounted for by a well known principle of Greek syntax - namely, the frequent omission of the article belonging to a predicate-noun, and this brings the passage into harmony with our author's doctrine examined above.

Now, it is a principle of exegesis, that of two or more possible interpretations of a difficult passage, that interpretation is to be preferred, which brings the passage in question into harmony with other passages bearing on the

same and kindred subjects, thus making the author self-consistent. This is, I think, a sufficient answer to the point above raised.

In verse 3, we read that through the Logos all things came into being. Philo sometimes speaks of the instrumentality of the Logos in the formation of the world; but in what sense is it the instrument? The Logos viewed as the

intelligible Kosmos, which we have seen to be the inner thought of God, as the archetypal ^{seed} becomes the instrument by which God stamps the ideas on matter, in consequence of which matter takes on rational forms, and becomes a Kosmos. In our author's view, the creat-

ing Logos is a divine person called the only-begotten son, co-existing in the divine essence with another divine person called the Father.

For further particulars of this doctrine, compare the remarks on verses 1 to 3, as illustrated by verse 18 (pp 5-4 to 5-6 of this paper)

In verse 4, the Logos is endowed with the principle of life. As far as I have been able to make investigation, I have not been able to find either in Philo's writings, or in commentaries on his writings, that Philo had any notion corresponding to this. It is difficult, moreover, to see how he could, when we pause to reflect on all we have learned of his

Logos doctrine.

In verse 18, the Logos is called $\mu\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\eta\varsigma$ $\delta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$. This phrase occurs nowhere in Philo's writings. He makes use of the phrase $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\delta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, but we also read of a younger son of God, that is the Kosmos; from which it is evident that Philo is here indulging his predilection for figures. Our author, on the other hand, calls the Logos the Only-begotten Son who exists in the bosom of the Father, has declared him. Does this correspond to Philo's twofold Logos of the universe? Before answering this however, let us consider another passage, which will, I think, throw light on the subjectⁿ question.

According to verse 14, the Logos became incarnate and dwelt among men. This doctrine is entirely foreign to Philo's philosophy. He could speak, in a figure, of the Logos putting on the Kosmos as a garment; but to attribute personality to the Logos, which, as we have seen, he did not, and, from his standpoint, could not attribute to him apart from the personality of the self-existent God, ~~to his mind, would not only be~~ ~~blasphemous~~ and then make this Logos dwell in a frail corruptible material body, to his mind, would not only be blasphemous, but would be thoroughly unphilosophical. We can now answer the question raised above. The double

Logos of Philo is this : on the one hand, it is the divine thought immanent in God; on the other hand, it is that thought made objective in the Kosmos. In our author's view, the Logos, as immanent, subsists as a person in the divine essence, and comes forth in incarnation to reveal the invisible God to man.

While there is a seeming resemblance in outward form, the difference from the standpoint of doctrine is so great, that we cannot consider one derived from the other, without doing great violence to both.

The foregoing comparison has not narrowed the gap between the Logos of Philo and that of the Fourth Gospel; on the contrary, it has only served to make it more distinct.

The same term is employed by both, although the distinguishing features are different. In Philo's Logos, the idea of rationality is the more prominent. Influenced by the stoic theory of the universe and the cosmic reason, he dwelt more on the rational side of the divine nature, than a Jewish writer, apart from Greek influence, would do. In the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, on the contrary, the other main idea of Logos, namely, that of declaration or utterance, seems to be the more prominent. Besides this, it does not occupy the same

place in their respective systems. Philo's doctrine was devised to meet the requirements of his dualistic philosophy, and make a mediating principle between God and the universe. In the Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, the Logos is a divine person, who becomes incarnate to reveal God to men, and accomplish the redemption of the world.

Conclusion.

We have shown the difference between the person of Christ in the Pauline epistles and the Logos of the Fourth Gospel, on the one hand, and the Logos of Philo on the other (note 7 Appendix) In so doing, we have incidentally shown the chief points of resemblance.

These resemblances we have found to be verbal rather than doctrinal. We have further seen that both Paul and John, instead of showing in their doctrine a development of the Philonian Logos, present throughout a consistent doctrine of incarnation and of trinitarian monotheism. The coincidences of expression pointed out above, cannot be considered accidental. The apostles finding these phrases in the current theology and philosophy, adapted to their purpose, and realizing that they would be more intelligible

and more expressive to the minds of the age than a new terminology would be, employed them to give clearness to their own profound doctrines. There is nothing derogatory to the sacred scriptures in this admission. As the scriptures were given by divine inspiration, and were intended to be an intelligible revelation of God's truth, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Holy Spirit directed the apostles in the choice of language which would set forth, in the clearest way, the great doctrines of God's being, of Providence and of Redemption. Nay, we might go farther, and conclude with Jowett, that as God chose the Greek language with which to clothe his new revelation, and made that language the universal thought medium of the age in which that revelation was to be given, he may have designed in Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, combining as it did, Jewish and Hellenic ideas into one system, and giving to the Greek language a religious terminology, to prepare the way for his new and higher revelation.

Appendix - Notes

Note 1 of page 13. Boethius rejected the pantheism of his school and taught the transcendence of the Deity, though not in a Jewish or Christian sense.

Note 2 of page 30. After writing this section on Plato, I read Drummond's discussion of the subject, and was surprised and not a little gratified to find that, in showing the relation of the Platonic philosophy to the Logos doctrine, he followed in broad outline the same line of thought which I had independently worked out.

Note 3 of page 41. The Logos serves also as a mediating principle between God and the rational principle in man; but as this is only a specific application of the general mediating principle here discussed I have not introduced it, as it would be adding words without giving much additional force or clearness to the point in question.

Note 4 of page #9. Prof. Toy's discussion is one of the ablest I have seen from the stand-point of the liberal critics; I have, therefore, selected him to represent this class.

Note 5 of page 49. I cannot here enter into the question of the date of the Fourth Gospel. The Johannine authorship is now quite generally acknowledged; and, as the apostle John died about A.D. 100, the publication of this book in all probability belongs to the last quarter of the first century, perhaps, about A.D. 80.

Should it be urged that I ought to have established the Johannine authorship before entering on this discussion, I reply that the Johannine authorship is not essential to the argument here presented for the independence of the Fourth Gospel.

Note 6 of page 56. Origen's doctrine of eternal generation minus his subordinationism, is I think, the nearest approach in human thought to a conception of the relation which exists between the Logos, or Son, and God the Father; ~~but~~ the relation as thus conceived, however, is not comprehensible but infinitely transcends the human understanding.

Note 7 of page 62. I have limited the comparison to Philo and the New Testament. The contrasts between εἶναι and γίγνεται which the author of the Fourth Gospel makes use of (Compare Jns 8:58, 1:1+3 taken to-

gether and 1:14-14 taken together) is probably not due to Platonic influence; for, although this contrast is most common in Plato's writings, it was employed by philosophers in general, especially after Plato's time - it is frequently to be met with in Philo. Besides this, as far as I can see, no other characteristic idea of Plato appears in the Fourth Gospel. The distinction in verse 18 is not to be connected with Stoic distinction of λόγος ἐν δὲ ἀθέτος and πρῶτον ἔστιν. It is improbable that the author of the Fourth Gospel, who was a Jew, would borrow this distinction from the Stoic logic and apply it to the divine Logos without any vestige of the Stoic terminology, when he had before him in the writings of Philo, a Jewish philosopher, a notion much more closely allied to his own conception; especially, as Philo in his system had already given the term λόγος a theological setting. It is not probable, therefore, that either Plato or the Stoics had any direct influence on the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel.

Note 8 of page 17. I introduced this passage on the authority of Zeller and drew from it an inference which

would have been legitimate had Zeller's
reference been correct. On attempt-
ing to verify the reference, I discovered
Zeller's mistake, (~~it would~~ probably a mis-
print); hence this explanation.