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The Concept of Person in Christian Theology: An Exposition and Defense of a Classical Boethian/Thomistic Definition of Person
Chapman, Darron Thomas
Chapman, Darron Thomas
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Abstract
This dissertation briefly examines some current conceptions of what it is to be a person and defends the classical definition of person as formulated by Boethius: persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia—a person is an individual substance (subsistence) of a rational nature. Special attention is paid to Thomas Aquinas’ exposition and defense of Boethius’ definition in the Summa Theologiae. This work begins by examining some current conceptions of personhood. It is argued that many contemporary conceptions of person assume a psychological model of person or a relational model of person. Such conception, however, creates problems for both Trinitarian and Christological doctrine and are not consistent with the important and carefully formulated creeds and statements of the past. The next chapter provides several criteria that any Christian definition of person should fulfill. To establish the traditional and credal understanding of person, the history of the concept of person is briefly outlined and special attention is given to the Christian contribution to the formulation of the concept of person. It is demonstrated that the person-nature distinction is carefully articulated and codified in the Trinitarian and Christological creeds and definitions. Furthermore, it is noted that those aspects of personhood such as mind and will have been understood to be located properly in nature and not person. Next, Boethius’ definition as found in Contra Eutychen et Nestorium is examined. Boethius begins with a careful examination of the concept of nature. After carefully defining nature, Boethius provides the following definition of person: persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Significant attention is given in the next chapter to Thomas Aquinas’ defense of Boethius’ definition. Before turning explicitly to Aquinas’ exposition and application of Boethius’ definition, space is given to outlining Aquinas’ views on important aspects of the divine nature that have implications for a proper understanding of person. Furthermore, Aquinas’ understanding of the distinctions between univocal, equivocal and analogical language are briefly explored. This is significant because Aquinas argues that all language that is applied to God is analogical, including the concept of person. The remainder of the chapter focuses on Aquinas’ explanation and defense of Boethius’ definition. The work concludes by arguing that Boethius’ definition meets the criteria proposed in the earlier part of the work and that his definition is superior to many current conceptions of person. Finally, it is concluded that Boethius’s definition is not only faithful to the creeds and the theological tradition but is also sufficiently robust and can account for important aspects we typically associate with personhood.
Description
Ph.D., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2026
Date
2026-05
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The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary